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The thesis focuses on the liberalization of services in the context of preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs). The first part develops an interpretation of Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) that regulates the conclusion of the so-called economic integration agreements 
(EIAs). It is argued that in the context of preferentialism, the GATS does not impose any market 
access discipline but aims at creating a non-discriminatory trading environment. Special attention is 
paid to Mode 4 and to the type of liberalization that it covers. 
 
In the second part of the thesis the main elements of Article V GATS (sectoral/modal coverage and 
non-discrimination) are employed to conduct an empirical analysis of EIAs. The chosen sample 
includes four of the European Union’s international trade agreements that feature significant 
services liberalization. The services schedules of these four agreements are reviewed and rated to 
find out their level of liberalization. In the context of the EU, its services commitments continue, to 
a large extent, to be determined individually by its Member States. As the thesis shows, significant 
variations still exist among different Member States both in horizontal and sector-specific 
commitments.  
 
The thesis connects the EU’s internal situation to the wider issue of how deep EIAs should be in 
order to escape claims of non-compliance. It asks the question of how the exact coverage and level 
of non-discrimination should be assessed in a situation where commitments vary across different 
states or regions of the same contracting party. No clear answer can be provided but the thesis 
proposes that in order to be in line with its international obligations, the EU, as well as any WTO 
Member with internally divided regulatory powers in services, should ensure that when signing 
EIAs, the commitments of all Member States (or, in the case of other WTO Members, all 
states/regions/other entities with regulatory powers in services) reach the GATS threshold of 











I wholeheartedly thank the European University Institute and the Academy of Finland for making it 
possible for me to pursue doctoral studies in the field of international trade law. I also thank Judge 
Allan Rosas from the Court of Justice of the European Union for offering me the chance to work in 
his cabinet for a year during my PhD. My warmest thanks also to the Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs for welcoming me as a visiting researcher during a year of my research. 
Finally, my sincere thanks to my jury and especially to my supervisor, Professor Petros C. 
Mavroidis, who opened my eyes to the possibilities of approaching legal research from less 
traditional angles. 
 
A big thank you also to my dearest and closest friends all around the world – you know who you 
are. I would not have done this, or anything really, without your support. 
 
That is even more so with my parents. I have relied, and I keep relying, on your support, love and 
wisdom. Thank you for teaching me the value of culture and education, and most importantly – the 
value of a good sense of humour. This thesis is dedicated to you. 
 



















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I.	 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1	
1.	 WTO, EU and international trade agreements on services ....................................................... 1	
2.	 The research questions ............................................................................................................ 11	
3.	 The structure of the thesis ....................................................................................................... 16	
II.	 PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE WTO ............................................... 18	
1.	 The historical background of PTAs ........................................................................................ 18	
2.	 The control of PTAs under WTO law ..................................................................................... 21	
i.	 The multilateral review of PTAs ........................................................................................ 21	
ii.	 PTAs in GATT/WTO dispute settlement .......................................................................... 26	
3.	 The implications of proliferating preferential trade ................................................................ 31	
4.	 Preferentialism in services – are services special? ................................................................. 34	
i.	 Particularities of going preferential in services ................................................................. 34	
ii.	 The lack of market access discipline in Art. V GATS ....................................................... 38	
III.	SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RULES ON EIAs .................................................... 42	
1.	 The background of Art. V GATS ........................................................................................... 42	
2.	 The legal requirements for economic integration agreements (EIAs) .................................... 45	
i.	 The main ingredients of Art. V .......................................................................................... 45	
ii.	 Substantial sectoral coverage (Art. V:1(a)) ....................................................................... 48	
iii.				Absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination (Art. V:1b) ............................. 52	
iv.				Wider process of economic integration (Art. V:2) ............................................................. 58	
v.	 Special and differential treatment (Art. V:3) ..................................................................... 60	
vi.					The external requirement (Art. V:4) .................................................................................. 60	
vii.				Rules of origin (Art. V:6) .................................................................................................. 61	
3.	 The elimination of discrimination in EIAs ............................................................................. 62	
i.	 The key obligation: non-discrimination ............................................................................. 62	
ii.	 Discrimination analysis in the EIA context ....................................................................... 63	
iii.				An analysis of discriminatory measures in specific commitments .................................... 67	
4.	 Regional subdivision and EIA commitments ......................................................................... 71	
5.	 Conclusions on the interpretation of Art. V ............................................................................ 76	
i.	 The main challenges .......................................................................................................... 76	





IV.	THE SPECIFIC CASE OF SERVICE MOBILITY (MODE 4) ........................................... 80	
1.	 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 80	
2.	 What is Mode 4? ..................................................................................................................... 84	
i.	 Historical and economic background ................................................................................. 84	
ii.	 Definition under the GATS ................................................................................................ 87	
iii.					Mode 4 as a trade instrument ............................................................................................ 92	
iv.					The issue of MFN .............................................................................................................. 95	
3.	 Employment market access as a defining criterion ................................................................. 98	
i.	 The categories of persons covered by Mode 4 ................................................................... 98	
ii.	 Regulation of service contracts in the national sphere ..................................................... 101	
4.	 Mode 4 in WTO Members’ commitments ............................................................................ 104	
i.	 Method of the study ......................................................................................................... 104	
ii.	 Results of the study .......................................................................................................... 106	
5.	 Conclusions on Mode 4 ........................................................................................................ 110	
V.	 ANALYSIS OF THE EU’S ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS ................. 113	
V.1 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................. 113	
1.	 Earlier empirical research on EIAs ....................................................................................... 113	
2.	 Detailed explanation of the chosen methods ........................................................................ 120	
i.	 Overview of the empirical part and the choice of agreements ......................................... 120	
ii.	 The methods of the empirical study ................................................................................. 122	
iii.					The scoring of sector-specific commitments .................................................................. 126	
iv.					The treatment of horizontal limitations ........................................................................... 135	
v.							Issues relating to a wider process of economic integration or trade liberalization ......... 136	
vi.						Review of commitments on Mode 4 .............................................................................. 136	
V.2 EU’S TRADE POLICY AND SERVICES AGREEMENTS .............................................. 138	
1.	 The development of the EU’s competences in the field of trade .......................................... 138	
2.	 The (lack of) EU’s internal market of services – implications for external trade ................. 144	
3.	 Service mobility as part of the CCP ...................................................................................... 148	
V.3 THE RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ......................................................... 155	
1.	 An overview of the reviewed agreements ............................................................................. 155	
2.	 Detailed results of the review ............................................................................................... 157	
i.	 Common features of the reviewed EIAs .......................................................................... 158	





EU-CARIFORUM EPA 2008 ...................................................................................................... 166	
EU-SOUTH KOREA FTA 2010 ................................................................................................. 170	
EU-CENTRAL AMERICA AA 2012 ......................................................................................... 173	
EU-GEORGIA AA 2014 ............................................................................................................. 176	
VI.	EU’S EIAs THROUGH THE LENS OF WTO LAW ......................................................... 180	
1.	 Introduction to the discussion of the results ......................................................................... 180	
2.	 Discussion of the results ....................................................................................................... 182	
i.	 Issues of interpretation ..................................................................................................... 182	
ii.	 Sectoral coverage ............................................................................................................. 186	
iii.				The level of non-discrimination ....................................................................................... 188	
iv.					Wider process of economic integration ........................................................................... 191	
3.	 The scope and depth of the EU’s Mode 4 commitments ...................................................... 193	
i.	 Mode 4 commitments in the EU’s EIAs .......................................................................... 193	
ii.	 The EU’s approach to the issue of employment market access ....................................... 197	
VII.	 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 203	
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................................... 207	
TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS ........................................ 207	














1. WTO, EU and international trade agreements on services 
 
The purpose of the thesis is twofold. Firstly, it examines the rules of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) on economic integration agreements (EIAs) in the field of services.1 Secondly, it presents 
the results of an empirical analysis of international trade agreements concluded by the European 
Union (EU) and including liberalization of trade in services.2 Drawing on the interpretation of the 
relevant WTO rules, the thesis gives an evaluation of the level of liberalization reached by the EU 
in these agreements. 
 
The thesis contributes to the growing amount of research on preferential trade agreements (PTAs). 
Such research has become topical with the vast increase in the numbers of PTAs globally. Whereas 
earlier research used to be focused on PTAs in the field of goods, there is now a significant number 
of trade lawyers, social scientists and economists working on preferentialism in the field of services 
too. At the moment, almost all new PTAs, especially among developed countries, include 
provisions on the liberalization of services. Moreover, a subset of WTO Members (including the 
EU) is currently negotiating on a so-called plurilateral initiative to liberalize services through a new 
international agreement – the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA).3 Considering that tariffs on 
goods, especially preferential ones, are already relatively low, many countries have turned their 
attention to services. This is a logical development also in the light of new technologies that enable 
services to become more globally tradable. It is also widely understood that services play a key role 
in infrastructure as well as global supply chains. Thus, the dismantling of barriers in services trade 
often leads to productivity gains also in other sectors of the economy. 
                                                
1 EIAs are preferential trade agreements (PTAs) focusing on the liberalization of services. The term EIA is employed in 
Art. V of the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
2 ‘Empirical’ in the present thesis refers to the nature of our method which is to go through the EU’s services schedules 
in four chosen EIAs. Even though it concerns interpretation of legal text and thus corresponds to the traditional method 
of conducting legal research, we refer to our analysis as empirical in order to distinguish it from the interpretation of the 
proper texts of the agreements. Instead of engaging in an extensive interpretation of the EU’s schedules in accordance 
with the customary rules of interpretation, we give numerical values to the EU’s commitments based on placing the 
commitments in simple categories. Our choice of vocabulary is therefore meant to take some distance to a traditional 
legal analysis. However, ‘empirical’ in this thesis does not mean information gained by experience, observation or 
experiment – even though experience and repeated observations are definitely useful to understand the complex nature 
of services schedules and the way in which services commitments are formulated. The scheduled services commitments 
are part of the overall agreement but each party provides its own commitments. They are typically vaguer and more 
practically oriented than the actual chapters of the agreement. That makes the interpretation of services schedules 
somewhat special and, arguably, especially challenging. 
3 For information on the negotiations, see, for example, the webpages of the European Commission and the United 
States Trade Representative: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/tisa/ and https://ustr.gov/TiSA (accessed on 





The thesis aims at presenting an original theory on preferentialism in services, taking into account 
the law as well as the special characteristics of services trade as compared to trade in goods. The 
starting point of the theoretical analysis is Art. V of the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS)4. Art. V lays down the discipline for economic integration agreements (EIAs), 
which are PTAs including liberalization of trade in services.5 In principle, all EIAs concluded by 
WTO Members6  with each other or non-Members should abide by its provisions. In practice, 
however, compliance with the Art. V rules is questionable to the least.  There are numerous reasons 
behind the lack of respect for the legal discipline, but they can, in essence, be summarized to two: 
the rules are vague and they have proved hard to enforce. 
 
So far, the legal content of Art. V GATS has attracted relatively little attention. Compared to the 
existing literature on Art. XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)7, research 
on Art. V is modest in amount. Preferentialism in the field of goods has been the object of 
economic and policy-oriented research already for decades.  However, notwithstanding the large 
interest, the exact conditions that Art. XXIV GATT sets for free-trade agreements (FTAs) and 
customs unions (CUs) also remain unclear due to the open-endedness in the wording of the 
conditions. No significant clarification has been attained due to the extremely low number of PTA-
related disputes brought under the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedure. The Members lack 
enthusiasm in enforcing Art. XXIV through multilateral control of PTAs. In practice, the legal 
disciplines of both Art. XXIV GATT and Art. V GATS have given up to the highly political nature 
of preferential trade. 
 
The thesis focuses on the rules of Art. V GATS. They are arguably even more vague than those of 
Art. XXIV GATT, which is part of a much older agreement. The essence of Art. V is that it allows 
                                                
4  General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1B, The legal texts: the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 284 
(1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) (hereinafter GATS). 
5 In the following, the acronym PTA is used when referred to preferential trade agreements in general sense. Such 
agreements may include liberalization of goods, services or both.  Several commentators, as well as the WTO 
Secretariat, prefer to use the term Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). The term PTA is here considered more 
appropriate since the most essential feature of such agreements is their preferentiality in the relations of the 
participating countries. Moreover, many of todays PTAs are not limited to any specific region. See Bhagwati 2008, XI. 
When referring especially to the service part of a specific PTA or specific PTAs, the thesis refers to EIA(s). This 
clarifies that the purpose is to refer solely to the service elements of the agreement(s). 
6 Hereinafter referred to only as Members. 
7 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, The legal texts: the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1999), 




a limited derogation from the corner stone of WTO law, the most-favoured nation principle.8 The 
main requirements for GATS-consistent EIAs are that, firstly, they have substantial sectoral 
coverage and, secondly, that they provide for the absence or elimination of substantially all 
discrimination in the sectors covered by the agreement.9 In addition, the so-called internal and 
external trade requirements should be fulfilled. According to these requirements, an EIA should, on 
the one hand, be designed to facilitate trade between the parties to the agreement (the internal 
requirement) and, on the other hand, not raise the overall level of barriers to trade in services with 
regard to any Member outside the agreement (the external requirement). So far, we have no clear 
understanding of any of these requirements due to the open-ended nature of definitions such as 
‘substantial’, and because of methodological difficulties in calculating the effects of barriers to 
services trade. At least so far, Members have been reluctant to challenge each other’s PTAs and the 
GATT/WTO dispute settlement has so far not given much guidance on the relevant rules. 
 
In the absence of effective control over PTAs, it is up to the Members party to such agreements to 
make sure that they are complying with their obligations towards other Members. However, due to 
the ambiguous nature of Art. V, it unclear what is the degree of integration that Members should 
follow. Thus, Members inevitably face a challenge in structuring their EIAs in a WTO-consistent 
fashion. Due to non-enforcement, they also lack sufficient incentive to do so. Because of the 
uncertainty surrounding the WTO rules on PTAs, the WTO-consistency of PTAs already in force is 
naturally also covered by uncertainty.10  
 
Economists and lawyers have already for long worried about the systemic consequence of PTAs to 
the multilateral trading system. So far, the debate on whether PTAs should be seen as building 
blocks or stumbling blocks to multilateralism has been mostly confined to the liberalization of trade 
in goods.11 One of the main observations of the thesis is that due to inherent differences between 
trade in goods and services, preferentialism in services is fundamentally different from 
preferentialism in goods. Another important observation is that preferentialism in services is 
potentially less dangerous than in the field of goods but it should still be carefully analyzed and to 
at least some extent controlled as to prevent increase in the forms of integration that have most 
                                                
8 In case a PTA regulates trade in goods in addition to trade in services, its WTO-consistency is determined also under 
Art. XXIV GATT. 
9 This is to be done through elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or  prohibition of new or more 
discriminatory measures, “either at the entry into force of the agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time-frame, 
except for measures permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIV and XIV bis”. Discrimination is specified to be understood 
“in the sense of” Art. XVII GATS (national treatment). 
10 Mitchell and Lockhart 2009, 113. 




harmful discriminatory effects on outsiders and, in many cases, to those inside the agreement as 
well. 
 
Whereas in goods trade, the central element of a PTA is a preferential tariff reduction vis-à-vis a 
WTO Member’s multilateral tariff binding, in EIAs the central element is the heightened 
elimination of discrimination towards one’s preferential partner. The difference is reflected in the 
legal disciplines. Unlike Art. XXIV GATT that focuses on elimination of tariffs and thus on 
enhanced market access for goods of preferential origin, Art. V GATS does not include any market 
access (“MA”) discipline but is focused on the elimination of discrimination between the parties to 
the agreement. We argue that the difference stems from the basic features of services trade. 
Whereas altering the conditions for MA through tariffs is easily done with regard to goods, in the 
field of services the application of different sets of MA conditions to different partners is often 
unpractical and in some cases close to impossible. Instead of focusing on mostly quantitative MA 
limitations, Art. V requires extensive elimination of discrimination. It is proposed in this thesis that 
the emphasis on non-discrimination alleviates concern over growing preferentialism in services. 
Unlike the elimination of tariffs that takes place in goods PTAs, the elimination of discrimination 
through EIAs is more likely to benefit outsiders as well and thus makes EIAs less susceptible of 
creating trade diversion. This effect is coupled with the generous rules of origin that are required 
from EIAs by Art. V. Such rules are often implemented also in practice.12 
 
As all PTAs, EIAs are capable of creating negative effects especially for outsiders. Art. V aims at 
reducing such effects but it suffers from the same problem as Art. XXIV. The problem is the 
general ambiguity in the rules. So far there is no general understanding of the level and type of 
liberalization EIAs must adopt in order to satisfy the Art. V requirements.13  Neither the WTO’s 
dispute settlement mechanism nor the Members themselves have been able to provide guidance on 
the issue. The WTO’s Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (the CRTA), the official review 
body of all PTAs, is now mainly an enforcer of transparency.14 At the same time, however, there 
                                                
12 As Miroudat et al. (2010) note, liberal rules of origin for service suppliers play an important role in minimizing the 
distortions introduced by EIAs as companies from third-countries can benefit from the preferential treatment of EIAs 
through commercial presence in the territory of the parties. See Miroudot, Sauvage, and Sudreau 2010, 27. 
13 The same problem applies to the interpretation of Art. XXIV of the GATT. It is, however, claimed that the GATS 
rules on PTAs are even more open-ended than those of Art. XXIV GATT. 
14 On 14 December 2006, the General Council established on a provisional basis a new transparency mechanism for all 
PTAs. The transparency mechanism provides for early announcement of any PTA and notification to the WTO. 
Members will consider the notified PTAs on the basis of a factual presentation by the WTO Secretariat. In contrast to 
the previous review procedure, there is, however, no longer review of the consistency (from a legal perspective) of the 




seems to be a general agreement on the urgent need to clarify what is required from PTAs. Without 
such clarification, PTAs continue to be undisciplined and MFN will be reduced to “LFN”.15  
 
The thesis consists of two parts. The first part presents and develops WTO law regarding 
preferentialism in services. It starts by exploring the historic background of regional and 
preferential trade agreements and the reasons for their significant increase especially during the last 
two decades. It then provides a substantive analysis and interpretation of Art. V GATS that includes 
the detailed rules on services PTAs. The aim of the first part is to provide a theoretical framework 
for a legal analysis of individual services agreements. The thesis focuses on the so-called internal 
requirement for EIAs included in the first paragraph of Art. V, as well as on the possibility to give 
consideration to the relationship of the agreement to a wider process of economic integration or 
trade liberalization among the countries concerned (paragraph 2 of Art. V). On the contrary, the 
external requirement of Art. V:4, which concerns the requirement of not to raise the overall level of 
barriers in respect of any Member outside the agreement, is not explored to the same length. That is 
because the thesis aims at providing a framework for analyzing the internal liberalization levels of 
EIAs. The possible tools for assessing the fulfillment of the external requirement differ from the 
analysis of EIAs under the internal requirement and the provisions of Art. V:2. Such tools, which 
largely remain to be developed, would be challenging to integrate in a purely textual analysis of 
EIAs. 
 
The first part of the thesis is thus concentrated on exploring the WTO rules on EIAs, mainly 
through Art. V GATS. One of the crucial elements of Art. V is that it demands the inclusion of all 
modes of supply.16 The requirement is problematic as it is not entirely clear what is the exact scope 
of each mode.17 Much confusion relates especially to Mode 4 which concerns the cross-border 
movement of natural persons supplying services. Understanding the coverage of each mode is 
                                                
15 Mavroidis 2005, 246. See Bhagwati who refers to LFN, “least favoured nation”, as a demonstration of the increasing 
proportion of non-MFN trade in the overall volume of world trade: Bhagwati 2008, 14. 
16 The GATS differentiates between four modes of supply: 1) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any 
other Member (cross-border trade); 2) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member 
(consumption abroad); 3) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any 
other Member (commercial presence, or investment) and 4) by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of 
natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member (Art. I:2(d) GATS). 
17 There is very limited case law on the GATS in general and hardly any concerning the definition of the modes. 
Moreover, in one of the central GATS cases, Mexico-Telecoms, the Panel might have got it wrong. Neven and 
Mavroidis argue that the Panel misinterpreted the service provided by the U.S. operators to their subscribers to be in the 
scope of Mode 1. The case did concern a Mode 1 type of supply but in reality the supplier was the Mexican telephone 
operator which terminated the calls originating in the U.S. in Mexico (and not the U.S. operator, as considered by the 
panel). See Neven and Mavroidis (2006) and the panel report in Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications 





important in order to conclude how well EIAs correspond to the requirements of Art. V. Extensive 
inquiries into the nature of all four modes would make too vast a project for the purposes of the 
present thesis. We have, therefore, decided to focus on Mode 4. It is arguably the most disputed of 
the four modes and it remains the least liberalized among them. Chapter IV is thus dedicated to a 
substantial analysis of the coverage of Mode 4. 
  
The second part of the thesis looks into practice. It provides an analysis of four EIAs concluded by 
the EU. The analysis is built on a methodology that is based on the theoretical findings of the first 
part of the thesis. As a result, the thesis provides an evaluation of the EU’s services commitments in 
light of the GATS-discipline on EIAs. The method consists of a textual analysis of the EU’s EIAs, 
including both the text of the agreement and the EU’s services commitments. However, the focus is 
on the commitments, especially on sector-specific commitments. 
 
Only the EU side’s commitments are analyzed: the purpose is to find out the approximate level of 
liberalization reached by the EU, as well as to assess how the EU’s method of liberalization 
corresponds to the Art. V criteria. Thus, no conclusions can be drawn on the agreements in their 
entirety. Since the EU has concluded EIAs with very different types of countries from several 
regions, the agreements are useful material for an analysis under the various elements of Art. V. Yet 
considering that all EU Member States are highly developed countries and advanced economies, the 
flexibility that Art. V GATS provides for developing countries does not apply to the EU side. 
Whereas the overall purpose of the agreement can be taken into account in the analysis under Art. 
V, it is argued that the EU side’s level of liberalization should always correspond to the strict 
requirement of ‘substantiality’ in terms of sectoral coverage and elimination of discrimination. 
 
In the interpretation of the results in light of the WTO rules, particularly Art. V GATS, specific 
attention is paid to the EU’s commitments under Mode 4. We assess how the EU understands Mode 
4 and to what extent the EU’s position matches our understanding of Mode 4, explained in Chapter 
IV. As with the other modes, we also try to evaluate how the liberalization level in the EU’s Mode 4 
commitments corresponds to the criteria of Art. V. 
 
The methodological approach is adapted to take into account the special circumstances of services 
trade liberalization by the EU towards third countries, especially the fact that regulation of services, 
unlike goods, is not uniform throughout the Union. However, it is proposed that such special 




with constitutionally divided powers in the regulation of service activities.18 Similar circumstances 
are likely to rise also with regard to any other existing or future free trade area that would start 
concluding services agreements independently in its own name, similarly to the EU.19 
 
The challenges that the EU as a multi-state actor faces in concluding services trade agreements are 
often similar to countries that have a federal structure. Trade liberalization by the EU reflects the 
combination of supranational and national jurisdiction over trade negotiation areas. Within the field 
of services, as in goods, the competence to conclude agreements with third parties is within the 
powers of the Union.20 However, due to the lack of internal harmonization of services regulations 
within the EU, the EU Member States keep scheduling their own nationally based restrictions to the 
common EU services schedule in PTAs. In this sense, there are similarities to countries with de-
centralized regulation of services. In the case of many federal states, however, such non-central 
measures are not explained in detail in the country’s services schedule. A prominent example of a 
federal state with regional powers in the field of services is the United States. The United States 
(“U.S.”) has recently begun including an illustrative list of non-conforming measures (“NCMs”) in 
the field of services for state level restrictions. However, the NCMs illustrated at the state and local 
                                                
18 ‘Regulation’ in this thesis is understood as a broad, general political and legal concept that includes all governmental 
policies and measures that are aimed at influencing, controlling and guiding all private activities with impacts on others. 
See Krajewski 2003, 4. Similarly to Krajewski, we also refer to Reagan who defines regulation as “a process or activity 
in which government requires or proscribes certain activities or behaviour on the part of individuals and institutions, 
mostly private, but sometimes public”. See Reagan 1987, 15. Regulation can take place on all levels of a state, as well 
as on supranational and international level. 
19  So far, to our knowledge, the EU is the only free trade/common market area that is clearly concluding trade 
agreements in its own name in addition to its member states (and thus binding itself legally too). It is also the only 
organization that is a Member of the WTO in its own right, in addition to its member states. This might, however, 
change, as more regions are engaging in deeper integration. The EU, for its own part, is interested in agreements with 
other free-trade areas or common markets. Negotiations for an Association Agreement are on-going with Mercosur. 
Mercosur appears as the contracting party or negotiating party to several trade agreements but it is the individual 
member states rather than Mercosur that are the formal contracting parties to those agreements. The EU also wishes one 
day to integrate its separate deals/negotiations with certain Southeast Asian countries and conclude a region-to-region 
trade agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). See European Commission’s memo “The 
EU’s bilateral trade and investment agreements – where are we” of December 3, 2013, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/november/tradoc_150129.pdf, accessed 17 December 2015. Whether any 
future agreement would bind the ASEAN as an organization naturally depends on the level of integration and legal 
structure that ASEAN countries are willing to adopt for the organization. According to its Charter, ASEAN has been 
accorded legal personality as well as an explicit international treaty-making power. In most cases, however, all member 
states of the ASEAN are listed as parties to the agreement. See Cremona et al. 2015, 84-87. 
20 Originally, in Opinion 1/94, the Court of Justice of the European Union had concluded that only cross-border trade 
(Mode 1) fell within the Union’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP) since it was ‘not unlike trade in goods’ and 
involved no movement of persons. See Opinion 1/94, Opinion of the Court of 15 November 1994 - Competence of the 
Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual property [1994] 
ECR I-05267. The Amsterdam Treaty and the Treaty of Nice extended the Union’s competences in the field of external 
trade. However, prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s exclusive competence did not apply in a number of services 
sectors. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, Art. 3 and Art. 207 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provide that trade in services, as well as commercial aspects of intellectual 





level are provided for transparency purposes only and are not bound by the services provisions of 
these PTAs.21 In its GATS schedule, the U.S. has, however, specified also state-level measures. Art. 
I of the GATS specifies “measures by Members” meaning measures taken by central, regional or 
local governments and authorities alike. The exclusion of a Member’s regional or local limitations 
from its schedule would thus go against the GATS.  
 
This thesis asks how such sub-federal limitations to cross-border services trade should be taken into 
account when analyzing the GATS Art. V criteria for substantiality. In the present work the focus is 
solely on the EU and on the question whether the EU’s and its Member States’ EIA commitments 
reach the Art. V threshold of substantiality as regards their sectoral coverage and the level of non-
discrimination. A similar research question could, however, be applied also to such countries that 
have a federal structure or which otherwise regulate services on sub-central levels. The 
methodology would in most cases need to be adapted since, as in the case of the U.S., most 
countries do not specify sub-central restrictions to services trade in the way that individual EU 
Member States do. 
 
In the WTO the EU has been one of the most active proponents of service trade liberalization. This 
is logical considering that the EU is the world’s biggest exporter of commercial services.22 During 
the past decade the EU has become active in liberalizing services trade also through PTAs with 
third countries. Especially in the most recent, so-called deep and comprehensive free trade 
agreements (FTAs), new market opening in services is one of the main goals of the negotiations.23 
Detailed commitments on the liberalization of services can also be found in certain other types of 
                                                
21 See p. 12 of KORUS, Annex I, the schedule of the United States and Appendix I-A to the same schedule. Page 12 
includes the following statement: "For purposes of transparency, Appendix I-A sets out an illustrative, non-binding list 
of non-conforming measures maintained at the regional level of government.” 
22 World Trade Report 2015, p. 25, available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/wtr15-1_e.pdf (accessed 
30 November 2015). If one were to take into account the share of individual countries, the biggest exporter of 
commercial services would be the United States. In the EU, the single biggest exporters are United Kingdom, Germany 
and France. See Annex 1 for a list of all PTAs, including EIAs, notified by the EU to the WTO. 
23 The first such “deep and comprehensive” FTAs aimed at more market opportunities are the EU-South Korea Free 
Trade Agreement of 2011 and the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement of 2013. The EU-Singapore agreement was 
initialed in September 2013. It was not yet officially published and ratified during the writing of the thesis and it is 
therefore not included in the empirical analysis. In November 2013 the EU initialed deep trade agreements also as part 
of Association Agreements with Moldova and Georgia (the agreement initialed with Armenia is no longer pursued as in 
September 2013 Armenia announced to join a customs union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan). A deep and 
comprehensive trade agreement was signed with Ukraine in June 2014 (the political chapters of the agreement were 
signed already in March 2014). Deep trade agreements remain in the focus of the EU’s trade agenda: In October 2013 
the EU and Canada reached a political agreement on the key elements of a trade agreement, labeled as Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). In June 2013 the EU opened negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership with the U.S. (TTIP). Other negotiation partners include Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, 




agreements concluded by the EU with third countries. These agreements include two association 
agreements, one economic partnership agreement and one agreement simply referred to as “trade 
agreement”. 24  The empirical analysis conducted for the purposes of the thesis covers four 
agreements belonging to three different groups of agreements (AA, FTA and EPA). The results 
partly reflect differences in these three types of agreements. 25  However, overall, and maybe 
surprisingly, the differences are revealed to be relatively modest. 
 
Earlier research on the level of liberalization of EIAs has demonstrated that the services 
commitments in the EU’s EIAs go further than the EU’s multilateral commitments under the GATS 
and the EU’s latest GATS offer of 2005.26 Earlier studies have also studied the various policy areas 
covered by EIAs.27 So far, there is, however, only limited empirical research that would consider 
specific EIAs in light of the criteria of Art. V GATS.28 Most studies focus only on certain modes of 
delivery, most often on Modes 1 and 3. Their point of departure is not Art. V but rather the level of 
liberalization set by the chosen Members GATS commitments. Most studies also do not 
differentiate between market access (“MA”) and national treatment (“NT”) limitations but group 
them together. In such an analysis, every improvement or deterioration of a commitment under 
either field leads to a higher or lower value in the index.29 This is in contrast to the present study 
                                                
24 Association Agreements (AAs) are international agreements that the EU has concluded with third countries with the 
aim of setting up an all-embracing framework to conduct bilateral relations. These agreements normally provide for the 
progressive liberalization of trade and, in certain cases, they prepare for future membership of the European Union. 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are trade and development agreements negotiated between the EU 
and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Their aim is to contribute, through trade and investment, to sustainable 
development and poverty reduction. All PTAs notified by the EU to the WTO are listed in Annex 1. For the list of 
agreements included in the empirical study see Annex 2. 
25 The methodology is explained in detail in Chapter V. The results are given in section V.3 and in Annex 4. 
26 See; Roy, Marchetti, and Lim (2007), Marchetti and Roy (2008) and Roy (2011). The dataset in Roy et al. (2007) and 
Marchetti and Roy (2008) covers 37 Members in 40 PTAs, and the extended dataset in Roy 2011 covers 53 Members in 
67 Agreements. The studies focus on Mode 1 and Mode 3. The dataset has been made available on the WTO website: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/dataset_e/dataset_e.htm. Roy et al. also analyze to what extent EIA 
commitments go beyond services offers in the Doha Development Agenda. 
27 Horn, Mavroidis, and Sapir 2010. 
28 Fink and Molinuevo (2008) analyze the liberalization content of 25 East Asian EIASs and their compliance with 
WTO rules on regional integration. Their point of departure is, however, different than in this study as they define 
trade-restrictive measures as all measures that are inconsistent with GATS-style market access and national treatment 
disciplines. They look at all the four modes of supply but merge market access and national treatment commitments. 
Moreover, their study is limited to East Asian agreements. The present study focuses only on sectoral coverage and the 
level of non-discrimination since it is argued here that Art. V does not impose any discipline on market access. At least 
two studies have adopted an approach that makes a separate comparison of MA and NT commitments possible. Wang 
(2012) takes China’s eight EIAs as test cases for interpreting GATS Art. V in light of their sectoral coverage and level 
of non-discrimination. However, he does not engage in a detailed empirical analysis of China’s EIAs in this respect. 
Miroudot, Sauvage, and Sudreau (2010) follows Hoekman (1995), Roy et al. (2007), Marchetti and Roy (2008) and 
Fink and Molinuevo (2008) but go further by providing the information for each signatory of the EIA, by sub-sector and 
by mode of supply, for both market access and national treatment commitments. Additionally, they break down partial 
commitments into nine categories accounting for different types of trade restrictive measures. A more detailed overview 
of previous empirical studies in included in Chapter V.1 on methodology. 




that indexes limitations to NT only. Since Art. V GATS requires the elimination of existing 
discriminatory measures and/or prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures, any 
commitment falling short of full NT (whether no commitment at all or a partial commitment) brings 
in this study the value for that specific commitment to zero. Naturally, it can be argued that partial 
commitments are better than nothing but since the thesis applies the Art. V criteria, arguably only 
commitments providing for full non-discrimination should pass the test of compliance with the 
GATS discipline on EIAs. 
 
Even if the present method is less sophisticated than the methods based on Hoekman (1995), our 
approach makes it relatively easy and straightforward to compare EIAs to the Art. V criteria and 
also to each other.30 The methodology adopted here lacks the value judgment that is present in 
studies that index improvements in commitments by giving them values between 0 and 1. Our 
method follows the way that MA and NT limitations are scheduled under the GATS but it is 
compatible to analyze commitments also in so-called negative-list agreements modeled after the 
NAFTA.31 In the case of negative scheduling, the analysis is, however, more challenging to carry 
out as our approach is built on going systematically through the 155 sub-sectors of the WTO’s 
Services Sectoral Classification List.32 In an analysis of a negatively scheduled agreement, one 
needs to engage in the burdensome exercise of picking each discriminatory reservation and placing 
it in the correct place in the sectoral classification list. Our analysis includes one agreement (the 
EU-Georgia EIA) that has negatively scheduled commitments under Mode 3. Otherwise, our results 
                                                                                                                                                            
commitments. Hoekman covers all four modes of supply and distinguishes between market access and national 
treatment commitments. His study assessed GATS schedules only but can be used to analyze EIAs as well. In 
Hoekman’s index the content of GATS schedules emerging from the Uruguay Round is assessed by giving, for each 
sub-sector and mode of supply, a score of 1 for a full commitment (without limitations), 0.5 for partial commitments, 
and 0 for the absence of commitments. In Roy, Marchetti, and Lim (2007), the Hoekman index is adapted so as to allow 
the comparison of a Member's partial commitments in different PTAs. The index gives a higher score for each 
improvement in a Member's partial commitments: for each step, half the difference between the score for a full 
commitment (1) and the score of the partial commitment being improved is added. 
30  Naturally, the comparison is rougher than comparisons based on more sophisticated analyses of differences in 
commitments. For comparing the degree of preferentialism between different EIAs, the method applied by Miroudot, 
Sauvage, and Sudreau (2010) is especially useful. 
31 There are two principal methods to schedule services commitments: the so-called positive and negative scheduling, 
often referred to as “top-down” (negative) and “bottom-up” (positive) approach. In negative listing, a country covers all 
services except those listed, while in positive listing a country covers only listed services. The most famous example of 
a top-down agreement is the NAFTA, whereas the GATS is a positively-listed agreement.  The issue is taken up in 
more detail further in the thesis. 
32 We employ a sectoral classification list prepared by the WTO Secretariat. It is a comprehensive list of services 
sectors and sub-sectors and it is typically used by the Members to schedule their commitments under the GATS and 
often also in EIAs. It was compiled by the WTO in July 1991 and its purpose was to facilitate the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, ensuring cross-country comparability and consistency of the commitments undertaken. The 160 sub-
sectors are defined as aggregate of the more detailed categories contained in the United Nations provisional Central 
Product Classification (CPC). Services sectoral classification list, Note by the Secretariat, WTO document 
MTN.GNS/W/120, 10 July 1991. See also United Nations International Trade Statistics information on the Sectoral 




are based on analyzing positively scheduled commitments. 
 
To summarize, the empirical method used in the present thesis is designed in a way that allows an 
EIA’s direct comparison with the principal requirements of Art. V:1 GATS (substantial sectoral 
coverage and elimination of discrimination). The work does not neglect any of the so-called GATS 
“modes of delivery” but, in fact, presents a new possible way to approach Mode 4 and adapts the 
methodology to include this specific mode as well. In addition, the empirical study takes into 
account the special structure of the EU, which is a free trade area itself but does not have uniform 
service regulations across its territory. As will be shown, a common characteristic of the EU’s EIAs 
is the varying degree of asymmetry in the Member States’ services commitments. How well the EU 
does in respect of sectoral coverage and non-discrimination depends on how well it manages to 
bring its Member States’ commitments over the threshold of substantiality separately, and also as a 
whole.   
 
In the following, the central research questions are introduced more thoroughly.  
 
2. The research questions 
 
The thesis is composed of two parts: the first is an interpretation of Art. V GATS and the second is 
a study of the EU’s EIAs.  The two questions at the core of the thesis are the following: 
 
1) What conditions does Art. V GATS set for EIAs? 
2) How does the EU’s method of liberalization in its EIAs correspond to these conditions? 
 
The first question refers to the criteria set by the GATS for preferential liberalization in services. 
The second question asks where the EU’s trade agreements stand in respect of these criteria. 
 
The thesis claims that the interpretation of the WTO rules on PTAs cannot be formed in a vacuum 
but should be analyzed in interaction with existing agreements. This is especially the case with Art. 
V that is more open-ended than the corresponding provision under the GATT. The GATS discipline 
on EIAs arguably allows very distinct types of agreements and gives relevance to the overall 
objective of each agreement. Because of this flexibility, it is impossible to give any universal 
interpretation of Art. V. Instead, the different components of Art. V must be analyzed in the specific 





It is proposed that Art. V includes different elements, some of which are more demanding than 
others. The core of the provision is formed by the condition of substantiality that is expressed both 
in terms of sectoral coverage and non-discrimination. The level of coverage and non-discrimination 
are the elements that can be best used as key indicators in the examination of existing agreements. 
They are the elements with the clearest legal content even though they are qualified by the obscure 
requirement of ‘substantiality’.  
 
In addition, Art. V includes more open-ended elements that provide for flexibility. Such an element 
is especially the provision of Art. V:2 which gives significance to “a wider process of economic 
integration or trade liberalization among the countries concerned”. In addition, Art. V:3 provides 
for flexibility whenever developing countries are parties to the agreement.  
 
In the empirical part of the thesis, the key indicators of Art. V (coverage and non-discrimination) 
are used to analyze the EU’s trade agreements in the field of services. At the same time, the analysis 
picks out the ingredients of the EU’s agreements that point towards ‘a wider process of economic 
integration’. The results of the empirical case study are then used to estimate where the EU’s 
agreements stand in light of the criteria set down in Art. V. 
 
The empirical study consists of a detailed analysis of four EIAs concluded by the EU.33 The 
agreements chosen for the review comprise the EU’s trade agreements featuring specific GATS-
type commitments on services trade liberalization. The EU began including detailed services 
commitments in its trade agreements in the mid-2000s when, in accordance with a new global 
strategy, it started to enter into so-called deep and comprehensive trade agreements.34 So far, the 
EU has concluded eight agreements with a proper EIA element. The most recent concluded EIAs 
comprise three AAs with the EU’s so-called Eastern Neighbourhood countries: Moldova, Georgia 
and Ukraine (in 2014). The agreement with Georgia is included in the study and it demonstrates the 
current level of the EU’s commitments in its so-called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas 
(“DCFTA”). 35  Altogether, the study includes two AAs (Central America and Georgia), one 
                                                
33 See the details on the four agreements in Annex 2. 
34 ‘Global Europe, competing in the world’, the European Commission’s contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs 
Strategy, 2006, available online at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130376.pdf (accessed 1 
December 2015). 
35 The EU’s EIAs with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, however, differ from the other EIAs with regard to the parties’ 
commitments under Mode 3 (commercial presence). Instead of listing commitments under Mode 3 similarly to the other 




Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) (CARIFORUM), and one FTA (South Korea).  All four 
agreements include a GATS-type EIA-element.  
 
The EU has concluded also several other agreements with service trade-related components. 
Especially the so-called Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) include long-term service 
liberalization but they do not contain GATS-type specific commitments providing clear indications 
as to the extent of liberalization sector by sector. These agreements establish an FTA but they also 
aim at a closer integration with the Union by following the principles of services liberalization 
within the Union.36  Because of the lack of detailed services commitments, there are no SAAs in the 
study. Also the EU’s agreements with the countries of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA)37 have been left outside the study as their liberalization logic is different from the GATS 
and the EU’s other trade agreements. In principle, the trade components of such agreements should 
also respect the WTO disciplines on PTAs. Their detailed analysis would, however, require a 
somewhat different type of methodology. Therefore, we have not included any agreement without a 
clear GATS-type service schedule. Similarly, the EU’s FTA with Mexico has been left outside the 
empirical analysis, as the parties have not yet proceeded to full liberalization of services. So far, 
they have only agreed not to introduce new restrictions in the national legislation in the fields of 
services and investment.38 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
economic activities where reservations to national treatment or most favoured treatment apply to establishments and 
investors of the other party (the EU-Georgia EIA refers to “entrepreneurs” instead of “investors”). 
36  SAAs are primarily FTAs applicable to trade in goods with asymmetric timetables for liberalization alongside 
provisions for deeper political integration. They also include a degree of liberalization of services, with NT for the 
establishment of companies, subsidiaries and branches, provision for intra- corporate transferees and the possibility of 
future extension to the establishment of nationals of the parties for the purpose of self-employed activities and the 
provision of services on a temporary basis. But since SAAs are oriented towards preparation for possible future 
accession to the EU, their primary aim is deep integration with the EU. SAAs thus include provisions on all four EU’s 
single market "freedoms" (although they do not achieve them fully) and on harmonization of standards with the EU. 
See Cremona 2010b, 251. 
37 All four current members of EFTA participate in the EU’s single market: Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway through 
the Agreement on a European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland through a set of bilateral agreements. Cremona 
notes that of the agreements with Switzerland the only PTA in the strict sense requiring Art. XXIV GATT notification 
is the 1972 FTA on trade in industrial goods; no general agreement on services liberalization has been reached. 
However the EU and Switzerland have a wide framework of agreements designed to support economic integration. See 
Cremona 2010b, 254. 
38 The EU and Mexico have concluded an Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement in 
1997 which included trade provisions that were developed in a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement that entered into 
force in October 2000 for the part related to trade in goods and in 2001 for that related to trade in services. However, 
the parties have not proceeded in elimination of discrimination in the field of services as planned at the conclusion of 
the agreement. In financial services, the EU enjoys the same access as NAFTA countries. “NAFTA-equivalent” access 
has been granted to EU service suppliers also with regard to certain other sectors, including energy, telecommunications 
and tourism. See Condon 2009, 88. Due to lack of multilateral control over PTAs, it is unclear whether such restrictive 




In the discussion of the results of the empirical study, the thesis concentrates on three central issues. 
Before that, the same issues are first examined from a more theoretical point of view. These three 
issues at the center of the thesis are the following: 
 
1) WTO law on EIAs and especially the requirements for EIAs under Art. V of the GATS 
2) Mode 4 as a special case of services liberalization 
3) The multi-level liberalization of services in the EU’s trade agreements 
 
The first issue forms the framework for the main research question of the thesis: the criterion that 
Art. V sets for EIAs. In addition, two other relevant areas are analyzed in detail.  
 
Firstly, in the analysis of the legal conditions of Art. V, special attention is paid to a specific area of 
services trade liberalization: that relating to the movement of natural persons supplying services 
(the so-called “Mode 4”). The study of Mode 4 is relevant for understanding the type and extent of 
service supply that EIAs are supposed to cover. The presence of another Member’s service 
suppliers in the territory of another Member, Mode 4 in the GATS-parlance, is one of the four 
categories that the GATS uses to define trade in services. The exact scope of Mode 4, however, 
remains contested among the Members and academics alike. The definition of Mode 4 is, 
nevertheless, relevant for the interpretation of the Art. V conditions as Art. V explicitly calls for the 
elimination of discrimination with regards to all modes of supply. Nevertheless, in the light of the 
Members’ practice, the fundamental criterion of non-discrimination (in the sense of Art. XVII 
GATS), does not appear directly suitable for the liberalization of Mode 4. That is because foreign 
nationals are usually never treated as favorably as one’s own nationals. Even if the conditions for 
supplying the service were the same (which they most often are not due to various qualification and 
professional requirements), foreign nationals’ entry and stay in any given country is usually strictly 
restrained. Mode 4 is thus generally the least liberalized mode. From the point of view of 
preferentialism, however, Mode 4 is maybe the most feasible way of granting preferential access to 
one’s market. Whereas with regard to other modes, countries often do not adjust their regulatory 
environment depending on the origin of the service supplier, under Mode 4 this is a common 
practice.39 Different rules regarding entry, stay and qualifications are generally applied to nationals 
of different states. 
                                                
39 Hoekman and Mattoo note that reciprocity may be less powerful in services because policy reforms made at the 





In the thesis, the issue of Mode 4 is brought up both under the interpretation of Art. V and in the 
empirical analysis of the EU’s services PTAs. It is argued that from the GATS’ point of view, Mode 
4 should be considered a special form of mobility (“service mobility”) for the purpose of providing 
specific services and should thus exclude traditional labour migration. The thesis differentiates 
service mobility from labour mobility by arguing that Mode 4 does not require host states to allow 
any access to their national employment market. Naturally, host states are free to do so, but from 
the point of view of Art. V and its condition of non-discrimination, this is not required. By 
providing a clearer conceptualization of Mode 4, the thesis provides tools to analyze commitments 
under Mode 4 and reflect them in light of the Art. V criteria. This is especially enlightening in order 
to interpret the Mode 4 commitments of the EU, which has not harmonized rules relating to the 
entry and stay of third-country services suppliers. 
 
The third area of more detailed investigation is focused on how international trade in services is 
liberalized by the EU. The thesis suggests how the Art. V criteria should be applied to a multi-state 
actor such as the EU. There are several reasons justifying the choice of the EU as the object of 
analysis. Firstly, the EU is one of the most active WTO Members in concluding EIAs. Secondly, 
the EU has agreements with countries at very different stages of development, which is especially 
illustrative for the scrutiny of the EU’s agreements in light of the Art. V conditions. Thirdly, the 
EU’s services schedules follow the scheduling logic of the GATS and they are therefore a practical 
object of analysis under the GATS provisions for services trade liberalization. Fourthly, the EU’s 
agreements comprise the commitments of over 20 different countries, which makes it possible to 
analyze the commitments of all these countries at once.40 
 
When analyzing the EU’s trade agreements, the thesis pays attention to the nature of the EU as a 
free trade area itself. The EU has a highly integrated commercial policy, known as the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP). Under the CCP the Union enjoys exclusive competence to conclude 
trade agreements on behalf of all of its Member States. Notwithstanding this exclusive competence 
and centralized negotiation authority, the EU’s schedules of services commitments are not unified: 
all EU Member States prescribe their own services commitments and limitations to the common EU 
schedule. This is an interesting phenomenon that has implications outside the EU as well. Several 
                                                                                                                                                            
regulations often apply in a similar manner to all firms operating in the market, notwithstanding their origin (Hoekman 
and Mattoo 2013, 141). Mode 4 is different in this regard. 




Members have internally divided competences on the regulation of services. In case there are 
discrepancies between the depths of liberalization on different levels of government, the relevant 
question is how to determine the GATS-consistency of their EIAs. In case the extent of 
liberalization varies between regions (or member states, as in the case of the EU), the relevant 
question is how the coverage and degree of non-discrimination of an EIA by such a contracting 
party should be assessed. What is the salient unit in such an analysis? Should only state-level 
measures be analyzed or are regional measures as relevant? The thesis analysis this problem in the 
light of the EU example. For this purpose, the EU’s services PTAs are examined in the wider 
context of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP). 
 
The result of the thesis is, on the one hand, a better understanding of the criteria that the GATS sets 
for EIAs and, on the second hand, a clearer picture of the level of liberalization reached in the EU’s 
services trade agreements. The thesis also shows how the EU’s EIAs vary depending on the overall 
process of integration among the countries concerned.  
 
3. The structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is organized in two parts. Part 1 deals with the WTO law on PTAs and provides the 
theoretic frame of the thesis. It starts by explaining the historic background of preferentialism and 
all the relevant WTO rules and procedures relating to them (Chapter II). Chapter III focuses on 
EIAs: it develops an original interpretation of the legal criteria for EIAs under Art. V GATS. 
Chapter IV builds a theory around Mode 4 and suggests a clear way for its conceptualization. 
 
Part 2 of the thesis concentrates on the EU. It begins by a review of the legal issues in the EU’s 
trade policy in the field of services (Chapter V.1). The development of the EU’s competences in the 
field of services is analyzed in light of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU (“the 
Court”). The thesis explains what are the consequences of the unfinished nature of the EU’s internal 
services market on its external liberalization of services. Finally, the first part of Chapter V 
demonstrates what types of discrepancies arise from the under-developed internal services market 
by providing examples of the EU’s EIA schedules. 
 
The second part of Chapter V provides a detailed explanation of the methodology for the empirical 
study on the EU’s EIA commitments. The results of the empirical study are presented in the third 




included in the wider process of economic integration between the EU and its EIA partners. The 
results also shed light on how the EU’s EIAs correspond to the conceptualization of Mode 4 put 
forward in Chapter IV. 
 
Chapter VI discusses the results of the empirical study in light of the understanding of Art. V 
developed in Part 1 of the thesis. We also look into the conceptualization of Mode 4 in the EU’s 
EIAs, and analyze how the internal diversity in the EU’s services commitments is shown by our 
results. We do not give any final judgment as to the EU’s compliance with Art. V, but contemplate 






II. PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE WTO 
 
1. The historical background of PTAs 
 
Preferential trade is not a new phenomenon. Trade relations between selected countries have been 
secured through various preferential arrangements throughout modern history – from colonial 
preferences to bilateral commercial treaties and broader regional arrangements. The most-favoured 
nation (MFN) clause was regularly applied in bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and 
navigation in the 19th century. These agreements contributed to a network of interlinked 
agreements that preceded the formation of a proper multilateral system after World War II.41 
 
In the field of goods, PTAs were concluded in modest numbers until the 1990s. The inclusion of 
services in PTAs is a later phenomenon. According to the DESTA database42, the first agreement 
mentioning services trade liberalization as a goal is the Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community (Treaty of Rome, 1957), while the first agreement that actually includes commitments 
in services trade liberalization is the Yaoundé Convention of 1969 more than ten years later.43 Since 
the early 1990s, the number of EIAs has, however, grown very fast. Starting from 1994, some 180 
PTAs including rules on services trade have come into existence, compared with only 38 in the 
previous forty years. Of the cumulative total of all PTAs including services, over 40 % has come 
into existence since 2000.44 Overall the numbers of PTAs have greatly multiplied since the early 
1990s. The vast increase in the numbers of PTAs is often described as ‘proliferation’.45 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, services trade was included mostly in the so-called North-South and South-
South agreements, concluded between developed and developing countries (N-S), and developing 
countries (S-S) respectively. In the 1980s the first North-North agreements were concluded. The 
period of the GATS negotiations marked the beginning for a trend towards the conclusion of PTAs 
                                                
41 Cottier and Oesch 2011, 3. 
42 “Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) Database”, available at http://www.designoftradeagreements.org/ (accessed 
1 August 2016). 
43 The Yaoundé Convention was a treaty signed in the city of Yaoundé, Cameroon between the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the AASM (Associated African States and Madagascar) for the first time in 1963. The second 
convention was signed in 1969. The treaties governed relations between the EEC and the EEC Member States’ overseas 
countries and territories. See Sieber-Gasser 2016, 63. 
44 The agreements typically include rules on both services and investment. See Heydon and Woolcock 2009, 90. 
45 See Fiorentino, Verdeja, and Toqueboeuf 2007, 2.  Dür et. al have identified a total of 733 PTAs signed between 
1945 and 2009 (including concrete steps towards the preferential liberalization of trade in goods and/or services). At the 




with a service component. Their number is steadily growing.46 The most active participants to EIAs 
have been industrialized countries with strong service industries, especially the EU and the U.S., 
but since the 1990s developing countries have been rapidly catching up.47 
 
Preferential trade was disciplined for the first time in the original GATT agreement of 1947. Art. 
XXIV GATT set the rules for the formation of customs unions (CUs) and free-trade areas (FTAs). 
The rigid classification of regional integration into these two formations can be seen as the result of 
the historic context of the GATT. Two customs unions participated in the negotiation of the GATT: 
the Benelux and the Syrian-Lebanese customs union. The GATT negotiators where therefore 
presented with a fait accompli. FTAs, on the contrary, were included only in the last draft of the 
GATT; the seven drafts prepared before that included CUs only. According to Chase, the U.S. 
negotiators played a leading role in designing the FTA provision to accommodate a secret trade 
agreement that the U.S. was planning with Canada.48 
 
The text of Art. XXIV GATT has remained unchanged since then. In 1994, the provision was 
clarified with an Understanding agreed upon by the Members during the Uruguay Round.49 From 
the beginning, the contracting parties, and later the Members of the WTO, have been under an 
obligation to notify every PTA they conclude. During the GATT years, the examination of PTAs 
was conducted in working parties established individually for that purpose. In 1996 a new body, the 
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), was created to consider individual PTAs, the 
relationships between them and their systemic implications for the multilateral trading system. 
 
                                                
46 Sieber-Gasser (2016), 63-64. 
47 Ibid., 66. 
48 Chase 2006, 10-15. The U.S. had a significant role in the formulation of the FTA provision notwithstanding its 
commitment to multilateralism. According to Chase, the evidence shows that the U.S. position on preferential 
arrangements changed because the U.S. wanted to accommodate a possible FTA with Canada. In the end of 1947, 
Canada asked the U.S. for tariff cuts on its key exports but was not willing to enter into a CU with the U.S. The U.S 
then came up with the idea of free trade without a common tariff system. As the U.S. did not want to present the idea 
itself because of likely public relations problems, it planted the proposal with the Lebanese and Syrian representatives. 
In the process, the U.S. representatives had three goals. First, they wanted interim agreements to be accommodated. 
Second, they came up with the elimination of tariffs on “substantially all trade” – not “all trade” – so that protection for 
sensitive items could be retained. And third, they wanted to ensure that clauses banning tariff increases against third 
countries applied only at the time a FTA was formed, and did not operate indefinitely. Consequently, neither the 
Havana Charter nor the U.S.-Canada FTA became law. However, the rules on CUs and FTAs survived as part of the 
GATT and remain in force today. 
49 Understanding on the Interpretation of Art. XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Uruguay Round 




In addition to Art. XXIV GATT, another, limited, possibility for preferential arraignments in goods 
trade was created by the 1979 Enabling Clause.50 Adopted under the GATT, it enables developed 
Members to give differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries. This takes 
place under the so-called Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) through which developed 
countries offer non-reciprocal preferential treatment to products originating in developing countries. 
The Enabling Clause is also the legal basis for regional arrangements among developing countries. 
Moreover, it provides for the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP), under which a number 
of developing countries exchange trade concessions among themselves. According to Paragraph 4 
of the Enabling Clause, Members pursuing arrangements under it must notify the other Members 
and furnish them with all the information they deem appropriate. The provision also provides for 
consultations with a view to reaching solutions that are satisfactory to all Members. Notifications 
under the Enabling Clause are made to the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD). A debate 
is held at a CTD meeting but generally the CTD requires no in-depth examination by the CRTA. 
 
Besides Art. XXIV GATT, Art. V GATS is the other WTO provision that creates a legal basis for 
PTAs in the strict sense.51 The GATS rules concerning the notification and control of EIAs are less 
strict than those of the GATT. Art. V:7(a) GATS requires parties to an EIA to promptly notify such 
an agreement and any enlargement or any significant modification of the agreement to the Council 
for Trade in Services (CTS). In addition, Art. V:7(b) includes the obligation of periodic reporting 
with regard to EIAs that are implemented on the basis of a time-frame. The CTS may pass a 
notified agreement to the CRTA for examination. Unlike PTAs that are notified under Art. XXIV 
GATT, the examination of EIAs by the CRTA is optional. 
 
We will now turn into the issue of how PTAs are controlled in the WTO. There are two possible 
mechanisms: the multilateral review and dispute settlement. As we will explain, neither mechanism 
has proved successful in putting the GATT and GATS disciplines on PTAs into practice. 
 
  
                                                
50 Decision of 28 November 1979 on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries, GATT Document L/4903 (Enabling Clause). 
51 There is no separate “Enabling Clause” for services PTAs. However, Art. V.3 GATS creates a less rigid setting for 
EIAs involving developing countries. According to the provision, flexibility shall be provided for where developing 




2. The control of PTAs under WTO law 
 
i. The multilateral review of PTAs 
 
The multilateral track for the control of PTAs concerns the review of PTAs by the Members 
themselves. As no panel has ever pronounced on the GATT/WTO-consistency of any PTA, it can 
be considered that the main responsibility over the examination of PTAs belongs to the Members.52 
Examination was first carried out in individual working parties but since the establishment of the 
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) by a decision of the WTO’s General Council in 
February 1996, it has been the task of the CRTA. The original CRTA procedure is explained very 
briefly as the nature of the review mechanism has changed with the introduction of the 
Transparency Mechanism in 2006. 
 
The rules for the examination of PTAs are included in Art. XXIV GATT and Art. V GATS. Art. 
XXIV GATT gives Contracting Parties/Members wide powers to examine notified PTAs.  That is 
especially evident in Art. XXIV.7(b) that deals with interim agreements leading to PTAs:  
 
”If the CONTRACTING PARTIES find that such agreement is not likely to result in 
the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area - - the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES shall make recommendations to the parties to the agreement. The parties 
shall not maintain or put into force, as the case may be, such agreement if they are not 
prepared to modify it in accordance with these recommendations.”  
 
Mavroidis notes that the provisions give the impression of a multilateral review system designed as 
an institution akin to a modern merger authority: PTAs would not be consummated unless cleared 
through the process established.53 In reality, however, the Contracting Parties/Members have never 
lived up to their institutional promise of a genuine multilateral review. Prior to the establishment of 
the WTO, Working Party reports on PTAs notified under Art. XXIV GATT were usually adopted 
even though Members had divergent views on the end result. Consensus on consistency hardly 
existed: only on five occasions were the Contracting Parties able to agree that a PTA satisfied the 
                                                
52 Panels are not likely to do so either in the future. See Mavroidis (2006). 




requirements of Art. XXIV GATT.54  The Contracting Parties never reached a decision on a notified 
PTA’s inconsistency with the GATT.55 
 
The review mechanism under Art. V GATS is less rigid. According to Art. V:7(a), EIAs are to be 
notified to the Council for Trade in Services. The Council may then establish a working party to 
examine such an agreement or enlargement or modification of that agreement and to report to the 
Council on its consistency with Art. V (emphasis added). Under Art. V:7(b), Members that are 
parties to EIAs implemented on the basis of a time-frame shall report periodically to the Council on 
the implementation. The Council may establish a working party to examine such reports if it deems 
such a working party necessary. Under Art. V:7(c), the Council may, based on the reports of the 
working parties, make recommendations to the parties as it deems appropriate.  
 
Since the establishment of the CRTA, the Council has passed a number of EIAs to the CRTA for 
examination (typically examined together with the goods component of the agreement). But in 
contrast to PTAs notified under Article XXIV GATT, such examination of EIAs is optional, not 
mandatory. Moreover, unlike Art. XXIV.7(b) GATT, Art. V GATS does not preclude the 
enforcement of agreements that are in conflict with working party recommendations; it simply 
allows for recommendations to be made to the parties of the agreement. In practice, however, the 
difference has been inconsequential as no PTAs have been considerer inconsistent under neither 
procedure. 
 
The CRTA conducts its examination of based on information provided by the parties to the PTA. 
Other material includes written replies to written questions posed by other Members and 
discussions at CRTA meetings. Prior to 2006, the factual examination was followed by an 
examination report drawn by the WTO Secretariat. Once the report was accepted by the CRTA, it 
was to be submitted for adoption by the Members. The difficulty in reaching consensus over the 
consistence of PTAs with the GATT and GATS rules, however, led to a situation where no report 
was finalized since 1995.56 
 
                                                
54 Schott 1989 (at p. 25) mentions four decisions where the PTA was considered broadly consistent with the GATT. 
Since then, consensus has been reached only once: the report on the 1993 CU between the Czech Republic and the 
Slovak Republic states clearly that the PTA is fully compatible with the GATT rules. See Mavroidis 2011, 376. 
55 WTO 2000, 10 and Mavroidis (2006). See also Mitchell and Lockhart 2009, 112. 
56  The WTO website on the CRTA, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regcom_e.htm 




As a response to this deadlock, a new mechanism was adopted in 2006. The procedure to control 
the WTO-consistency of PTAs went through a drastic change with the General Council’s adoption 
of a decision concerning the Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements. 57  The 
Transparency Mechanism de facto replaced the existing multilateral review system of PTAs. The 
practical consequence of the resolution is that the consistency of PTAs responding to Art. XXIV 
GATT, Art. V GATS or the Enabling Clause is actually no longer checked multilaterally.58 The 
new mechanism is implemented by the CRTA with regard to PTAs falling under Art. XXIV GATT 
and Art. V GATS. The Committee on Trade and Development is responsible for the 
implementation with regard to agreements falling under paragraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause.   
 
Under the Transparency Mechanism the WTO Secretariat prepares a factual presentation of each 
notified PTA. The factual presentation is distributed to the Members at least eight weeks in advance 
of the meeting devoted to the consideration of the PTA.  The parties to the agreement must circulate 
answers to questions sent by other Members at least three working days before the corresponding 
meeting. In addition, there is a written record of the meeting devoted to the consideration of each 
notified agreement. The Members’ questions and the parties’ responses as well as a record of the 
discussion are available on a WTO database. The decision on the Transparency Mechanism also 
requires that at the end of the PTA's implementation period, the parties submit to the WTO a short 
written report on the realization of the liberalization commitments in the PTA as originally notified. 
However, there is no longer need to prepare a final report for adoption by the Members.59 
 
In fact, the introduction of the Transparency Mechanism has normalized a practice that is to ignore 
the Members’ treaty-based responsibilities to enforce the rules on PTAs. The enforcement of the 
rules has proved too hard to accomplish in a situation where, first, there is no general understanding 
of the exact contents of the substantive rules on PTAs, and, secondly, where there is not enough 
political willingness to tackle the issue. 
 
From a legal point of view, it is clear that partial trade deals are allowed for Members only if they 
meet the requirements of Art. XXIV GATT, Art. V GATS or the Enabling Clause.  Only such PTAs 
                                                
57 Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, General Council, Decision of 14 December 2006, WTO 
Document WT/L/671 of 18 December 2006. The transparency mechanism was negotiated in the Negotiating Group on 
Rules and is implemented on a provisional basis. The purpose is that Members replace it by a permanent mechanism to 
be adopted as part of the overall results of the Doha Round. 
58 Mavroidis 2011, 377. 
59 The Decision on the Transparency Mechanism and the WTO website on the Transparency Mechanism, available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/trans_mecha_e.htm (accessed 10 May 2016). The WTO database with 




that fall within one of these exceptions are valid under WTO law. Thus, any Member entering a 
PTA should ensure that the agreement complies with the conditions of the relevant WTO exception. 
Otherwise, the Member risks acting inconsistently with its WTO obligations.60 No one claims that 
the vast majority of the well over two hundred PTAs that have been notified since the establishment 
of the WTO are ‘customs unions’. Since most of the agreements involve liberalization of trade in 
goods and are not concluded solely for development purposes, they must be “free-trade areas” 
within the meaning of Article XXIV.8(b) of the GATT. However, no one knows what a free trade 
area really is – or really wants to know. The GATT/WTO trading system has thrived for more than 
half a century without knowing the answer to this question.61 As to understanding what exactly is 
“economic integration” under the criteria of Art. V:1 GATS, we are not any more enlightened. 
 
Clearly, the main reason for the lack of comprehension of the rules on PTAs is the obscurity of the 
rules. Naturally, there is the possibility for the Members to provide for more legal clarity and detail 
to the rules. The former Director-General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, has brought up this possibility 
by pointing out that it is for the governments to determine whether they need greater legal certainty 
in this domain. 62 This option is, however, undermined by the fact that years of effort before and 
during the Doha Round to address the multilateral provisions on PTAs have not proved 
successful.63 New rules, therefore, seem highly unlikely. 
 
A politics of tolerance towards PTAs has been practiced already for decades. According to Snape 
(1993), the formation of the EEC marked a significant start in this regard. Political considerations 
affected the GATT Contracting Parties in their decision not to scrutinize the deal too heavily. The 
Community’s six original member states had made sufficiently clear that they could withdraw from 
the GATT were the Contracting Parties to find that the EEC Treaty violated Art. XXIV GATT. 
Given that the ECC of the 1950s most likely did not meet the requirements of Art. XXIV, a 
precedent was created and it has been subsequently followed.64 
 
The Members seem divided on all significant aspects of the WTO disciplines on PTAs. In addition, 
there does not seem to be enough political willingness to tackle the issue. The obscurity of the 
                                                
60 Mitchell and Lockhart 2015, 82. 
61 Foreword by James Bacchus, Former Chair of the WTO Appellate Body in Lester, Mercurio, and Bartels 2015, xiv. 
62 WTO 2011, 4. 
63 In the beginning of the Doha Round, Members agreed to clarify and improve the disciplines and procedures for 
PTAs. See Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, adopted 14 November 2001, para. 29 and Negotiating 
Group on Rules, Compendium of Issues related to Regional Trade Agreements, TN/RL/W/8/Rev.1, 1 August 2002. 




provisions is potentially damaging but it is also in the benefit of many. As noted by Mavroidis, it is 
actually counter-intuitive why Members would be willing to enforce the so-called internal 
requirement of the rules on PTAs. That is because the less trade liberalization exists among parties 
to a PTA, the less trade diversion is likely to take place.65 It is maybe more understandable why 
Members would be willing to enforce the external trade requirement which under both Art. XXIV 
GATT and Art. V GATS requires that trade barriers towards outsiders must not be raised as a 
whole. 
 
However, the economic consequences of PTAs for outsiders are complex and depend on a variety 
of factors. Moreover, we do not have a straightforward answer to the question of whether 
preferentialism in general is detrimental to multilateralism or more of a catalyst for further trade 
liberalization. Economic consequences matter but it is important to keep in mind that PTAs are not 
only about GDP. The Members’ reluctance to clarify and enforce the rules may also relate to the 
understanding that PTAs do not serve economic motives only. The WTO rules on PTAs are built on 
mainly economic criteria but the Members use PTAs to address various types of issues. Even if the 
GATT rules do not acknowledge the variety of policy reasons for CUs and FTAs, PTAs are in 
practice largely used also for non-economic aims.66  The rise of the so-called mega-regionals, 
referring especially to the U.S-centered Transpacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the U.S. and the EU, as well as some new initiatives by 
China and Russia in their geographic proximity, shows the growing importance of geo-politics as a 
driving factor for preferentialism.67 
 
In this sense, Art. V GATS may provide more room for agreements having wider motivations than 
Art. XXIV GATT since its second paragraph allows consideration to be given to the ‘wider process 
of economic integration’ between the participating countries. It is, however, unclear what the 
provision means in practice. There is no more consensus on the meaning of Art. V:2 GATS than on 
                                                
65 Mavroidis 2006, 210-211. The internal requirement concerns the criteria on the liberalization of ‘substantial’ amount 
of trade in the case of both goods and services. 
66 Damro lists seven big themes behind the preference to pursue PTAs: 1) Marginalization syndrome (“the fear of being 
left out”), 2) security via economic means, 3) “New security needs” (eg. environmental damage, illegal migration, drug 
smuggling), 4) increase in negotiating leverage, 5) lock-in domestic reforms, 6) accommodate domestic constituents 
and 7) practical ease. See Damro 2006, 29-30 in Bartels and Ortino (2006). 
67  The geopolitical motivations of PTAs were present already during the negotiations on the International Trade 
Organization in the 1940s. Chase notes that despite its hatred of colonial preferences and dedication to MFN rules, the 
U.S. came to regard FTAs as instruments to promote economic and political unity against the Soviet threat and achieve 




the meaning of any other WTO provisions on PTAs. With so many partly conflicting interests 
involved, any particular interpretation of the rules is unlikely to gather the support of all Members. 
 
It seems fair to conclude that the Members are clearly not fulfilling their supervisory role over 
PTAs. Considering that the CRTA is now close to a pure enforcer of transparency, the legal status 
of current and new PTAs is set to remain unclear. Even if the primary responsibility over the 
enforcement of the rules on PTAs has been considered to belong to the Members, any solution one 
way or the other seems now possible through litigation only. However, as it will be explained in the 
next section, GATT/WTO panels have so far been very reluctant to interpret the rules on PTAs. 
 
ii. PTAs in GATT/WTO dispute settlement 
 
Considering the importance of PTAs to the world trade today, one could expect that GATT/WTO 
panels had been involved in a legal review of at least some of the agreements. However, the panels 
and the Appellate Body (AB) have not yet got fully engaged in the interpretation and enforcement 
of the rules on PTAs. The reasons arguably lie both with the Members and the panels/AB 
themselves. Firstly, legal challenges are not likely. One of the most convincing explanations behind 
this lies in strategic reasons: all Members are now parties to PTAs and many of them do not want to 
limit their options or to risk their own PTAs being subjected to legal review.68 Therefore, a situation 
of certain ‘co-operative equilibrium’ has developed: in order to avoid being challenged, Members 
do not challenge each other’s PTAs.69 Mavroidis also mentions such reasons as collective action 
problems, the benefits of non-enforcement (reduced trade diversion) and the institutional design of 
panels (mistrust of amateur judges).70 
 
Secondly, Panels and the AB themselves do not seem willing to engage in a ‘complex undertaking 
which involves consideration by the CRTA, from the economic, legal and political perspectives of 
different Members, of the numerous facets of a regional trade agreement in relation to the 
provisions of the WTO’. 71  The adjudicating organs of the GATT/WTO have been extremely 
sparing in their rulings concerning PTAs and seem to prefer to leave the consistency issues of PTAs 
                                                
68 Following Mongolia's decision to join the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), all WTO members are now 
members of one or more PTAs (some belonging to as many as 30). See the WTO website 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/brief_rta_e.htm (accessed 10 May 2016). 
69 Matsushita, Schoenbaum, and Mavroidis 2006, 585. 
70 Mavroidis 2010, 1150. 
71 A quote from the Panel Report in EC-Citrus, para. 9.52. See European Community — Tariff Treatment on Imports of 





to the Members themselves. The following statement of the former chair of the AB, James Bacchus, 
is revealing: 
 
“More ominously, no one knows what a ‘free-trade area’ is within the meaning of 
Article XXIV.8(b) of the GATT – or really wants to know. The GATT/WTO trading 
system has thrived for more than half a century without knowing the answer to this 
question. As I have often said, and not entirely in jest, one of my greatest 
accomplishments as a Member for eight years of the Appellate Body of the WTO was 
that I was able to get out of Geneva alive without having to answer this question.”72 
 
So far, the only case that has dealt, in a limited manner, with Art. V GATS has been Canada-
Autos73. However, the arguments used by the Panels or the AB with regard to Art. XXIV GATT or 
the Enabling Clause may be considered relevant also for the analysis of EIAs under the GATS. 
Since Art. V is the service trade equivalent of Art. XXIV GATT, the considerations reached in the 
GATT/WTO dispute settlement with regard to CUs and FTAs may be of relevance also in the 
interpretation of Art. V GATS.74 
 
Unfortunately, the substantive guidance on the provisions of Art. XXIV is also almost nonexistent. 
There have been several disputes that have dealt with or touched upon Art. XXIV but the panels 
have refrained from targeting PTAs directly. Instead, they have taken a piecemeal approach and 
focused on particular measures that have followed from the agreements. At least so far, panels and 
the AB have not been explicitly asked to rule on the validity of a specific PTA. In US-Line Pipe 
Safeguards, the evidence submitted by the U.S. on NAFTA’s compliance with Art. XXIV:8(b) led 
the Panel to conclude that the U.S. had established a prima facie case that the criteria of an FTA 
were met. However, the AB did not consider it necessary to address this finding and declared it to 
be of no legal effect.75 
 
The only substantive issue has been taken up by the AB in the case Turkey-Textiles. The case 
concerned the Turkey-EC Association Council Decision of 1/95 setting out certain modalities for 
the completion of a CU between the EC and Turkey. The decision required the elimination of 
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73 Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, Report of the Panel, 
circulated 11 February 2000. 
74 The GATS does not distinguish between FTAs and CUs as the GATT does. However, EIAs appear to be closest to 
FTAs. See Mitchell and Lockhart 2009, 110. 
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customs duties, alignment of the common customs tariff, and provisions to harmonize certain other 
policies.76 The dispute arose between Turkey and India, towards which Turkey, upon the formation 
of the CU with the EC, began to apply a series of restrictive quantitative measures similar to those 
already applied by the EC. The unilateral measures were put in place for textiles and clothing 
products originating from a total of 28 countries, India among them. 
 
In its ruling, the AB introduced the so-called necessity test for CU measures that are inconsistent 
not just with the MFN obligation but also with some other GATT provisions (in this case with 
Articles XI and XIII GATT on quantitative restrictions). According to the AB, Art. XXIV justifies 
such measures only if the party to a CU demonstrates that the formation of the CU would be 
prevented if it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue. In addition, the party must 
demonstrate that the measure is introduced upon the formation of a CU that fully meets the 
requirements of Art. XXIV GATT.77 The AB concluded that Turkey had failed to demonstrate the 
necessity of violating Articles XI and XIII as other means were available to accommodate the 
internal trade requirement of Art. XXIV:8, for example through the adoption of rules of origin with 
certificates of movement.78 
 
As the case was focused on analyzing the legality of a particular measure applied upon the 
completion of the CU, the AB did not engage in scrutinizing the CU itself. However, it established 
that a CU formed in accordance with the criteria of Art. XXIV can work as a type of “defence” for 
CU parties to violate certain other GATT provisions. Two conditions would need to be 
demonstrated in this regard: 
 
“ - - First, the party claiming the benefit of this defence must demonstrate that the 
measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of a customs union that fully meets 
the requirements of sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of Article XXIV. And, second, that 
party must demonstrate that the formation of that customs union would be prevented if 
it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue. Again, both these conditions 
must be met to have the benefit of the defence under Article XXIV.”79 
 
                                                
76 Mathis 2002, 195. 
77  Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/AB/R, Appellate Body Report, 
circulated 22 October 1999, para. 58. For a detailed account of the case law on Art. XXIV GATT, see Mathis (2002). 
78 Turkey-Textiles, Appellate Body Report, para. 62. 




In addition to the necessity test, the AB thus established that the party claiming the benefit of the 
defence must coincidentally demonstrate that the CU fully meets the requirements of Art. XXIV. 
As to the requirements themselves, the AB noted that “neither the GATT Contracting Parties nor 
the WTO Members have ever reached an agreement on the interpretation of the term "substantially" 
in this provision”. It then went further and stated that ‘substantially all the trade’ as mentioned 
under Art. XXIV:8 is clearly “something considerably more than merely some of the trade”. At the 
same time, however, the members of a CU were allowed to maintain, in their internal trade, certain 
restrictive regulations of commerce. According to the AB, the terms of Art. XXIV thus offer “some 
flexibility” to the constituent members of a CU when they liberalize their internal trade. Yet, the 
AB cautioned that the degree of "flexibility" is limited by the requirement that "duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce" be "eliminated with respect to substantially all" internal 
trade.80 
 
The ruling in Turkey-Textiles was welcome as it made it clear that the rules on PTAs are to be taken 
seriously. At the same time, it did not bring much assistance to the interpretation of Art. XXIV. The 
central conclusion would seem rather obvious: ‘substantially all’ is more than some. 
 
The only case that has dealt with Art. V GATS is Canada-Autos. In that dispute, Canada had 
accorded duty-free treatment to motor vehicles imported by certain manufacturers producing cars in 
Canada. The Panel found that the Canadian regime favored products of certain origins and 
concluded that Canada did not accord the advantage on equal terms to like products of different 
origin. Canada tried to invoke Art. V as a defence to its breach of the MFN obligation but the Panel 
rejected it. The Panel noted that the Canadian measure did not grant more favourable treatment to 
all services and service suppliers from NAFTA member countries. In practice, only a small number 
of U.S. and Mexican manufacturers/wholesalers enjoyed the more favourable treatment. According 
to the Panel, the requirement of Art. V:1(b) was to provide non-discrimination in the sense of NT. 
Once that was fulfilled, it would also ensure non-discrimination between all service suppliers of 
other parties to the EIA. The Panel also stated as its view that the object and purpose of the 
provision of Art. V:1(b) was to eliminate “all discrimination among services and service suppliers 
of parties to an economic integration agreement, including discrimination between suppliers of 
                                                




other parties to an economic integration agreement”.81 The Panel did not advance any further on 
Art. V and its conclusions on Art. V were not appealed. 
 
Thus not much light was shed by on the internal requirement of Art. V apart from the obligation to 
eliminate discrimination between all services and suppliers originating in Members of the EIA. The 
following clarifying statement was, nevertheless, made, along the lines of Turkey-Textiles: 
 
“Moreover, it is worth recalling that Article V provides legal coverage for measures 
taken pursuant to economic integration agreements, which would otherwise be 
inconsistent with the MFN obligation in Article II. Paragraph 1 of Article V refers to 
"an agreement liberalizing trade in services". Such economic integration agreements 
typically aim at achieving higher levels of liberalization between or among their 
parties than that achieved among WTO Members. Article V:1 further prescribes a 
certain minimum level of liberalization which such agreements must attain in order to 
qualify for the exemption from the general MFN obligation of Article II. In this 
respect, the purpose of Article V is to allow for ambitious liberalization to take place 
at a regional level, while at the same time guarding against undermining the MFN 
obligation by engaging in minor preferential arrangements.”82 
 
With the proliferation of PTAs, it may be only a question of time before a panel is forced to take a 
stand on the legality of a specific PTA. It may not be asked about the legality directly, but getting 
around the issue may, under the right conditions, become close to impossible. WTO panels are in a 
growing manner being engaged also in disputes having their origin in PTAs. Some case law at least 
is, therefore, likely to develop. Mitchell and Lockhart point out that it would, however, be 
unrealistic and even inappropriate to expect panels or the AB to develop a refined definition of 
‘substantially all the trade’ under Art. XXIV:8 GATT. How would a panel find a textual basis for a 
finding that a precise threshold of exactly 95 %, for example, would be ‘substantial’ but 90 % never 
is? 83 The same expectation, or lack of expectation, applies also to Art. V:1(a) GATS. Under the 
GATS, reaching a precise threshold on textual grounds is likely to be even harder due to the open-
endedness of such definitions as a ‘wider process of economic integration’ (Art. V:2). Nevertheless, 
in spite of these difficulties it is now settled that panels have a right (or an obligation) to review the 
quality of PTAs when raised on a defence.84 With a growing number of agreements, we are likely to 
                                                
81 Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, Report of the Panel, 
circulated 11 February 2000, para. 10.270 and Ortino 2008, 202-203. 
82 Canada-Autos, Report of the Panel, para. 10.271. 
83 Mitchell and Lockhart present that if the clarification of the notion is left to panels and the AB, it is likely that they 
will adopt a flexible test based on the specific facts at issue. They consider that the test is likely to be premised on the 
word ‘substantial’, which indicates the need to eliminate internal restrictions covering a very considerable proportion of 
the trade between the parties. Mitchell and Lockhart 2009, 96. 




witness many more PTA-related cases in the future. If and when PTAs are invoked as a defence to 
violations of WTO law, panels will find themselves facing a task which they would rather avoid, 
but which someone will need to tackle, sooner or later. 
 
3. The implications of proliferating preferential trade 
 
The growing number of PTAs has now become a constant feature of international trade. In the past, 
PTAs were more common between trading partners in geographic proximity. During the past two 
decades, an increasing number of PTAs has been concluded between partners a large distance apart; 
some of them are located in different continents. This is also true for services PTAs: trading 
services from one side of the world to the other is made possible by globalization, improved means 
of international transportation and technological developments.85 
 
The causes to the proliferation of PTAs are complex. One of the most significant underlying 
reasons is the crisis in multilateralism in general. The world is becoming increasingly complex and 
trade policies are highly politicized. The post-Second World War momentum that enabled the 
integration of world trade is, to a certain extent, gone. Trade is no longer limited to manufacturing 
and its meaningful liberalization necessitates regulation that reaches deep behind the borders. This 
means that trade is not an area free from politics and expression of societal values, whether 
regional, cultural or religious values. The expansion of the demand for democracy coincides with 
the emergence of important developing nations that express restraint in submitting to rules and 
values determined by the established economies. The attainment of a consensus is an enormous 
challenge in the expanding and pluralistic organization that the WTO has become. This can be seen 
as the principal reason behind the failure of the Doha Round. While the multilateral trade 
negotiations are at a stalemate, economic growth is pursued elsewhere. Countries are turning to 
like-minded countries in the search of companions for trade agreements that could go deeper than 
simple tariff liberalization.86 
                                                
85 Munin 2010, 217. 
86  Various governments are now openly advocating PTAs as an engine for much-needed economic growth. For 
instance, the European Commission has promoted the TTIP agreement as a project that would generate jobs and growth 
across the EU. The Commission has often cited an economic impact assessment (CEPR) released in the beginning of 
the TTIP negotiations and has let it become widely understood that a European family of four would see their annual 
disposable income increase by an average of €545 per year as a result of the agreement. See the Commissions brochure 
“The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: the Economic Analysis Explained”, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/september/tradoc_151787.pdf (accessed on 1 July 2016). The economic 
impact assessment of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), commissioned by the Commission’s 
Directorate General for Trade, is available at http://cepr.org/content/independent-study-outlines-benefits-eu-us-trade-




The possible negative effects of PTAs are well known and are not dealt with in detail here. It 
suffices to say that PTAs, while creating trade, may also create diversion and thus lead to overall 
welfare losses.87 However, there are also more political and principled arguments against PTAs. 
One of the most outspoken critics of preferentialism, Jagdish Bhagwati, sees the new mega-regional 
projects as hegemonic templates that strong countries use to take advantage of weaker economies.  
He is advocating for ‘garbage-free’ PTAs that would adhere to trade objectives and discard what 
special-interest lobbies in the U.S. and Europe seek to foist on PTAs.88 
 
An often-raised concern is that PTAs erode multilaterally negotiated concessions, which is 
especially detrimental for developing countries. However, at the same time developing countries are 
suffering from the formalistic requirement to reach the level of ‘substantial’ liberalization in their 
negotiations with the developed countries. As Bartels et al. point out, the attainment of very high 
liberalization levels leads to perverse outcomes especially for the least-developed countries. They 
argue that different levels of development should be taken better into account under Art. XXIV 
GATT and Art. V GATS for development-oriented PTAs to be genuinely development-oriented 
without artificial and harmful formalism.89 
 
Realpolitik arguments suggest that MFN liberalization is not the appropriate counterfactual to 
preferences among PTA partners. The willingness of countries to participate in the WTO 
agreements might be different were they deprived of the possibility to conclude agreements on a 
preferential basis.90 The banning of PTAs might, thus, have led to less satisfactory results on the 
multilateral level. Along this argumentation, the non-rigorous interpretation and non-enforcement 
of WTO rules on PTAs tell us that the Members understand this: PTAs are inevitably part of the 
reality in which they all live. 
 
Mavroidis points out that the rigorous enforcement of the rules on PTAs is actually not likely to be 
to the benefit of the Members outside a specific PTA. The crucial criterion for PTAs under both the 
                                                
87 For a discussion of the evolving economic analysis regarding PTAs, see the volume edited by Bagwell and Mavroidis 
(2011). They explore recent empirical research that casts doubt on the traditional “trade diversion” school. 
88  Bhagwati, Jagdish: “The Broken Legs of Global Trade”, Project Syndicate, 29 May 2012.  Available at 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-broken-legs-of-global-trade, accessed 5 July 2016. See also 
Bhagwati (2008). 
89 Bartels et al. (2013). 
90 Mavroidis 2011, 380. Mathis points out that Art. XXIV itself acknowledges the desirability of increasing freedom of 
trade through the voluntary agreements of closer integration between regional parties. This is thus the essence of what 
the GATT and now WTO Members have settled on – irrespective of the welfare implications of such agreements. See 




GATT and the GATS relates to the requirement of substantiality: PTAs must cover substantially all 
the trade in products or they must have substantial sectoral coverage in the case of services. 
However, the classic Vinerian analysis suggests that wide PTAs covering a substantial amount of 
tariff lines also lead to a substantial trade diversion. Therefore, quite understandably, Members lack 
the incentive to urge a very strict interpretation of the rules on PTAs. Taking into account the 
economic theory on trade diversion, the poor enforcement of the rules on PTAs should thus maybe 
not be considered a one-sided misfortune.91 Keeping in mind the necessity in guarding the principal 
rules of Art. XXIV and Art. V to prevent at least the worst types of cherry picking to the detriment 
of multilateral commitments, the de facto approach between the requirement of full implementation 
of the rules and complete latitude may be a well-placed compromise. 
 
This thesis does not attempt to answer the question of whether PTAs should be shunned or 
embraced but rather to bring more focus on what is happening in practice. The thesis gives a picture 
of the level of liberalization reached in a sample of EIAs. Even if the Art. V requirements are too 
ambiguous to give strict guidelines as to the exact content and liberalization level of EIAs, they do 
point us towards a clear direction. The rules call for a substantial sectoral coverage and elimination 
of substantially all discrimination. These are therefore the two starting points for our empirical 
analysis. We argue that each EIA can, and should be, scrutinized with these two criteria in mind. 
Whereas no concrete values for ‘substantial’ can be set, Art. V makes clear that real, cross-the 
border liberalization is required. In a world where trade liberalization is currently happening mostly 
through PTAs, the requirement for wide and deep liberalization is more necessary than ever to 
avoid a complex web of narrow agreements focusing on selected areas only. 
 
We emphasize that different methodologies may be used to analyze EIAs. The results of such 
analyzes can all feed into the discussion on preferentialism. In general, profound and extensive 
information of existing PTAs is needed for a more informed discussion. As noted by Wang, a focus 
on legal compliance issues helps to shed light on how EIAs can be better reviewed in the WTO and 
feed into the multilateral trade regime. As a result, best practices may be fostered in this regard.92 
Pascal Lamy has pointed out that the provisional establishment of the Transparency Mechanism 
“may pave the way for non-litigious deliberations that could build confidence and understanding 
among members regarding the motives, contents and policy approaches underpinning regional 
                                                
91 See Mavroidis (2010) and (2011). 




initiatives, leading over time to a shared vision and reinforced legal provisions”.93 The kind of 
deliberation referred to by the former Director-General requires in-depth information of the content 
and coverage of PTAs. This thesis provides some useful tools for such deliberation with regard to 
EIAs. 
 
4. Preferentialism in services – are services special? 
 
i. Particularities of going preferential in services 
 
The share of trade in services in global cross-border trade is approximately 20 per cent. This is in 
stark contrast to the importance of the service sector in national economies.94 The discrepancy 
reflects the difficulties in trading services across borders. 95  It is noteworthy that Mode 3 
(commercial presence) covers approximately 50 per cent of international trade in services.96 Trade 
in services is therefore, in practice, much about foreign investment. As pointed out by Fink and 
Jansen, this is one of the reasons why the perceived wisdom about regional integration coming from 
traditional trade literature does not necessarily apply to preferentialism in services.97 
 
In general, the study of services liberalization can be considered more challenging than the study of 
trade in goods. Whereas goods trade is liberalized primarily through tariff cuts and elimination of 
goods-specific regulatory barriers, deep liberalization of services involves a scrutiny of the entire 
national regulatory framework. Given the broad modal coverage of the GATS, which extends, inter 
alia, to factor movements, i.e. capital and labour, services trade touches upon more complicated 
issues than goods trade. This complexity is reflected in the lack of coherent theory of services trade 
liberalization in academic research. 
 
Trade diversion is usually considered to be significant if participating countries have had a high 
level of external protection prior to the establishment of a PTA. For PTAs concerning goods this 
concern has become less topical in the post-Uruguay Round era when the level of duties has, for 
most products, been reduced to low levels.98 For trade in services, however, the concern is still very 
                                                
93 WTO 2011, 4. 
94 Services represent about two-thirds of global GDP and over 70 per cent of GDP in most developed countries. World 
Bank data on services, available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.SRV.TETC.ZS (accessed on 15 July 2016). 
95 Fink and Jansen 2009, 224. 
96 Magdeleine and Maurer (2008) 
97 Fink and Jansen 2009, 224. 




valid. The level of liberalization reached since the conclusion of the GATS in 1995 is modest and 
the barriers to trade in services are still high. There are big differences between the different modes 
under which services are traded. Therefore, the motivations of countries to liberalize services trade 
also vary between the modes. Incentives to grant better access to foreign investment under Mode 3 
are not necessarily similar to the incentives that an enhanced movement of service suppliers under 
Mode 4 may offer, or a better access for online services for example. Moreover, the applicable 
regulations tend to vary greatly depending on the mode of delivery. 
 
Many scholars and practitioners consider that preferentialism in the field of services is likely to be 
less harmful than in the field of goods. Finck and Molinuevo summarize three basic reasons for this. 
First, there is the issue of domestic stocktaking. Second, services regulations are often applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner. The third reason are the liberal rules of origin that are set out in Art. V 
GATS and also typically applied in EIAs.99 
 
The first reason, domestic stocktaking, refers to the positive spillover effects from PTA to WTO 
negotiations. According to Finck and Molinuevo, such effects may be more important in services 
than in goods. Services negotiations require a resource-intensive stock-take of all such domestic 
laws and regulations that might be considered to affect trade in services. Governments that have 
carried out a comprehensive analysis of their domestic regulatory framework may be better 
prepared for services negotiations also in other contexts, particularly in the WTO. EIAs may 
therefore “play a useful role in overcoming ‘informational’ obstacles to further multilateral 
integration”.100 
  
The second reason behind the less dangerous character of service preferentialism lies in the way 
regulations are typically applied in practice. Behind-the-border regulations are relevant in goods 
and services trade alike. In the field of services, however, regulations are the only form of 
protection. The lack of tariffs means that a central, discriminatory means of protection is completely 
absent in trade in services. This has important implications for the liberalization of services 
considering that origin-based discrimination is often hard or at least unpractical to implement 
through domestic regulation. Adapting one’s internal service-related regulation depending on the 
origin of the service supplier is more difficult to accomplish and can be welfare-reducing as a 
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whole.101 As is noted by Miroudot et al. (2010), such a practice can create economic distortions that 
can further translate into productivity losses.102 
 
Miroudot and Shepherd note that overall the concept of preferences is not easy to tackle in the 
context of services trade considering that many service-related measures are not really prone to 
discrimination between domestic and foreign suppliers. They give the examples of market 
regulations introducing rules on prices, access to networks or increasing the powers of a 
competition authority. Such regulations equally benefit domestic and foreign services suppliers. As 
they note, it is not possible to create a more competitive market for domestic suppliers only. 
Foreign suppliers would have to be totally excluded from such a market.103 
 
Countries therefore often apply the same rules to services and service suppliers of all countries 
without differentiating between their MFN and PTA partners.104 Naturally, domestic suppliers may 
be treated more favorably de jure or de facto as many service-related rules require nationality, 
residency or country-specific qualifications. For foreign service suppliers, they often prove equally 
burdensome for all of them. 
 
Nevertheless, discriminatory application of domestic regulation to service suppliers of different 
origins is not impossible. Even if governments typically abstain from applying different sets of 
regulation depending on the origin of the service supplier, some of the most restrictive measures are 
applied on a preferential basis only. Such restrictive preferential measures are most easily applied 
under Modes 3 and 4. Miroudot and Shepherd note that discriminatory measures usually appear in 
the form of foreign equity restrictions, labour market tests for the entry of natural persons and the 
recognition of qualifications. But, as they note, even in these areas, not all countries introduce 
discriminatory measures.105 
                                                
101 With this type of legislation we mean all generally applicable regulation that applies to service suppliers in the 
territory of a country (to nationals and foreigners alike). Whereas MA limitations are quantitative, this type of 
regulation is qualitative in nature. Generally, genuine liberalization of internal service-related regulation often happens 
through unilateral reforms and not through trade negotiations. The preferential treatment of service suppliers of any 
specific country is thus not usually in a central role when new service-related regulations and reforms are put in place. 
See Bosworth and Trewin (2008). 
102 See Miroudot, Sauvage, and Sudreau 2010, 9. As an example they mention the promotion of a competitive market in 
telecoms where the facilitation of new entrants through regulation will benefit all companies. 
103 Miroudot and Shepherd 2014, 16. 
104 This is different under the so-called Mode 4 of the GATS, which involves the cross-border movement of natural 
persons supplying services. Different conditions are generally applied to nationals of different states. The analysis of 
liberalization of Mode 4 requires methods somewhat different from other modes of delivery under the GATS. Chapter 
IV of the thesis deals with this problem.  





Undertakings originating in EIA partners may sometimes be allowed to benefit from preferential, 
and often earlier, access to the market. In such a case, preferential liberalization may exert more 
durable effects on competition than in the case of goods. For instance, if second-best suppliers 
obtain a first-mover advantage, it may result in the country being stuck with such suppliers even if 
liberalization was subsequently carried out on an MFN basis. The establishment of preferences may 
thus result in entry by inferior suppliers.106 As noted by Sauvé and Shingal, in the field of services, 
the sequence of liberalization matters more than in goods.107 
 
EIAs sometimes include certain harmonization or coordination of regulatory measures, which may 
benefit their service suppliers in comparison to service suppliers originating in countries with 
differing regulatory standards. However, regulatory coordination between EIA partners may have 
positive effects as well. Sometimes regulatory changes may create schemes that benefit not just the 
preferential partners but all foreign suppliers.108 
 
In addition to the benefits of domestic stocktaking and the non-discriminatory application of 
services regulation, the third essential element in the less-risky character of EIAs are the liberal 
rules of origin. Such rules are necessitated by Art. V:6 GATS that requires service suppliers also 
from countries outside the EIA to benefit from the agreement as long as they are established in one 
of the parties and engage in substantive business operations in their territories.109 Rules of origin 
formed in accordance with Art. V:6 help to attenuate the so-called ‘stumbling bloc’ effect of 
PTAs.110 
 
In the case of goods trade, rules of origin are typically based on a value-added criterion. Only goods 
which have sufficient value added within a specific territory (thus are sufficiently transformed) are 
eligible for preferential treatment. The design of rules of origin for services trade is essentially 
different. Instead of targeting the service and its transformation within the relevant territory, they 
focus on the characteristics of the service supplier. Jansen points at two reasons behind the 
differences in rules of origin in manufacturing and services. First, the nature of services trade 
                                                
106 Winters 2008a, 223-224. For economic considerations on services preferentialism, see especially Mattoo and Fink 
(2002) and Hoekman and Sauvé (1994b). 
107 Sauvé and Shingal 2011, 954. 
108 WTO 2011, 54. 
109 In accordance with Art. V:6 GATS, service suppliers of other Members constituted as juridical persons under the 
laws of a party to an EIA must be entitled to treatment granted under such agreement, provided that they engage in 
substantive business operations in the territory of the parties to such agreement. 




significantly differs from goods trade and thus the rules of origin for services make references to 
issues such as place of incorporation, particular ownership or control and the level of business 
operations within a specific territory. Value-added rules are inappropriate for services where only 
under Mode 1 the service alone is crossing the border. Secondly, the rules of origin in 
manufacturing and services do not always serve the same purpose. In services, rules of origin 
similarly delimit the extent to which non-members may benefit from the EIA but they also pursue 
goals that are more related to regulatory issues than economic interests. Therefore, rules of origin 
are sometimes constructed in a way that allows for more regulatory oversight within the EIA or 
domestically.111 
 
ii. The lack of market access discipline in Art. V GATS 
 
EIAs tend to follow the disciplines of the GATS in their design: they generally include provisions 
similar to at least Art. II (MFN), Art. III (Transparency), Art. VI (Domestic regulation), Art. XVI 
(MA), Art. XVII (NT) and Art. XIV and XIV bis (general and security exceptions) of the GATS. 
Similarly to the GATS, Members typically undertake their EIA commitments in respect of both MA 
and NT. It is, however, noteworthy that Art. V GATS does not include any MA discipline: it does 
not require any specific level of liberalization as regards the various, mostly quantitative, limitations 
included in Art. XVI GATS. 
 
This is reflected in the wording of Art. V that places the emphasis in a specific EIA’s analysis to the 
level of non-discrimination granted to one’s partners. Requiring MA commitments from EIA 
partners would not be desirable, as countries would in that case be incentivized to apply different 
MA conditions to different trading partners. Relaxed quotas and other quantitative limitations in 
EIAs could lead to a more restrictive trading environment towards countries outside the EIA. 
Service suppliers from EIA partner countries would have less restrained access to each other’s 
markets whereas outsiders would be subject to stricter requirements in the form of a higher number 
of discriminatory quotas and other quantitative restrictions. As a consequence, service suppliers 
from MFN countries would suffer while EIA service suppliers would enjoy a more favorable 
operating environment through more open MA conditions.  
                                                
111 Jansen 2008, 139-140. Jansen notes that in a number of sectors, such as the financial sector and telecommunications, 
regulation plays a crucial role in guaranteeing the efficient functioning of the markets. The policy-makers must 
therefore make sure that trade liberalization does not jeopardize the regulation of relevant markets. In some cases, rules 
of origin are designed for protectionist purposes. For example, the condition that owners or managers of foreign 
companies are domestic may reflect the intention to ensure that their decisions reflect the interest of the domestic 





As Fink and Jansen note, preferential liberalization of services may create a long-term trade 
diversion effect.112 In service markets, high location-specific sunk costs and network externalities 
can give first-movers a durable advantage. Second-best service suppliers may thus take over the 
market and will not be replaced by first-best suppliers from outside the EIA when trade is 
eventually liberalized on an MFN basis. Even short-term preferences can thus be detrimental as 
they have long-term effects.113 
 
Preferential MA conditions can take the form of bigger quotas and more relaxed conditions as to the 
types of legal entities. They may also waive otherwise applicable economic needs tests. Also, a 
limited number of licenses may be made more easily available to preferential partners and the 
numbers of their personnel may be unlimited.114 The creation of preferential MA conditions can 
thus significantly alter the conditions of competition to the benefit of service suppliers from an EIA 
partner country as others may in practice be blocked from the market due to later arrival. Even if 
such policies may not applied widely in practice, it may be considered whether Art. V has been 
designed in a way that deliberately does not put emphasis on the liberalization of MA conditions. 
 
In contrast, the requirement of elimination of discrimination towards one’s EIA partner is 
potentially less harmful as it is more likely to benefit also those service suppliers who come from 
countries outside the EIA. Differentiation among foreign suppliers is more easily carried out with 
regard to MA conditions as various limitations on the number of services suppliers, economic needs 
tests and other MA requirements usually involve some type of case-specific discretion. 
 
Considering that MA limitations tend to be the most harmful types of limitations, it can 
nevertheless be asked why Art. V does not include any discipline on MA at all. If the discipline 
existed, it could require the elimination of substantially all MA limitations (in addition to the 
requirement to eliminate substantially all discrimination). Such a requirement could be seen as a 
counterpart to the requirement of elimination of duties with respect to substantially all the trade 
between parties to CUs and FTAs under Art. XXIV:8 GATT. The negotiation background of Art. V 
                                                
112 “Trade diversion” is a term originally coined by Jacob Viner. In his groundbreaking work of 1950 Viner analyzed 
the effects of PTA on economic welfare. He labeled those conflicting forces as “trade creation” and “trade diversion”. 
See Viner (1950). 
113 Fink and Jansen 2009, 230. The authors point out that the potential for trade diversion effects greatly depends on the 
rules of origin adopted by an EIA. 
114 Especially self-regulated industries tend to have numerus fixus constraints on new entry (certain professions). See 




does not reveal any specific reason for this – actually, we have not identified any specific reason for 
the neglect of a MA discipline in Art. V either in literature or through various discussions with 
specialists who were observing the GATS negotiations. As to the MA discipline in Art. XVI of the 
GATS, there is a wide array of opinions as to its reach and dimensions, especially as a result of the 
U.S.-Gambling dispute.115  
 
A close observer of the GATS negotiations has noted that, in his view, one of the underlying and 
also explicit purposes of Art. XVI was to reform domestic service markets. At least for such 
countries that were expecting the GATS to induce domestic liberalization, and not just trade 
liberalization, Art. XVI clearly covered not only discriminatory but also non-discriminatory MA 
measures.116 
 
One option is thus to consider whether the lack of a MA discipline in Art. V is related to the 
perceived function of Art. XVI as a vehicle of domestic liberalization. In such a case there would be 
less reason to include a MA discipline in the rules on EIAs, which are primarily targeted to ensure a 
high level of non-discrimination between the participating countries. As we already proposed 
above, an explicit encouragement towards taking commitments on quantitative limitations in the 
form of a MA discipline could lead to quotas and other numerical limitations being taken on a 
preferential basis. That type of preferentialism can be considered especially harmful in the field of 
services.  
 
Due to the absence of a specific MA discipline in Art. V, Members appear free to include MA 
limitations in their EIAs. They are, however, restricted by the requirement to eliminate 
discrimination in the sense of NT as that requirement applies to such MA limitations that are 
prescribed or implemented in a discriminatory manner.117 Already this has a restrictive effect on the 
use of MA limitations, as Members may be reluctant to formulate MA limitations that they would 
have to extend also to their own service suppliers.118 
                                                
115 United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Report of the 
Appellate Body, WT/DS285/AB/R, circulated 7 April 2005. For a discussion on the scope of Art. XVI GATS (the 
GATS discipline on MA), see Pauwelyn (2005) and Mavroidis (2007). 
116 Interview with Hamid Mamdouh, Director, Trade in Service Division, WTO Secretariat, 31 January 2013. 
117 It should be noted that subsection (f) of Art. XVI:2 refers to limitations that are by their nature discriminatory 
(limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the 
total value of individual or aggregate foreign investment). 
118  In light of the U.S.-Gambling, Art. XVI covers also non-discriminatory measures that are in conflict with a 
Member’s MA commitments. A Member may, however, choose to formulate its commitments in a discriminatory way 
or leave a specific sector completely unbound. Under Art. V, however, Members are restricted as the EIA should have a 





Some commentators have argued that Art. XVI should encompass discriminatory MA limitations 
only.119 If this was the case, the reason for the lack of a MA discipline in Art. V could be quite 
straightforward: since Art. V requires the elimination of discrimination there would be no reason for 
it to include specific rules for the scheduling of discriminatory MA limitations. The majority 
opinion, however, appears to be that Art. XVI covers discriminatory and non-discriminatory 
measures alike. This is also the WTO Secretariat’s view120 and, importantly, it has been confirmed 
by the result in U.S.-Gambling.121 However, when the negotiation history of Art. V is considered, it 
cannot be ruled out that some Members might have understood Art. XVI to cover discriminatory 
measures only. 
 
The following chapter analyses the core requirements of Art. V GATS. The purpose is to address 
the lack of comprehension over the rules on PTAs and provide a legal interpretation of the GATS 
rules in light of the wider understanding of preferentialism in services that has been introduced in 
this chapter. The interpretation is then used as the basis for the empirical analysis of EIAs, which 
makes the part II of the thesis. The underlying idea is that new proposals for the interpretation and 
analysis of PTAs should actively be put forward to avoid a situation where the trade community 
simply stops caring about the WTO rules and their enforcement altogether. The move to the so-
called “mega-regionals” is already a reality. Even if the risks relating to preferential treatment in 
services are lower than in the field of goods, it is still important to keep track of the current 
developments and analyze to what extent new agreements open up trade in services.   
                                                
119 See especially Mavroidis (2007). 
120 See page 4 of the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines (S/L/92, 28 March 2001). The guidelines have been prepared by the 
WTO Secretariat and adopted by the Council on Trade in Services. 
121 The AB did not deal with this question explicitly but since the zero-quota was applied also to domestic service 
suppliers, the AB must have considered Art. XVI to cover non-discriminatory measures as well. The issue of 




III. SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RULES ON EIAs 
 
1. The background of Art. V GATS 
 
International trade in services was not born at the advent of the GATS: services had been traded for 
centuries before the talks on a multilateral services agreement were initiated during the Uruguay 
Round. Moreover, regulation of services trade had started to take place on a bilateral and a regional 
level already prior to the conclusion of the GATS. In addition to the EU 122 , where detailed 
provisions on regional services liberalization existed since the EEC Treaty, the U.S. pioneered by 
including specific service disciplines in its FTA with Canada, concluded in 1987. The U.S.-Canada 
FTA contained provisions on trade and investment in services and even covered temporary 
movement of businesspersons.123 
 
In addition to bilateral and regional initiatives, industry-specific standard setting contributed to the 
increasing service flows already prior to the GATS. For example, the International 
Telecommunications Union, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International 
Aviation Organization established standards and administered agreements concerning the services 
provision in their respective fields. Moreover, specific schemes existed with respect to certain 
services. The U.S., for example, had been active in concluding treaties of Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation (FCN) that regulated, among other issues, aviation, shipping and communications 
services.124 
 
The Uruguay Round, however, marked the debut of comprehensive trade negotiations across a wide 
spectrum of services sectors. Since then, trade in services has become an indispensable element of 
bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts of trade liberalization.125 A significant phenomenon in the 
development of world trade since the establishment of the WTO in the mid-1990s is that the 
number of PTAs has rapidly multiplied. Today, the majority of PTAs include rules on services.126  
The stalled state of multilateral trade negotiations has driven countries to seek further opening of 
goods and services trade also through more innovative arrangements. A selected group of countries 
                                                
122 The term EU refers to all historical denominations (EEC, EC) of the European integration process. 
123 Marchetti and Mavroidis 2011, 690. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Marchetti and Roy 2008, 1. 
126 According to the WTO’s RTA database, over 130 EIAs and over 260 PTAs in total were notified and in force as of 
May 1, 2016. See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm. The numbers do not include accessions 




keen to proceed with further liberalization of services is currently negotiating a cross-regional 
services agreement outside the WTO. If a critical mass of participants is achieved, the so-called 
Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) will possibly be applied on an MFN-basis.127 The increasing 
number of EIAs and the TiSA project show the willingness of Members to engage in the 
liberalization of services where very little has happened in the multilateral scene since the first 
commitments taken upon the entry into force of the GATS. 
 
Whereas the U.S. demand was crucial in putting services on the multilateral negotiation agenda, the 
EU’s role was instrumental in shaping the final agreement.128 The EU’s own example was also 
essential in the formulation of the GATS rules on EIAs. The EEC Member States had detailed 
provisions for the liberalization of services trade in place; they needed to be taken into account in 
the formulation of the GATS provisions. Since preferential liberalization of trade in services was 
already a reality during the negotiations of the GATS, the agreement had to provide a possibility for 
their existence. According to Stephenson, during the Uruguay Round negotiations, a draft provision 
on preferential trade for services was introduced by the EU and supported by Switzerland, 
Australia, and New Zealand. The proposed draft was included in the “Dunkel text” of December 
1991. At the end of 1991, the footnote to Art. V:1(a) was added. The final version of Art. V found 
in the GATS is almost identical to that set out in the Dunkel draft.129 
 
The GATS allows the conclusion of EIAs that ensure comprehensive trade liberalization in trade in 
services. In contrast to the two strict forms of PTAs allowed under the GATT (CUs and FTAs), the 
drafters of the GATS opted for a broader term of ‘economic integration’. The more open-ended 
formulation made it possible to abstain from specifying the exact type of liberalization required 
from EIAs.130 Nevertheless, Art. V GATS includes a set of legal criteria that all EIAs should 
respect. 
 
                                                
127 The economic case for a plurilateral agreement on services is clear. Lee-Makiyama notes that neither is such an idea 
a novelty. The GATS itself started as a plurilateral agreement that was created by a group of countries that chipped in 
their commitments until the collective offer was good enough to be extended to all members of the WTO on the 
principle of MFN. See Lee-Makiyama 2012, 3. 
128 According to Marchetti and Mavroidis, the U.S. conditioned its participation in the Uruguay Round upon the 
inclusion of services trade in the negotiation agenda. The EU’s priority was to defend its Common Agricultural Policy 
and only gradually it became a key participant in the services liberalization and drafting of the GATS. See Marchetti 
and Mavroidis 2011, 694-695, 716. 
129 Stephenson 2000a, 88. 




Since few border measures are applied in the field of services, the concept of discrimination, or 
rather non-discrimination, forms the core of services liberalization. As will be shown in this 
Chapter, the requirement of non-discrimination with respect to domestic policies is the very essence 
of Art. V GATS. 
 
Assessing the level of elimination of discriminatory measures is necessarily more qualitative in 
nature than assessing the level of duties. Notwithstanding the most blatant violations of MFN and 
NT, determining what constitutes discrimination requires discretion. This normally involves a value 
judgment. If one is to avoid empirical results being skewed by personal judgment, one has to take a 
relatively restrictive approach to the concept of discrimination or at least be very clear in defining 
one’s methodology and its consistent application the deeper to the sphere of de facto discrimination 
one is willing to venture. 
 
The present Chapter interprets the various elements of Art. V. The following, methodological part 
of the thesis is designed based on the understanding of Art. V proposed here. However, as we argue 
that the rules on EIAs cannot be interpreted in a vacuum, an overall understanding of Art. V must 
necessarily be inspired by empirical findings. Any empirical analysis of existing agreements shows 
the challenges and limitations present in a legal interpretation of the GATS rules on EIAs, and in 
the interpretation of the EIAs themselves. 
 
As the external effects of EIAs are outside the scope of this thesis and its empirical analysis, our 
interpretation of Art. V is focused on the first two paragraphs of Art. V: the so-called internal trade 
requirement and the possibility to take into account a wider process of economic integration or trade 
liberalization between the EIA partners. The concept of non-discrimination is dealt with in detail, as 
it is the fundamental building block of Art. V:1. In addition, we add to earlier research by taking up 
the issue of internal differentiation in a specific Member’s (in this case the EU’s) services 
commitments and argue that such differentiation, which is due to the Member’s regional 





2. The legal requirements for economic integration agreements (EIAs) 
 
i. The main ingredients of Art. V 
 
The GATS discipline on EIAs is almost five decades younger than the corresponding discipline for 
CUs and FTAs under the GATT. However, the two disciplines share common elements. Similarly 
to Art. XXIV GATT, Art. V GATS includes an internal requirement (facilitation of trade between 
the parties to the EIA), an external requirement (prohibition to raise the level of barriers applicable 
to outsiders) and a notification requirement.131 In addition, Art. V includes features that are specific 
to EIAs only. This is arguably due to the different nature of preferentialism in goods and services, 
as well as to changes in Members’ opinions towards PTAs in general. When the GATS was 
negotiated, PTAs were already part of the everyday practice of the Members. This was likely to call 
for more flexibility in the design of the discipline. In addition, as viewed in the previous chapter, 
services preferentialism can be considered less harmful than preferentialism in the field of goods. 
This may have encouraged a looser attitude to be reflexed in Art. V. 
 
The flexibility is especially present in the provision of Art. V:2, which allows the EIA’s 
contribution to the wider economic integration between its participants to be taken into account. 
Even more leeway is available to developing countries. Under the provision of Art. V:3, in EIAs 
involving developing countries, the condition regarding the elimination of discrimination is more 
flexible in accordance with the level of development of the countries concerned (both overall and in 
individual sectors and subsectors). 
 
Unlike Art. XXIV GATT, Art. V also includes a specific rule regarding the origin of the service 
suppliers. Suppliers originating in Members outside the agreement will still benefit from the EIA if 
they have substantive business operations within the territory of one of the members to the 
agreement. As discussed in the previous chapter, this potentially greatly extends the field of 
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The entire provision of our center of focus, Art. V:1 (including footnote (1)), reads as follows: 
 
Art. V: Economic Integration  
 
1. This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from being a party to or entering 
into an agreement liberalizing trade in services between or among the parties to such an 
agreement, provided that such an agreement: 
 
(a) has substantial sectoral coverage (1), and 
  
(b) provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination, in the sense 
of Art. XVII, between or among the parties, in the sectors covered under subparagraph (a), 
through: 
  
(i) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or 
  
(ii) prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures, 
  
either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time-frame, 
except for measures permitted under Art.s XI, XII, XIV and XIV bis. 
 
 
(1) This condition is understood in terms of number of sectors, volume of trade 
affected and modes of supply. In order to meet this condition, agreements should not 
provide for the a priori exclusion of any mode of supply. 
 
 
The first paragraph, the chapeau of Art. V, gives reason to conclude that EIAs may take the form of 
either a bilateral or a plurilateral trade agreement between two or more countries and within one or 
more regions. The same provision implies that Art. V applies to both current and future EIAs. 
Further, the reference to ‘parties’ as participants to the agreements implies that the scope of the 
provision is not limited to agreements between Members but applies also to agreements between 
Members and non-Members. 
 
To qualify as an EIA under Art. V, the agreement must satisfy three main requirements.132 First, an 
EIA must have substantial sectoral coverage (paragraph 1(a)). Secondly, it must provide for the 
absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination between or among the parties and in the 
sectors covered under the first requirement (paragraph 1(b)). Finally, in addition to these two 
requirements designed to facilitate trade between the parties to the agreement (often referred to as 
the ‘internal requirement’), an EIA must satisfy an external requirement (paragraph 4): it must not 
                                                
132 EIAs liberalizing trade in services are admitted “provided that” the conditions of the first paragraph are met. The 




raise the overall level of barriers to trade in services with regard to any Member outside the 
agreement. 
 
The AB has not yet had the occasion, or desire, to interpret Art. V. The only reference to Art. V so 
far has been in the Panel Report of Canada-Autos. The case dealt mostly with measures relating to 
trade in goods but the Panel concluded that a specific measure was inconsistent also under Art. 
V:1(b) since it accorded an advantage to U.S. firms and excluded other firms in another party to the 
EIA.133 
 
In Turkey-Textiles, the AB indicated that the words “shall not prevent” in the opening paragraph of 
Art. XXIV.5 GATT mean that the GATT does not make impossible the formation of a customs 
union. The same, presumably, applies to FTAs under Art. XXIV GATT. It is noteworthy that Art. V 
GATS employs the same words “shall not prevent” in its chapeau. Since the context of Art. XXIV 
GATT and Art. V GATS is identical (both provisions justify an exception to certain WTO 
obligations for Members engaged in deep economic integration with their preferential trading 
partners), one may assume that the AB’s reasoning in Turkey-Textiles is in this respect applicable 
also to EIAs concluded under Art. V GATS. 
 
There is, however, a certain difference between Art. XXIV GATT and Art. V GATS regarding the 
legal effects of a PTA. Both disciplines include a notification requirement but Art. XXIV contains 
stronger language than Art. V on the 'conditionality' attached to the time frame for implementation. 
If a Working Party were to find that the plan or schedule for an interim agreement for a PTA is not 
likely to result in a GATT-consistent CU or FTA, its members "shall not maintain or put into force 
[an] agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with ... the recommendations." 
No such provision exists in Article V.134  This difference has, however, become redundant as 
practically no multilateral control of PTAs exists any longer. The formal discussions on legal 
consistency of PTAs have been replaced by the Transparency Mechanism of 14 December 2006 
 
There are commentaries on Art. V in a number of textbooks and articles dealing with services trade. 
Their analysis, however, typically stays on a relatively general level. A deeper analysis is provided 
by Cottier and Molinuevo who engage in an extensive legal commentary on the Art. V 
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disciplines.135 Also Stephenson provides a useful analysis and points to a number of challenges in 
effectively applying these disciplines.136 
 
Art. V is explored at some length also in Hoekman and Sauvé (1994). They consider Art. V 
conditions to be weaker than those applying in the GATT context and point out that the weakness of 
the disciplines on EIAs implies only a limited constraint on 'strategic' violations of the MFN 
obligation.137 
 
We will now proceed to a more detailed analysis of the two core requirements of Art. V:1: the 
requirement of ‘substantial sectoral coverage’ and the elimination of ‘substantially all 
discrimination’. In addition, we will shortly explain the other principal criteria of Art. V: the 
possibility to pay attention to ‘a wider process of economic integration or trade liberalization’ (Art. 
V:2), the flexibility provided for developing countries (Art. V:3), the external requirement (Art. 
V:4) and the criteria for rules of origin in EIAs (Art. V:6). Even if the focus in the thesis and 
especially in the empirical analysis is on the first paragraph of Art. V, these other criteria are 
essential elements in services preferentialism and they inform the overall interpretation of Art. V.138 
Art. V:5 (renegotiation of commitments) and Art. V:8 (lack of compensation for trade benefits 
accruing from the EIA to non-parties) are not dealt with as they are not essential elements in a 
compliance analysis. Art. V:7 (notification and examination procedure) has been taken up in 
Chapter II.  
 
ii. Substantial sectoral coverage (Art. V:1(a)) 
 
The term ‘substantial’ in Art. V defines sufficient coverage in terms of sectors covered as well as 
non-discrimination provided. It appears in two different forms: ‘substantial’ (Art. V:1(a)) and 
‘substantially’ (Art. V:1(b)). 
 
According to Art. V.1(a), an EIA must have substantial sectoral coverage. The requirement is 
designed to prevent the conclusion of numerous sector-specific agreements that would pick and 
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choose from areas of mutual interest. The goal is trade promotion while containing trade diversion 
to which randomly concluded sectoral agreements are likely to contribute.139  
 
The use of the word ‘substantial’ gives reason to conclude that EIA partners are never under an 
obligation to liberalize trade in all service sectors. The requirement can be contrasted to Art. 
XXIV:8 GATT. In that context, in Turkey-Textiles, the AB noted that ‘substantially all the trade’ as 
mentioned under Art. XXIV.8 GATT is ‘something considerably more than merely some of the 
trade’.140 Mitchell and Lockhart conclude that the relevant amount of trade must, therefore, fall 
somewhere between some and all trade among the parties to the PTA. However, since there is no 
clear definition or agreement about the meaning of the word ‘substantial’ under the GATT, the 
practice under the GATT does not shed light on the word’s definition either in the context of the 
GATS.141 
 
Similarly to Art. XXIV.8 GATT, Art. V.1(a) GATS focuses on the level of liberalization rather than 
the type of trade affected.142 Unlike paragraph 8 of Art. XXIV, Art. V.1(a) GATS, nevertheless, 
gives some further guidance for its interpretation. It includes the following footnote: 
 
“This condition is understood in terms of number of sectors, volume of trade affected 
and modes of supply. In order to meet this condition, agreements should not provide 
for the a priori exclusion of any mode of supply.” 
 
However, the precise application of these additional elements remains unclear. Fink and Molinuevo 
point out several essential questions. First, how to understand ‘volume’ of services trade. Is it 
opposed to the ‘value’ of such trade? At what level of disaggregation should the count of sectors be 
made? And, moreover, can entire sectors be excluded from the agreement? If so, at which point 
would an exclusion of a sector reduce the volume of trade to a non-substantial level? As noted by 
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the authors, the lack of sufficiently disaggregated data on trade in services further complicates the 
determination of volumes and value of trade covered by a specific EIA.143 
 
Under the GATT, various suggestions regarding ‘substantially all the trade’ have been made, also 
among the Members. According to one of such propositions, a threshold could be set at 95 per cent 
of all tariff lines at the six-digit level. That starting point could then be complemented by an 
assessment of trade flows at various stages of the implementation of the PTA.144 The proposal did 
not receive support. 
 
With regard to Art. V, there has been a variety of opinions regarding the scope of ‘substantial 
sectoral coverage’ among the Members. Because of the wording ‘number of sectors’ in the footnote 
to paragraph 1(a), it has been suggested that not all sectors need to be covered under an EIA to meet 
this criterion. Otherwise the text would have clarified that all, and not a ‘number of’, sectors had to 
be covered.145 Some Members have argued that the exclusion of certain sectors and volume of trade 
would be permissible, given that the footnote to Article V.1(a) only condemns the a priori 
exclusion of a mode of supply, not specific sectors. Some have emphasized that the number of 
exclusions to the sectoral coverage must be restricted and not further limited by the volume of 
affected trade and the modes of supply.146  
 
According to another line of argumentation, the word ‘substantial’ does not allow any, or at least 
any essential, sector to be excluded from an EIA. If a major sector were excluded, it would need to 
be considered in conjunction with the modes of supply and the volume of trade involved.147 
 
Other issues brought up by the Members include the degree of detail in the examination of EIAs 
and the coverage of modes of supply. The first issue relates to the correct level of examination: it 
can be done either sector-by-sector, subsector-by-subsector or on a disaggregated basis. The 
coverage in terms of modes is seen to relate especially to Modes 3 and 4. For some Members, both 
investment and the movement of natural persons need to be included. At least one delegation has 
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proposed that certain aspects exempted from the GATS through the MNP Annex need to be 
included in an EIA for consistency with the GATS.148 
 
Whereas certain rough or approximate values for ‘substantial’ may be given, it is hard to see how to 
settle on any specific value. Such a set value may be even harder to conceive in respect of sectoral 
coverage than in respect of elimination of discrimination. The requirement to achieve substantial 
sectoral coverage presumes that we know the overall number of service sectors that exist. This is 
not really the case.  
 
The GATS does not impose any specific set or list of sectors on the Members but they are free to 
use their own categorizations. Most Members have opted to use the WTO’s Sectoral Classification 
List that is used as a basis of our empirical analysis.149 However, they are not required to do so. And 
even if the Members typically do use the recommended list, they sometimes combine or divide 
certain sectors or sub-sectors to their own choosing. As witnessed by our analysis, also the EU 
Member States do this in certain instances even though generally they tend to follow the 
Secretariat’s list. 
 
Another issue relates to the emergence of new services sectors. Technological progress brings about 
challenges in the classification of new services. Should completely new services, or services that 
used to be delivered under a specific mode only, count towards the overall number of sectors 
towards which the ‘substantial’ sectoral coverage of a specific EIA should be compared? In this 
respect EIAs following the so-called negative listing model do better as they automatically extend 
all relevant disciplines to new services that were not yet developed or commercialized at the time of 
the conclusion of the agreement. Only such current or future measures or policy areas that have 
been specifically excluded from liberalization would remain outside the scope of liberalization in 
such new services sectors.150 
 
In the present thesis the EU’s EIAs are analyzed on the basis of the Sectoral Classification List. 
This makes it possible to compare the EU’s EIA commitments to most other Members’ 
commitments as the majority of them use the same list both in their EIAs as well as under the 
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GATS. However, it should be kept in mind that the overall number of sectors may, and is likely, to 
rise in the future and methodologies should be adapted to take them into account. 
 
iii. Absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination (Art. V:1b) 
 
The second sub-paragraph of Art. V:1 requires that an EIA provides for the absence or elimination 
of substantially all discrimination in the sectors covered by the agreement. This is to be attained 
either through “(i) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or (ii) through prohibition 
of new or more discriminatory measures”. There are two interlinked issues that complicate the 
interpretation of the provision. 
 
Firstly, there is no common understanding of the link between ‘substantial sectoral coverage’ 
(subparagraph 1(a)) and ‘substantially all discrimination’ (subparagraph 1(b)). One view is that a 
sector would not be considered covered unless it satisfied also the requirements under Art. V:1(b). 
Another view holds that the two tests need to be distinguished. According to this view, the 
requirement of substantial sectoral coverage merely determines the proportion of sectors or 
subsectors subject to liberalization. Art. V:1(b), on the other hand, would apply as a separate 
requirement by determining the general degree of discrimination that is allowed in the liberalized 
sectors. It would seek to determine to what extent policy measures retaining a degree of 
discrimination in the liberalized sectors and modes are acceptable.151  
 
The fact that Art. V:1(b) calls for the absence or elimination of discrimination in the sectors covered 
under subparagraph (a), would give reason to conclude that a sector should be considered covered 
only if it provides for full non-discrimination. However, in light of the Member’s practice where 
hardly any service sector in any EIA provides for full (or even close to full) non-discrimination, we 
suggest that the two requirements could be treated separately. At least such an approach would be 
more informative than disregarding each sector where discrimination is not eliminated. Thus, each 
EIA could be given two separate scores under Art. V:1: one for sectoral coverage and another one 
for the level of non-discrimination (in the sectors covered). This is the approach in our empirical 
analysis on the EU’s EIAs. Each sector and sub-sector gets two scores: one for being included with 
at least some level of a commitments (coverage) and another one for the elimination of 
                                                




discrimination.152 Both scores are expressed as percentage values depending on how many EU 
Member States have bound themselves. 
 
The second challenge of interpretation relates to the question of whether the parties to an EIA must 
indeed eliminate substantially all discrimination or whether a mere standstill agreement could be 
considered sufficient. Hoekman and Sauvé have argued that a standstill is enough. They consider 
that the drafting of such a minimalistic requirement was linked to the outcome of the 1989 Canada-
U.S. FTA which largely consisted of a standstill agreement applied to a finite list of covered 
services.153 
 
Cottier and Molinuevo, on the other hand, argue that the answer should be ‘no’, because the 
introductory sentence of Art. V:1(b) specifically calls for the ‘absence or elimination’ of 
discrimination between the EIA parties. The options of (i) and (ii) are informed by this main 
obligation and need to be construed accordingly. In order to live up to the obligation, EIAs must 
abolish discriminatory measures where they exist and prohibit the future introduction of 
discriminatory policies in those sectors or sub-sectors where no discriminatory policies are 
maintained at the time of the conclusion of the EIA.154 
 
We agree with the interpretation of Cottier and Molinuevo and consider that Art. V goes beyond a 
standstill and requires EIA parties to achieve a sufficient degree of rollback of protective measures. 
The provision of Art. V:1(b) needs to be read as a whole and in the light of its opening sentence that 
sets the required degree of liberalization, which is the absence or elimination of substantially all 
discrimination. We consider that the conjunction ‘or’ has been inserted in Art. V:1(b)(i) for such 
cases where parties have already prior to the EIA eliminated substantially all discrimination 
between them at least in certain sectors. In such a case, the parties are requested not to introduce 
any new or more discriminatory measures. As noted by Cottier and Molinuevo, the standstill 
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obligation also ensures that the absence of discrimination will be maintained in sectors and modes 
that have previously been subject to unilateral liberalization.155 
 
The absence of substantially all discrimination does not need to be provided at once. Art. V:b 
includes the possibility of eliminating discrimination on the basis of a reasonable time-frame. 
Therefore, discrimination does not have to be eliminated on day one but a time-frame must be set. 
In the discussions of the CRTA, Members have suggested periods ranging from five to ten years.156 
In any case, we consider that keeping in mind the purpose of Art. V:1, any open-ended undertaking 
to eliminate discrimination at a later stage should not suffice but a specific, ‘reasonable’ time-frame 
must be set. 
 
In addition to these more technical issues, a central element in Art:1(b) relates to the meaning of 
‘discrimination’. Discrimination in WTO law covers two concepts: MFN treatment and national 
treatment (NT). With regard to the first, it is unclear what type of MFN treatment is required by the 
provision. Does the provision allow for an EIA to include a conditional MFN provision or different 
degrees of MFN treatment depending on the parties? Is gradual implementation of MFN treatment 
possible?157 As an example, in the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (‘EPA’), 
the commitments related to the presence of natural persons are not covered by the MFN clause at 
all. Compulsory provision of MFN could mitigate the possible harmful effects of proliferating 
PTAs. However, since Art. V requires the elimination of discrimination in the sense of NT only, we 
conclude that MFN as regards other EIAs is not expected from partners to an EIA. The existence of 
a general MFN discipline in the EU’s EIAs is nevertheless noted in our empirical analysis as it tells 
about the overall depth of integration between the partners to the agreement. 
 
With regard to the second aspect of discrimination, or rather non-discrimination, Art. V is clearer. It 
makes an explicit reference to the NT discipline of Art. XVII. Even though one could argue that it 
is not entirely clear whether exactly similar treatment is required under both provisions, such an 
argument is in our opinion far-fetched. There could hardly be any clearer indication of equivalence 
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in interpretation than the specification that the discrimination should be eliminated ‘in the sense of’ 
Art. XVII.  
 
Art. XVII requires that subject to any conditions and qualifications set in a Member’s Schedule, 
“each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all 
measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its 
own like services and service suppliers.” The second paragraph specifies that the requirement may 
be met by according either formally identical or formally different treatment to that accorded to the 
Member’s own like services and service suppliers. This implies prohibition of both de jure as well 
as de facto discrimination.158 
 
Some EIAs go beyond the obligations entailed in Art. XVII and engage in deeper forms of 
economic integration. The objective of deeper liberalization of services trade can be advanced 
through various regulatory cooperation instruments such as agreements on mutual recognition 
(MRAs) and harmonization.159  Since the liberalization of services is primarily concerned with 
regulatory issues, the deeper the integration, the more issues there are that tend to fall outside NT 
and instead enter the sphere of non-discriminatory domestic regulation. Deep regulatory 
cooperation typically ends up eliminating discrimination but may, in addition, lead into an 
acceptance of certain parts of the service supplier’s domestic regulatory framework as sufficiently 
adequate for the receiving Member’s regulatory purposes. Our view is that because of the direct 
reference to Art. XVII, Art. V does not require more than elimination of discrimination in the sense 
of NT. Art V. nevertheless duly recognizes deeper integration: the second paragraph gives the 
possibility to take a wider process of economic integration into account in the analysis of EIAs. 
However, since the possibility is tied to evaluating whether the conditions under paragraph 1(b) are 
met, it would seem that Art. V:2 is recognizing elements that fall short of non-discrimination, not 
elements that go further than the provision of NT. The provision is thus giving leeway to EIAs that 
do not eliminate discrimination as extensively as required by Art. V:1.  
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type of measures count as de facto discrimination. This issue is taken up below as well as in Chapter V.1 on 
methodology. 
159 As Trachtman notes, for mutual recognition to succeed, a satisfactory level of essential harmonization must have 
already taken place. Only then can countries agree on a minimum level of regulation. See Trachtman 2014, 110. Instead 
of mutual recognition, we can also talk about mutual acceptance of ‘equivalence’. A MRA or mutual acceptance of 
‘equivalence’ may be possible without straightforward harmonization but such outcomes are possible only once the 
parties are satisfied that  at least the minimum requirements of domestic regulation are fulfilled, in a different but 





A possible interpretation is that Art. V:2 simply recognizes the overall aim of deeper economic 
integration in a specific EIA. While such an agreement may contain regulatory elements of deep, 
non-discriminatory integration in certain sectors (for example, through MRAs or even through 
harmonization), the agreement may still fall short of NT in some other sectors. Therefore, we 
consider that the mapping of instruments of deep economic integration, such as MRAs and 
harmonization that go beyond the requirement of non-discrimination, is in any case relevant as they 
might affect the overall discrimination analysis of an EIA.160  
 
An EIA that does not reach the threshold of ‘substantiality’ may still be considered to respect the 
requirements of Art. V if its overall purpose is to engage in a deeper economic integration over 
time. Therefore, Art. V:2 must necessarily allow for a certain time-frame during which the wider 
process of economic integration or trade liberalization can take place. The possibility for a ‘time-
frame’ is mentioned also under Art. V:1. The elimination of substantially all discrimination should 
take place either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of ‘a reasonable time-
frame’. Since Art. V:2 allows for additional elements to be taken into account in evaluating the 
fulfillment of conditions under Art. V:1, the ‘wider process’ should be interpreted to allow for 
economic integration or trade liberalization to take place over a time period that is more extensive 
than ‘a reasonable time-frame’ that is available already under the conditions of Art. V:1. 
 
Another unclear issue relates to the list of exceptions included in Art. V.1(b). Measures permitted 
under Articles XI, XII, XIV and XIV bis are excluded from the requirement of elimination and 
prohibition of discriminatory measures. Emergency safeguard measures (Art. X), on the contrary, 
are not mentioned in the list. A question often put forward thus is whether EIA partners retain the 
right to maintain them.161 As these provisions act as exceptions, a Member is exempted from its 
obligations under a specific commitment in case it successfully invokes one of the provisions. 
 
Let us assume that a Member in an EIA with another Member has prescribed a specific 
commitment in the field of professional services, more specifically concerning medical doctors. In 
                                                
160  A separate issue is whether MRAs concluded in the context of EIAs should still be notified to the WTO in 
accordance with the procedure of Art. VII and whether they should provide adequate opportunity to any other Member 
to indicate their interest in participating in the arrangement. Since Art. V does not require Members to engage in any 
MRAs or other deep regulatory instruments, a possible interpretation is that the independent obligations under Art. VII 
still apply. As noted by Mathis, to the extent that Art. V notifications incorporate recognition instruments falling within 
the meaning of Art. VII, it is up to the Members affected by them to bring cases to dispute settlement accordingly. See 
Mathis 2006, 98.  




the commitment, in respect of Modes 3 and 4, the Member has included a language requirement 
(complete fluency in the local language). In such a scenario it could possibly be argued that such a 
strict language requirement should be considered as a measure that is de facto discriminatory (at 
least if applicable across the board with no possibility for exemptions) and thus subject to 
elimination under the criteria of Art. V. However, in this specific case, the Member might be able to 
invoke Art. XIV:b and claim that the language requirement is necessary to protect human health 
since patients must be able to communicate with their doctor in their own language. An additional 
justifying argument could be that doctors must be able to effortlessly communicate with pharmacies 
and medical authorities. Assuming that the Member’s claim was considered legitimate and it would 
satisfy all the requirements under one of the justifications of Art. XIV, and the chapeau, the 
language requirement would, in that specific case, not affect the Member’s compliance with Art. 
V:1(b).162 
 
The obvious problem is that an abstract, ex ante analysis cannot take such situations into account. 
The general exceptions, as well as security exceptions and restrictions to safeguard the balance of 
payments, are available as exceptions and thus do not need to be anticipated in one’s schedule. 
Certain commitments falling short of NT may thus lower the ‘compliance score’ of the EIA even if 
they were in an ex poste situation (in dispute settlement) considered justified under one of the 
general exceptions. Since the consideration of EIA commitments in this light is purely speculative, 
any compliance analysis is necessarily somewhat skewed in this regard.163 
 
Munin argues that Art. XVI (market access) restrictions are not covered by the requirement to 
eliminate substantially all discrimination since Art. V.1(b) requires elimination in the sense of Art. 
XVII only. Therefore, according to this interpretation, the depth of MA concessions is left to the 
discretion of the parties and only a wide scope of coverage of an EIA in terms of sectors is required. 
As has already been discussed above, we share this opinion and argue that Art. V is only concerned 
with the elimination of discrimination. This issue, however, invokes an important interpretative 
question relating to certain MA limitations: should discriminatory measures listed under Art. XVI.2 
(joint venture requirements and foreign equity ceilings) be considered as measures ‘in the sense of 
                                                
162 In order to comply with the requirements of Art. XIV, the measure would have to satisfy the necessity test, which 
requires, among other criteria, the Member to demonstrate that no other reasonably available alternative measure were 
at the Member’s disposal. In this specific example of a language requirement for medical doctors, a possible alternative, 
less trade-restrictive measure could be cooperation with local doctors or the requirement of intermediate language skills 
instead of complete fluency. On the criteria of Art. XIV GATS, see Cottier, Delimatsis, and Diebold 2008. 
163  The same applies to Art. XXIV:8 GATT since duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce must be 




Art. XVII’ to which the provision applies?164 In our opinion, that should definitely be the case 
considering that in addition to being MA limitations, such measures clearly discriminate against 
foreign services suppliers when they limit the amount of foreign investment (but not domestic 
investment) and impose an obligation of cooperation with local companies (when they, on the 
contrary, can operate freely). 
 
Among the Members, the central issue with regard to Art. V:1(b) has been the extent to which 
discriminatory measures are allowed. Most remarks have been made on the scope of the list of 
exceptions included in the provision. At least three Members have argued that the list is not 
exhaustive. 165  Divergent views have been expressed especially on safeguard measures. Some 
Members have argued that they can be applied on an MFN basis also between parties to an EIA, 
whereas some consider that safeguard measures should not be applied at all. A relevant question is 
also what other discriminatory measures, besides those falling under the enumerated Articles, 
should be allowed under an EIA.166 
 
Some Members have paid attention to the difficulty of developing elaborate interpretations or 
formulas to clarify the requirements relating to EIAs, referring especially to the difficulty in 
arriving at a percentage-type test for quantitatively measuring ‘substantially all discrimination’, 
similar to the test used in defining ‘substantially all the trade’ in goods PTAs. As a result, it has 
been suggested that each EIA needs to be examined on its own merit.167 
 
iv. Wider process of economic integration (Art. V:2) 
 
According to Art. V.2, the relationship of the EIA to a wider process of economic integration or 
trade liberalization may be considered. The provision allows for an overall assessment of the 
agreement. One could consider a situation where a new Member State joins the EU. Under Art. V:2, 
the final result and the essence of the economic integration could possibly be taken into account.168 
It is important to note that such a wider process may only be considered in evaluating whether the 
EIA provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination, but not in regard to 
the requirement of substantial sectoral coverage. 
                                                
164 Munin 2010, 233. 
165 Argentina, Japan and Korea, WT/REG/M/22, paras.16, 18 and 20. 
166 Hong Kong, China, non-paper entitled Systemic Issues arising from Article V of the GATS, Section 2. 
167 New Zealand, WT/REG/M/22, para. 17 and WTO 2000, 34. 





The Members themselves have proposed the ‘wider process of economic integration’ could be 
construed as one involving the elimination of barriers also in goods; the drafting history of this 
paragraph is said to support such an argument.  The harmonization of domestic regulation among 
parties to an EIA could also contribute to such a process.169 The meaning of the provision has been 
also been perceived as relating at to the interpretation of ‘substantially all the trade’ under Art. 
XXIV GATT and that of a ‘reasonable time frame’ in prohibiting new or more discriminatory 
measures under Art. V.1(b).170 
 
As already discussed above with regard to the requirement of elimination of discrimination, the 
provision of paragraph 2 may allow for consideration to be given to economic integration going 
beyond non-discrimination. One example of such deeper integration are recognition agreements, 
which we consider to be one demonstration of a wider process of economic integration to be taking 
place and thus relevant for the analysis of an EIA under Art. V.  A different angle to this question is 
possible as well. Trachtman considers that Art. V does not provide an exception for agreements on 
equivalence or harmonization from other GATS requirements. He argues that in light of the Turkey-
Textiles case, the exception of Art. V is, similarly to the exception of Art. XXIV GATT, only 
available with respect to measures that are necessary in order to form an EIA, or a FTA/CU.171 On 
the other hand, as argued by Klamert, the broad wording of Art. V supports a more extensive 
interpretation of this provision than Art. XXIV that was at issue in Turkey-Textiles. Art. V is not 
limited to any specific integration model but seems to encourage flexibility in the design of EIAs 
through the provision of Art. V:2. We agree with Klamert who considers that the strict standard 
applicable to CUs and FTAs would not make much sense under Art. V as it would have the effect 
of blocking many measures under deep EIAs from the start.172 Thus, MRAs and harmonization 
should be possible through an EIA even if such arrangements were not strictly necessary for the 
formation of the EIA. In our view, the notification requirement (together or separately with the 
                                                
169 WTO 200034; WT/REG/W/34, para. 11; Japan, WT/REG/M/23, para. 31; EC, WT/REG/W/35, para. 11. 
170 Korea, WT/REG/M/21, para. 20. 
171 Trachtman 2014, 122. A similar view with regard to recognition agreements is put forward by Marchetti and 
Mavroidis 2012, 425-427. 
172  Klamert 2015, 62. It should be noted that the “necessity” test formulated in Turkey-Textiles to determine the 
legitimacy of a CU/FTA still requires further clarification. The language and approach of the AB are strongly 
reminiscent of the more famous necessity test under Art. XX GATT. However, as noted by Bartels, any analogy to the 
Art. XX necessity test includes various complications in the application of the Art. XXIV defence. The most striking 
complication is the absence of any catalogue of objectives for the achievement of which a trade measure taken in the 
context of forming a PTA might be “necessary”. In Turkey-Textiles, the AB assumed that it was permissible for the 
European Communities to seek to avoid trade diversion while concluding a PTA with Turkey but the AB did not 




EIA), as well as the offering of adequate opportunity to outsiders to participate to any recognition 
measures under Art. VII still apply. In this sense, we agree with Marchetti and Mavroidis who argue 
that the establishment of an EIA cannot provide legal shelter from requests of extension of 
recognition agreements from Members outside the EIA.173 
 
v. Special and differential treatment (Art. V:3) 
 
In the GATS, developing countries do not benefit from an “enabling clause” but are subject to the 
same requirements under Art. V as developed countries. However, Art. V:3 allows for flexibility in 
the application of the substantive liberalization requirements when developing countries are parties 
to EIAs,  “in accordance with the level of development of the countries concerned, both overall and 
in individual sectors and subsectors”. Unlike the flexibility provision of Art. V:2, flexibility for 
developing countries is allowed also in regard to sectoral coverage.  However, it could be argued 
that there is a higher degree of flexibility available towards Art. V:1(b) than Art. V:1(a) since Art. 
V:3(a) states that ‘flexibility shall be provided... particularly with reference to subparagraph b’.  
 
In addition, Art. V:3(b) allows developing countries concluding EIAs among themselves to give 
more favorable treatment to firms that originate in parties to the agreement. It therefore allows for 
discrimination against undertakings originating in countries outside the agreement, even if they 
were established within the territory of one of the parties. 
 
Unlike under the Enabling Clause, Art. V:3 is not limited to EIAs among developing countries. 
Flexibility also applies to EIAs between developed and developing countries and operates as a 
limitation on the principle of reciprocity present in Art. V:1(b).174 
 
vi. The external requirement (Art. V:4) 
 
The so-called external requirement of Art. V is set in paragraph 4. It provides that EIAs must not 
“raise the overall level of barriers” to trade in services with respect to third parties. The assessment 
is made in comparison to the level applicable prior to such an agreement and in respect of each 
                                                
173 Marchetti and Mavroidis 2012, 427. 
174 Cottier and Molinuevo 2008, 141. The authors remark that some Members have suggested that the flexibility would 
extend to developed countries too when they participate in EIAs with developing countries. As the authors note, such an 
interpretation would lead to the awkward result that developed countries were required to provide for greater 




sector and subsector covered by the agreement. The provision builds upon the tradition of Art. 
XXIV:5 GATT and aims to prevent parties from embarking on so-called “fortress” economic 
integration.175 The coverage of ‘barriers’ is not defined and it is therefore unclear whether the 
provision covers measures subject to the general disciplines of the GATS (e.g. MFN, domestic 
regulation and transparency), or merely specific commitments under Art. XVI and XVII.176 
 
The interpretation of the external requirement includes similar challenges to the quantification of 
the internal requirement. As noted by Stephenson, the difficulty of calculating the overall level of 
barriers to services trade in effect before and after the formation of an EIA makes it almost 
impossible to translate this requirement in practice.177 Therefore, other approaches would need to be 
developed. Among the Members, there has been a proposition to require that an EIA did not reduce 
either the level, or growth, of trade in any sector or subsector below a historical trend.178 
 
One way to analyze at least perceived changes to the overall level of barriers towards third parties is 
to review how many negotiations based on Art. XXI (“Modification of schedules”) have been 
initiated between third parties and the EIA parties.  The modification of schedules has been topical 
between the EU and third countries after the accessions of new Member States to the Union.179 
 
vii. Rules of origin (Art. V:6) 
 
Art. V:6 includes the requirement to establish a liberal rule of origin for EIAs. The benefits of the 
EIA must be extended to any service supplier of any Member that is a “juridical person constituted 
under the laws of a party”, provided that such a service supplier “engages in substantive business 
operations in the territory of the parties to such agreement”. As has already been discussed in 
Chapter II, this feature of Art. V is unparalleled in the area of goods trade and is one of the reasons 
                                                
175 Cottier and Molinuevo 2008, 144. In “fortress” integration, countries liberalize their internal trade but do so to the 
detriment of third parties by raising compensatory protection in relation to services/service suppliers from countries 
outside the EIA. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Stephenson 2000a, 96. 
178 Hong Kong, WT/REG/W/34, para. 13. 
179  See for example the Commission proposal COM/2013/0689/final where the Commission explains the changes 
relating to the modification of commitments in the schedules of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania in the course of 
their accession to the European Union and asks the Council to authorize agreements in the form of an Exchange of 
Letters between the European Union and third countries who had submitted claims of interest. See also Jacobsson 
(2013) that analyzes the horizontal commitments of the EU’s schedule on Mode 4 in the Doha Round services offers of 
2003 and 2005. It is observed that due to the EU’s desire to aim at a common offer in services, there are certain 





why preferentialism in services is potentially less harmful for outsiders than preferentialism in 
goods. 
 
3. The elimination of discrimination in EIAs 
 
i. The key obligation: non-discrimination 
 
The essence of Art. V is the requirement of elimination of discrimination.180 This is in contrast to 
the multilateral liberalization of services under the GATS. The Preamble to the GATS does not 
mention elimination of discrimination but merely calls, among other objectives, for progressive 
liberalization of services trade. The framework for such liberalization to take place over time is 
provided in Part IV of the GATS: under Art. XIX GATS, Members should enter into successive 
rounds of negotiations of specific commitments with a view to achieving a progressively higher 
level of liberalization. The GATS Preamble can be compared to the Preamble of the GATT 1994, 
which calls for the “elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce”. 
Elimination of discrimination is thus one of the GATT’s long-term objectives but a similar 
statement is lacking in the GATS. 
 
There is thus a principal difference in the way multilateral and bilateral services negotiations should 
be conducted. The fact that non-discrimination has a key role to play in the GATS discipline on 
EIAs may give reason to suspect that GATS-compliant EIAs are possible between very trusting 
partners only. At least a certain level of similarity in cultural, political and economic backgrounds 
of the participating countries seems to contribute to a deeper integration in the field of services.181 
 
The obligation to provide for a high level of non-discrimination (a ‘substantial’ level) brings with 
itself a certain challenge for any compliance analysis. Under the GATS, discrimination can exist 
only in a situation where the services and/or service suppliers under comparison are ‘like’. The 
determination of the existence of discrimination thus requires a comparison of specific services 
and/or service suppliers to each other. This cannot be done in an abstract analysis of an EIA, and 
thus no completely accurate compliance analysis under Art. V can be concluded. 
                                                
180 Cottier, Delimatsis, and Diebold 2008, 317-318. 
181 On the relevance of the “trust theory of economic integration” in the EU and the WTO, see Lianos and Odudu 2012. 
One form of economic integration are mutual recognition agreements (MRAs). Marchetti and Mavroidis (2012) argue 
that MRAs in the WTO are frequently concluded between countries having a similar cultural background. Moreover, 






The question of likeness is only the first step in a discrimination analysis under Art. XXIV GATS. 
The finding of discrimination also requires a finding of ‘a treatment no less favourable’ than that 
accorded to one’s own like services and/or service suppliers. The question of treatment, however, 
becomes topical only after likeness has been established. 182  In the field of services, the 
establishment of likeness and less favourable treatment can be a taunting task because governments 
can always invoke difference in treatment due to various regulatory distinctions. In the lack of any 
real-life service or service suppliers, we lack the means to carry out a full discrimination analysis. 
In the following sub-section, we explain how to approach this problem in an abstract, legal analysis 
of EIAs. 
 
ii. Discrimination analysis in the EIA context 
 
Non-discrimination entails the idea of a level playing field between domestic and foreign like 
products and services. The legal framework for the creation of such a playing field is set in Art. 
XVII GATS. Based on the rulings of the Panel and the AB in EC-Bananas III, we know that the 
following four cumulative elements need to present in a successful NT violation claim: 
 
1) First, there needs to be a specific commitment in the relevant sector and mode of supply; 
2) Second, there must be a measure affecting the supply of services in the sector and mode of 
supply concerned; 
3) Third, the measure is applied to foreign and domestic like services and/or service suppliers; and 
4) Fourth, the measure accords to foreign services and/or service suppliers treatment less 
favourable than that accorded to their domestic counterpart. 
 
There is thus a four-prong test to establish inconsistency of a particular measure with Art. XVII 
GATS.183 The existence of a specific commitment in a given sector is a factual issue. Even though 
interpretative problems are always present, in an ex ante analysis of services commitments we have 
to take the existence of a commitment as taken. We also have to assume that the scheduled measure 
is meant to affect the supply of services in the sector and mode concerned. If that were not the 
purpose, the measure would not have been prescribed. The two final elements, however, pose more 
                                                
182  For an analysis of the ‘less favourable treatment’ obligation, see Ortino 2008, 174 onwards in Andenæs and 
Alexander (2008). See also Krajewski and Engelke 2008, 409-416 in Wolfrum, Stoll, and Feinäugle (2008). 




difficulties for an abstract analysis of services commitments. We do not have any real-life 
services/service suppliers to compare to each other and we typically have very few details on the 
measure to estimate whether it accords less favourable treatment or not. This is a genuine problem 
because a conclusion one way or another may result in a false finding of discrimination or non-
discrimination.184 
 
As noted by Mattoo, the narrower the definition of likeness, the more likely is the possibility that 
measures will escape the Article XVII net.185. This issue was dealt with in the most recent WTO 
dispute settlement case in the services context, Argentine – Financial Services. The dispute 
concerned eight financial, taxation, foreign exchange and registration measures imposed by 
Argentina mostly on services and service suppliers from jurisdictions that did not, at the time, 
exchange information with Argentina for the purposes of fiscal transparency. In its ruling, the Panel 
found that the relevant services and service suppliers were ‘like’ under both Art. II:1 and Art. XVII 
of the GATS, because the eight challenged measures provided for differential treatment on the basis 
of the origin of the services and service suppliers at issue. The AB, in its ruling, pointed out that 
likeness may indeed be presumed where a measure provides for differential treatment based 
exclusively on the origin of the services and service suppliers concerned. The AB, however, found 
that in its analysis under Art. II:1, the Panel did not make a finding that the distinction between 
cooperative and non-cooperative countries in the measures at issue was based exclusively on origin, 
and that the Panel erred in finding likeness “by reason of origin” in the absence of such a finding. 
Instead, the Panel should have undertaken an analysis of likeness on the basis of various criteria 
relevant for an assessment of the competitive relationship of the services and service suppliers of 
cooperative and non-cooperative countries. Because the Panel's finding of likeness under Art. XVII 
was based on its finding of likeness under Art. II:1, the AB found that the Panel erred also in its 
analysis under Art. XVII. Consequently, the Panel's findings of likeness of the services and service 
suppliers at issue under Articles II:1 and XVII of the GATS were reversed.186  
                                                
184 The establishment of likeness and less favourable treatment require a case-by-case analysis. In Japan-Alcoholic 
Beverages II, regarding Art. III:2 GATT, the AB came to the conclusion that “the interpretation of the term [likeness] 
should be examined on a case-by-case basis”. According to the AB, this allows a fair assessment in each case of the 
different elements that constitute a “similar” product. See Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, 
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, circulated 4 October 1996. 
185 Mattoo 1997, 122 and Mattoo 2000, 55. For a comprehensive analysis in the literature, see Diebold (2010). 
186 Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, WT/DS453/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, 
circulated 14 April 2016. In the same report, the AB concluded that, where a measure is inconsistent with the non-
discrimination provisions of the GATS, regulatory aspects or concerns that could potentially justify such a measure are 
more appropriately addressed in the context of the relevant exceptions and not in the context of the analysis of 
‘treatment no less favourable’ under Art. II:1 and Art. XVII. Likeness in the services context has also been dealt with in 





Because the AB did not draw any conclusions on the question of whether the services and service 
suppliers of cooperative and non-cooperative countries were like or not, it was left unclear to what 
extent a country’s cooperation with other countries on tax matters may affect the position of its 
services and service suppliers in a discrimination analysis. What the AB said was that the differing 
treatment between cooperative and non-cooperative countries inherent in the eight measures at issue 
was origin-related; however, it is not origin in itself that determines which countries are on the 
“cooperative” list but rather those countries’ respective regulatory frameworks. The AB thus left the 
door open to the possibility of taking certain regulations, or rather the lack of such regulations, of 
the country of origin into account in the determination of ‘likeness’. In this case, such regulations 
did not even relate to the quality of the services or the service suppliers but rather to their operating 
environment. However, the AB abstained from explaining how ‘likeness’ should be defined.187 
 
As a result of differences between goods and services, WTO-compliant, unilateral and extra 
territorial application of one’s regulations may be more feasible in the field of services than in the 
field of goods. One could, for example, ask if two service suppliers are like if one of them respects 
the rules of the core ILO Conventions with respect to employed personnel supplying services and 
the other one does not.188 Could the service supplier in another Member be considered ‘unlike’ to 
one’s domestic supplier if the foreign supplier’s employees had working conditions considered 
degrading in the other Member? One may also ask to what extent the ‘method’ of achieving one’s 
                                                                                                                                                            
Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publication and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, circulated 21 December 2009. 
187 The AB and panels have abstained from taking a clear stand on ‘likeness’ in the services context also in earlier 
instances. In EC-Bananas III, the panel accepted that foreign and domestic services and services suppliers were like 
without justifying its decision in detail. Its restraint is obvious in its infamous conclusion of likeness according to which 
"... to the extent that entities provide these like services, they are like service suppliers" (Panel Report, para. 7.322). In 
Canada-Autos the same conclusion (this time with respect to Art. II GATS) was repeated with the addition that it was 
applied for “the purpose of the case” (Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/R, 
WT/DS142/R, Report of the Panel, circulated 11 February 2000, para. 10.248). In the same case, the Panel also 
introduced the concept of “likeness across modes” (Panel Report, para. 10.307). The Panel also found that in the 
absence of “like” domestic service suppliers, a measure by Canada could not be found to be inconsistent with the NT 
obligation (Panel Report, paras. 10.283-10.289). The Panel thus seemed to assume that the absence of like suppliers 
implied the absence of like services. The correlation between the likeness of services and service suppliers is one of the 
key questions in the likeness analysis. In general it appears that the determination of likeness, as well as the application 
of the NT principle as a whole, gives rise to a wider range of questions and uncertainties under the GATS than under 
the GATT. See Cossy 2006, 2. 
188 The question addresses a situation where the foreign service supplier’s employees do not access the employment 
market of the other Member. In such a situation, the employment laws of the home state usually apply. Under Mode 4, 
the receiving state may in certain cases require the application of its core labor laws to the employees of a foreign 
service supplier (especially in the case of contractual service suppliers). This question is examined in more detail in 




professional capacity, such as the quality of one’s educational institute, may affect the evaluation of 
‘likeness’.189 
 
The liberalization of services has an important particularity. In contrast to the GATT whose 
disciplines are confined to the cross-border flow of goods, the GATS extends to measures affecting 
both the services (i.e. the product) and the service supplier (i.e. the producer). The extension of 
coverage to service suppliers is significant considering that many typically national regulations, 
such as quality standards, are based on the characteristics of the supplier.190 This is in contrast to 
goods where the AB has, at least so far, drawn a line between the methods of production and the 
product itself. In simple terms, the basic method of differentiation has been that only such methods 
of production that leave a trace on the product can be taken into account in the discrimination 
analysis.191 In the field of services, the competence and the performance of the ‘producer’, the 
service supplier, are inherently linked with the result of the ‘production’ – the service. This means 
that there is possibly a wide scope for differentiation of like services and service suppliers based on 
characteristics attributable to the service supplier and the methods that the supplier employs while 
supplying the traded service.192 
 
Mattoo explains the great role played by regulatory distinctions.193 Even if cross-price elasticity, 
consumer choice and other case law -established factors would point towards likeness, nothing 
prevents a government from intervening and imposing a regulatory component on a given service or 
service supplier and thus differentiating the foreign supplier from a domestic one. Moreover, 
                                                
189 There is discussion of more meaning to be given to non-product related production methods and to the production 
environment also in the field of goods. For example, Cottier and Oesch argue that it is only a matter of time before 
human rights will inform the basis of definition for a like product, and “thus will relevantly and explicitly shape the 
operation of non-discriminatory treatment”. See Cottier and Oesch 2011, 12. 
190 Lim and De Meester 2014, 1-2. 
191 So far, the AB has considered that the method of production cannot affect the analysis of ‘likeness’, unless the 
method affects the product itself. However, the placement of import controls on products produced according to a 
specific method of production may be allowed if justified under one of the general exceptions of Art. XX GATT. In US-
Shrimp/Turtle the AB made clear that Members have the right to take trade action to protect the environment (in 
particular, relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources). According to the ruling, measures relating to 
the method of harvesting sea turtles could be considered legitimate under Art. XX(g). The U.S., however, lost the case, 
not because it sought to protect the environment but because it discriminated between Members by violating the 
chapeau of Art. XX. See United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the 
Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R, circulated 12 October 1998. On the notions of non-product related and product 
related processes and production methods (‘PPMs’), see Joshi 2004, 69, 73-74. Joshi defines non-product related PPMs 
as ‘measures that relate to processes that do not impart any distinguishing characteristics to the final product’ (at p. 73). 
See also Kudryavtsev 2013, 40-47 in Epps and Trebilcock (2013). 
192 According to Krajewski, the extension of the NT obligation to service suppliers can be interpreted as allowing for a 
certain degree of differentiation according to the production process methods (PPMs) of the service in regulatory 
measures. See Krajewski 2003, 97. 
193 Mattoo 2000, 73-75. Mattoo is writing on likeness in the context of Art. II (MFN) but similar conclusions on 




likeness is of course not the sole ground for regulatory distinction; ‘less favourable treatment’ is the 
other one. The finding of discrimination between like services/service suppliers similarly requires a 
case-by-case analysis of the treatment granted.194 In addition, as we have discussed above, there is 
also the possibility of recourse to one of the justifications under Articles XI, XII, XIV and XIV bis. 
No matter where the burden of proof is placed, getting a final answer in an unclear situation is 
possible through dispute settlement only.195 
 
iii. An analysis of discriminatory measures in specific commitments 
 
Because of the above-mentioned problems in an abstract, empirical analysis of EIAs, we consider 
that the most legitimate way to conduct such an analysis is to focus on explicitly discriminatory 
measures only.196 Measures constituting de facto discrimination have to be largely omitted in an ex 
ante analysis of an EIA. Instead, the focus must be on the most detrimental types of discrimination, 
those constituting direct (or nearly direct) discrimination.197 For the analysis to be possible, a 
likeness between foreign and domestic services and/or service suppliers in the scheduled 
commitments must be assumed. We consider this reasonable as otherwise no discrimination 
analysis is possible to carry out. In any case, legal analyses of commitments under trade agreements 
always include a certain margin of error since they remain on an abstract level. 
 
                                                
194 In this regard, Mattoo notes that the sequential procedure of first determining likeness and than less favourable 
treatment is actually not ideal in the services context but leads into a legal cul-de-sac. Instead, he proposes simultaneous 
consideration of the degree of unlikeness and differences in treatment. See Mattoo 2000, 73. 
195 Discussing likeness under Art. II (MFN), Mattoo argues that in case a Member refuses access to another Member’s 
service or service supplier the burden of proof should be placed on that Member. The Member would thus be requested 
to demonstrate why the foreign and domestic services/service suppliers are not like. Mattoo 2000, 75. As to seeking 
clarity through dispute settlement, a certain reservation is warranted. As the scant case law (most recently in Argentina-
Financial Services) on ‘likeness’ under the GATS demonstrates, the meaning and scope of the concept remains largely 
unresolved. 
196 Other methodologies are, of course, available, in other types of approaches (e.g. econometric analyses). However, 
since our approach is legal and our intention is to analyze EIA commitments directly in the light of the Art. V criteria, a 
strict methodology is required.  
197 This can be equated to de jure discrimination. A measure that openly links a difference in treatment to the origin of 
the service or services and therefore modifies the conditions of competition in favour of domestic services and services 
suppliers is generally considered de jure discrimination. See Krajewski and Engelke 2008, 410. As for de facto 
discrimination, there is no positive concept for its determination and various views have been put forward in the 
literature. However, it can be considered to cover measures which do not distinguish services/services suppliers based 
on their origin but which with respect to a “neutral” criterion modify the conditions of competition in favour of 
domestic services and/or service suppliers. Ibid., 411. See also Krajewski 2003, 113, where he argues that only those 
measures which can at least theoretically be scheduled should be seen as discriminatory. This is because the possibility 
to schedule a de facto discriminatory measure only exists if the adverse effect on foreign services/service suppliers is 




In this type of abstract discrimination analysis, we divide the clearest, most explicit types of 
discriminatory measures in services trade into four different groups. These four groups consist of 
the type of measures that are taken into account in our empirical analysis.198 
 
The first group covers all commitments that prescribe an ‘unbound’ in a specific sector or sub-
sector. In substance, an ‘unbound’ means that the Member takes no commitment at all. It is the 
most straightforward limitation to NT as it entails the widest possible scope of discretion in the 
treatment of foreign services and service suppliers. Outside the general obligations that may apply 
across the sectors even when no specific commitments are undertaken, specific commitments that 
are left ‘unbound’ do not grant any guarantee of non-discrimination. Such “empty” commitments 
are thus always considered discriminatory. 
 
The second group consists of measures that are discriminatory in the clearest sense of the word: 
they are applied to foreigners only. This category of measures is directly discriminatory as the basis 
for the application of the measures lies solely in the foreign origin of the service supplier. Naturally, 
measures that grant more positive treatment to foreigners than to one’s own nationals are not of 
relevance here but only the type of measures that restrict trade in services.199 Typical measures 
under this first category are discriminatory market access restrictions such as the requirement of a 
specific legal entity, limitations to numbers of foreign services suppliers and such economic needs 
tests (ENTs) that are applied to foreigners only. Other clearly discriminatory measures are 
foreigners’ non-eligibility for subsidies, prohibition to acquire real estate, discriminatory taxes and 
discriminatory licensing and qualification requirements. With the last types of requirements, we 
refer to cases where licensing is required from foreigners only and cases where foreigners are 
required to have higher qualifications than one’s own nationals.  
 
                                                
198 Our analysis of the types of measures to be considered as limitations to national treatment is close to that of 
Miroudot and Shepherd (2014).  In their analysis of existing EIAs, they map commitments that are either ‘full’ (no 
limitation), ‘partial’ (some limitations listed), or ‘unbound’ (no commitment). ‘Partial’ commitments are broken down 
into nine different types of trade restrictive measures, four for market access and five for national treatments. See the 
“Typology of Limitations in Partial Market Access and National Treatment Commitments” in Miroudot and Shepherd 
2014, 1770. The authors use a database developed at the OECD that covers all services agreements where an OECD 
economy, China or India is a party (Miroudot, Sauvage, and Sudreau (2010)). The database includes a similar analysis 
for commitments taken under the GATS. See also the illustrative list of frequently occurring limitations to the NT 
obligation published by the WTO Secretariat. It is included as Attachment 1 in the Scheduling Guidelines (S/L/92, 28 
March 2001). The list gives examples of measures Members consider as possible violations of NT. Some of the 
measures discriminate overtly, while others appear to amount to de facto discrimination. 
199 Essentially, states have a sovereign right to treat their own products and nationals less favourably than imported 




The third group covers measures that relate to nationality.  Such measures are also based on one’s 
origin and can thus be seen as a sub-group of the second category of measures. However, they differ 
from the second group in the sense that they concern measures, which are not applied only to 
foreigners, but include a requirement concerning one’s nationality.  For example, a specific 
commitment under professional services may prescribe that companies acting in the field of 
auditing services must have in their board at least one person with the nationality of the Member in 
question. In contrast to the second group of measures, the measures belonging to this category are 
applied indistinctively to all service suppliers, but since they are based on nationality, they are 
clearly discriminatory.   
 
The fourth group of considered NT limitations forms an exception to our otherwise strict approach. 
It consists of measures concerning one’s residency. In trade law, residency requirements are 
typically considered to form a type of indirect, or covert, discrimination as they are not directly 
based on one’s nationality.200  However, because of how the GATS is structured, we consider 
residency requirements to be discriminatory but only with regard to Modes 1, 2 and 4. This is 
because the essence of these three modes is in that they enable the supply of services without 
residency. The requirement of residency would thus often strip a commitment under any of these 
three modes of its liberalization content. Although the measure does not formally distinguish 
service suppliers on the basis of national origin, it de facto offers less favourable treatment to 
foreign service suppliers because they are less likely to be able to meet a prior residency 
requirement than like service suppliers of national origin.201 With regard to this group of measures, 
our analysis includes a certain margin of error but we consider that the margin of error would be 
more significant if residency requirements under Modes 1, 2 and 4 were not taken into account. 
 
We do not take note of residency requirements under Mode 3 even if such requirements could 
potentially be considered discriminatory at least when they do not apply to the legal entity but to its 
personnel. For example, foreign companies established in the receiving Member may have board 
members or members of personnel that have their permanent residence in their country of origin. 
Requiring such persons to change their residence to the receiving Member may thus be seen as a 
restriction to the supply of services under Mode 3. However, if a similar residency requirement is 
                                                
200 Klamert 2015, 274-275. 
201 See the WTO Secretariat’s Scheduling Guidelines, S/L/92, p. 6. In the Scheduling Guidelines it is explained that the 
need to schedule residency requirements should be decided on a case-by-case basis, and in relation to the activity 
concerned. For example, a residency requirement may be considered discriminatory when there is no justified need to 




applied also to legal entities of national origin, it is not directly based on the origin/nationality of 
the service supplier. Even though such requirement may potentially constitute a violation of the NT 
obligation (in case the requirement modifies the conditions of competition in favour of services or 
service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any other 
Member), such a conclusion is not straightforward and arguably based on a case-specific analysis. 
Under Mode 3, the service supplier has a commercial presence in the receiving Member and, 
therefore, the local regulatory framework typically applies in its entirety (in the case of juridical 
person constituted under local laws) or at least to a larger degree than in respect of the other modes 
(in the case of branches and representative offices).202 Thus, there is more leeway for residency-
based measures under Mode 3 than under the other modes. 
 
Notwithstanding the residency requirements (which are arguably a form of de facto discrimination), 
our analysis is thus limited to de jure discrimination. These types of discrimination can be 
considered to constitute the clearest violations of the NT obligation. Outside such direct forms of 
discrimination, we enter a far less certain ground. The more hidden types of discrimination are 
revealed only when reviewed in the context of a specific case. 203  Taking the example of 
qualification requirements, the requirement of a local qualification (such as a professional degree in 
the receiving state) may be considered discriminatory or non-discriminatory depending on whether 
service suppliers with and without the qualification can be considered like. In addition, the 
qualification requirement must modify the conditions of competition in favour of the Member’s 
own services or service suppliers.204 
                                                
202 See our analysis of the scope of Mode 4 in the following Chapter. There we advance the argument that one 
constitutive element of service supply under Mode 4 is that the service supplier (a natural or a juridical person) remains 
largely subject to the regulatory framework of the state of origin. Under Mode 3, the establishment of a commercial 
presence in the receiving state brings the service supplier deeper, or completely (depending on the legislation that is 
applied to different types of commercial presence), within the regulatory framework of the receiving state. 
Nevertheless, the discrimination analysis of residency requirements needs to be case-specific. Certain services may be 
practically impossible to provide without residence (e.g. daily postal delivery services), whereas certain others may 
require no residency or residency of a certain type of personnel only. In addition, in many occasions public policy 
concerns may justify the need of a local representative. Since it is often not possible to conclude whether such justified 
concerns are present in a residency requirement under a specific commitment, we have opted to disregard all residency 
requirements under Mode 3 (unless it is obvious that they are applied on a discriminatory basis). 
203 The situation can be contrasted to an analysis of a goods agreement in light of Art. XXIV GATT. Even though Art. 
XXIV requires the elimination of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce on substantially all the trade 
between the parties, the analysis is, in practice, to a large extent limited to the elimination of duties. If there is an 
extensive amount of restrictive regulations of commerce left in place, such a situation is typically revealed only in 
practice. 
204 Members sometimes include in their schedules also measures that cannot easily be considered discriminator. This is 
probably a sign of lack of clarity over the borderlines between national treatment and domestic regulation. However, 
such over-scheduling may also be a smart policy as some of the measures that do not at first glance appear 





The problems relating to the analysis of discriminatory measures in a schedule of specific 
commitments are taken up in mode detail in Chapter V.1 on Methodology. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the absence of ‘substantially’ all discrimination depends not only on 
sectoral commitments but also on crosscutting horizontal commitments. They pose an additional 
challenge for any empirical analysis as they often include discriminatory limitations that are applied 
to all or a significant part of services sectors (for example, subsidies available only to one’s own 
nationals). This issue is taken up in mode detail in Chapter VI concerning the methodology of our 
empirical analysis. 
 
4. Regional subdivision and EIA commitments 
 
Research on services preferentialism has so far largely neglected the question of how to address a 
regional subdivision of a Member and the consequences it possibly has on that Members’ services 
commitments. It is noteworthy considering that several Members have constitutional structures that 
give powers to states, regions or other local entities in the regulation of services.205 The issue has, 
however, entered into spotlight in the currently ongoing trade negotiations, especially in those 
involving the EU and Canada (the CETA) and the EU and the U.S. (TTIP). 
 
Regional powers are applied across various economic activities. For example, both in the EU and 
the U.S, technical regulations on products and processes to protect health, safety, consumers and the 
environment are set on federal, state, regional and even on local agency level. In the U.S., state 
regulation often coexists with federal regulation and thus imposes a double layer of regulatory 
requirements with a significant economic impact on business. In the EU, national (and several 
layers of sub-national) regulations are abundant, especially in the non-harmonized sectors. 206 
Considering the various policy preferences and regulatory goals that are at play in economic 
activities concerning services, there can be significant differences in the ways they are regulated on 
different levels of government. The same applies to public procurement.207 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
applied. Therefore the inclusion of such measures in a schedule releases the Member from its responsibility and gives it 
more leeway in the application of the measure. 
205 The issue of commitments/restrictions on the level of sub-central governments is particularly important for federal 
states, such as Canada, Australia and the U.S. 
206 Beviglia-Zampetti 2000, 315. 




Such a variety in the internal regulations of a country, or a trading block in the case of the EU, can 
clearly be a hindrance to trade in services.  Therefore, one of the explicit aims of the new generation 
trade agreements has become to include regulatory measures imposed on services not only on the 
level of the central government but also on regional levels.208 
 
In the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Canada has for the 
first time in its PTA history included a list of provincial and territorial non-conforming measures in 
the field of services and investments. 209  The Canadian provinces and territories are bound to 
regulatory status quo and have committed to providing to the EU the benefits of autonomous 
liberalization in a number of sectors (architectural, engineering, foreign legal consultancy, urban 
planning, tourism, business services).210  
 
There is practically no literature on sub-central measures in services liberalization but Marchetti et 
Roy (2008) have paid some attention to the phenomenon. They have noted that a number of 
agreements using a negative-list approach do not include in their “List of existing non-conforming 
measures” such measures that are applied by sub-central entities, either at the state/provincial level 
or local level. Even if the measures of such entities are not listed, the existing level of access 
provided by them is nevertheless bound and cannot be made more restrictive. Given the importance 
of state/provincial entities in federal states, the authors have in their empirical study considered as 
'partial commitments' − as opposed to 'full commitments' with a score of 1 − situations where a 
country had not prescribed any limitations in a given sector but where state/provincial level 
                                                
208See, for example, the Commission’s negotiation mandates for both the CETA and TTIP agreements. In the CETA 
negotiation directives it is stated that “The Agreement shall include substantial, explicit and binding commitments in all 
those areas under negotiation which fall, wholly or in part, under the jurisdiction of Canadian Provinces and 
Territories”. Moreover, “the Agreement shall enter into force only upon the completion of the necessary procedures to 
bind the Canadian Provinces and Territories in all those areas under negotiation which fall wholly or in part under their 
jurisdiction.” See Annex 1 of the partially declassified 2008 negotiation directives, available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9036-2009-EXT-2/en/pdf (accessed 5 April 2016). 
209 “Technical Summary of Final Negotiated Outcomes, Agreement-in-principle, documents summarizing the important 
negotiated outcomes of the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement as of October 18, 
2013”, The Government of Canada, p.13, available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/ceta-aecg/ceta-technicalsummary.pdf (accessed on May 2, 2016). The CETA has not yet been 
signed nor ratified by the Parties. It is therefore not included in the empirical part of the present thesis. 
210 Ibid. Another area of major commercial interest is government procurement. Enhanced access to the Canadian public 
procurement market, including in particular access to the sub-federal levels of procurement, was a major negotiating 
aim of the EU in CETA. The final (not ratified) agreement provides full coverage of Canadian procurement, covering 
federal, provincial and municipal procurement, with relatively few explicit exceptions. See “EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)”, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External 
Policies, Policy Department, EP/EXPO/B/INTA/FWC/2013-08/Lot7/02-03, December 2015, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/535016/EXPO_IDA(2015)535016_EN.pdf (accessed on 2 
May, 2016). The EU is pushing for an enhanced sub-federal market access in services and in government procurement 
also in the TTIP negotiations. See “The Beauty of Public Procurement in TTIP” by Patrick Messerlin, ECIPE Bulletin 




measures were not listed. These were only scored as 'full commitments' in view of information 
suggesting that non-conforming measures were not applied (for example where a commitment in 
another negotiating context revealed that no such measures were in existence).211 
 
In general, sub-central measures are typically not excluded from PTAs; they are often bound at 
existing levels, but they are not listed.  That naturally complicates their analysis. That is why the 
listing of sub-central measures in the CETA is such a big step forward. With countries that do not 
list their sub-central measures, it is sometimes possible to find out what these existing measures are 
from other PTAs where they have been listed.212 
 
From a practical and methodological point of view, it may be difficult, or practically impossible, to 
map all existing non-conforming measures by regional entities in different countries and thus 
understand to what extent they do away with the amount of non-discriminatory treatment granted 
on the central level. That is the case especially when sub-central restrictions are not listed in a 
specific EIA (as is the case of the EIAs concluded by the U.S.). Sometimes it may be possible. This 
is the situation in CETA.213 The binding of provincial and local measures by Canada makes it 
possible to analyze whether Canada’s commitments reach the thresholds of Art. V as a whole.  
 
The thesis argues that no matter how they are listed, from a legal point of view, sub-central 
measures can, in excessive amounts, always be against Art. V GATS. A contradictory conclusion 
would seriously undermine the criterion of substantiality in the case of countries that have 
constitutionally divided powers in their internal regulation of service activities. 
 
Art. V does not say anything about the level of government on which the preferential liberalization 
of services needs to take place. It mentions only “between or among the parties”, meaning two or 
several contracting parties. This should be interpreted as referring to states or customs territories 
                                                
211 Marchetti and Roy 2008, 109-110. 
212 According to Martin Roy, that is the case, e.g., with the Australia-China FTA which includes state measures by 
Australia. An email discussion with Senior Trade Policy Advisor Martin Roy (former senior economist in the Canadian 
Department of Finance and former Counsellor in the Trade in Services Division of the WTO Secretariat), 25 May 2016. 
213 Canada has included in its schedule separate federal, and provincial and territorial annexes, which together form the 
entirety of its commitments. Canada’s two annexes with federal measures take approximately 50 pages of the 
agreement, whereas the two annexes with provincial and territorial restrictions occupy over 200 pages. Both the EU’s 
and Canada’s commitments follow the so-called negative scheduling practice. This is unusual for the EU, which has so 
far been using GATS-type scheduling practice in its PTAs. The GATS is based on a "hybrid" approach:  it combines a 
positive listing of sectors with a negative listing of restrictions. See Carzaniga 2003, 2. According to the EU, “the clear 
and comprehensive listing of the reservations provides unprecedented transparency on existing measures, in particular 
at provincial level”. See “CETA – Summary of the final negotiating results” by the European Commission. Available at 




such as the EU that can appear as contracting parties. In the GATS, only Art. XVI on MA refers to 
a ‘regional subdivision’. As has been noted by Krajewski, the ordinary meaning of the term would 
suggest that it is a unit which is smaller than the entire territory of a country but which is also larger 
than any particular local entity. According to Krajewski, regional subdivisions could be the states or 
provinces in a federal system or other larger administrative units in a centralized state. Since the 
term ‘subdivision’ implies that the entire territory of a country can be divided into regional 
subdivisions, a measure applying only to a particular, limited area or distinct units of the country 
(such as national parks or river basis) should not be covered.214 
 
The question we put forward in this thesis is whether Art. V covers measures taken on sub-central 
levels or on the state/CU level only. We consider the first option to be correct. The required level of 
non-discrimination should be provided across all levels of government considering that the GATS 
covers measures taken by regional and local governments and authorities in addition to the central 
authorities. According to Art. XX:1 GATS, each Member shall set out in a schedule the specific 
commitments it undertakes under Part III of the agreement. Art. XX:2 mentions ‘measures’ and 
states that such measures which are inconsistent with both Articles XVI and XVII shall be inscribed 
in the column relating to Art. XVI.  Under Art. V:1(3)(a), "measures by Members" means measures 
taken by:  
 
(i) central, regional or local governments and authorities; and   
 
(ii) non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by central, regional or 
local governments or authorities. 
 
Art. V and Art. XVII do not include any reference to a ‘regional subdivision”. It is therefore unclear 
to what extent regional measures are covered by the said provisions. The issue is as relevant under 
the GATS as it is in EIAs but in the multilateral context Members have more leeway as they may 
choose the level of government on which they desire to liberalize and how much they desire to 
liberalize. However, we would argue that they still need to exclude such local measures that they do 
not wish to liberalize. In EIAs the situation is different. Art. V GATS requires the elimination of 
substantially all discrimination between the parties with no exceptions made depending on the 
constitutional structure of the country concerned. Considering that in many countries services 
activities are to a large extent regulated on sub-central levels, the application of the Art. V 
                                                




requirements only to the central government could potentially leave a significant amount of non-
discrimination uncounted for. 
 
In the EU, the issue of regional subdivision is relevant on two levels. First, on the level of the Union 
and secondly, on the level of individual Member States. On the level of the Union there is still a 
considerable degree of diversity in the liberalization of services among different Member States. 
Considering that the EU is a contracting party of the WTO and has exclusive external competence 
to conclude trade agreements also in the field of services, the level of liberalization of services 
should match the requirements of Art. V throughout all of its constituent territories. The 
methodology of the empirical analysis of the present thesis has been built to take account of such 
differences. The liberalization scores of the EU reflect the number of Member States that have 
eliminated discrimination under each sector and sub-sector. 
 
In the EU, the second level consists of the discriminatory regulations that are potentially in force on 
the sub-central level of individual Member States. There are only a few examples of such occasions 
in the reviewed schedules of the EU’s EIAs and we have not taken them into account in our 
scoring.215  
 
As the results of our empirical analysis show, the EU’s services commitments, to a large extent, 
continue to be determined individually by its Member States. Significant variations still exist 
among different Member States both in horizontal and sector-specific commitments. The EU’s 
internal situation can be connected to the wider issue of how deep EIAs should be in order to escape 
claims of non-compliance. We put forward the question of how the exact coverage and level of non-
discrimination should be assessed in a situation where commitments vary across different states or 
regions of the same contracting party and try to answer it with regard to a customs union, the EU 
(which is not a full customs union in the field of services).  We suggest that in order to be in line 
with its international obligations, the EU (or any WTO Member with internally divided regulatory 
powers in services) should ensure that when signing EIAs, the commitments of all Member States 
(or, in the case of other WTO Members, all states/regions/other entities with regulatory powers in 
services) reach the GATS threshold of ‘substantiality’ in terms of sectoral coverage and elimination 
of discrimination. 
 
                                                
215 For example, the Åland Islands of Finland. The archipelago of Åland is a region of Finland, but compared to the 




5. Conclusions on the interpretation of Art. V 
 
i. The main challenges 
 
The biggest challenge in the analysis of EIAs under the Art. V criteria is that we do not have a clear 
benchmark for the requirements of sectoral coverage and elimination of discrimination. There is no 
unequivocal answer to the question of what ‘substantial’ and ‘substantially’ really mean. This 
forces one to ask whether the negotiators’ purpose has been to avoid any clear-cut interpretations 
from being made. The diversity in the Members’ positions as to the correct interpretation of 
‘substantiality’ confirms that no common understanding exists. 
 
In addition, an empirical analysis of the level of discrimination in EIAs includes two other 
significant challenges. First, because only the most blatant forms of discrimination can be taken into 
account, the results of an abstract empirical analysis (to which we also refer as ex ante analysis) are 
likely to show less discrimination than the agreement in reality entails. The second challenge, on the 
other hand, relates to the possible event of finding discrimination there where it could potentially be 
permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIV and XIV bis. 
 
The measurement and assessment of ‘substantial coverage’ and ‘substantially all discrimination’ in 
quantitative and qualitative terms inevitably entails a case-by-case analysis on the level of specific 
commitments under each sector. However, the review procedure under the Transparency 
Mechanism of 14 December 2006 is limited to the preparation of a simple factual presentation that 
only gives an overall assessment of the agreement. A more specific examination may only take 
place in dispute settlement where Panels and the AB would be called upon to examine the WTO-
compatibility of a specific domestic measure based upon an EIA. In such a case, the compatibility 
of the agreement with Art. V may be examined as a preliminary matter.216 
 
Dispute settlement on PTA-related issues is extremely rare and we are not likely to receive much 
clarity on the WTO-compliance of EIAs through that route. While the number of PTAs is growing, 
it would, however, be important to keep some track of their relationship to the legal disciplines. Due 
to the modesty of the Transparency Mechanism, it is mainly left to scholars to propose alternative 
methods for the analysis of PTAs and to inform decision-makers of the results of such analyses. In 
                                                




this thesis, we propose one approach that pays due respect to the flexibility and complexity depicted 
in the discipline while providing concrete means to assess EIAs and compare them to each other. 
 
ii. What benchmark for EIAs? 
 
The internal and external requirements set out the principal intent behind Art. V. They express the 
desirability of increasing trade by voluntary agreements between willing partners. Similarly to Art. 
XXIV GATT, they recognize that the purpose of an EIA should be to facilitate trade between the 
parties and not to raise barriers towards those remaining outside the agreement.217 As in Art. XXIV, 
there is, however, a clear tension between the two requirements: the deeper the integration, the 
more dramatic are typically the effects on outsiders. This seeming irrationality was already brought 
up by Viner who noted the paradox of demanding a 100 per cent preference, “which suddenly turns 
to a maximum evil at 99 per cent…” In Viner’s view, a completed customs union was still 
preferable since in that case the removal of duties is non-selective by its very nature and the 
“beneficial preferences are established along with the injurious ones, the trade-creating ones along 
with the trade-diverting ones”.218 
 
This very tension is maybe behind what has become a systemic disregard of the basic principles of 
Art. XXIV GATT and Art. V GATS. Moreover, it is now practically impossible to know how far or 
close PTAs come to fulfilling the requirements, as there is no longer any comprehensive 
multilateral review system. There has also been a shift in the analysis of PTAs in literature. Today, 
most studies focus on systemic issues stemming from PTAs as well as on reviewing the so-called 
WTO+ elements contained in them. Even when presenting observations on a specific PTA’s 
consistency with the WTO criteria, scholars avoid drawing any dramatic conclusions based on such 
observations. 
 
Especially in the context of EIAs this is understandable considering the vagueness of the terms 
‘substantial’ and ‘substantially’, as well as the complex modalities of liberalizing services. We lack 
a clear benchmark as to how much discrimination EIAs should be allowed to maintain. In addition, 
an objective analysis is close-to an impossible task to carry out. Because of difficulties in measuring 
services liberalization, assessing the fulfillment of the Art. V criteria necessarily includes a great 
                                                
217 Mathis 2006, 79-80. 




deal of subjectivity.219 Another challenge is that Art. V gives some room to the so-called “living 
agreements”. First, the absence/elimination of discrimination can be attained on the basis of a 
reasonable time-frame and second, Art. V:2 allows consideration to be given to a wider process of 
integration. In deep economic integration projects, such as the EU, higher level of liberalization is 
being attained in a continuous, slow process with occasional setbacks.220 
 
In the present thesis the emphasis is on analyzing the EU’s EIAs in the light of the internal 
requirement of Art. V:1. The aim is to show how far the EU comes in eliminating discrimination 
across the services sectors. The purpose is not to reach any final conclusion on the compliance of 
the EU’s EIAs with Art. V:1. Some suggestions can, however, be made. They are made on two 
different grounds. First, it is suggested that if an EIA provides for non-discrimination in less than 50 
% of the coverage of the agreement, a priori assumption of the agreement falling short of Art. V 
requirements can be made. That is because under no circumstances can ‘substantial’ be considered 
to be less than 50 % of coverage. Such a low level of liberalization cannot, in our view, be saved 
even by the possibility of taking any wider process of integration into account.  In the case of the 
EU, our results do not show the overall level of coverage but the percentage of Member States 
providing for non-discrimination. The implications of this are analyzed in Chapter VI.  
 
The second ground for conclusions as to the liberalization level of a specific EIA in relation to the 
Art. V criteria relates to the Members’ practice. Considering the intentional flexibility built in Art. 
V, the Members’ practice becomes more relevant than in a situation where a clear interpretation of 
the wording of Art. V was available. We do not suggest the establishment of subsequent practice in 
the sense of Art. 31:3(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as that would require 
going through a much bigger sample (if not all) of EIAs with a rigorous methodology. Such a 
methodology is hardly available for the analysis of EIAs. Instead, we suggest a more modest 
comparison of the Members’ EIAs to each other. In such a comparison, the overall purpose of the 
agreement should be taken into account. An EIA aiming to create a common market should be 
viewed somewhat differently from an EIA aiming at simple commercial market opening. Such 
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comparisons should be made also between the different agreements of any single Member. The 
average level of liberalization in both types of comparisons gives us some scope of realistic 
expectations to be made as regards the liberalization level of EIAs. 
 
In the present thesis, the EU’s EIAs are compared to each other keeping this purpose in mind. Each 
agreement’s numerical scores on sectoral coverage and non-discrimination provide the tool for 
comparison, between the agreements themselves as well as to the criteria of Art. V:1. In addition, 









One of the substantial issues of the thesis is to clarify what is the exact scope of Mode 4. The thesis 
thus sheds light on the question concerning the differentiation between labour mobility and the 
movement of natural persons supplying services (labeled by us as ‘service mobility’). This is done, 
firstly, by analyzing the GATS provisions on Mode 4 and, secondly, by interpreting the provisions 
in the light of the Members’ practice. The chapter serves the overall goal of the thesis, which is to 
find out how well the EU’s EIAs correspond to the requirements of Art. V GATS. Even though 
there are uncertainties relating to the exact scope of all modes under the GATS, Mode 4 is arguably 
the most disputed one. At the same time, due to its connection to migration, Mode 4 is especially 
sensitive to political considerations.221 For that reason, it also remains generally the least liberalized 
mode in the WTO Members’ commitments.222 The extent to which the EU’s preferential services 
commitments correspond to the Art. V criteria depends partly on how we should understand the 
scope of Mode 4. This is the question we engage with in this chapter. 
 
The present chapter thus analyses the scope and coverage of the so-called Mode 4 in the 
international trade in services and especially within the framework of the WTO.223  Instead of 
presenting Mode 4 as another form of labour migration, the focus is on the conceptualization of 
Mode 4 as an instrument of multilateral trade liberalization.224 The analysis is built upon the issue 
of employment market access that is argued to distinguish Mode 4 from traditional labour 
migration. It is proposed that for employment market access to occur, two criteria need to be 
simultaneously met. First, the host state’s labour laws must apply, and secondly, the foreign worker 
must occupy, in the host state, a post that could be taken up by a local worker. The normative 
conclusions are supported by an empirical study of the biggest service importers’ Mode 4 
commitments. 
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(e.g. managers), movements (e.g. intra-corporate) and stays (e.g. up to four years). See WTO 1998, 2. 
223 The present chapter is a modified version of Jacobsson (2015) in Panizzon, Zürcher, and Fornalé (2015). 






The relevance of cross-border movement of labour was evident early on in the GATS negotiations 
but the question of the scope of Mode 4 took longer to resolve. 225  According to the final 
formulation, Mode 4 covers the supply of a service by a service supplier of a WTO Member in the 
territory of another WTO Member through the presence of natural persons. The GATS applies to 
measures affecting natural persons who are service suppliers themselves and to natural persons who 
are employed by a service supplier. Both independent service suppliers and employees of service 
suppliers are thus covered. In the second case, the employer is either a natural person (an 
independent service supplier) or a service company. In order to benefit from Mode 4, the natural 
persons and their employer must all originate in a WTO Member.226 
 
The GATS does not set any time limits for the supply of a service under Mode 4 and the WTO 
Members remain free to regulate the issue as they choose. In most cases the Members’ Mode 4 
commitments are limited to a specific period of time. It has therefore become customary to speak of 
Mode 4 as covering the temporary movement of service suppliers.227 
 
This chapter argues that the temporary nature of the movement of service suppliers is only one 
element of Mode 4 and does not suffice for its conceptualization. Instead of concentrating on the 
duration covered, the focus should be on the principal issue that is necessarily pertinent whenever 
the movement of people is at stake. The natural question is to ask if the GATS regulates labour 
migration, i.e. the inward movement (immigration) for employment purposes. The answer 
characterizes the nature of the GATS as an international agreement and significantly affects the 
types of migration and transactions it can cover. This chapter takes the position that the question 
should be answered in the negative. The reasoning behind this is principally based, first, on the text 
of the GATS and, secondly, on its nature as a trade agreement. 
 
The starting point is the GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services (the 
MNP Annex) which provides some clarification on the scope of Mode 4. According to the Annex, 
‘the Agreement shall not apply to measures affecting natural persons seeking access to the 
employment market of a Member, nor shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship, residence or 
employment on a permanent basis’. This blunt statement seems to carve out employment market 
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access from the agreement’s scope. However, nowhere in the GATS is it explained what 
employment market access means. While making the scope of Mode 4 extremely vague, the 
ambiguity is understandable especially for the following reasons. Firstly, the Annex strikes a 
delicate balance between the interests of countries at different stages of development and with 
different economic profiles. 228  Without being too restrictive, the carve-out protects the most 
developed countries against the demands for the liberalization of labour immigration.229 Secondly, 
employment market access is impossible to define in exact terms in an international trade 
agreement because it is a concept that is dealt with under national employment law and thus differs 
from state to state. Thirdly, because international service transactions can be carried out through 
different types of contractual arrangements, the issue necessarily enters into the field of contract law 
and private international (labour) law. No internationally harmonized codes exist in either 
discipline. 
 
Notwithstanding these inherent difficulties in defining Mode 4, this chapter builds upon the issue of 
employment market access that the GATS itself places at the centre of its definition.230 In the 
absence of any generally agreed definition for employment market access, and the dependence on 
national employment and conflict of law rules, the chapter proposes one possible construction with 
the help of which the issue may be analysed. 
 
Employment market access is here understood to cover at least two issues. Firstly, it means that the 
migrant worker enters the regulatory framework of the host state. From the point of view of 
employment regulation, this entails that the labour laws of the host state apply in their entirety. 
Secondly, employment market access implies that the foreign worker is occupying, in the host 
state’s labour market, a post that might equally well be occupied by a domestic worker. It is argued 
that for full employment market access to occur, both criteria need to be fulfilled simultaneously. 
 
The first criterion is a legal one. Although the applicability of the host state’s labour varies across 
the WTO Members, the issue is usually contractual in nature: the extent to which a service supplier 
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enters the regulatory framework of the host state depends on the nature of the service supplier’s 
relationship with the host state entity that is acting either as an employer or as a client. A work 
contract entails employment in the host state, whereas a service contract provides for a private 
transaction with a wider freedom of contract. In a service contract there is no employment 
relationship between the foreign service supplier and the host state client. Instead, a work contract 
may exist between the service supplier and its employees. Such an employment relationship is 
primarily subject to the laws of the sending state and the labour laws of the host state apply to the 
workers only to a limited extent. How widely they apply, greatly affects the conditions under which 
the service supply can take place. 
 
The second criterion compares a Mode 4 service supplier to a person employed in the host state (a 
participant in the host state’s employment market). Any exhaustive assessment of the effects of a 
foreign workforce on local workers requires an economic analysis.231 However, another way to 
approach the issue is more analytical. For that purpose it suffices to ask which Mode 4 categories 
involve persons performing activities that could equally well be performed by local workers. 
 
Both criteria are examined below. In addition, a short study on the biggest service importers’ GATS 
commitments is presented. The results of this study show how some of the biggest WTO Members 
approach the issue of employment market access and how it is to be understood based on their 
practice, in the light of the commitments they have taken under the GATS. 
 
When addressing Mode 4 type movement, we refer to service mobility. This term encompasses both 
natural persons acting as service suppliers and natural persons employed by service suppliers 
(which, in turn, are either companies or natural persons themselves). In contrast, the movement of 
natural persons who gain access to the host state’s labour market and are thus employed there is 
referred to as labour mobility. This term basically means the same as labour migration or labour 
immigration. The term mobility, however, encompasses a wider scope of activities than migration. 
Whereas migration is usually understood as a movement of an often permanent nature, the term 
mobility lays emphasis on today’s reality of a mobile workforce and on the blurriness of the limits 
between permanent and temporary types of work. 
 
                                                





The chapter starts by briefly explaining the historical and economic background of the GATS and 
analyses how Mode 4 is constructed in it. It then concentrates on the central question of 
employment market access. The final, empirical section starts by explaining the method used in the 
study on the chosen WTO Members’ Mode 4 commitments, after which it turns to the analysis of 
the results. Both the empirical results and the arguments presented in the chapter are drawn together 
in the conclusion. 
 
2. What is Mode 4? 
 
i. Historical and economic background 
 
The scope and significance of Mode 4 is best understood in the light of the negotiations that led to 
the conclusion of the GATS in 1994. Before the advent of the GATS, trade in services was already 
regulated in certain bilateral and regional schemes, the focus of which was, however, quite 
narrow.232 In the 1980s it became clear that technological development was beginning to open 
foreign markets to services more widely. The U.S. in particular saw the opportunities that a 
multilateral trade agreement on services could create.233 
 
The GATS was negotiated at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, at a time when 
the importance of the services sector was becoming increasingly evident. By that time services 
already accounted for over 60 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.234 Even though there was a general 
understanding of the significant economic gains that could be attained through liberalization of 
services, the challenge was to draft an agreement that would meet the expectations of countries at 
different stages of development. Several developing countries at first refused to negotiate on 
services for fear of having to open their vulnerable services markets to foreign competition. In the 
course of the negotiations they also became concerned that their own comparative advantage, 
abundant labour, would not be adequately addressed in a services agenda that was mainly focused 
on the liberalization of the financial sector and investment. For reasons of parity, certain leading 
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developing countries thus pushed for the inclusion of labour movement in the GATS.235 The results 
of the negotiations only partially met the demands of these countries. Whereas, in principle, the 
GATS allows for the movement of all categories of natural persons, in practice, the Members have 
liberalized the movement of very specific types of professionals only. 
 
Notwithstanding the significant economic potential that freer movement of service suppliers holds, 
many authors have drawn attention to the extremely modest level of liberalization that was reached 
under Mode 4 in the Uruguay Round.236 Very few WTO Members have taken any significant 
commitments under Mode 4 and the existing commitments mainly relate to the movement of intra-
corporate transferees (most often executives, managers and specialists), business visitors and highly 
skilled self-employed persons. Moreover, Mode 4 commitments generally do not even bind the 
status quo but often reflect stricter entry conditions than the access granted in practice. 237 
Considering that the GATS commitments were made in the mid-1990s, the difference between 
bound and applied entry conditions is likely to have become wider since then. Taking into account 
the modest level of liberalization achieved so far, it is not surprising that trade in Mode 4 represents 
less than 5 per cent of overall services trade.238 
 
It can be argued that, for the sake of increased relevance, the WTO Members should extend their 
Mode 4 commitments to include temporary employment with nationally-owned host state 
employers.239 The supporters of this point of view emphasize the economic gains stemming from 
the liberalization of labour migration and the difficulties in distinguishing service contracts from 
employment contracts.240 In this chapter it is proposed that the placing of Mode 4 outside the ambit 
of labour mobility follows the logic of a trade agreement and can lead to benefits that participation 
in the local employment market would not offer. There is a growing need to efficiently transfer 
expertise and labour force internationally, either through the temporary relocation of specialists or 
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for the purposes of contractual service supply.241 Even though such transactions do not replace 
traditional immigration for labour purposes, they can increase gains and bring additional income to 
both sending and receiving states. A more practical consideration is that it would be unrealistic to 
expect OECD countries to open their markets to labour mobility in a multilateral, legally binding 
agreement. Instead of arguing that WTO Members should do this, it could be more productive to 
call for deeper commitments that remain purely within the sphere of services trade.242 
 
A significant impediment to a more liberalized Mode 4 is the lack of incentive. Instead of taking 
binding commitments on a multilateral basis in accordance with MFN treatment, WTO Members 
have the possibility to do so unilaterally or bilaterally by granting access to certain nationals only. It 
seems that even if access to local employment markets is ruled out, the requirement of MFN creates 
an issue of trust. Unilateral market opening or specifically negotiated bilateral migration schemes 
have the advantage that they can be easily reversed and are concluded with certain countries only. 
Such arrangements provide the flexibility that is often needed for the regulation of movement of 
people.243 
 
Mode 4 does, however, have certain advantages over bilateral migration agreements. Being part of a 
trade deal, Mode 4 commitments can be used as a trade-off for other goals: the commitments are 
part of a wider negotiation agenda and hence contribute to the attainment of a quid pro quo.244 
Moreover, a trade agreement can be an easier instrument to use politically than an agreement 
liberalizing immigration outright.  
 
Multinational companies and developing countries share an interest in having a more open Mode 4. 
Whereas the latter wish to increase the movement of their nationals in ways unrelated to 
commercial presence abroad, multinational companies would like more scope for the international 
movement of their personnel (related to Mode 3).245 Moreover, both big and smaller companies are 
increasingly interested in deploying foreign personnel for short, specific projects with tight 
deadlines. 246  An attractive prospect for these companies would be the possibility to bypass 
frustrating visa procedures and employer’s obligations. Considerable economic gains have been 
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243 See Cholewinski (2015), 238. 
244 Panizzon (2010) and Trachtman (2009). 
245 Mattoo and Carzaniga (2003), 1-3. 




demonstrated to be achievable even by modest liberalization of Mode 4 if the relatively abundant 
medium-skilled and less-skilled workers from developing countries were allowed to provide their 
services in developed countries247 In the developed parts of the world, temporary access is often 
preferred to more permanent types of immigration due to the lower social and political costs 
involved. In developing countries, on the other hand, temporary outward movement can lead to less 
brain drain than permanent emigration.248 
 
ii. Definition under the GATS 
 
Article 1 of the GATS defines trade in services under Mode 4 as the supply of a service by a service 
supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any 
other Member. In addition, the MNP Annex states that the Agreement does not apply to measures 
affecting natural persons seeking access to the employment market of a Member, nor to measures 
regarding citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis.249 
 
The GATS does not define the concepts ‘access to the employment market’, ‘residence’ and 
‘employment’. Whereas the exact scope of all GATS modes of supply is somewhat open to 
interpretation, in the case of Mode 4 the lack of clarity culminates in a very fundamental issue. 
Based on the reading of the GATS provisions dealing with Mode 4, it is not entirely clear to what 
extent measures pertaining to the field of labour mobility were intended to be covered. 
 
The obscurity is principally due to two separate provisions of the GATS. First, it is sometimes 
claimed that Article 1:2(d) read together with the first paragraph of the MNP Annex leaves it 
unclear whether employment in the service of a host state employer can be considered part of Mode 
4.250 Secondly, the second paragraph of the MNP Annex has given some commentators reason to 
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infer that only permanent employment in the host state is excluded.251 They have, a contrario, 
concluded that temporary employment in the host state would be covered by Mode 4. 
 
Some backing for such a proposition can be found in certain WTO Members’ GATS schedules. The 
most notable example is the Mode 4 commitment of the U.S. that provides on an annual basis for 
the temporary employment of 65 000 persons in specialty occupations (the so-called H1-B visa). 
Moreover, a significant number (43) of mostly developing Members have included in their 
schedules a versatile group of executives, managers and specialists (EMSs) without specifications 
as to the nationality or location of their employer.252 Section 5 of this chapter will show that in the 
case of the biggest service importers, no access to the host state employment market is allowed in 
the majority of their commitments. 
 
It has been proposed that a combined reading of the MNP Annex, Art. I:2(d) as well as the 
Members’ commitments could be seen as resulting in the coverage by Mode 4 of the following 
categories of persons:  
 
• foreign self-employed persons supplying services to host state companies of individuals 
(independent professionals, IPs) 
• employees of a foreign service supplier who are temporarily transferred to the supplier’s 
commercial presence in another Member (intra-company transferees, ICTs) 
• employees of a foreign service supplier who enter the host state to supply a service pursuant 
to a service contract between their employer and the host-country client (contractual service 
suppliers, CSSs) and  
• business visitors (BVs) and services salespersons who seek entry for the purpose of setting 
up a commercial presence or negotiating the sale of a service.253 
 
As already mentioned, some Members have also included in their schedules the group of 
executives, managers and specialists (EMSs) who appear on some occasions to overlap with ICTs 
and on other occasions to provide for the possibility of entry to the host state employment market. 
Notwithstanding these differences in the Members’ practice and certain scholars’ desire for an 
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extended coverage of Mode 4, the majority view among commentators appears to be that host-
country employers are not covered.254 Self and Zutshi point out that during the GATS negotiations 
the issue of employment of foreigners by host state employers did not even come up for a detailed 
examination because access to the employment market was understood to be outside the coverage 
of the agreement.255 However, as the GATS does not define Mode 4 in any detail, there is no clear 
answer to the question of which categories of persons exactly are covered. 
 
The most common conceptualization of Mode 4 is built around its temporary character. The GATS, 
however, does not set any time limits and the definition of period of stay is left to the discretion of 
the Members.256 A look at the Members’ schedules reveals that there is considerable variety in the 
periods of time covered: they extend from a couple of months to several years. Bilateral migration 
schemes, such as temporary worker programmes, usually also limit the maximum period of 
employment and they are categorically conceptualized as providing temporary employment in the 
host state.257 Trade agreements, however, do not follow an entirely similar logic to that of migration 
agreements; it is thus questionable whether the most accurate conceptualization of service supply 
under a trade agreement should be built similarly to migration schemes. 
 
According to the MNP Annex, employment market access is the factor that distinguishes labour 
mobility (labour immigration) from service mobility (Mode 4). Employment market access would 
entail employment with host state entities. Even though the majority view is that domestic 
employment, and thus labour mobility, is not covered, making the distinction between service and 
labour mobility is largely neglected in the scholarly analysis of Mode 4.258 This neglect results from 
difficulties in distinguishing between the two phenomena, as their boundaries vary between the 
different legal cultures. Furthermore, the distinction tends to be further blurred by economic 
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analyses that do not take the conceptual differences between labour and service mobility into 
account.259 
 
Analyses of Mode 4 usually focus on the formation of an employment relationship between the 
Mode 4 entrant and the service recipient. According to Bast, ‘the decisive element in distinguishing 
employment from other forms of personal service is the degree of freedom from the instructions of 
a superior since a substantial degree of independence is usually seen as a typical feature of self-
employment’.260  
 
The analysis by Bast is correct. Based on a case-by-case analysis, and in accordance with the host 
state law, it helps to establish whether a specific situation is covered by Mode 4 or not. There are, 
however, practical considerations which limit the usefulness of a blunt differentiation between work 
and service contracts. For these reasons, the analysis should be taken further. There are two groups 
that require specific attention. The first are intra-company transferees (ICTs) who appear in most 
Members’ schedules.261 ICTs are a special case in the sense that they are employed in the host state. 
Their employer, however, is a foreign-owned entity whose presence in the host state is often linked 
to Mode 3.262 If one were to distinguish Mode 4 entrants from labour migrants purely based on their 
type of contract, ICTs would necessarily have to be categorized as labour migrants because they are 
employed in the host state. 
 
A second complex category of Mode 4 entrants are contractual service suppliers (CSSs). So far they 
appear in only a few schedules, the EU being the most prominent example. Nevertheless, the 
biggest potential for further liberalization of Mode 4 lies in this category.263 This would be the case 
especially if WTO Members opened their markets to less-skilled contractual workers in sectors such 
as construction, health-care or any other sector where there is significant labour input. In these 
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sectors, however, there is a strong prospect for the contractual relationship between the Mode 4 
entrant and the host state client to become blurred. To stay in the field of Mode 4, the person 
performing the service should not become a subordinate of the host state entity but should retain a 
strong degree of freedom and take regular instruction only from the employer based in the sending 
state.  
 
In fields where CSSs work closely with the host state entity, the maintenance of independence can 
be problematic. In the construction field, for example, part of a project can be outsourced to a 
foreign service supplier. When the employees of the foreign service supplier work side-by-side with 
local workers and under the supervision of the same master builder, they become easily identifiable 
with the locally employed workers. Even if formally in a contractual relationship, such workers 
may be categorized as labour migrants by local authorities. This can be detrimental to their status as 
Mode 4 entrants. A similar problematic situation can arise in the case of independent professionals 
(IPs). IPs, however, are usually highly-skilled professionals, such as architects and lawyers. Since 
they usually perform their services independently, the formation of an employment relationship is 
avoided. In the case of less independent IPs, similar problems to those faced by CSSs may arise. 
 
The examples of ICTs, CSSs and IPs demonstrate that it is problematic to use the type of contract as 
the main criterion for distinguishing Mode 4 entrants from more traditional labour migrants. Even if 
the distinction is legally correct, it leads to situations where further liberalization of Mode 4 would 
be challenged due to its identification with labour immigration. To keep Mode 4 in the field of 
services and within the scope of the GATS, Members should aim to construct their commitments in 
a way that does not entail the formation of an employment relationship with a host state entity. 
 
To help in this endeavour, additional criteria for defining ‘employment market access’ in the GATS 
context could be used. Special attention should be paid to the cross-border element of Mode 4 that 
is present in all service trade. The cross-border element separates service mobility from labour 
mobility. Whereas employment-based work performance is regulated by host state norms, in service 
contracts the employment relationship remains under the regulation of the sending state. Even if 
host states sometimes extend the application of their most important labour norms to foreign 
workers performing services on behalf of their home state employers, the home state rules on the 
employment of the workers continue to apply. One can take the example of CSSs and IPs. If they 
retain a sufficient degree of independence from their customers, they are usually not considered to 




sending state, even if certain mandatory host state rules, for example on minimum pay, are often 
applied. 
 
The first aspect specific to Mode 4 entrants thus relates to the regulatory framework in which these 
entrants operate. The second aspect is the competition with local workers. Employment market 
access can occur only in cases where the Mode 4 entrant is occupying a post that could potentially 
be filled by a local worker. With CSSs and IPs this is often the case since most services could also 
be provided by domestic workers. In the case of ICTs, however, the situation is different. When 
they are required to possess knowledge specific to the foreign company, no local worker is 
replaced.264 The situation is different when ICTs are simply categorized as experts or managers with 
no special connection to any foreign entity belonging to the same group of companies as the 
receiving entity in the host state. If they are in an employment relationship with the group’s host 
state entity and their job could be performed by a local worker, under the criteria presented here, 
employment market access can be said to occur. 
 
As the examples of CSSs, IPs and ICTs show, both criteria put forward here need to be 
simultaneously met for employment market access to occur in a specific case. In the case of CSSs 
and IPs, attention should be paid to the applicable regulation. Where closer links to the sending 
state prevail, no employment market access occurs even if the job could be performed by a local 
worker. In the case of ICTs, a conceptual differentiation between labour entrants and Mode 4 
entrants relates to their capacity to provide expertise that could not be easily supplied by local 
workers. 
 
Before going further into the issue of employment market access, it is necessary to explain why the 
issue is important and why employment market access (or rather, non-access) should be seen as the 
core criterion in the definition of Mode 4. Two issues arise in particular: trade logic and MFN. Each 
will be dealt with separately below.  
 
iii. Mode 4 as a trade instrument 
 
                                                
264 The company-specific specialty is usually demonstrated with a prior employment requirement. Of the ten biggest 
service importers whose Mode 4 schedules were examined for the purposes of this chapter, eight explicitly require prior 
employment in the sending state for a minimum of one year before the transfer. Two (Brazil and China) do not mention 




Mode 4 suffers from a lack of clear conceptualization. This is evident both in the light of the 
Members’ schedules and the literature. The absence of generally agreed definitions makes it hard to 
distinguish between different categories of Mode 4 and to compare them across the Members’ 
commitments. Particular terms, such as specialists and executives, and open-ended notions, such as 
economic needs tests, are not used consistently even by individual Members. The problems in 
classification and in determining the exact scope of Mode 4 allow for administrative discretion and 
loss of relevance. 
 
The main challenge is the location of Mode 4 in the middle of trade and migration, due to which it 
is often poorly coordinated between the authorities administering the two fields. Even though it is 
part of a trade instrument, the fate of the persons entering a country under Mode 4 is in the hands of 
immigration authorities. Even though some countries have special procedures for entrants under 
Mode 4 (for example, the GATS visas in the UK and Australia), service suppliers may need to be 
fitted into immigration categories designed for employment-based movement. 
 
The variety of actors involved is thus a challenge. Another factor blurring the distinction between 
labour and service mobility is that developing country Members of the WTO, as well as several 
commentators, are pushing for further liberalization of labour mobility. Bringing labour mobility 
under the GATS would make any commitments on immigration binding and subject to compulsory 
WTO dispute settlement. This would greatly increase the relevance of Mode 4 as a migration 
instrument considering that there are no other legally enforceable migration agreements.265 
 
It is, however, hard to see many countries being willing to tie their labour migration schemes to a 
multilaterally fixed level enforced with MFN. The overemphasis on Mode 4 as a labour migration 
scheme actually limits its use in trade negotiations: Mode 4 already risks becoming a non-trade 
issue in some countries. For example, in the U.S., as a consequence of the opposition of the 
Congress, no PTA negotiated by the U.S. since the early 2000s has contained a chapter aimed to 
facilitate the movement of natural persons.266 In the EU, on the other hand, the Union’s exclusive 
competence to conclude trade agreements does not extend to agreements liberalizing immigration. 
Agreements entering into the field of labour mobility would thus need to be signed and approved 
                                                
265 Trachtman (2009). 
266 Stephenson and Hufbauer 2011, 282. In 2005 the Congress started to oppose the inclusion of immigration measures 
in trade agreements especially because of the limited possibility to exercise control. This has blocked the inclusion of 
Mode 4 commitments in US trade agreements altogether. See Sarah Anderson, U.S. Immigration Policy on the Table at 




separately by each Member State, which otherwise is no longer a necessity in services trade. This 
would mean that any national parliament that was discontented with the immigration aspect of the 
trade deal could veto it in its entirety.267 
 
Limiting the scope of Mode 4 to service mobility would not eliminate opposition but could increase 
the tradability of Mode 4. Moreover, such a limitation more closely follows the logic of a 
conventional, cross-border trade agreement. In an international trade transaction a sales contract is 
concluded between economic actors in (at least) two different countries. In labour mobility the 
economic actor (the migrant) moves to the regulatory framework of the host state and no formal tie 
with the country of origin necessarily remains. The economic benefits of such a move accrue 
primarily to the migrant himself or herself. Naturally, the migrant’s family and the country of origin 
often benefit in the form of remittances, but such transfers are subject to individual discretion.268 
 
It is worth emphasizing that the GATS is an agreement that provides for the liberalization of trade 
in services between different countries. Trade in services under Mode 4 is defined as the supply of a 
service by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in 
the territory of any other Member. In the case of natural persons acting as employees of a service 
supplier, the service being liberalized is the one supplied by their employer, not by themselves.269 If 
domestic service suppliers (other than foreign-owned entities established under Mode 3) could also 
appear as employers, there would be no trade in the sense of the GATS. 
 
For the sending state it is relevant that the service supplier and its employees remain in the field of 
application of home state regulation. In this case, the employees’ work performance, as well as the 
value created by the service supplier, can be subjected to home state taxes and social security 
contributions.270 If the service supplier or its employees instead enter the host state employment 
                                                
267 Bungenberg 2010, 132. 
268 For an excellent account of the welfare economics of migration see Trachtman 2009. The economic effects of 
temporary v.  permanent migration in home and destination countries are debated among economists. There are no 
simple conclusions but the theory suggests that the biggest benefits accrue to the migrants themselves. See Trachtman 
2009, 48. Temporary migration, or, as in this case, service mobility, does not necessarily make the home country better 
off. Temporary migration, however, appears better suited than permanent migration to ensure that the arrangement 
benefits developing countries. See Chaudhuri, Mattoo and Self, 381. 
269 In the MNP Annex persons covered by Mode 4 are defined either as natural persons who are service suppliers of a 
Member or as natural persons of a Member who are employed by a service supplier of a Member, ‘in respect of the 
supply of a service’. See Bast 2008, 579. 
270 The host state may on certain occasions require similar contributions. However, in many cases where work is 
subcontracted to a foreign company, social security contributions are paid by the foreign company according to the 




market, these connections to the sending state are in most cases lost. It is hard to see what is left to 
be considered as trade in such circumstances. 
 
It is important to note that Mode 4 entrants are often subject to the host state’s minimum wage and 
certain other labour standards.271 Low-wage countries are thus, to a certain extent, stripped of their 
comparative advantage: being subject to mandatory rules imposed by the host state, means that they 
cannot necessarily benefit from their home state’s more lenient regulation. Lower wages are, 
however, only one factor that encourages companies to engage in cross-border services trade. Gains 
in productivity, and especially the availability of persons with different levels of skills, are often 
more relevant considerations.272 Significant benefits to both sending and receiving countries could 
be attained especially if the movement of less-skilled persons was facilitated. Developing countries 
could benefit more were they to pursue deeper Mode 4 commitments that would remain strictly in 
the field of services trade but would be extended to cover categories of less-skilled workers. Ideally, 
developed countries would also open their labour markets to more entrants from developing 
countries. In the context of a trade agenda, to strive for employment market access can, however, 
put at risk the attainment of a more liberal Mode 4 regime overall.273 
 
iv. The issue of MFN 
 
Another consideration in drawing the limits of Mode 4 stems from the need to avoid clashes with 
bilateral and regional migration schemes. There are numerous bilateral and regional agreements, in 
the field of both trade and migration, which provide for different types of movement of labour. If 
Mode 4 of the GATS was considered to cover labour mobility, the signatories to such agreements 
would risk violating their MFN obligation. 
 
                                                
271  This consideration is mostly relevant for CSSs since ICTs and IPs are usually highly-skilled and highly-paid 
specialists. Fifty WTO Members have inscribed the application of domestic minimum wages in their schedules, often 
coupled with some other laws regarding working conditions. See OECD et al. 2004, 84. In principle, scheduling is not 
necessary since Members are allowed to apply their national laws to Mode 4 entrants. In the absence of an explicit 
statement, it is, however, hard to know to what extent local wages and other working conditions are extended to 
temporary service suppliers. 
272 The US, for example, imports most of its services from other high-wage, skill-abundant countries. Jensen notes that 
even the US companies establishing affiliates overseas to export services back to the parent company are usually 
located in high-income countries and thus pay relatively high wages. See Jensen 2011, 156. 
273 In Bast’s opinion the legal construction of the terms of the MNP Annex should aim at preserving the fragile 
compromise represented therein. Winters shares the view that bringing the WTO into the contested field of domestic 
labour law without proper support by the Members puts at risk the attainment of other trade objectives. See Bast 2008, 




The reach of the MFN can be avoided through PTAs, labour markets integration agreements 
(LMIAs), MFN exemptions and waivers. Art. V GATS does not apply to agreements limited in 
their scope. Most labour mobility schemes would thus not qualify as EIAs. Very few of them would 
qualify as LMIAs either. LMIAs, regulated under Art. V bis of the GATS, exempt the citizens of 
the parties from requirements concerning residency and work permits, and typically provide them 
with a free entry to the parties’ employment markets. LMIAs thus require full liberalization of 
labour markets between the contracting parties.274 
 
An MFN exemption, on the other hand, releases the Member from applying MFN as far as a 
specific measure has been prescribed as an exemption in the Members’ schedule. All MFN 
exemptions had to be notified before the entry into force of the GATS and new ones cannot be 
added.275 Moreover, according to the GATS Annex on MFN exemptions, such exemptions should 
not, in principle, exceed a period of ten years. The availability of MFN exemptions is, therefore, 
limited.276  
 
The last option for deviating from the MFN obligation is to apply for a waiver. A waiver is a 
permission granted by all WTO Members for a certain WTO Member not to comply with its normal 
commitments. Waivers are difficult to obtain and they are limited in time. A waiver has been 
successfully adopted with regard to the least-developed WTO Members (LDCs). At the eighth 
WTO Ministerial Conference of 2011 the Members adopted a waiver that provides for a departure 
from the MFN principle and allows Members to give preferential treatment to services and service 
suppliers of LDCs.277 Favourable treatment of LDC service suppliers, however, depends on the 
willingness of the other Members to make preferential concessions in this regard. 
 
At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994 certain labour mobility schemes were inscribed as 
MFN exemptions, most notably by European countries towards their former colonies and with 
                                                
274 Art. V bis of the GATS was tailored especially to meet the needs of the Nordic countries that had deeply integrated 
labour markets and did not want to risk the compatibility of their arrangement with the GATS. Bast also mentions 
India’s integrated labour market with Nepal (Bast 2008, 154). 
275 An exception is made for new Members who have the option to inscribe their own MFN exemptions when acceding 
to the WTO. See Wolfrum, Stoll, and Feinäugle 2008, 570. 
276  Wolfrum notes that the wording ‘in principle’ and the fact that MFN exemptions remain subject to future 
negotiations imply that the ten-year period is not indefinite. In fact, most Members’ exemptions were introduced as 
indefinite. Ibid., 571.  
277 Preferential Treatment to Services and Services Suppliers of Least-Developed Countries, Ministerial Conference 
Decision of 17 December 2011, WTO Document WT/L/847. The existence of the exceptional circumstances justifying 




regard to traditional recruitment areas.278 Some scholars claim that the presence of such MFN 
exemptions demonstrates that WTO Members understood labour migration to be covered by Mode 
4 since otherwise they would not have included them. They thus conclude that bilateral labour 
mobility schemes are covered by the WTO disciplines (especially by MFN) and consequently 
several of them appear to be clear violations of WTO law.279 
 
This is not a viable position. If labour mobility (employment market access) was part of the scope 
of the GATS, WTO Members could no longer favour labour immigration from certain countries 
only. It is difficult to believe that the purpose of the GATS negotiators was to render all labour 
mobility schemes, including those between countries with especially close cultural ties, potential 
violations of WTO law. 
 
It is more likely that the MFN exemptions were inscribed for other reasons, some of which were 
probably purely political. An easily understandable reason is that the scope of Mode 4 was unclear 
from the beginning and several Members felt that in the presence of doubt, it was better to protect 
themselves against accusations of MFN violations (even though this was only for a period of ten 
years). Another completely rational reason may be the degree of overlap between service and labour 
mobility: many labour mobility schemes facilitate the movement of service suppliers as well. By 
exempting the entire arrangement, the Member can preserve the preferential arrangement for 
service suppliers originating in a specific country without violating its MFN obligation towards 
other Members.280 
 
It is worth noting that the GATS does not prevent Members from regulating the entry of service 
suppliers from different countries.281 In the case of two similar suppliers, the main distinguishing 
feature being their origin, the MFN obligation, however, prevents favouring one of them with 
respect to the supply of a service. Were the MFN discipline to be extended in the field of labour 
                                                
278 See a comprehensive account of such exemptions in Grynberg and Qalo 2007. See also Annex of WTO 2009. 
279 See especially Grynberg and Qalo 2007, 758. 
280  Similar reasons are likely to be behind the inclusion of Art. V bis in the GATS (labour markets integration 
agreements). Since entire labour market integration agreements are exempted, the countries involved can liberalize the 
movement of service suppliers as well. This may be a practical necessity since many countries’ immigration schemes do 
not differentiate between employment-based movement and service supply. 
281 The MNP Annex specifies that the agreement does not prevent a Member from applying measures to regulate the 
entry of natural persons into, or their temporary stay in, its territory. Visas, for example, can be administrated 
differently among different nationalities. Border and entry measures cannot, however, be applied in such a manner as to 
nullify or impair the benefits accruing under the terms of the Member’s specific commitment. Excessive border control 





mobility, unexpected consequences would follow as the same treatment would need to be extended 
to all similar labour migrants originating in WTO Members and entering service sector activities 
covered by the GATS.  
 
It is also important to note that the MFN obligation is binding with regard to all services covered by 
the GATS, irrespective of a Member’s commitment to liberalize a specific sector. Schmitz takes the 
example of a Ugandan lawyer who has legally entered the EU and cannot consequently be 
discriminated against in favour of a lawyer from any other Member with respect to the provision of 
legal services, even if no commitment in legal services exists.282 Similarly, immigration and visa 
policies are covered by the MFN obligation even if no specific commitment has been taken.283 
 
3. Employment market access as a defining criterion 
 
i. The categories of persons covered by Mode 4 
 
It has been proposed that employment market access under the GATS necessitates two separate 
criteria: full application of the host state’s employment regulation and occupation in the host state 
of a post that could be taken up by a local worker. Both of these criteria need to be fulfilled before a 
foreign worker can be said to have entered the local employment market. 
 
The first criterion is especially complex since it is at the crossroads of both (national) public and 
private law and public and private international law. It points to the fact that the type of contract the 
foreign service supplier is engaged under cannot be disregarded since, depending on the national 
legislation, it can bring about very distinct regulatory outcomes. The principal difference is that 
while host state employment contracts are in the field of application of local labour laws, the 
employment aspects of service contracts are to a certain extent beyond their reach. A necessary 
condition for a service contract is that its connections to the host state are limited. That goes hand in 
hand with the assertion that no employment market access occurs. The two regulatory outcomes are 
                                                
282  Schmitz 2015, 383. It should, however, be noted that the GATS provides for a comparison with like service 
suppliers. Considering the significance of a service supplier’s personal characteristics (such as education and skills), it 
can be extremely difficult to prove that likeness exists in any given case. 
283 Some commentators have referred to the MNP Annex, which allows Members to regulate the entry and stay in their 
territory, and stated that immigration and visa policies are covered by specific commitments only. This can be contested 





analysed in more detail in the following sub-section which concentrates on the question of conflict 
of laws. 
 
The consideration of the second criterion of employment market access, replacement of a local 
worker, is here more limited. For the purposes of the conceptual analysis of Mode 4, it is relevant to 
ask which Mode 4 categories involve persons performing activities that could potentially be 
performed by local workers. 
 
Business visitors (BVs) are most clearly performing tasks that cannot easily be done by local 
workers. BVs represent themselves or their employers and go on short visits to prepare the 
establishment of a subsidiary or to negotiate a trade deal. They are the group of service suppliers 
that are most clearly outside the application of host state labour laws. ICTs, by contrast, are 
employed by local entities and are therefore usually covered by the host state labour laws. They do 
not, however, enter the local employment market because their place of work cannot be occupied by 
a local worker. As Bast points out, ICTs cannot, on the basis of Members’ GATS commitments, 
present themselves to other potential employers in the host state. At the point of entry, they are 
already employed by the foreign entity established in the host state.284 
 
CSSs can most easily be seen as replacing local workers. Their movement is not related to Mode 3, 
as in the case of ICTs, and their service supply is usually much closer to a work performance than is 
the case for BVs. They are engaged in the type of projects that can potentially create jobs for local 
workers. Maybe for these reasons few Members have so far facilitated the movement of CSSs and, 
where they have done so, it is limited it to a few sectors. In 2009, the number of such Members was 
31 (including all EU Member States).285 Since CSSs’ employers compete directly with domestic 
suppliers, the liberalization of the movement of CSSs carries similar types of risks to the opening of 
domestic labour markets. Although conceptually a separate regime, the risk that CSSs pose to 
domestic workers can be considered even higher than in the case of traditional labour immigration 
since foreign suppliers may, in certain cases, benefit from differences between their home state’s 
and the host state’s operating environments.286 
 
                                                
284 Bast interprets the MNP Annex’s carve-out of employment on a permanent basis to refer mainly to ICTs who are 
formally employed by a host state entity but who do not seek entry to the employment market and whose stay is 
temporary by definition. Bast 2008, 586–587. 
285 See WTO 2009, 24. In addition to the EU, several newly acceded Members have inscribed a commitment on CSSs, 
which may imply that this category is becoming more widely acknowledged. 




Certain Members have scheduled a category of EMS (executives, managers and specialists) whose 
movement is not limited by an obligation of prior employment in the sending state. When employed 
by a host state entity and with no special link to a foreign establishment, in the case of such 
employees, as in the case of the US H1-B visa holders, employment market access can be seen to 
occur.  
 
Some Members use quotas or economic needs tests (ENTs) to make sure that service suppliers are 
not replacing local workers. In the case of Mode 4, ENTs are usually applied in the form of labour 
market tests which allow entry only when it is not expected to have a negative impact on the 
domestic labour market. ENTs therefore generally establish as the sole criterion the non-availability 
of suitably qualified persons in the local employment market.287 
 
In the case of ICTs, a few Members have inscribed quotas or ENTs, concerning mostly specialists. 
Specialists can potentially replace local employees where the required expertise is very general in 
nature. The requirement of ENTs is thus understandable from the point of view of avoiding 
employment market access. In the case of BVs, only two Members impose ENTs. No quotas are 
applied. For CSSs and IPs the use of quotas and ENTs is rare, even though by definition CSSs and 
IPs can win contracts that could create jobs for local workers. The requirement of an ENT would, 
however, make the relevant commitment largely obsolete since it would not create any opportunity 
for foreign service suppliers to compete with local providers. Access would be granted only if no 
domestic service suppliers were available.288 
 
The examples of the various categories covered by Mode 4 demonstrate that both criteria of 
employment market access used here have to be met simultaneously. It is worth stressing that the 
absence of employment market access does not mean that the presence of foreign service suppliers, 
especially CSS and IPs, in the host state does not have any implications on local jobs. Instead, the 
purpose is to show how the issue of employment market access can be used to conceptually 
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ii. Regulation of service contracts in the national sphere 
 
Typically the regulatory outcome differs depending on whether the service is supplied through a 
work contract or a service contract.289 From a legal point of view, the basic distinction is that a 
work contract is regulated by labour laws, many of which are mandatory, whereas a service contract 
is in the field of private law. Another important distinction can be made based on the choice of law. 
In cross-border transactions the parties usually select the law applicable to the contract. In 
employment contracts the choice of law is typically more restricted. Where there is no cross-border 
element involved, all compulsory employment norms of the state of employment usually apply. For 
example, in cases where a work contract is concluded between a host state employer and a foreign 
worker employed in the host state, the work contract is regulated by host state labour laws 
notwithstanding the foreign origin of the worker. In service contracts the contractual relationship is 
between the client and the service supplier. The employment relationship, on the other hand, is 
between the service supplier and its employees. The work contract is thus subject to the rules of the 
sending state. 
 
In many legal systems it is accepted that an employee temporarily sent abroad by his or her 
employer remains subject to the law of the home state. Several regional and sub-regional social 
security conventions establish a similar principle. There are, however, variations regarding what is 
considered temporary. Some social security conventions, for example, limit the application of the 
state-of-origin rules to six months or one year with a possibility of extension. There is, however, 
great variety in how countries treat contracts with foreign elements. Each state’s choice of law rules 
finally determines which country’s law is applied.290  
 
Even in situations where foreign service suppliers are performing under a service contract, the host 
state has an interest in ensuring that the most crucial norms of the country are adhered to. Such 
norms can be referred to as mandatory or overriding rules291 and they apply for public policy 
reasons even in situations where a foreign law would otherwise apply.292 In the field of employment 
such generally applicable rules can relate to crucial issues such as minimum wage, working hours 
                                                
289 As has been pointed out above, in practice an employment relationship can, however, be seen to form between the 
customer and a service supplier.  
290 Choice of law rules are determined by private international law. Each country has its own private international law 
that is a branch of national law. 
291 Different terms, such as lois de police, lois d’application immediate and Eingriffsnormen, are used. See Liukkunen 
2006, 76. 
292  Hepple 2005, 155. This approach was adopted in the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual 




and safety at work. Even when no employment relationship exists in the host state, the employees 
of foreign service suppliers may be subject to such overriding rules of the host state. The basic 
feature of Mode 4, however, is that the law primarily applicable to the employment relationship is 
that of the home state. 
 
For a trade scholar, employment law and private international law can be unfamiliar areas. Labour 
laws, as well as choice of law rules, are not issues dealt with by the WTO. It is, however, important 
to keep in mind that trade in services is crucially different from trade in goods. Barriers to services 
are not tariffs but instead take the form of regulations. To understand how to liberalize services, one 
needs to understand regulations. Therefore, it is crucial to determine whose regulations apply. 
Certainly, it would be unrealistic to expect WTO Members to come to a joint agreement on the 
issue. It suffices to look at the EU where the Member States did not manage to agree on any clear-
cut rule for the choice of law in the long-awaited Services Directive adopted in 2006.293  
 
Instead of aiming to adopt any WTO-wide choice of law rules, WTO Members could look at Mode 
4 from the perspective of their own national laws and formulate their commitments in a way that 
would be in line with the GATS as a trade instrument. Naturally, nothing would prevent Members 
from making commitments that would provide for employment market access. Such commitments 
would, however, be so-called WTO+ issues that are outside the scope of the GATS.294 
 
Countries interested in further liberalization of Mode 4 should do a careful analysis of the types of 
migratory movements that are most beneficial to them.295 Remittances sent home by their nationals 
who are immigrants in richer countries are attractive but they do not necessarily bring similar, long-
                                                
293 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the 
internal market. The Commission originally proposed a country-of-origin principle, which stipulates that service 
providers should be subject to the laws of their own country rather than of the country where the service is provided.  
294 However, where such WTO+ commitments are made, they should, a priori, be considered binding. One can draw a 
parallel to commitments made by new WTO Members in their accession protocols. The new Members’ commitments 
sometimes go further than the WTO rules but are still binding. Such rules relate, for example, to export duties regarding 
which China at least was required to make commitments that do not exist for original WTO Members on the basis of 
the GATT. The binding nature of China’s WTO+ commitments was upheld in the WTO dispute settlement. See Espa 
(2012) 
295 Betts and Nicolaïdis note that, India excluded, developing countries are not doing research on demand and supply to 
find out what would benefit them most. India, by contrast, is on a path significantly different from most other 




term and widely distributed benefits to those to be gained from a more developed services 
economy.296  
 
At present, the most successful bilateral migration schemes are considered to be those that are 
holistic in their approach. In addition to providing adequate protection and benefits to the workers, 
they enforce temporariness and facilitate formal channels for transferring remittances and for 
directing them towards productive investments in the sending state. Their aim is to make sure that 
the state of origin and its society as a whole benefits from its nationals working abroad, not just the 
migrant and the receiving state. Similar perspectives should be adopted with respect to Mode 4. It is 
in the interests of labour-abundant countries to develop such institutional and practical mechanisms 
that would help in persuading other WTO Members to let in those countries’ service suppliers.297 
Nothing prevents countries from simultaneously aiming at labour mobility agreements. Keeping 
Mode 4 in the field of trade would, however, bring different sources of income that would 
contribute to the development of a services economy. 
 
Trachtman notes that it is highly unlikely that a one-size-fits-all approach to migration liberalization 
would suit all states. Neither would it be consistent with maximizing global welfare. According to 
him, the WTO negotiation procedure with request–offer-type negotiations seems attractive since it 
is country-specific and allows the exchange of liberalization commitments in migration for 
commitments in other areas, such as investment or goods.298  It is, however, questionable how 
practical it is to have a very diverse and inconsistent group of Mode 4 commitments from different 
countries. Mode 4 already suffers from lack of common understanding as to its scope, which from 
the point of view of the service suppliers undermines its legal predictability. The main Mode 4 
categories need to be clearly defined, and for the sake of clarity and consistency, they should 
correspond to the scope of the GATS.299 If the categories could be made clearer, there would still be 
plenty of room for negotiations on questions such as length of stay, professional experience, 
                                                
296 Kelsey writes about the ‘fetishisation’ of turning Mode 4 into labour migration in exchange for remittances. She 
points out how ‘the broader rights and interests of workers, their communities and the long-term development vision of 
the country are often left out of the equation altogether’. Kelsey 2010, 286. 
297 For CSSs, Chanda proposes a form of juridical affiliation for less-skilled workers in the home country. Such 
affiliation could sponsor a worker and appear as the contracting party for the overseas client. The return of the Mode 4 
entrants could be encouraged through different incentives for the entrant or through obligations imposed on the sending 
country. Chanda (2009). 
298 Trachtman 2008, 33. 
299 The EU notes in a communication to the Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services that the definitions of 
terms such as personnel, administrators, managers, and specialists are often neither clear nor consistent between 
different country schedules. According to the EU, the vague terms and definitions lay the ground for administrative 
discretion and can thus be subject to arbitrary and discriminatory application by regulatory authorities. See WTO 




economic needs tests and covered sectors. The national treatment commitments would ideally take 
a stand on the question of to what extent host state labour laws apply to workers sent to perform a 
contract. The situation is different in each country and binding the national rules would greatly 
improve transparency and predictability. 
 
The rest of the chapter is dedicated to the results of an empirical study on the biggest WTO service 
importers’ Mode 4 commitments. The results show that most of the Members reviewed seem to 
differentiate Mode 4 from labour mobility and formulate their commitments in a way that is aimed 
to prevent the establishment of an employment relationship in the host state. 
 
4. Mode 4 in WTO Members’ commitments 
 
i. Method of the study 
 
We now turn to an analysis of the issue in the light of WTO Members’ commitments. 
 
The countries chosen for review include the ten WTO Members with the highest share in imports of 
commercial services in 2011.300 Ranked according to volume of imports from the biggest to the 
smallest these ten countries are the EU-27 (extra-EU imports), the United States, China, Japan, 
India, Singapore, Canada, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation and Brazil. Imports were 
considered most relevant for the study since each Member’s schedule of commitments defines the 
level of liberalization applied to imports only. It is, however, noteworthy that an almost identical 
group of countries appears in the list of the top ten services exporters.301 
 
Most Members’ schedules were formulated in 1994 at the conclusion of the GATS. China and 
Russia joined the WTO during the Doha Round and their schedules date from 2001 and 2011, 
respectively. Offers made during the Doha Round were not reviewed in this study. It is likely that 
since 1994, the conditions for service supply under Mode 4 have changed in many Members to a 
large extent. However, rather than enquiring into currently applicable entry conditions, the purpose 
of this small study is to examine the Members’ approach to the question of employment market 
                                                
300 The EU is counted as one Member and intra-EU trade is excluded. See ‘Leading exporters and importers in world 
trade in commercial services (excluding intra-EU(27) trade), 2011’, Appendix Table 6 of the World Trade Report 2012 
(p. 33), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/wtr_e.htm, date accessed 31 May 2016. 
301 In the list of the top ten importers of commercial services, Russia is number 9, whereas among exporters it is number 




access. Despite the study’s limitations, the Members’ perception of the scope and purpose of Mode 
4 at the time of its negotiation can be illustrated in the light of the original GATS commitments.302 
 
The review is limited to the chosen Members’ horizontal Mode 4 commitments. Most Members 
include the categories of persons covered under Mode 4 in the horizontal section of their schedule 
of commitments. The exact depth of liberalization for a specific service sector is, however, revealed 
only by reviewing the specific commitment for the sector concerned. Under Mode 4, in those cases 
where a commitment exists, it is common practice to refer to the schedule’s horizontal section, 
which includes the common rules for the types of movement that the Member accepts under Mode 
4.303 These rules contain the categories of persons covered and the conditions for their access to the 
host state. The categories of persons usually apply to all sectors although some Members limit some 
categories of persons to certain sectors or to certain professional groups.304 
 
National treatment is usually provided for the categories of persons covered in the horizontal 
commitments. This is usually expressed in the horizontal commitments’ national treatment column 
in the following blanket reference to immigration law or similar: ‘Unbound except for the measures 
concerning the entry and temporary stay of natural persons who fall into the categories referred to 
in the market access column’. Such blanket references are problematic since they allow for broad 
discretion which diminishes legal security. Moreover, giving foreign service suppliers the same 
treatment as one’s own nationals does not mean that foreign qualifications, education and 
experience were accepted. Especially in regulated professions the Members generally require 
national qualifications or limit considerably the scope of activity allowed. This is usually expressed 
in the horizontal commitments by noting that the natural person must possess the necessary 
academic qualifications and professional experience as specified for the sector or activity 
concerned. The possibility to practise one’s profession in the Member in question is thus revealed 
only by reviewing the applicable requirements in the relevant service sector. 
 
Even though qualifications, education and professional experience are relevant to whether foreign 
workers can practice their professions in other countries, for the purposes of this chapter the review 
                                                
302 It is, however, noteworthy that the categories of persons covered have not radically changed in the Doha Round 
offers. Instead, certain Members have aimed at solidifying the four most established categories (ICTs, BVs, IPs and 
CSSs). See Schmitz (2015). 
303 In many schedules this is expressed by inscribing in the relevant sector ‘Unbound, except as indicated in horizontal 
commitments’. 





is limited to issues directly relevant for employment market access. Such issues include the type of 
contract that the service supplier is engaged under, the foreign or national ownership of the entity 
engaging the workers, the existence of a link between the service provider and an employer in the 
sending country (e.g. the requirement of prior employment), the requirement of an economic needs 
test (to check for the availability of similarly qualified workers in the host state), the period of stay, 
the source of remuneration and the status of the service supplier in the company hierarchy (for 
ICTs).  
 
ii. Results of the study 
 
The categories that appear most often in the Members’ schedules that were reviewed are ICTs, IPs 
and BVs. ICTs are included in 60 per cent of all Members’ schedules and they are clearly the 
category of persons most frequently covered.305 The movement of ICTs is almost always connected 
to commercial presence in the host state.306 BVs are the second-biggest group, whereas CSSs and 
IPs appear only in a small number of Members’ schedules. Some Mode 4 commitments provide for 
the possibility of an employment relationship in the host state, the most notable one being the US 
quota for highly skilled persons in specialty occupations (H-1B visa). Such bindings, however, 
seem to represent a small minority. 
 
The results of the present study show that the biggest service importers follow the MNP Annex’s 
demarcation and cover in their horizontal commitments only categories of persons who do not 
access the national employment market. There are, however, two important exceptions. Firstly, the 
H-1B visa category of the US allows employment market access for up to 65,000 persons annually 
in specialty occupations.307  Secondly, Brazil allows foreign specialized technicians and highly 
qualified professionals to work under temporary contracts with all legal entities established in 
Brazil, whether of national or foreign capital.308 
 
The commitment of the US is peculiar in the sense that it clearly provides for access to the 
country’s employment market. It concerns persons engaged in specialty occupations that require 
theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge and the possession 
of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specialty as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the 
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US.309 The persons and their US employers must comply with a number of conditions regarding 
wages and conditions of work. In addition, the employer must not have laid off or displaced 
workers during a specific period before or after engaging the foreign worker. The employer must 
also take timely and significant steps to recruit and retain sufficient US workers in the relevant 
specialty occupation. The length of stay is limited to three years. 
 
Brazil’s commitment is more open-ended. It states that foreign specialized technicians and highly 
qualified professionals may work under a temporary contract with legal entities, whether of national 
or foreign capital, established in Brazil. The company has to justify the need to contract such 
professionals and technicians in relation to similar professionals and technicians available in Brazil. 
In addition, the contract must be approved by the Ministry of Labour. With regard to certain service 
activities (e.g. communications, land transportation, commercial stores, hotels and restaurants), the 
engaging entities must obey the proportionality requirement of at least two Brazilians for every 
three employees. There are no specifications as to wage parity or other working conditions. In the 
light of the terminology used (work under a temporary contract and the proportionality of two 
Brazilians for three employees) it seems that the commitment is meant to cover employment 
relationships between local companies (also of national capital) and foreign workers.310 
 
None of the other schedules reviewed include such clear examples of employment market access. 
The most commonly occurring category of persons in them are ICTs. All the schedules reviewed 
include ICTs and all of them cover companies established in the host state. In most cases the 
receiving entity must be in the form of a subsidiary, dependent company or branch of a juridical 
person of another Member performing the intra-corporate transfer.  
 
In the schedules reviewed, the category of ICTs covers only persons who are not easily replaceable 
by local workers. They need to be highly qualified and possess experience and knowledge relevant 
to the company in question (evident in light of the obligation to have a prior employment in the 
sending company). Even if such persons are in the field of application of local labour laws, they can 
hardly be seen as occupying in the employment market a place that could equally well be occupied 
by a local worker and thus be displacing a domestic worker. Therefore, there is generally no 
requirement to apply an economic needs test before this type of transfer. There is, however, some 
                                                
309 In addition to persons engaged in specialty occupations, the US commitment covers fashion models who are of 
distinguished merit and ability. There are no further requirements or specifications and it is unclear whether fashion 
models are to be engaged as independent professionals or under employment contracts. 




haziness concerning the employment market access of ICTs in the schedule of the EU. There, 
certain EU Member States (Finland, Latvia and Poland) state that either an economic needs test is 
applied or that the post needs to be open for applications before the transfer can take place.311 
 
Another group of service suppliers that can in certain cases take away jobs from local workers and 
thus become comparable to employees are CSSs.312 This seems to be the view of some EU Member 
States at least. The EU’s schedule states that an economic needs test for CSSs will not be required 
except where otherwise indicated for a specific sub-sector. Such tests can be found in certain 
sectors. For example, the United Kingdom requires an economic needs test for persons admitted 
under Mode 4 in engineering services. 
 
The rather strict limits imposed on the use of CSSs (for example, maximum three months in any 12-
month-period for most EU Member States) reflect the sensitivities relating to the use of foreign 
workers through service contracts. CSSs are engaged in work that can usually be similarly 
performed by domestic workers. Even though several countries require that local labour standards 
must be adhered to, the control of such standards is much harder where no employment relationship 
to a domestic company exists.  
 
An especially interesting sub-sector from the point of view of employment market access is the 
“Placement and supply services of personnel”. 313  It seems that the intra-EU development has 
inspired the formulation of the EU’s GATS offer of 2005.314 There the EU has in two instances 
(CSSs and IPs) defined that the offer applies to natural persons engaged in the supply of a service as 
employees of a juridical person as long as the juridical person is not an agency engaged in the 
placement and supply services of personnel. The exception appears to reflect the EU’s internal case 
law according to which the making available of labour (hiring-out of workers by temporary work 
                                                
311  European Communities and their Member States, Schedule of Specific Commitments, WTO Document 
GATS/SC/31. 
312 Other schedules reviewed do not include CSSs, but the category of ‘professionals’ in the schedules of Japan and 
Canada seems to include persons who may be in an employment relationship in the sending country and thus in a 
situation similar to that of CSSs. See WTO Documents GATS/SC/46 (Japan) and GATS/SC/16 (Canada). 
313 In the WTO Secretariat’s Sectoral Classification (W/120) placement and supply services of personnel (CPC 872) are 
part of “Other Business Services” under the “Business Services” sector (1.F.k). 





agencies) is not within the scope of free movement of services but comes in the field of free 
movement of workers.315 
 
Interestingly, Canada has also paid attention to avoiding the formation of a relationship that 
resembles employment, between the client and the foreign service supplier’s workers, by excluding 
temporary agency work. Canada’s commitment on professionals engaged by a services contract 
obtained by a juridical person of another Member with no commercial presence in Canada excludes 
agencies engaged in the placement and supply services of personnel (service sector CPC 872). In 
addition, Canada clarifies that professionals may not engage in secondary employment while in 
Canada. 
 
Even though the GATS covers the supply services of personnel, i.e. manpower services, there are 
especially strong tensions that relate to the liberalization of such services. This is visible in the EU 
where the rules concerning the free movement of workers, rather than services, are in some respects 
applied to hired workers. If one applies the criteria for employment market access established in 
this chapter, one can conclude that hired workers do in certain cases enter the host state 
employment market. Countries may provide for the full application of local labour laws.316 In 
addition, hired workers are usually engaged to perform jobs that could as well be done by local 
workers. 
 
Certain clear exceptions (most notably the U.S.) and certain borderline cases (executives, managers 
and specialists) notwithstanding, the Members reviewed have formulated their Mode 4 bindings so 
as to avoid the formation of employment relationships between service suppliers and host state 
employers. At the same time it is notable that there are considerable differences in the periods of 
                                                
315 See especially the first rulings in cases C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417 and C-43/93, Raymond 
Vander Elst v Office des migrations Internationales [1994] ECR I-3803. The EU’s position on hired labour force is 
taken up in more detail in Chapter VI where the EU’s EIA results are analyzed. 
316 For example, the Temporary Agency Work Directive of the EU requires equal treatment of temporary agency 
workers. Workers hired out by temporary work agencies must be assured the working and employment conditions that 
would have applied if they had been recruited directly by the user undertaking to perform the same work. See Art. 5 
(the principle of equal treatment) in Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 
November 2008 on Temporary Agency Work. The Directive is partly in conflict with the PWD, which, according to the 
Court’s case law, requires the application of only certain mandatory rules for minimum protection to posted workers. It 
is up to the Member States to provide that temp-agencies posting hired workforce guarantee to their workers the same 
terms and conditions which apply to temporary workers in the Member State where the work is carried out (para. 9 of 
Art. 3). In the Commission’s proposal for the amended PWD (see the previous footnote), it is put forward that 
undertakings participating in hiring out of workers need to comply with the equal treatment principle of the Temporary 
Agency Work Directive (Art. 1 of the proposal). Moreover, with regard to all posted workers, it is proposed that the 
host state’s labour laws would apply to posted workers when the duration of posting is superior to 24 months (unless no 
other choice of law was made by the parties, and even then such provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement 




time for which access is allowed, ranging between 90 days and several years. The results give 
reason to conclude that the biggest importers of services consider that movement under Mode 4 is 
something that takes place primarily outside the host state’s employment market. 
 
5. Conclusions on Mode 4 
 
The object of this chapter has not been to rule out the possibility of regulating migration for 
employment purposes through GATS commitments. Members remain free to do so since they can 
schedule the types of movement they prefer. As the study conducted for the purposes of this chapter 
showed, some Members have indeed done this. Where such commitments exist, they should be 
considered binding. An analogy can be drawn to new Members’ accession protocols which remain 
binding in their entirety even if they sometimes contain elements that are outside the general WTO 
disciplines.  
 
The chapter has aimed at forming a more conceptual understanding of Mode 4, inspired by the 
specific context it is part of. The analysis of Mode 4 often suffers from analytical confusion 
regarding the differences between labour and service mobility. The purpose is not to deny the 
significant and desirable benefits that would follow from deeper liberalization of labour mobility. 
Instead, it is considered that imprudent extension of Mode 4 commitments in the field of 
employment-based migration carries the risk of making Mode 4 less relevant and more prone to 
violations of WTO law. Labour migration is currently rarely administered on an MFN basis. In 
WTO law, however, the treatment of a temporary labour migrant of one specific nationality would 
need to be extended to all similarly positioned nationals of WTO Members. Moreover, the 
availability of MFN exceptions is limited and new exceptions are hard to add. In practice, several 
WTO Members already seem to operate in a legally grey area. Restricting the scope of Mode 4 to 
genuine service transactions would clarify the types of situations it covers and improve the 
credibility of Mode 4 as a trade instrument which, instead of providing for a status quo, could entail 
real liberalization. 
 
As the study on the Members’ commitments demonstrated, there seems to be a certain distinction 
between service mobility and traditional labour mobility built around the issue of employment 
market access. Drawing the line between employment and supply of services can, however, prove 
difficult and often necessitates a case-by-case analysis. The issue is resolved in accordance with the 




countries. A good example of difficulties relating to the differentiation of service supply from an 
employment relationship is the EU experience with the posting of third-country workers. In its case 
law on posted third-country nationals, the Court has drawn a subtle and somewhat blurry distinction 
between work carried under a service contract and a service carried out with the sole purpose of 
entering the host state’s employment market. 
 
Employment market access almost always leads to wage parity. Temporary service contracts, in 
contrast, can sometimes be used to benefit from differences in wages and other conditions of work. 
This is, however, not self-evident under Mode 4 as many countries understandably require wage 
parity for ICTs and CSSs even if no employment market access is seen to occur. Independent 
professionals and business visitors (such as sale negotiators) are the groups that in most cases 
remain outside the application of domestic labour laws and thus easily fall under Mode 4. One can, 
however, perceive that movement of natural persons in conjunction with cross-border trade (Mode 
1) and commercial presence (Mode 3) is capable of creating a growing number of situations where 
added value is brought about by the temporary relocation of personnel from one Member to 
another. One can take the example of IT specialists who usually provide cross-border services, but 
occasionally travel to the location of the client. In such cases the natural persons are easily left 
outside the application of the host state labour laws. When it comes to CSSs, the most interesting 
category of Mode 4 especially for low-skilled workers, it is unlikely that developed countries would 
give up on requirements of wage parity.317 
 
Even if widened employment market access were to bring about significant economic gains and 
open up attractive possibilities for workers, especially in developing countries, from a trade 
perspective the liberalization of contractual service supply would be especially beneficial if it 
allowed the movement of low-skilled workers into a wide spectrum of service sectors. It is often 
conceived that employment market access is the most sensitive issue relating to cross-border 
movement of natural persons and especially hard to justify to national constituencies. This is 
understandable since employment market access is usually reserved for immigrants and any 
extension of immigration rights is likely to cause controversies. The resistance to immigration may, 
however, turn against itself when companies seek to benefit from cheaper ways to perform jobs. 
                                                
317 An interesting issue is whether the national treatment obligation of the GATS actually requires wage parity. If 
foreign service suppliers are to be treated similarly to domestic employees, all domestic labour laws would need to be 
applied. Winters mentions that the exclusion of foreign service suppliers from the host state’s social security systems 
may have to be registered with the WTO as exception to national treatment (Winters 2008, 516). One can, however, 
also conclude that conflict-of-law rules are part of the host state regulations and should therefore be normally applied 




Thus, when there is a specific need for a foreign workforce (as in the US for IT specialists), an 
increase in labour immigration may to a certain extent prevent the outsourcing of the same jobs to 
foreign service suppliers. When the need for foreign workers grows in the developed countries, 
opening up their employment markets may in practice be the most effective way to ensure 
compliance with local wage and labour laws. For labour-rich countries, on the other hand, the 
extension of possibilities to supply services on a contractual basis outside the regulatory jurisdiction 
of the host country should appear at the top of their Mode 4 agenda. This would allow them to 
benefit from their abundant labour force without losing the workers to host countries’ employment 
markets. 
 
In the second part of the thesis, the EU’s Mode 4 commitments under its EIAs are reviewed. The 
results show how the EU understands Mode 4 in its preferential trade relations and how far it has 
been willing to liberalize movement under Mode 4 so far. The scope of Mode 4 in the EU’s EIAs is 
contrasted to the conceptual understanding developed here. We also assess how the EU’s internal 
division of competences is visible in the EU’s Mode 4 commitments. Since a very long time has 
passed since the EU and its Member States took commitments under the GATS, the most recent 
EIAs tell more about the current situation. As has been discussed earlier, Mode 4 is an area that, in 
the EU, is especially prone to divisions between the Member States. Our results show to what 











1. Earlier empirical research on EIAs 
 
While there is decades’ worth of research on the nature and magnitude of goods trade, much less is 
known about services trade and its impediments. Data on cross-border transactions in services 
became available only in the last decade and data on service trade impediments have been collected 
and made available even more recently. 318  Knowledge about the main driving factors and 
consequences of barriers in services trade is now being developed constantly. A growing amount of 
literature is also focusing on preferentialism in the context of services. That research still pales in 
comparison with studies on preferentialism in goods trade but since services have become an 
important feature of PTAs their study is attracting a growing interest. There is also an increasing 
amount of research being carried out on services commitments, both under the GATS and EIAs. 
Several of such studies employ empiric methods. 
 
As is noted by Shingal and Egger (2014), most research on services preferentialism has so far been 
devoted to studying the trade effect of services accords on aggregate and disaggregated services 
trade flows. The impact of different levels of regulation and various barriers to trade in services and 
to trade costs are currently being the object of an increasing number of research projects. 319  
Empirically oriented legal and/or economic literature has evolved to explain services commitments 
in the GATS and EIAs (Hoekman, 1995, 1996; Roy et al., 2007; Roy, 2011), reciprocal services 
commitments (Marchetti et al., 2012320) as well as GATS+ commitments in PTAs (Roy et al. 
(2007)321 and Van der Marel and Miroudot, 2012322). 
 
The authors of existing empiric studies on services commitments readily acknowledge the inherent 
difficulties in approaching services agreements empirically. In contrast to the GATT, the measures 
under the GATS are not primarily about pricing but qualitative in nature. To convert qualitative 
information into a numerical assessment of the degree of trade restrictiveness can be approached 
                                                
318 Shingal and Egger 2014, 3. 
319 See the references to recent literature in Shingal and Egger 2014, 4. 
320 Marchetti, Roy, and Zoratto (2012). 
321 Roy, Marchetti, and Lim (2007). 




through a variety of methods ranging from the so-called frequency indices to price equivalents.323 
Hoekman (2006) explains the challenges relating to such efforts to “quantify” the coverage of 
service commitments.324 Hoekman himself focuses on GATS commitments but similar difficulties 
arise in quantifying commitments in EIAs. A simple method used by most quantifying studies is to 
count all sectors and modes where commitments are made or employ a weighting scheme that is a 
function of the type of commitment made.  
 
As Hoekman notes, even if a country submits an ‘unbound’ in its schedule, its actual policy may be 
much more liberal in practice.325 However, when characterizing commitments in an empiric legal 
study this is not relevant: “unbound” means that there is no commitment. Weighing a full 
commitment or no commitment is straightforward but much more challenging is to weigh the 
various restrictions and specifications that countries list across various service sectors and modes of 
supply. As Hoekman points out, this is analogous to the problem affecting efforts to characterize the 
restrictiveness of national policy stances through indices. A simple and transparent way adopted by 
Hoekman himself is to give a weight of zero to “unbound” type commitments; a weight of 1 to full 
commitments (i.e., the party has subscribed “none”, meaning there are no limitations), and a weight 
of 0.5 to commitments where restrictions are specified. This methodology was first adopted by 
Hoekman (1995, 1996)326 and it has subsequently been used and extended by numerous authors.327 
 
One of the most interesting studies is by Marchetti and Roy (2008)328 who have built an impressive 
dataset of EIA commitments. The dataset demonstrates the preferentiality of various countries’ EIA 
commitments as compared to the same countries’ MFN commitments under the GATS. The 
approach taken by the authors builds upon Hoekman (1995, 1996). The main difference to 
Hoekman is that rather than giving a score of 0.5 to all partial commitments, the index gives a 
higher score for each improvement in a Member's partial commitments. For each step, half the 
difference between the score for a full commitment (1) and the score of the partial commitment 
being improved is added. For example, a partial commitment that is improved by way of a foreign 
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equity limit moving from 49 to 51 per cent would obtain a score of 0.75. A further improvement by 
the Member in the same sub-sector and mode would get a score of 0.875 (e.g., the foreign equity 
limit moving up to 60%).329 
 
Thus, Roy and Marchetti’s index takes into account the level of commitments undertaken. The 
information also permits to compare a Member's commitments across its different EIAs. Overall, 
their results highlight that, on average, commitments undertaken in EIAs far outweigh those 
contained in Members’ GATS schedules, but also those offered in the current Doha Round of 
negotiations. This stands for both modes 1 and 3, and for countries of different levels of 
development.  Naturally, as the authors note, the level of GATS+ commitments varies significantly 
across Members.330 
 
Importantly, the index analyses commitments only under Modes 1 and 3. Another shortcoming is 
that the evaluation of the extent to which EIAs provide for new and improved bindings necessarily 
involves a degree of value judgment. As the authors point out, this is the case especially when 
comparing commitments framed under a positive-list approach and others under a negative-list one. 
Therefore, the authors highlight that their overview does not in any way amount to a legal 
evaluation of commitments.331 
  
This is in contrast to the present study, which aims at a legal evaluation of the EU’s EIAs. The goal 
of legal accuracy, especially with respect to finding the level of discrimination in the EU’s 
commitments, requires a somewhat simpler methodology than the methods employed in the studies 
mentioned above. Since we map the commitments only with regard to sectoral coverage and full 
NT, there is less space for such value judgment that is present in studies that quantify different 
types of limitations in the commitments. Naturally, also in the present study, there is always the 
possibility of errors. Our analysis also requires interpreting provisions, in particular for comparison 
purposes (for example, when the EU does not entirely follow the WTO’s Services Sectoral 
Classification List (MTN.GNS/W/120)) and especially in cases where it is not completely certain 
whether a specific limitation in a commitment is discriminatory or not. Therefore, the results of all 
empirical studies on services commitments, ours included, should be regarded more as an 
“approximation” of the reviewed commitments rather than a perfect representation of the content of 
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a specific EIA. 
 
Fink and Molinuevo (2008) offer an assessment of EIAs in East Asia, focusing on their 
liberalization content and their compliance with WTO rules on regional integration. Their analysis 
is divided into two parts. The first part evaluates to what extent the chosen 25 EIAs have offered 
liberalization undertakings that go beyond those to which countries are committed under the GATS. 
Also their dataset presents the value added of EIA liberalization undertakings relative to pre-
existing GATS commitments. They cover the all four modes of supply. Moreover, they use the 
database to empirically assess the effect of the scheduling approach on the depth and breadth of 
liberalization undertakings.332 The second part is similar to our approach in the sense that it seeks to 
shed light on whether the 25 East Asian services EIAs are compatible with Art. V GATS. As the 
authors note, while a number of authors have commented on the disciplines of Art. V, only few 
studies have confronted specific agreements with these disciplines.333 By using the first parameter 
of Art. V (sectoral coverage), the authors conclude that current commitments under the investigated 
EIAs do not manifestly provide for substantial sectoral coverage. As an obvious shortcoming, the 
authors’ database does not separately record MA and NT commitments. However, they do observe 
that none of the East Asian EIAs provides for full NT across all sectors and modes. In cases where 
sub-sectors have been scheduled, modes 1 and 2 are subject to the least number of explicit 
discriminatory measures. In several EIAs, however, parties require the establishment of a 
commercial presence or the registration with local professional bodies as a prerequisite for 
supplying services. The authors consider that even if such restrictions are de jure non-
discriminatory and are inscribed as MA limitations, they may be considered de facto discriminatory 
and thus be taken into account in an assessment of whether substantially all discrimination is 
eliminated. With regard to Mode 3, most agreements feature horizontal limitations that are 
relatively far-reaching and allow for the maintenance of significant discriminatory measures. Under 
Mode 4, the value added of the EIAs’ commitments relative to the GATS is minor. Fink and 
Molinuevo conclude that the reviewed EIAs currently do not comply with the requirements of 
substantial sectoral coverage and elimination of substantially all discrimination. They contemplate 
that if the agreements were legally tested by the WTO, much would depend on what is considered a 
‘reasonable’ time-frame for achieving those requirements.334 
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A study by Miroudot et al. (2010) also follows the methodology used by Hoekman (1995, 1996), 
Roy et al. (2007), Marchetti and Roy (2008) and Fink and Molinuevo (2008) by looking at specific 
MA and NT commitments in the 155 sub-sectors of the WTO’s Services Sectoral Classification List 
(MTN.GNS/W/120).335 Additionally, the authors have broken down partial commitments into nine 
categories accounting for different types of trade restrictive measures (four for market access and 
five for national treatment). These categories of limitations correspond to “partial” commitments, 
where countries decide to take MA and/or NT commitments but maintain non-conforming 
measures. As the point of departure is to measure how preferential EIAs are, the commitments are 
compared to the parties’ GATS commitments. 
 
Also these authors’ finding is that EIAs in services are quite preferential. Out of the 72 % of sub-
sectors with non-discrimination commitments, 30 % have commitments similar to GATS. This 
means that in 42% of the sub-sectors, parties to EIAs have improved their commitments or offered 
MA or NT in sectors previously unbound. These 42 % are further decomposed into 13 percentage 
points attributed to improved commitments and 29 percentage points explained by commitments in 
new sectors. According to the authors, among these new commitments, the majority (about 20 
percentage points) corresponds to full commitments.  
 
Whereas the referenced studies provide important information on EIAs, none of them pay special 
attention to the internal discrepancies in the EU’s services commitments. There are, however, two 
interesting studies that take the internal divergence within the EU into account: Langhammer 
(2005)336 and Eschenbach and Hoekman (2006)337. Both studies use a methodology that enables to 
assess the degree of uniformity across the EU Member States’ commitments. Eschenbach and 
Hoekman look into the EU’s and its post-GATS accession countries’ (and certain other transition 
economies’) commitments under the GATS and in the context of the Doha Round offers. 
Langhammer, on the other hand, analyzes the EU Member States’ commitments solely under the 
EU’s services offer during the WTO’s Doha Round (the EU including 15 Member States at the 
time).  
 
Eschenbach and Hoekman’s study assesses the following four main issues: (a) the formal degree of 
service sector openness reflected in the commitments made by EU Member States in the GATS, (b) 
                                                
335 Miroudot, Sauvage, and Sudreau (2010). They examine services schedules of commitments in 56 EIAs where an 
OECD country is a party. 
336 Langhammer (2005). 




the extent to which the Member States deviate from the EU ‘baseline’ by imposing country-specific 
restrictions, (c) the degree of uniformity across Member States’ commitments, and (d) the extent to 
which greater convergence is implied by the offers made by the EU and its members as in the 
context of the Doha Round. The deviation from the EU’s baseline is found by setting a benchmark 
score for the EU as a whole, based on which it is assessed to what extent each EU Member State 
imposes country-specific restrictions. The authors find that the pre-Doha level of commitment for 
the EU-15 as a whole was 47 % and that most Member States do not deviate significantly from this 
average ‘benchmark’ in terms of national commitments across modes. Using Langhammer’s (2005) 
data on the EU’s Doha Round offer, the authors calculate that the offer substantially increases the 
average commitment index from 46 % to slightly above 58 %. At the aggregate level, the standard 
deviation among the Member States would with such an offer fall from 2 under the GATS to 1.6 
under the offer, indicating an increase in uniformity at the Member State level.  
 
Langhammer’s central argument is that in the field of services, the EU’s level of integration is not 
yet comparable to the attainment of a full customs union in goods. Given the remaining national 
sovereignties in regulating service trade also against other EU Member States, the EU is arguably 
not yet even a free trade area. The author measures the EU’s distance from a customs union by 
calculating frequency indices of trade measures by refining the 1995 Hoekman index. His database 
is the EU’s first offer in service trade in the Doha round in February 2003. 
 
In order to identify differences between sector-specific concessions of individual EU Member 
States Langhammer modifies and expands Hoekman’s method with respect to the in-between 
category 0.5 (ranging between ‘unbound’ and ‘none’). Because of the importance of service trade 
enabled by factor flows, he gives a higher weight to modes 3 and 4 in the assessment of openness to 
service trade. The author then calculates the so-called overlap or similarity index and asks which 
proportion of a Member State A’s concession is ‘matched’ by concessions of Member State B in the 
same service sector. The index ranges between 0 (no overlap) and 100 (total overlap). A total 
overlap would point to identical concessions towards third countries and thus would indicate a 
complete customs union. In contrast to his central argument of a far-from-complete customs union, 
Langhammer, however, concludes that the similarity is high, at between 90 % and 100 %. Some 
elements of national ‘specialities’ of trade policy sovereignty remain, especially in three Member 
States who were the last ones to join the Union at the time (Austria, Finland and Sweden).338 
                                                
338  The results of both studies appear to imply that the EU Member States’ commitments towards third-country 





These two studies concentrate on the EU’s commitments under the GATS (including the EU’s more 
recent Doha Round offer) and they give valuable information of the relative openness of the EU 
Member States under the GATS and the Doha Round offer (at EU-15). Unlike Eschenbach and 
Hoekman, we do not compare the EU Member States’ commitments to each other. This information 
is of relevance also to us as one of the central arguments of the thesis is that the internal diversity in 
a WTO Members’ commitments affects the conformity analysis of an EIA under the Art. V criteria. 
Our methodology, however, is focused on showing the attainment of non-discrimination per each 
sector as a percentage of EU Member States. Since in the EU’s EIAs there is a significant degree of 
variation between the Member States in the number of non-discriminatory commitments offered, a 
percentage value quickly shows under which sectors the biggest number of Member States has 
provided for such a treatment. Under our analysis, this is most relevant as we argue that a 
contracting party with an internally divided structure in the regulation of services must reach the 
threshold of eliminating substantially all discrimination across its entire territory. The percentage of 
states thus shows to what degree such coverage is reached.  
 
In Langhammer’s study the EU’s average score of openness is calculated by weighing the EU 
Member States’ regulations with the share of the states in the EU’s gross national income.339 Such 
an approach could arguably be apt also for our method as there are significant differences in the 
sizes and economic weight of different EU Member States. We have, however, chosen to give the 
same weight to each Member State. The choice reflects the EU’s structure as a union of sovereign 
states where each state retains powers also as an independent WTO Member. Also from the point of 
view of service suppliers, national boundaries still mean more in services than in the field of goods. 
Suppliers may choose a specific EU Member State as point of access due to proximity, cultural and 
language factors – not necessarily because of its economic significance. The methodology can, 
however, be easily adapted to take economic significance of a state into account. This could be a 
more correct approach in the case of a singular country with a regional division in the regulation of 
services (e.g. Canada and U.S.). 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
similarities, or even identical concessions, on the part of the EU Member States do not necessarily mean that the 
conditions for third-country service suppliers are the same or even similar. For example, a similar measure, such as an 
economic-needs test (ENT), in one Member State is not necessarily applied according to the same criteria as an ENT 
applied by another Member State. Unless the conditions to access a specific service sector and to supply one’s services 
post-access have been harmonized within the EU, a uniformity analysis would need to go much further in order to 
confirm that the conditions of service supply for third-country operators are indeed the same (as they should be in a real 
free trade are in services). 




To summarize, our methodology differs from previous empirical studies on EIAs in two important 
respects. Firstly, whereas most studies are primarily econometric in their design, our method is 
adapted for a purely legal analysis. It shows how EIAs correspond to the exact requirements set for 
EIAs by Art. V:1 GATS under all four modes of supply. It therefore allows a legal analysis of how 
the chosen agreements correspond to the requirements of substantial coverage and elimination of 
substantially all discrimination. In addition, we take into account regional differences in the 
liberalization of services, in this case the differences among various EU Member States, and 
conduct the study in a way that shows the level on which the EU has committed to non-
discriminatory liberalization as a whole. 
 
2. Detailed explanation of the chosen methods 
 
i. Overview of the empirical part and the choice of agreements 
 
The purpose of the empirical review is to analyze, first, how the EU has liberalized services trade in 
its EIAs, and, second, to what extent the EU’s EIAs correspond to the requirements of Art. V 
GATS. Under these requirements, a specific agreement should reach the threshold of 
‘substantiality’ both in terms of sectoral coverage and elimination of discrimination. A central 
element of the analysis is to show, first, how the level of liberalization varies among the EU 
Member States and second, how the type of the agreement affects the level of liberalization reached 
in the agreement on the EU side. The results of the empirical analysis are presented in the following 
section of this chapter and an interpretation of the results in light of Art. V is given in Chapter VI. 
 
Overall, the EU has concluded eight agreements with a proper EIA element. Four of them are 
included in the study. Altogether, the study includes two AAs (Central America and Georgia), one 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) (CARIFORUM) and one Free Trade Agreement (South 
Korea). 
 
Of the analyzed agreements, the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement of 2011 is the first of 
the EU’s new generation PTAs, DCFTAs 340 , and it represents a stepping-stone for future 
liberalization. According to the EU, the agreement with Korea goes further than any of its 
                                                




previous agreements in lifting trade barriers in services. 341  The EU’s new generation, 
commercially driven PTAs are based on primarily economic criteria and according to the EU, go 
beyond the market opening that can be achieved in the WTO context.342 The trade pact of the 
agreement with Georgia is part of an AA, the purpose of which is wider than the objectives 
behind the more economically oriented EU-Korea PTA. An important part of the AA with 
Georgia is the approximation of Georgian trade-related laws to the selected pieces of the EU’s 
legal framework.  According to the EU, the adoption of EU approaches to policy-making will 
improve the quality of governance, strengthen the rule of law and provide more economic 
opportunities in Georgia, as well as in Moldova and Ukraine with whom similar agreements have 
been concluded. Opening of the EU market to their goods and services is also expected to attract 
more foreign investment.343 
 
The EIA with Georgia thus differs from the rest of the EU’s EIAs with regard to the commitments 
taken under the agreement’s Chapter 6 that concerns “Establishment, trade in services and 
electronic commerce”.344 The chapter aims at integrating Georgia as much as possible into the EU 
market. It provides for both the freedom of establishment in services and non-services sectors, 
subject to limited reservations, and the expansion of the internal market for a set of key services 
sectors once Georgia effectively implements the relevant EU acquis. The agreement thus provides 
for a right of establishment (as opposed to commercial presence under Mode 3) in services and non-
services sectors. The reservations to this right are provided in a negative list and automatic coverage 
for new services and further liberalization not listed as exceptions is guaranteed. 
 
The rest of the analyzed EIAs have varying motivations. They have a combination of objectives 
relating to commercial purposes, development, and economic and political integration between the 
EU and the country or countries concerned.345 These various motivations can be taken into account 
in accordance with Art. V:2 GATS since the provision allows flexibility in assessing compliance 
                                                
341 See the European Commission’s information page on the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea/ (accessed 1 November 2015). 
342  See the Commission’s Quick Reading Guide to the EU-South Korea FTA, October 2010. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145203.pdf (accessed 1 November 2015). 
343 See the Commission’s country sheets on Georgia and Ukraine, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-
and-regions/countries/georgia/ and http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/ukraine/ (accessed 
15 January 2016). In April 2014, in response to the various challenges faced by Ukraine since the signing of the AA 
with the EU, the EU unilaterally granted Ukraine preferential access to the EU market until 31 December 2015. The 
trade part (the DCFTA) of the EU-Ukraine AA became operational as of 1 January 2016. The political and cooperation 
provisions had already been provisionally applied since November 2014. 
344 See the Commission’s Reading guide on the similarly structured EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Area, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_150981.pdf (accessed 15 January 2016). 




with the criteria of the first paragraph of the article depending on the relationship of the agreement 
to a wider process of economic integration or trade liberalization among the countries concerned. 
We map these wider elements of all the analyzed agreements. The results show how the various 
characteristics relating to the type of the agreement affect the level of liberalization reached by the 
EU.346 In the discussion, we assess how the features relating to a ‘wider process of economic 
integration’ located in the EU’s EIAs should affect the EU’s compliance with the GATS discipline 
on EIAs – or if they should at all. 
 
ii. The methods of the empirical study 
 
The methodology used in the study corresponds to the core requirements of Art. V GATS regarding 
sectoral coverage and non-discrimination. In the study, a numerical score representing the number 
of committed EU Member States is counted separately for both requirements. This way, each mode 
of service supply gets two scores: one for sectoral coverage and another for the level of non-
discrimination. This is considered useful as Art. V distinguishes the two requirements. Even if in 
the light of Art. V only those sectors where non-discrimination is guaranteed are counted towards 
the threshold of substantial coverage, separating sectoral coverage from NT gives more information 
on a specific agreement. This approach is also useful for taking note of such instances where 
discrimination is eliminated only within a specific timeframe (something that is allowed under Art. 
V:1(b). 
 
All service sectors are given the same weight in the analysis. An alternative approach would be to 
give more weight to the most important sectors. They could be chosen by economic relevance in 
terms of value or volume. Footnote 1 to Art. V states that the condition of ‘substantial sectoral 
coverage’ is to be understood in terms of “number of sectors, volume of trade affected and modes 
of supply”. Volume of trade is thus relevant. However, since Art. V does not give any clear 
guidance on how these different factors should be weighed, it was considered more adequate for the 
purposes of this study to treat all modes and sectors equally. Volume of trade is a changing factor 
and we do not know what is the relevant point in time.347 Moreover, there are problems relating to 
                                                
346 As will be discussed later, the special characteristics of a specific type of an agreement (AA, EPA, FTA etc.) can be 
considered to explain only partly the level of liberalization achieved in the EIA part of a PTA. In the context of 
services, similarities in the countries’ political, economic and social systems arguably have an important role to play. So 
do the specific aims relating to the agreement (commercial, development, economic integration aims etc.). Naturally, all 
these issues affect the choice of the type of agreement. 
347 The liberalization of a specific sector can grow the volume significantly. Also, should a normally very important 




the availability of reliable data on volumes of services trade. Nevertheless, for informative 
purposes, we provide aggregated results for a few important service sectors on each reviewed EIA 
(average score sheets in Annex 4). Those sectors are business services, tourism and travel related 
services, transport services and financial services. Furthermore, the annexed review sheets reveal 
the exact score for each mode and each subsector. 
 
Based on our substantive analysis of Art. V:1, the most important criterion in measuring the 
compliance of an EIA with this provision is the level of non-discrimination that the agreement 
provides for. In this sense, as we have discussed earlier, discrimination can be more or less severe. 
In accordance with our substantive analysis, we, however, conclude that Art. V:1(b) requires the 
elimination of substantially all discriminatory measures (not discrimination in an aggregate 
amount), and thus only those commitments that provide for full NT are counting towards the 
fulfillment of that requirement. 
 
All the results of the empirical analysis are included in Annex 4. This Annex comprises a review 
sheet on each analyzed agreement in Excel format (a model review sheet is included in Annex 3). 
Each sheet starts by basic facts of the agreement in question (the name and parties to the agreement, 
the dates of signature, coming into force, notification to the WTO and full implementation of the 
agreement in case such a date has been agreed upon). The development level of the agreement 
refers to the other party’s status as a developing or developed country. It is also marked whether the 
EIA has been concluded bilaterally with one state (“bilateral”) or with a region/group of states 
(“regional”). 
 
The following part of the review sheet takes note of the elements in the agreement that relate to 
non-discrimination. These are clauses relating to MFN (necessary in order to conclude that the 
agreement provides for non-discrimination) and standstill obligations (prohibition of new or more 
discriminatory measures in the future).  
 
After that, the elements relating to a wider process of economic integration are taken note of. We 
have chosen twenty elements that we consider to represent not just economic but closer political, 
social or cultural approximation of countries. 
                                                                                                                                                            
sector happens to be low between the partners to a specific EIA? How to weigh the importance of supply through a 
specific mode is also problematic. As noted by Hoekman, establishing 'mode-of-supply’ weights on a sector-by-sector 






After these elements, the review sheet contains the mapping of the most important element of each 
EIA: the sector-specific commitments.  The sectoral coverage of the EU’s commitments is marked 
by “SC” and national treatment by “NT”. The scores are usually given on the level of sub-sectors. 
In some cases, however, the EU has not separated a sector into sub-sectors, in which case the score 
is given on the level of the entire sector. In case the EU has excluded a specific sector or sub-sector 
from its commitments, such excluded sectors are marked by a grey color. Thus, a review sheet with 
much of grey color reflects a large number of excluded sectors or sub-sectors. 
 
In the review sheet, we have decided to follow the WTO Secretariat’s services sectoral 
classification list that is to a large extent based on the United Nations’ product classification list 
(marked as corresponding CPC).348 In the following, the WTO Secretariat’s sectoral classification 
list is generally referred to as “W/120”. There are some problems relating to the use of W/120. 
First, it is only one means to categorize services into sectors. W/120 is not part of the GATS but has 
been suggested for use by the WTO Members in the Scheduling Guidelines that have been 
approved by the WTO’s Council for Trade in Services. 349  Secondly, W/120 is based on an 
aggregated system that sometimes combines certain services sectors that appear separated in some 
other classification systems, notably the UN’s CPC classification system. There is some discretion 
in the way that sectors have been aggregated. For example, financial services and 
telecommunications are divided into a number of detailed sub-sectors while health related and 
social services receive only four overall categories with no further sub-sectors whatsoever.350  
 
However, as many WTO Members use the W/120 classification and it is an agreed reference point 
for the categorization of services351, we consider it to be the most appropriate template for the 
comparison of services commitments in EIAs in light of Art. V. At the same time it should be 
acknowledged that it does not give a perfect representation of the universe of services. Naturally, 
                                                
348 Services sectoral classification list, Note by the Secretariat, WTO document MTN.GNS/W/120, 10 July 1991. The 
list was prepared by the WTO Secretariat based on comments from participating Members. The GATS does not require 
WTO Members to use this or any other specific classification list but most Members are using the W/120. CPC is the 
Central Products Classification as set out in Statistical Office of the United Nations, Statistical Papers, Series M, No 77, 
CPC Prov, 1991. 
349 Guidelines for the scheduling of specific commitments under the General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS), 
WTO’s document S/L/92 of 28 March 2001. Adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 23 March 2001. On page 
8 it is specified that “in general the classification of sectors and sub-sectors should be based on the Secretariat's Services 
Sectoral Classification List”. In addition it is stated that “Where it is necessary to refine further a sectoral classification, 
this should be done on the basis of the CPC or other internationally recognised classification (e.g. Financial Services 
Annex)”. 





the choice also leads to certain approximation in the results, as practically no schedule is identical to 
another schedule in its classification of services sectors. Also the EU has on some occasions moved 
certain sectors to another location in its schedule. This, however, does not affect the results of our 
study and the value for such sub-sectors is marked in the relevant place in the W/120 classification. 
 
On some other occasions, however, the EU has divided a specific sub-sector of the W/120 
classification list into smaller sub-sectors. In this case the EU’s commitments in these smaller sub-
sectors are aggregated so that the lowest score among the EU’s own sub-sectors becomes the 
overall score for the sub-sector in the review sheet.352 In some instances, the EU has prescribed an 
‘unbound’ for a sub-sector which is in a more aggregate form in W/120.353 In this case, the lack of 
commitment in the sub-sector used by the EU nullifies the commitment for the entire sub-sector in 
the W/120 classification.  The EU has also scheduled certain sub-sectors that are not included in the 
W/120 classification. These EU’s own sub-sectors are not taken into account in the review sheets 
but are taken note of and included in the annexed sheets containing the detailed explanations on 
each reviewed agreement. 
 
These last three methodological choices somewhat reduce the real value of the EU’s commitments 
but these cases are overall rare. The exclusion of the additional sectors prescribed by the EU is 
necessary so that the scheduling modalities of the classification list prepared by the WTO 
Secretariat can be followed. The chosen method makes the EU’s commitments comparable to other 
WTO Members’ commitments scheduled according to the same classification model (or according 
to slight variations of it). 
 
As the idea behind the methodology is not to find out how restrictive the commitments are, their 
level is not rated. This would be difficult, as such rating would require a careful qualitative analysis 
                                                
352 For example, in the EU-Korea FTA the EU has divided placement and supply services of personnel (grouped 
together in the WTO Secretariat’s list as CPC 872) into executive search (CPC 87201), placement services (CPC 
87202), supply services of office supply personnel (CPC 87203) and supply services of domestic help personnel, other 
commercial or industrial workers, nursing and other personnel (CPCs 87204/05/06 and 87209). Overall, the EU’s 
commitments across all of these sub-sectors are low but the lowest score (unbound for 26 out of 27 Member States) in 
placement services (Mode 1) and supply services of domestic help personnel etc. (Mode 1 and Mode 2) gives the 
aggregate score 0,04 (bound only for 1 out of 27 Member States) for the entire sector of placement services. 
353 An example are related scientific and technical consulting services (CPC 8675) under which the EU has otherwise 
committed a full binding but has specified ‘unbound’ for exploration services under Mode 1. Even though exploration 
services are only part of the larger service sector CPC 8675, the lack of commitment in part of the sector nullifies the 




of each commitment.354 Instead, the purpose is, to provide a relatively simple and straightforward 
tool to analyze EIAs in the light of Art. V GATS. Thus, the method is primarily designed to find out 
the number of sectors providing for non-discrimination. 
 
iii. The scoring of sector-specific commitments 
 
The coverage of the agreement is revealed by the numerical scores given to all sector-specific 
commitments of a party. Under this method, in the case of a contracting party that has made its 
commitments only on the level of the central government (no regional commitments included), the 
value given to each commitment is either 1 or 0. Under the column of sectoral coverage (SC), value 
1 means that there is some type (any type) of a commitment under the relevant sector or sub-sector. 
Value 0 means that the relevant sector or sub-sector has been completely excluded from the party’s 
commitments. Under the NT column, value 1 means full commitment (i.e. full NT) and value 0 
means that the specific sector or sub-sector is unbound or that the commitment is qualified (limited) 
in a way that does not provide for full NT. 
 
In the case of the EU, the numerical scores reveal the internal dispersion among the commitments 
between different Member States. The number of EU Member States depends on how many 
Member States the EU had at the time of conclusion of the agreement. For the reviewed EIAs, the 
number of Member States is either 27 (EIAs with CARIFORUM, South Korea, Colombia and Peru, 
or 28. The maximum possible score for the EU party is 1, corresponding to 100 % of the Member 
States (all Member States committed), and the minimum score is 0 (no Member State has given a 
commitment). If the score for SC is 1, it means that all the Member States have some type of a 
commitment for the sector or sub-sector in question. The commitment does not need to provide for 
full NT, a qualified commitment suffices. If, for example, all 27 Member States signatory to the 
EIA have a full or a qualified commitment on a specific sector, the score for that sector’s coverage 
is 100 %. If 20 of them have a commitment, the score is 20/27, that is 0,74, which represents 74 % 
of the Member States. If, for example, only 5 Member States have some type of a commitment for a 
specific sector, the score is 5/27, which makes 19 % (0,19). 
 
With regard to the column on NT, score 1 indicates that all EU Member States provide for non-
discriminatory treatment in respect of the other party’s service suppliers. If the score is 0, no 
                                                
354 Something that is recognized by Roy, Marchetti, and Lim (2007) in their empirical study on the preferentiality of 




Member State has prescribed a non-discriminatory commitment. In most cases, however, the score 
is something between 0 and 1. For example, if 10 out of 27 Member States have committed to NT, 
the NT commitment for that specific sector or sub-sector gets the score 10/27 which equals 0,37. 
This is the same as 37 % of the Member States. For example, in the EU-Korea EIA, under taxation 
services (CPC 863) and concerning Mode 1, four out of 27 Member States have prescribed 
‘unbound’ which means that 23 Member States have some kind of a binding.  23 Member States out 
of 27 represent 85 %, which gives the relevant sub-sector of professional services the score 0,85 for 
sectoral coverage (SC). Under NT, however, two of the committed Member States have included a 
discriminatory specification. Therefore, for NT the score is slightly lower, representing 21 out of 27 
Member States (0,78, i.e. 78 %).355 
 
Under the NT column, only such bindings that provide for full NT are taken into account in the 
score. The bindings can be somehow qualified but they cannot be overtly discriminatory. For 
example, a Member State may have prescribed a quota but if the quota is directed towards the other 
party’s service suppliers only, the Member State’s score for NT in that sub-sector is 0. If, on the 
other hand, the quota is applied in a non-discriminatory way to all service suppliers willing to offer 
their services in the market (domestic and foreign alike), it does not affect the Member State’s NT 
score. Even though even non-discriminatory quotas are MA limitations under the GATS, they are 
not relevant in our study as our methodology is based on an interpretation of Art. V GATS that 
requires the elimination of discrimination without the need to eliminate non-discriminatory MA 
limitations such as those listed in Art. XVI GATS. 
 
Problems in interpretation arise in the very often-occurring case of qualified commitments, i.e. 
commitments that provide for some type of limitations. The separation of discriminatory limitations 
from non-discriminatory ones is the most challenging aspect of the chosen approach. The EU 
follows a scheduling practice that generally does not separate discriminatory MA restrictions from 
non-discriminatory ones. Instead, the EU’s EIA schedules include only two columns, of which the 
first one contains the relevant sector and the second one the “description of reservations”. This 
practice is likely to result from the EU’s interpretation of the GATS356 and especially Art. XVI on 
                                                
355 Cyprus has inscribed a requirement of authorization that is subject to an economic needs test applied only to 
foreigners. Austrian commitment includes a nationality condition for representation before competent authorities. 
356 The issue is not completely clear under the GATS. There is a scholarly debate concerning the applicability of Art. 
XVI GATS to non-discriminatory MA limitations. The general opinion appears to favour the view that also non-
discriminatory limitations are covered as long as they come under the list of measures included in Art. XVI:2 GATS. 




MA 357  The list of prohibited MA limitations of Art. XVI does not differentiate between 
discriminatory and non-discriminatory limitations. Many WTO Members, including the EU, have 
decided not to differentiate between the two types of limitations in their EIA schedules. This 
scheduling practice, however, differs from the GATS. In the EU’s GATS schedule, as in the case of 
all other Members’ GATS schedules, there are altogether four columns. The first column includes 
the sectors and sub-sectors, after which there are two separate columns: one for “Limitations on 
Market Access” and another one for “Limitations on “National Treatment”. The fourth column is 
reserved for “Additional Commitments”.358 
 
The combination of MA and NT limitations means that if a specific sector or sub-sector is 
prescribed as ‘unbound’ (no commitment at all), the score is automatically 0 for SC and NT alike. If 
a Member State, or the EU as a whole, has prescribed ‘none’, it means that the sector or sub-sector 
is bound and there is full NT. This practice has its positive sides. When all restrictions are in one 
column, one does not need to contemplate how a commitment in the MA column affects the 
commitment in the NT column. This problem was at issue in China-Electronic Payment Services 
where it was considered in what case an ‘unbound’ in the MA column takes over the notation 
‘none’ in the national treatment column.359 In the EU’s schedule, an ‘unbound’ is clearly effective 
for both MA and NT.  
 
However, the combination of MA and NT limitations under one column in the EU’s EIAs makes it 
difficult, and sometimes impossible, to understand whether a specific restriction is applied on a 
discriminatory basis or not. This is the case, for example, with conditions relating to quotas or 
economic needs tests that do not always specify whether the conditions are applied only to 
                                                
357 The EU’s EIAs follow closely the wording of the GATS in its provisions on MA and NT. See, for example in the 
EU-Korea EIA, Art. 7.5 (MA) and Art. 7.6 (NT) with regard to Cross-Border Supply and Art. 7.11 (MA) and Art. 7.12 
(NT) with regard to Establishment. The section on “Temporary presence of Natural Persons for Business” does not have 
provisions on MA and NT. 
358 Entries in this column are not obligatory and rarely used. If a Member so wishes, it may in a given sector make 
additional commitments relating to measures other than those subject to scheduling under Articles XVI and XVII. 
These commitments can deal, for example, with qualifications, standards and licensing matters. The column should be 
used to indicate positive undertakings, not to list additional limitations or restrictions. See the WTO Secretariat’s 
Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 23 March 2001, S/L/92, 28 March 2001 (“Scheduling Guidelines”). 
359 Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services, WT/DS413/R, adopted 31 August 2012, 
paras. 7.661-7.669. The Panel found that the special scheduling rule in Art. XX:2 GATS applied to China's inscription 
of "Unbound" under the MA column for the cross-border supply of electronic payment services under Mode 1 even 
though with regard to NT China had inscribed “none”. China was therefore allowed to maintain the full range of 
limitations expressed in Art. XVI:2, whether discriminatory or not. According to Art. XX:2 GATS, “measures 
inconsistent with both Articles XVI and XVII shall be inscribed in the column relating to Article XVI. In this case the 





foreigners or to domestic and foreign service suppliers alike. In most cases, however, it is possible 
to understand which type of measure is in question. Therefore, if it is obvious that restricting 
measures such as standards and licensing requirements are applied to domestic and foreign 
suppliers alike, they are considered non-discriminatory.  
 
The EU has paid attention to the issue of scheduling of measures that apply to domestic and foreign 
service suppliers alike. The EU prescribes MA limitations listed in Art. XVI GATS but does not 
prescribe measures that somehow restrict the supply of services but do not constitute MA or NT 
limitations. The EU has included the following statement in the beginning of its services schedules 
on all modes: 
 
“The list below does not include measures relating to qualification requirements and 
procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements and procedures when they do 
not constitute a market access or a national treatment limitation within the meaning of 
Articles 7.5 and 7.6. Those measures (e.g. need to obtain a licence, universal service 
obligations, need to obtain recognition of qualifications in regulated sectors and need to 
pass specific examinations, including language examinations), even if not listed, apply in 
any case to services and service suppliers of [Korea].”360 
 
The EU’s statement makes the empirical analysis easier in the sense that if a Member State or the 
EU as a whole has included a measure listed above, it can be assumed to be a limitation either to 
MA or NT. Therefore, if a specific licensing requirement has been prescribed in a schedule, we 
assume that is applied to foreign services or service suppliers only. 
 
Some of the most challenging limitations to interpret are quotas and economic needs tests (ENTs). 
The EU’s practice appears to be to list both discriminatory and non-discriminatory MA limitations 
such as these two types of measures. It is not often clear whether they apply only to foreigners or to 
all service suppliers, domestic and foreigners alike.361 In the review, there is a certain margin of 
error in this regard. Sometimes it is possible to interpret that a certain ENT applies to all service 
suppliers (domestic and foreigners alike), in which case it is considered a non-discriminatory MA 
limitations and it thus does not affect the relevant commitment’s NT score. In certain other cases, 
however, the field of application of the ENT remains a mystery, as it is often not specified whether 
ENTs are applied on a discriminatory or non-discriminatory basis. There are, however, differences 
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361 The same problem relates also to other WTO Members’ schedules. Many schedules do not provide a precise 
description as to whether the origin of the service or service supplier is a criterion of the test.  Sometimes the 
discriminatory criterion may be inferred from the commitment. See the WTO Secretariat’s Note “Economic Needs 




between the Member States in this regard. An example of a clearly formulated condition of a non-
discriminatory ENT is Italy’s commitment under services auxiliary to transport (heading 17 A) in 
the EU-Korea EIA. It includes a footnote 75 specifying that an ENT is applied on a non-
discriminatory basis. An example of a unclear scheduling is France’s commitment under legal 
services (CPC 861) which specifies that lawyers’ access to the profession of ’avocat auprès de la 
Cour de Cassation’ and ‘avocat auprès du Conseil d’État’ is subject to quotas and to a nationality 
condition. It is not specified whether the quota applies also to France’s own national. The 
nationality condition, however, ensures that the service supply by Korean nationals is prohibited 
and there is thus no NT. 
 
The analysis of ENTs therefore requires a careful case-by-case analysis based on the wording of 
each commitment.  If there is no sign of discrimination, there is no effect on the score for NT. In 
case the field of application of the measure is unspecified, the score for NT goes to 0 as the Member 
State in question can, in principle, claim that it is free to apply the quota or ENT as it wishes. There 
is thus at least a possibility of discrimination. One specific case of ENTs are those that are applied 
to the groups of persons admitted to the Member States under Mode 4. The EU has in its annexes 
on the reservations applying to Mode 4 specified that in those sectors where ENTs are applied, 
“their main criteria will be the assessment of the relevant market situation in the Members State of 
the European Union or the region where the service is to be provided, including with respect to the 
number of, and the impact on, existing service suppliers”.362 Considering that the assessment is 
extremely open-ended (“relevant market situation”) and conducted with respect to the number of 
existing service suppliers, it is likely to affect foreign service suppliers differently from domestic 
suppliers. Foreigners’ access to the market is usually subject to visas or some other type of entry 
permission. ENTs are usually applied at the point of entry to the country. ENTs can be applied to 
domestic service suppliers as well but typically only in certain regulated professions. Open-ended 
ENTs under Mode 4 were therefore considered discriminatory by definition as Member States 
remain free to deny entry to the country altogether. 
 
The biggest challenge in our method of interpretation and legal analysis relates to reservations that 
appear especially burdensome for foreign suppliers. As has already been discussed in Chapter III, 
Art. XVII GATS prohibits both de jure and de facto discrimination. 363  In accordance with 
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paragraph 2, “treatment no less favourable” is attained by according to services and service 
suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment 
than the treatment accorded to the Member’s own like services and service suppliers. Under 
paragraph 3, the treatment is to be considered less favourable if it modifies the conditions of 
competition in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or 
service suppliers of any other Member.  
 
A modification in the conditions of competition in favour of a Member’s own services or service 
suppliers can be hard to establish in a real life situation and it is possibly even harder to establish 
based on a simply-worded commitment in a service schedule. Under the GATS, the requirement to 
provide “treatment no less favourable” than to one’s own like services and service suppliers 
depends, to a large extent, on the definition of ‘likeness’. Likeness can be hard to prove in any 
given context, let alone in an abstract situation of a scheduled commitment. In addition, even 
though Art. XVII clearly covers also de facto discrimination, its exact meaning and scope remains 
unclear. As explained by Krajewski, a measure can be considered to constitute de facto 
discrimination if it (a) does not formally discriminate against foreign services and service suppliers 
but (b) has the same or similar effects as a formally discriminating measure. The absence of formal 
discrimination is usually easy to determine on the basis of the plain language of the measure but the 
existence of a situation under condition (b) is harder to ascertain, as it requires the determination of 
a discriminatory effect.364 Therefore, to know whether a Member should in any particular case 
apply formally identical or formally different treatment to a foreign service or service suppliers 
often depends on the particularities of the specific case and on the effects that the measure has in 
that specific case.365 
 
So far, the case law on ‘likeness’ in the context of the GATS remains elusive. With regard to NT 
under Art. XVII, the Panel in China – Publications and Audiovisual Products held that likeness is 
established when origin is the only factor on which a measure bases a difference of treatment 
between domestic and foreign service suppliers.366 Such a “presumption of likeness” was confirmed 
                                                                                                                                                            
favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of services or service suppliers of a Party compared to 
like services or service suppliers of the other Party.”  
364 Krajewski 2003, 108. In addition, the GATS-case law on non-discrimination is very limited and we do not have 
much guidance on the issue of what types of discrimination de facto are covered by the agreement. 
365 On the concept of national treatment and likeness under the GATS, see especially Diebold 2010, 50-62. The issue of 
what constitutes discrimination in services trade is taken up in more detail in Chapter III that provides the substantive 
analysis on Art. V GATS. 
366 China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual 




in the recent case Argentina – Financial Services, where the AB considered that a complainant may 
establish "likeness" by demonstrating that the measure at issue makes a distinction between services 
and service suppliers based exclusively on origin.367 The AB also noted that “measures allowing the 
application of a presumption of "likeness" will typically be measures involving a de jure distinction 
between products of different origin.”368  If there are issues other than origin, a more detailed 
analysis becomes necessary. The panel engaged in a somewhat deeper analysis in China – 
Electronic Payment Services, where it concluded that like services are to be in a competitive 
relationship with each other. In any case, a case-by-case analysis is required.369 
 
This is the challenge with an ex ante review. A case-by-case review cannot be engaged in with 
regard to each commitment with potential implications of indirect discrimination. Moreover, the 
analysis of ‘likeness’ requires the establishment of a competitive relationship between services 
considered like. With no real-life services and service suppliers this is impossible. Any analysis is 
bound to stay on the level of speculation. In addition, as noted by the AB in Argentina – Financial 
Services, the scope for a “presumption of likeness” under the GATS should more limited than in the 
context of trade in goods. According to the AB, establishing "likeness" based on the presumption 
may often involve greater complexity in trade in services, due to the fact that the determination of 
"likeness" under Articles II:1 and XVII:1 GATS involves consideration of both the service and the 
service supplier. This may render it more complex to analyze whether or not a distinction is based 
exclusively on origin, in particular, due to the role that domestic regulation plays in shaping the 
characteristics of services and service suppliers and consumers' preferences. In addition, in the field 
of services there are notable complexities of determining origin and whether a distinction is based 
exclusively on origin. Furthermore, an additional layer of complexity stems from the existence of 
different modes of supply and their implications for the determination of the origin of services and 
service suppliers.370 
 
Due to these inherent challenges in determining likeness in the context of services, as a general rule, 
our analysis can only take account of de jure discrimination and the most blatant forms of de facto 
discrimination. The most obvious cases of discrimination are nationality requirements. All 
limitations requiring residency in the host state are also considered discriminatory as they 
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circulated 14 April 2016, para. 6.38. 
368 Ibid., para. 6.36. 
369 China - Electronic Payment Services, WT/DS413/R, Report of the Panel, circulated 16 July 2012, paras. 7.700-
7.702. 




effectively preclude the supply of services through modes 1, 2 and 4. Under Mode 3 residency 
requirements, on the other hand, are considered discriminatory only when they go further than 
requiring establishment (for example, by requiring permanent establishment for a specific period of 
time prior to granting full non-discriminatory treatment).371 Measures that require specific types of 
legal entity or joint venture through which a service must be supplied are also considered 
discriminatory in case they apply only to foreign service suppliers.372  
 
On the contrary, potentially indirectly discriminatory requirements can escape our analysis. Such 
requirements can relate to various aspects of host-state legislation relating, for example, to specific 
quality requirements or professional requirements that are not openly discriminatory but can be 
more easily fulfilled by host state nationals, for example, due to their education, language skills or 
acquired experience in the host state. In principle, Art. XVII could possibly be considered to 
prohibit excessive requirements relating to host-state permissions, qualifications and procedures 
that modify the conditions of competition in favour of local service suppliers compared to like 
services or service suppliers of the other party.373 However, since service schedule commitments are 
typically extremely vague and we do not have any specific, real-life service suppliers whose 
situation to analyze, such potential breaches of the NT obligation cannot be included in an empirical 
analysis such as the one in the present study. Uninformed estimations one way or another could 
skew the final outcome considerably if incorrectly analyzed. Therefore, in this study only clearly 
discriminatory limitations are noted. More covert indirect discrimination may thus escape the 
analysis and qualify as a full NT commitment. 
                                                
371 Also conditions that in practice necessitate extensive prior residence are considered discriminatory. For example, in 
the EU-Korea EIA, Denmark requires that marketing of legal advice services under Mode 1 is reserved to lawyers with 
a Danish licence to practice and to law firms registered in Denmark. In addition, there is a requirement of a Danish legal 
examination to obtain a Danish licence. In the case of an individual lawyer, this would usually necessitate university 
studies in Denmark and thus prior residence there. For law firms, it is not clear what registration in Denmark means but 
it is likely to require some type of establishment, which contravenes the essence of Mode 1 that is to supply services 
across borders without local presence. 
372 Such measures appear under subsection (e) of Art. XVI:2 on MA. However, measures requiring a special type of 
legal entity from foreigner service suppliers are clearly discriminatory so such measures must be considered to be in 
breach of Art. XVII. The same conclusion applies to subsection (f) of Art. XVI:2 (limitations on the participation of 
foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or 
aggregate foreign investment). 
373When considering the scope of de facto discrimination, the interpretative footnote to Art. XVII:1 must be taken into 
account. The footnote states “Specific commitments assumed under this Article shall not be construed to require any 
Member to compensate for any inherent competitive disadvantages which result from the foreign character of the 
relevant services or service suppliers”. The footnote implies that inherent characteristics of a foreign service supplier 
working to the supplier’s disadvantage need to be separated from a disadvantage created by de facto discrimination. 
Therefore, only “true” discrimination should be considered as a violation of Art. XVII. In addition, the existence of a 
separate discipline on domestic regulation (Art. VI) suggests that Art. XVII should be clearly distinguished from non-
discriminatory measures subject to Art. VI:4. See the discussion in Krajewski 2003, 108-114 and Diebold 2010, 58-59. 






We, however, estimate that such cases are very limited. Considering that NT is not an all-
encompassing concept under the GATS but available only in situations where Members have opted 
in for NT through their commitments, it would be far-fetched to assume that any measure causing 
adverse effects on service suppliers of other countries would amount to discrimination. Such 
measures would be extremely hard to schedule, as their effects are often not foreseeable. We agree 
with Krajewski who argues that only those measures should be seen as discriminatory, which can at 
least theoretically be scheduled. A broader interpretation of the NT obligation of Art. XVII could be 
detrimental to national regulatory autonomy.374 Therefore, even though a certain margin of error 
exists, our analysis should be able to catch most forms of discrimination according to this approach. 
Another issue is that measures, which are not considered discriminatory by a Member, are typically 
not prescribed in its schedule. Their discriminatory effect may be revealed only in dispute 
settlement. Naturally, such measures escape any empirical analysis, as we can only consider 
measures that are scheduled. On the other hand, as the example of the EU shows, countries tend to 
compensate such a risk by being careful and prescribing certain measures even if their 
discriminatory nature is subject to doubt. For example, the EU has included in all of its reviewed 
EIAs a statement specifying that that certain measures relating to qualification requirements and 
procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements and procedures are not schedules. It, 
however, specifies that such measures apply even if they do not constitute discrimination. Without 
case-by-case analysis, we cannot of course be sure that some of such measures could not be 
considered violations of the NT obligation, but as long as they are not included in the specific 
commitments, they cannot in any case be taken into account. 
 
Lastly, state monopolies, even though not discriminatory per se (they are listed under Art. XVI 
GATS on MA), are considered of equal value to ‘unbound’ in the review since state monopolies in 
practice make it impossible for a foreign service supplier to access the market. State monopolies 
therefore nullify the score for both sectoral coverage and NT for the Member State in question.375 In 
addition, in light of the recent WTO dispute settlement case China – Electronic payment services, 
monopolies can be considered NT violations if not scheduled as limitations.376 
 
                                                
374 Krajewski 2003, 113-114. 
375 Under wholesale trade services (Section B of the EU-Korea FTA) the state monopolies on tobacco are not taken into 
account in the score as their significance in the entire sector is minor. 
376  Hoekman and Meagher 2014, 439. See the Panel Report in China – Measures Affecting Electronic Payment 




iv. The treatment of horizontal limitations 
 
In addition to sector-specific commitments, most services schedules include a section referred to as 
‘horizontal commitments’. They include commitments, typically limitations, applying to all of the 
sectors included in the schedule. They often refer to a particular mode of supply, in most cases to 
modes 3 and 4. Any evaluation of sector-specific commitments must therefore take any such 
horizontal entries into account. 
 
Quantifying the restrictiveness of horizontal limitations is, however, especially problematic. While 
they apply to all modes of supply across all the sectors, the effects they have on particular sectors 
greatly differ from each other.377 In the EU’s EIAs, horizontal limitations for modes 1 and 2 
typically concern real estate. In the case of Mode 3, they concern real estate, public utilities, some 
aspects of investment and types of establishment. Under Mode 4, the horizontal limitations relate to 
ENTs and certain categories of persons, their residence and qualifications. Since the limitations are 
in most cases discriminatory, taking them into account under each separate sector would nullify 
most of the commitments altogether. 
 
While horizontal commitments are often discriminatory, we consider that there must be some room 
for them and the rest of the analysis on sector-specific commitments should be separated from 
them. Naturally, the horizontal limitations must be taken into account in the overall assessment as 
their extent may largely affect the conditions of service supply. This is the case especially under 
Mode 4, where the horizontal commitments in principle determine the conditions of entry for 
foreign suppliers.  
 
Authors of empirical studies have treated horizontal commitments in varying ways. Fink and 
Molinuevo treat them as if they were inscribed in each scheduled sub-sector. They consider the 
approach most appropriate from a legal perspective as it directly follows the scheduling guidelines 
under the GATS.378 Since their method in analyzing sectoral commitments is less aggregated than 
ours, it accommodates such an approach. Hoekman (1995) takes horizontal limitations into account 
with regard to Mode 4.379 Roy et al., on their part, also assess the horizontal limitations. However, 
so as not to overestimate their effect, they only factor into the scoring the more stringent types of 
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horizontal limitations (and improvements to them). In their analysis, those are foreign equity 
restrictions, limitations on the number of suppliers, including through economic needs tests, joint-
venture requirements, and nationality requirements.380  
 
In our analysis, we review all the horizontal limitations in the EU’s EIA schedules. However, so as 
not to overestimate their impact on the sector-specific analysis, we only take note of them and do 
not factor them into the non-discrimination analysis. Naturally, in assessing the extent of non-
discriminatory treatment granted to each EIA partner, the horizontal part of the commitments is 
relevant and it is thus separately analysed in connection with each agreement.  
 
v. Issues relating to a wider process of economic integration or trade liberalization 
 
In addition, the review sheet takes into account the wide array of issues included in the EU’s 
modern PTAs. They are considered to form part of the larger context that can be seen reflected in 
Art. V:2 GATS which gives consideration to a “wider process of economic integration or trade 
liberalization”. The existence or non-existence of these elements does not affect the scoring and 
they are thus simply noted in the beginning of the empirical review (see the model review sheet in 
Annex I). 
 
vi. Review of commitments on Mode 4 
 
Mode 4 liberalization commitments are typically crafted along somewhat different parameters than 
the other modes and are also subject to specific disciplines. In the EU’s EIAs, the types of 
categories of persons admitted under Mode 4 are specified in the text of the agreement. Limitations 
to Mode 4 are sometimes included also in the horizontal section of the commitments. The text of 
the agreement already specifies what type of service suppliers are allowed to enter the EU under 
Mode 4. The structure of commitments thus critically differs from the rest of the modes, as the 
freedom of supply through Mode 4 greatly depends on the categories of persons admitted. The 
analysis of Mode 4 thus necessarily requires a more qualitative assessment. This is done in 
connection with each agreement through a separate analysis of the EU’s Mode 4 commitments. The 
sector-specific Mode 4 commitments applicable to these specified categories of persons are, in 
addition, taken into account normally in the empirical analysis and marked into the review sheet. It 
                                                




should, however, be noted that the value of the sector-specific commitments under Mode 4 greatly 
depends on the types and number of categories of persons admitted in the first place. 
 
Under Mode 4, the most often-occurring limitations are citizenship, nationality and residency 
requirements. They are considered discriminatory as they in essence prohibit the supply of a service 
by a foreign national through temporary presence. The biggest challenges in interpretation relate to 
ENTs. The cover page of the EU’s schedules on Mode 4 contains a statement on ENTs that is not 
present in the cover page on modes 1-3. The statement includes the criteria used for ENTs but does 
not specify whether they are applied in a discriminatory or non-discriminatory manner.381 However, 
it is worth noting that under Mode 4 ENTs are likely to be applied in a discriminatory manner as 
they generally concern the right to work in a specific field where no economic criteria are applied to 
one’s own nationals.382 As is also noted in the WTO’s Secretariat’s Note on ENTs, in cases where 
movement of natural persons is subject to an ENT, the limitation is typically intended to 
discriminate between foreign and local workers.  This is clearest when an ENT conditions the 
access on the "lack of availability in the local labour market", or the "lack of domestic supply".383   
 
Lastly, the analysis of the EU’s commitments on Mode 4 also informs us of the EU’s position as to 
the scope of that specific mode. In thus allows us to consider the EU’s stance to the issue of 
employment market access as the dividing factor between service mobility and labour mobility. 
  
                                                
381 See, for example, Annex 7-A-3 in the EU-Korea EIA. 
382 In contrast, seemingly non-discriminatory ENTs usually include specifications on the criteria applied. For example, 
the EU Member States have often inscribed ENTs with regard to certain social and health care services (e.g. hospital 
and ambulance services). The criteria typically applied are the number of and impact on existing establishments, 
transport infrastructure, population density, geographic spread, and creation of new employment. In these cases, the 
measure’s application to all service suppliers can often be inferred (though a margin of error does exist). In the case of 
Mode 4, the EU Member States typically impose an ENT without any further criteria and in such sectors where access 
to employment would not typically be restricted with regard to one’s own nationals. 
383 See the WTO Secretariat’s Note “Economic Needs Tests”, WTO document S/CSS/W/118, 30 November 2001, 




V.2 EU’S TRADE POLICY AND SERVICES AGREEMENTS 
 
1. The development of the EU’s competences in the field of trade 
 
In this part of the thesis we provide a short overview of the EU’s trade policy and the Union’s 
competences in the field of external trade.384 As we have chosen some of the EU’s EIAs as our data, 
the methodology of the thesis is adapted to the EU’s practice of scheduling services commitments. 
An essential characteristic of this practice is that the EU’s commitments are a compilation of 
separate commitments of a large number of different states. To understand and interpret the EU’s 
PTAs, one needs to understand the Union’s policy and competences in the field of trade. In the field 
of services the extent to which the EU can act as a uniform actor externally is also closely related to 
the state of development of its own internal market in services. Therefore, before embarking on the 
results of the study, we provide a brief overview of the legal aspects of the EU’s trade policy in 
services. This serves the understanding and interpretation of the EU’s services commitments and 
the results of our study. It also clarifies the EU’s position on the types of movement covered by 
Mode 4. 
 
Trade in services is today, in its entirety, part of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP). Due 
to the special, more politically sensitive nature of services, as compared to goods, the current state 
of affairs required a constitutional struggle regarding the scope of the CCP. Most modes of supply 
were first considered to be outside the CCP and even when included, the EU’s exclusive 
competence did not apply in a number of services sectors. The Lisbon Treaty brought about a 
significant change in this respect: the main subject matters of the WTO, goods and services, were 
matched by the new formulation of the CCP.385 Whereas the Nice Treaty had left agreements 
relating to certain sensitive service sectors subject to the common accord of the Union and the 
Member States, Art. 3 and Art. 207 TFEU clearly provide that trade in services, as well as 
commercial aspects of intellectual property and foreign direct investment, belong to the area of the 
CCP and thus to the category of the EU’s exclusive competence.386 Under TFEU, trade agreements 
with third countries can therefore, in principle, be concluded solely by the Union without the need 
for separate ratification by the Member States.387  
                                                
384 Parts of this chapter have been published earlier in Jacobsson (2013). 
385 Müller-Graff 2008, 190. 
386 Rosas and Armati 2010, 205. 
387 There are some possible areas that may bring a trade agreement within the field of shared competence. These 





In practice, however, the EU continues to conclude its trade agreements as so-called mixed 
agreements, which means that both the EU and the Member States are signatories to the 
agreements.388 That is partly because the EU’s agreements include issues outside the CCP and the 
Union’s exclusive competence but also because it is not entirely clear whether certain trade-related 
areas (such as mutual recognition of professional qualifications) are within the Union’s 
competence.389  Especially the extent to which the EU has powers in respect of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has been a controversial issue since the Lisbon Treaty came into force. The 
Commission has interpreted the treaty broadly as allowing the EU the exclusive competence to 
negotiate and conclude agreements regarding all aspects of investment.390 Many Member States, 
however, have taken an alternative interpretation, arguing that the EU has powers only in relation to 
the narrow category of FDI, admission of investment, and that the type of portfolio investments and 
post-establishment investment protection covered by BITs (including the so-called investor-state 
                                                                                                                                                            
competence between the Union and the Member States remains shared (Art. 4(2)(g) TFEU). If a trade agreement 
includes such transport services that remain outside the Union’s exclusive competence, Member States must appear as 
co-parties to the agreement. The scope of such services is, however, reduced by the development of the Union’s 
secondary law, which in combination with the AETR/ERTA principle and the principle of loyal cooperation means that 
the Member States’ action is significantly limited and the Union’s competence accordingly extended. Pursuant to the 
AETR/ERTA judgment of 1971 (and the doctrine of implied powers), the Member States have no right to undertake 
obligations with third countries which affect common rules laid down by the Community (now the EU), only the EU 
itself can do so. As a general rule, the doctrine means that the EU enjoys implied external competence in areas where it 
enjoys internal competence. With the Lisbon Treaty, the principle is now also codified in Articles 3(2) and 216(1) 
TFEU. See Rosas and Armati 2010, 209 and Case 22/70, Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263. 
388 ‘Mixed agreements’ are international agreements concluded jointly by the EU (before, the Community) and the 
Member States because they include issues in shared competence. Cremona notes that this is a particular kind of shared 
competence, which requires joint action instead of permitting the Community and the Member States to act either alone 
or together. See Cremona 2010a, 679. 
389 The lack of clarity around the issue of competence is evident in the controversy relating to the conclusion of the 
CETA. The Commission decided on 5 July 2016 that CETA is a "mixed" agreement. Since then, the Commission and 
the Member States have been at odds as to which parts of the agreement can be subjected to provisional application and 
with varying opinions as to which parts need to wait for each Member State’s ratification. See the news piece “EU 
members unsure how to apply CETA, 2 months from signing”, 15 August 2016, CBC News, available at 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-european-union-ceta-trade-provisional-application-1.3715488 (accessed 18 
August 2016). It would appear that under Art. 218(5) TFEU, all areas of agreements between the Union and third 
countries can be provisionally applied before the entry into force of the agreement by an authorization of the Council. 
However, it seems that certain Member States wish to keep certain areas out of provisional application (such areas 
potentially being or not being in the shared competence) prior to the ratification of the agreement in their national 
legislature(s). In an answer to the European Parliament, the EU Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malmström, stated 
that if the Council decided to sign CETA as a mixed agreement, “it could be applied provisionally before it has been 
ratified by the Parliaments of the Member States at least in part, that is to the extent that CETA falls within the Union's 
competence and if the Council so decides on the basis of a Commission proposal”. In the same answer, Commissioner 
Malmström said that “in case the Council decided to apply provisionally CETA, the fact that a national parliament 
voted against CETA would not automatically put an end to the provisional application”. See “Answer given by Ms 
Malmström”, 8 July 2016, Parliamentary questions, European Parliament, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2016-003206&language=EN (accessed 19 August 
2016). 




dispute settlement) do not fall within the concept of FDI. Such issues would thus remain within the 
scope of shared competence, needing approval from both the EU and individual Member States.391 
 
With the conclusion of the EU-Singapore FTA, the Commission has decided to legally address the 
question of the EU’s powers in the fields of trade and investment. The EU organs are currently 
waiting for the opinion of the Court of Justice, which is expected to clarify on the Union’s 
competence to sign and ratify the agreement.392 The Commission is asking whether the Union has 
the requisite competence to sign and conclude the FTA alone. The Commission has been arguing 
that the agreement falls within the Union’s exclusive competence but its stand does not necessarily 
apply to all EU’s trade and investment agreements. For example, in the case of the CETA 
agreement with Canada, the Commission is proposing its conclusion as a mixed agreement.393 In 
addition, in the press release concerning the request to the Court regarding the FTA with Singapore, 
the Commission expressly states that “In case of the EU-US trade talks, for instance there will most 
likely be a number of elements that will require ratification by national parliaments“.394 For the time 
being, it remains unclear which exactly are the areas of the EU’s trade and investment agreements 
that the Commission believes to fall within the EU’s exclusive competence. The Court’s Opinion 
will hopefully clarify the issue as regards most of the areas in the EU’s newest agreements. 
However, as the request is limited to the FTA with Singapore, the Court will not have the occasion 
to consider the new investment court system included in the agreements with Vietnam and Canada 
and proposed by the EU also to the U.S.395 
 
                                                
391 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, there has been also a lively academic debate regarding the issue of 
EU’s competences in the field of investment. For literature on the various aspects of the new EU investment powers, 
see footnote 6 in Reinisch 2014, 115-116. 
392  Request for an opinion submitted by the European Commission pursuant to Art. 218(11) TFEU (Opinion 2/15). 
393 The Commission’s press release concerning the proposal to sign the CETA. See “European Commission proposes 
signature and conclusion of EU-Canada trade deal”, 5 July 2016, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
16-2371_en.htm (accessed 23 August 2016). According to the Commission, the conclusion of CETA as a mixed 
agreement is to allow for a swift signature and provisional application of the agreement. The Commission notes that 
“this is without prejudice to its legal view, as expressed in a case currently being examined by the European Court of 
Justice concerning the trade deal reached between the EU and Singapore.” The Commission’s stand on the question of 
‘mixity’ as regards specific areas of the CETA agreement may be affected by political considerations. 
394 The Commission’s Press Release: “Singapore: The Commission to request a Court of Justice Opinion on the trade 
deal”, 30 October 2014, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1235_en.htm (accessed 23 August 
2016). 
395 The CETA text follows the EU's new approach as set out in the recently negotiated EU-Vietnam FTA and the EU’s 
TTIP proposal. See the Commission’s Press Release “CETA: EU and Canada agree on new approach on investment in 
trade agreement”, 29 February 2016, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-399_en.htm (accessed 26 





The formulation of the law on the EU’s competences as it stands today started with the advent of 
the WTO in the mid-1990s when the Uruguay Round was closing and the Court was asked to give 
its opinion on the question of who had the competence to conclude the new GATS and TRIPS 
agreements embodying the results of the Round. Already much earlier the Court had declared that 
the Community enjoyed exclusive external competence in two fields in particular: the CCP 
(Opinion 1/75) 396  and the common fisheries policy 397 . The rationale with regard to the CCP 
(including only trade in goods at the time) was that there was no longer room for the Member 
States’ unilateral action. Instead, in a common market where third country goods imported into any 
Member State were treated as goods originating in the Community, unified rules and policies were 
required to ensure an adequate direction for the Community’s external trade. A common position 
was also needed to avoid the Community being weakened in its relations with third countries.398 
 
However, at the advent of the WTO, the Court in Opinion 1/94399 established that the logic applied 
in Opinion 1/75 to trade in goods was not suitable for all aspects of services trade. With respect to 
establishment (Mode 3) and the movement of natural persons as recipients or suppliers of services 
(Modes 2 and 4), the existence in the Treaty of specific chapters on the free movement of natural 
and legal persons led the Court to conclude that those matters did not fall within the CCP. 
Furthermore, the chapters were not inextricably linked to the treatment to be afforded in the 
Community to nationals of non-member countries. Therefore, in the absence of specific provisions 
to that effect, the treatment of TCNs crossing the external frontiers of the Member States was 
outside the ambit of the Community’s exclusive competence. The Court concluded that only cross-
border trade (Mode 1) fell within the CCP since it was ‘not unlike trade in goods’ and involved no 
movement of persons. 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty empowered the Council to extend the scope of the CCP to services and 
intellectual property insofar as they were not already covered by it. The Council did not act upon 
the authorization but the reform was finally implemented by the Treaty of Nice, in which the ambit 
of the CCP was expanded to all modes of services.400 Agreements relating to trade in cultural and 
                                                
396 Opinion 1/75, Opinion of the Court of 11 November 1975 given pursuant to Article 228 of the EEC Treaty [1975], 
ECR 01355. 
397 Case 804/79, Commission v United Kingdom [1981], ECR 1045. 
398 Leal-Arcas 2003, 4. 
399 Opinion 1/94, Opinion of the Court of 15 November 1994 - Competence of the Community to conclude international 
agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual property [1994] ECR I-05267. Regarding foreign 
investment, see Opinion 2/92, Third Revised Decision of the OECD on national treatment [1995] ECR I-521. 
400 In Opinion 1/08 the Court confirmed that the Community was, as a result of the Nice Treaty, competent to conclude 




audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human health services were, however, 
still left within the shared competence of the Community and its Member States.401 Consequently, 
in addition to the applicable Community decision-making procedure, the conclusion of agreements 
including such services required the common accord of the Member States. 
 
The impractical state of affairs was finally rectified by the Lisbon Treaty that changed the law in 
two important ways. Firstly, all service sectors, except for transport services, were brought within 
the exclusive competence of the Union. Consequently, the ratification of agreements covering 
services, as well as trade-related intellectual property rights, in the Member States’ parliaments can 
be precluded as long as no liberalization of transport services is included.402 Secondly, the powers 
of the European Parliament in the area of the CCP were increased. The European Parliament is now 
required to give its consent to any trade agreement and, during negotiations, it must be kept 
regularly updated on their progress. The Lisbon Treaty has thus significantly enhanced the 
Parliament’s voice in the international trade matters of the EU. 
 
In 2013, the Court handed down two more important rulings on the scope of the CCP. In Daiichi 
Sankyo403, the Court confirmed that the Treaty amendments of the Lisbon Treaty brought the TRIPs 
Agreement in its entirety within the scope of the CCP. In that case, as well as in the second case, 
Conditional Access Services404, the Court also clarified the relationship between Articles 114 and 
207 TFEU. Art. 114 constitutes the main Treaty article used to enact harmonization measures in the 
internal market. In both cases, one of the central issues was the potential ‘abuse’ of Art. 207 TFEU 
as a means of externally harmonizing the internal market and therefore infringing upon the EU 
competences under Art. 114 TFEU. The Court did not find reason for such concern. The latter case 
concerned an international agreement on Conditional Access Services, an area for which a similar 
level of protection had already been established through the EU’s internal legislation. The Court 
found that Art. 207, and not Art. 114 TFEU, was the correct legal basis for the conclusion of an 
                                                                                                                                                            
Court (Grand Chamber) of 30 November 2009 — Opinion pursuant to Article 300(6) EC [2009] ECR I-11129, 
paragraph 119. Opinion 1/08 concerned the modification and withdrawal of the EU’s specific commitments under the 
GATS following the EU’s enlargement. 
401 Art. 133(6)(2) EC. In Opinion 1/08 (paragraphs 135-140) the Court stated that also such agreements that concern 
neither exclusively nor predominantly sensitive sectors (cultural, audiovisual, educational, social and health services) 
fell within the shared competence. 
402 A shared competence between the Union and the Member States applies in the area of transport (Art. 4 TFEU). 
Thus, the EU can still not operate as an entirely exclusive actor in the WTO or in bilateral trade negotiations involving 
transport. See Waele 2011, 70. However, as noted above, the EU may enjoy implied external powers at least in certain 
areas of transport services. On this issue, see Eeckhout 2011, 59. 
403 Case C-414/11, Daiichi Sankyo Co. Ltd, Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. DEMO Anonimos Viomikhaniki kai 
Emporiki Etairia Farmakon [2013] EU:C:2013:520. 




international agreement which lead to external harmonization of conditional access services with 
third countries, even if the agreement had certain internal effects. By applying the so-called “centre 
of gravity” test in determining the correct legal basis for measures falling within separate 
competences, the Court concluded that the Convention’s aim was not to promote conditional access 
services within the EU, but rather to protect EU service providers beyond the borders of the EU. Its 
primary objective had a specific connection with international trade in those services, and thus it 
could be legitimately linked to the CCP.405 
 
In a similar vein, the Court in Daiichi Sankyo rejected the argument that allowing TRIPs to fall 
within the scope of the CCP would unduly affect the EU’s competence in internal market matters 
by leading to indirect harmonization of the internal market or even deactivation of a shared 
competence.406 The Court pointed out that the main objective of the TRIPS Agreement was to 
strengthen and harmonize the protection of intellectual property on a worldwide scale. 407  It 
remained open to the EU to legislate on intellectual property rights within the internal market. The 
Court admitted, however, that such competence must be exercised in conformity with TRIPs, ‘as 
those rules are still, as previously, intended to standardize certain rules on the subject at world level 
and thereby to facilitate international trade’.408 
 
By the two judgments, the Court has given good ground to expect that it will continue to 
consolidate the wide interpretation of the scope of the CCP. The possible effect of external 
harmonization on the EU’s internal rules may bring up new questions as a result. For example, one 
can ask to what extent the EU’s unified external trade commitments on third-country service 
suppliers’ entry, stay and professional qualifications will affect their rights within the internal 
market. So far there is only limited EU legislation in that regard (mainly the ICT Directive). 
Therefore, it would seem that the Commission-led unification of conditions in trade agreements, so 
far seen at least in the EU’s horizontal commitments on third-country service suppliers, is creating 
common rules that are the main source of EU rules on third-country service suppliers. However, the 
reach of such rules is limited considering that trade commitments do no extend to such natural 
TCNs who are legal residents in the EU and outside the limited scope of Mode 4. Nevertheless, as 
                                                
405 In accordance with the centre of gravity test, it is sufficient that the "main purpose" of an agreement is the external 
harmonization for it to fall within the scope of the CCP. "Incidental" internal harmonization does not require reference 
to another legal base. Para. 53 of C-137/12, Conditional Access Services and Ankersmit (2014). On the centre of gravity 
test, see e.g. Van Vooren and Wessel 2014, 158-185.  
406 Ankersmit 2014, 205. 
407 Para. 58 of C-414/11, Daiichi Sankyo.  




is discussed in this thesis, the borderlines between Mode 4 and other migrants are not always so 
clear. 
 
The decision-making procedure for the conclusion of trade agreements is governed by Articles 207 
and 218 TFEU. Unless the agreement covers a field for which unanimity is required for the 
adoption of the EU’s internal rules or in case of specific risks relating to certain politically sensitive 
services enumerated in Art. 207 (4) TFEU, the Council acts by a qualified majority throughout the 
procedure. The reason for the exception of unanimity is to safeguard the parallelism of the decision-
making rules in the internal and external dimension of EU legislation.409 
 
The significance of the all-encompassing exclusivity of the CCP should, nevertheless, not be 
overemphasized. Considering that trade agreements are becoming increasingly complex and 
encompass various behind-the-border issues, there will be a need for mixed agreements also in the 
future. Trade deals covering policies outside the EU’s exclusive competence and involving issues 
that have not been harmonized in the EU will need to be concluded by the EU and Member States 
together.410 
 
2. The (lack of) EU’s internal market of services – implications for external trade 
 
Even though goods and services are now equally located within the CCP and the EU’s exclusive 
competence, the offers which the EU makes to its trading partners in respect of services look very 
different from its offers in respect of goods. Whereas goods are treated similarly in each Member 
State once they enter the territory of the Union, in services the diversity of national rules prevails. 
This is due to the fact that the EU still, to a large extent, lacks harmonized legislation with regard to 
how services and services-related areas of law are regulated in the Member States.411 For example, 
in the absence of a genuine EU-wide immigration policy, service suppliers from third countries face 
a different immigration scheme in each Member State. Even if the Member States aim at 
formulating unified conditions relating to issues such as period of stay and prior employment, there 
is still a separate work and residence permit procedure in each Member State. 412 Another example 
                                                
409 Müller-Graff 2008, 200. 
410 Bungenberg 2010, 133. For example, in the fields such as social policy, health and culture intra-EU harmonization is 
largely absent or impossible. 
411 See Langhammer who notes that given the significant amount of national sovereignties that remain in the services 
trade amongst EU Member States, the EU is not yet even a free trade area. Langhammer 2005, 311. 
412 The directive on a single application procedure for TCN workers does not apply to self-employed persons nor ICTs. 




is the absence of uniform rules regulating service professions (most relevant for sector-specific 
commitments under the GATS). Each Member State can apply its own qualification, license and 
residence requirements across the sectors. The complex and Member State-specific sectoral 
commitments that the EU has offered under the GATS and its services PTAs illustrate how the 
incompleteness of the EU’s internal services market appears in its external trade relations. 
 
Even though the Commission is the exclusive trade negotiator of the Union and undoubtedly aims 
at as consistent a schedule as possible, each Member State formulates its own concessions and 
limitations to be included in the EU’s common, consolidated services schedule. Significant 
differences still exist among Member States both in horizontal and sector-specific commitments. 
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the continuing diversity within 
the EU’s services schedule can be seen in all of the EU’s most recent trade agreements, as is 
showed also by our results.  
 
A look at the EU’s services schedules demonstrates the situation. Both in horizontal and sector-
specific commitments, the description of reservations is prescribed separately by each Member 
State. In some cases two or more Member States have adopted the same position, in which case the 
relevant states are grouped together. On some occasions, the commitment or restriction is marked as 
being taken by the EU if all Member States share the same commitment or restriction. The 
following example concerning auditing services is from the EU-Korea FTA: 
 
 
6. BUSINESS SERVICES 
 




b) 2. Auditing services 
(CPC 86211 and 86212 other than accounting 
AT: Korean auditors’ (who must be authorised 
according to the law of Korea) equity 
participation and shares in the operating results 
of anyAustrian legal entity may not exceed 25 
percent, if they are not members of the Austrian 
Professional Body. 
CY: Access is subject to an economic needs test. 
Main criteria: the employment situation in the 
sub-sector. 
                                                                                                                                                            
application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member 
State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State. ICTs and the self-
employed are outside the scope of application. Contractual service suppliers are sometimes required to obtain a work 




services) CZ and SK: At least 60 percent of capital share 
or voting rights are reserved to nationals. 
DK: In order to enter into partnerships with 
Danish authorised accountants, foreign 
accountants have to obtain permission from the 
Danish Commerce and Companies Agency. 
FI: Residency requirement for at least one of the 
auditors of a Finnish liability company. 
LV: In a commercial company of sworn auditors 
more than 50 percent of the voting capital shares 
shall be owned by sworn auditors or commercial 
companies of sworn auditors of the European 
Union. 
LT: Not less than 75 % of shares should belong 
to auditors or auditing companies of the 
European Union. 
SE: Only auditors approved in Sweden may 
perform legal auditing services in certain legal 
entities, inter alia, in all limited companies. Only 
such persons may be shareholders or form 
partnerships in companies which practice 
qualified auditing (for official purposes). 
Residency is required for approval. 
SI: The share of foreign persons in auditing 




As the commitment shows, ten of the EU Member States have state-specific restrictions on the 
supply of auditing services in or to their territory. Between them, only two Member States provide 
for the same restriction (CZ and SK). For the 17 Member States that have not prescribed 
restrictions, the sector is ‘bound’, meaning that they do not restrict the supply of auditing services 





In practice, the Commission thus coordinates the Member States’ positions that vary according to 
their national legislation. The Commission does act as the sole negotiator but in the formulation of 
the EU’s offer on services, the content of the offer is largely dependent on how far each Member 
State is willing to go. International services negotiations are generally hampered by the challenge of 
coordinating various positions of national authorities in the fields of taxation, social security, 
immigration and employment (to name just a few). It is conceivable that in the field of services, the 
Commission has to be particularly attentive to the prerequisites of the Member States. Running over 
the Member States and their various regulatory authorities would risk the Council not accepting the 
final agreement.413 This risk is emphasized by the European citizens’ interest in safeguarding public 
services in Europe, which makes them especially alert to trade agreements in the field of services.414 
 
A uniform, common services schedule of the EU is not likely to be achieved. Only a completed, 
largely harmonized internal market in services would make a customs union in services possible. 
And even in a harmonized internal market uniform conditions towards third-country service 
suppliers would exist only if the Member States were able to agree on issues such the entry 
conditions for TCNs and acceptance of their professional qualification. Mode 4 is formally in the 
EU’s exclusive competence but immigration and professional recognition rules are not.415 Actually, 
EU Member States keep concluding bilateral migration agreements, which may, in a limited extent, 
include some overlap with service mobility.416 From an external point of view, the formal existence 
of the Union’s exclusive competence in services may not seem to matter much as long as internal 
policies are not aligned. Especially as most of the EU’s trade agreements are likely to require 
                                                
413 In concluding trade agreements, the Council acts by a qualified majority (Art. 207(4) TFEU). In certain cases, and 
especially when unanimity is required for the adoption of the EU’s internal rules, the negotiation and conclusion of 
agreements requires unanimity. Moreover, Art. 207(6) provides that the exercise of the competences conferred by the 
article “shall not affect the delimitation of competences between the Union and the Member States, and shall not lead to 
harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member States in so far as the Treaties exclude such 
harmonisation”. In addition, as noted above, EU’s trade agreements continue to be ‘mixed’ and thus subject also to 
national ratifications (which can be seen as especially risky). 
414 This is the case also in intra-EU services trade. A good example is the EU’s Services Directive in which several 
sectors were excluded for political reasons (Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2006 on services in the internal market). In particular, the directive does not apply at all to healthcare 
services and audiovisual services. Social services are also largely excluded. For a good account of the Services 
Directive and its somewhat complicated relationship to the Court’s case law, see Snell (2008). 
415 One possible argument is that if the rules concerning the movement and professional recognition of TCN service 
suppliers within the EU were harmonized, the EU could have an implied external competence in that regard. One may, 
however, question to what extent the Member States are willing to let go of their national policies in the control of the 
movement of TCNs and accept trade agreements setting a common policy for the entry, stay and service supply by 
TCNs. Especially since so far they have managed to agree on internal rules only in a very limited amount. 
416 Arguably, the GATS MFN clause acts as a tool to discipline bilateral immigration agreements. See Panizzon (2010). 
However, as we explain in Chapter IV concerning Mode 4, there is no MFN obligation with regard to such rules that 
provide for an access to the host state’s labour market as labour migration is outside the scope of Mode 4. There is 




national ratifications in any case. However, having a single negotiator (the Commission) is likely to 
be in the interest of everyone.417 
 
3. Service mobility as part of the CCP 
 
The EU’s Mode 4 commitments belong to the field of the CCP and can be negotiated and concluded 
under the EU’s exclusive competence. The Union’s exclusive competence on Mode 4 does not 
mean that the Union could, by means of trade agreements, aim to harmonize the Member States’ 
immigration legislation. Any harmonizing measures must, instead, be adopted in accordance with 
the usual internal legislative procedures.418 As long as there is no common EU framework for issues 
such as TCN service suppliers’ entry conditions, free movement rights and recognition of 
qualifications, the Member States continue to schedule their own national preferences. It is also 
worth noting that the Member States are always guaranteed the right to determine the volumes of 
admission of TCNs coming to their territory from third countries. This applies to TCNs arriving to 
seek work as employed but also as self-employed.419 
 
Among the most significant entry barriers to service suppliers are work permits and economic needs 
tests (ENTs) that countries use to assess whether the same job or service could be carried out by a 
local person.420 Since the entry conditions for TCN service suppliers have not been harmonized, the 
uniformity of the EU’s offer in this respect depends on coordination among the Member States. The 
political sensitivities and different Member State preferences relating to the entry and movement of 
TCNs make it challenging to adopt EU-wide legislation. A partial move to this effect, however, is 
                                                
417 The exclusive Union competence enables the Commission to act as the sole negotiator of the Union with third 
countries. It is one factor in the institutional balance that is a key principle in the relations between different EU 
institutions. However, it is not always clear how the principle should play out in practice. There are unfortunate 
examples of international negotiations where the composition of the EU’s negotiation team has been unclear also to the 
Europeans themselves. To guard the correct institutional balance, the Commission has also legally challenged the 
practice of concluding mixed agreements as ‘hybrid’ acts consisting concurrently of a decision of the Council (acting 
for the Union) and of the Representatives of Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council. 
Commission has argued that the involvement of the Member States in the Council’s decision-making procedure violates 
the treaties as it undermines the qualified majority rule and blurs the division of competences between the different 
actors. The Court has ruled in the favour of the Commission in the case C-28/12, European Commission v. Council of 
the European Union [2015] EU:C:2015:282. The EU’s complicated institutional rules and practices cause legal 
uncertainties, and they may be especially difficult to understand for third parties. See van Elsuwege 2014, 131-133. 
418  Art. 79 TFEU is a more specific legal base in this respect and specifically provides for enacting ‘common 
immigration policy’ in the Union. See also Art. 207 (6) TFEU according to which the exercise of the competences in 
the field of the CCP does not affect the delimitation of competences between the Union and the Member States. 
419 Art. 79(5) TFEU. See De Baere 2011, 172. 




the EU’s ICT Directive.421 The directive aims at making the EU more attractive for multinational 
corporations and their key personnel by providing harmonized conditions of entry and stay, 
provisions ensuring certain social and economic rights, enhanced family rights and intra-EU 
mobility. Even though ICTs are the least sensitive group of persons moving under Mode 4, their 
easy access to the EU and movement from one Member State to another is crucial for many 
multinationals opening or running a business in Europe. 
 
Another piece of legislation potentially relevant for third-country service suppliers is the seasonal 
workers directive. 422  Even though it is primarily meant to cover direct working relationships 
between seasonal workers and employers in the Member States, it does not exclude situations where 
a Member State’s national law allows admission of TCNs as seasonal workers through temporary 
work agencies established on its territory and which have a direct contract with the seasonal 
worker.423 Therefore, at least in some Member States, a TCN may be able supply his services in 
seasonal work through a contract with a local temporary work agency. However, such a presence in 
the EU should, in our opinion, be seen primarily as a form of labour migration instead of service 
mobility, even if work through temporary work agencies may seem close to freelancing. 
Nevertheless, local employment legislation typically applies in its entirety or to a large extent, and 
thus the TCN should be seen as accessing the local employment market. 
 
Outside the ICT directive, there is little progress in the facilitation of service mobility within the 
EU.424 Too much should neither be expected in that regard. The lack of expectations relates to 
earlier failures that the EU has experienced in trying to liberalize the intra-EU movement of TCN 
service suppliers. Article 56 (2) TFEU includes an option for the European Parliament and the 
Council to extend the freedom to provide services to natural TCNs who supply services and are 
                                                
421 Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer. Under Art. 6 of the directive, 
Member States retain the right to determine the volumes of admission of third-country nationals in accordance with Art. 
79(5) TFEU. On that basis, an application for an intra-corporate transferee permit may either be considered 
inadmissible or be rejected. The maximum duration of an intra-corporate transfer under the directive is three years for 
managers and specialists and one year for trainee employees after which they must leave the territory of the Member 
States unless they obtain a residence permit on another basis in accordance with Union or national law (Art. 12). Under 
certain conditions, ICTs may move to work, within the same undertaking, from one Member State to another for a 
period of up to 90 days in any 180-day period. 
422 Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of entry 
and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers. 
423 See recital 12 of the directive. 
424 For measures concerning legal migration for employment purposes, an overview of EU legislation is available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.12.3.html  (accessed 27 August 
2016). Following the difficulties encountered in adopting a general provision covering all labour immigration in the EU, 
the current approach consists of adopting sectoral legislation, by category of migrants, in order to establish a legal 




established within the Union.425 Despite certain attempts, such an extension has not yet taken 
place.426 Progress in developing intra-EU movement rights for TCNs under Mode 4 is even harder 
to attain considering that Mode 4 does not necessitate establishment (as self-employed or through 
an undertaking) in any Member State as Art. 56 (2) TFEU does. 
 
The EU’s Services Directive427 has not changed the situation in this regard. It removes certain 
barriers in intra-EU service provision but does not apply to TCN service suppliers unless they 
establish a subsidiary in a Member State in accordance with Art. 54 TFEU. Only legal persons that 
are duly established in such a way begin to enjoy the freedom to provide services under Art. 56 
TFEU.428 
 
In addition to immigration and intra-EU movement rules, the other important set of entry barriers 
for TCN service suppliers are the laws regulating services within the Member States. There are 
significant legal and administrative barriers that apply across the sectors, including requirements for 
specialized professional knowledge, residence and even nationality. Regulations on professional 
services vary across Member States and the Services Directive has not changed the situation in this 
regard either as it is not aimed at the harmonization of any service sectors and does not set any 
common sets of professional qualifications. There is a number of sectoral directives that include 
harmonized requirements for the practice of various professions in the EU’s internal market, but the 
internal recognition rules of the EU do not apply to TCNs supplying services under Mode 4.429 
                                                
425 ‘Establishment’ is not defined in the TFEU or in the implementing legislation. However, Art. 49 TFEU provides for 
the ‘freedom of establishment’ which covers the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to 
set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms (Art. 49(2)) TFEU). 
426 In 1999, the Commission proposed such an extension and put forward an “EC service provision card” which would 
have facilitated the movement of TCN service providers in the EU. The proposed directive would have covered “self-
employed persons who are not citizens of the Union, but third-country nationals legally present in the Community” 
(recital 1 of the proposed directive). See the Proposal for a Council directive extending the freedom to provide cross-
border services to third-country nationals established within the Community, COM (1999) 3 final. The proposal was 
withdrawn in 2004. See Eisele 2014, 38. 
427 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the 
internal market (the “Services Directive”). 
428 As noted by Krajewski, the Services Directive aims at an effective implementation of the freedom of establishment 
and the freedom to provide services. These freedoms are enjoyed by natural and legal persons that are nationals of a 
Member State and are established in a Member State as provided in Art. 49 and 56 TFEU. See Krajewski 2008, 198-
199. The opening of a branch is not enough to bring a foreign entity in the sphere of freedom of establishment within 
the EU. According to Art. 2 of the Services Directive, the directive applies to services supplied by providers established 
in a Member State. Pursuant to recital 36, “the concept of a provider should not cover the case of branches in a Member 
State of companies from third countries because, under Art. 48 of the Treaty, the freedom of establishment and free 
movement of services may benefit only companies constituted in accordance with the laws of a Member State and 
having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community. 
429 Under Art. 2 of the EU’s professional qualifications directive, only EU nationals are covered by the general rules 




Therefore, the EU’s services market remains greatly differentiated with regard to the conditions for 
the provision of professional services by third-country service suppliers. The EU’s internal diversity 
in this regard is not always visible in its EIA services schedules in case Member States’ 
professional regulations do not include violations of NT.430 However, the diversity of professional 
rules in itself (even when such rules are de jure non-discriminatory towards TCNs) makes the 
access to the EU additionally complicated and burdensome for TCNs interested in supplying their 
services in more than just one Member State. 
 
Arguably for this reason and because of EU’s trade partners’ expectations, the Commission is, 
aiming at a more uniform services schedule for the Union. The quest for a more harmonized 
services offer was visible already in the EU’s services offer made in the first years of the Doha 
Round (which now, over ten years later, is largely meaningless).431 Following the EU’s first GATS 
commitments at the end of the Uruguay Round, the EU has made two offers as part of the Doha 
Round: one in 2003 and another, revised offer, in 2005.432 The horizontal commitments of the EU’s 
Doha Round offers reveal a reasonable unification of the general conditions for the entry and stay 
of TCN service suppliers. Notwithstanding certain examples where a limited number of Member 
States have either gone further or remained below the EU’s common standard, the offers on 
horizontal commitments significantly streamline the Member States’ commitments as compared to 
their consolidated GATS commitments that remain in force. The change is noteworthy considering 
that in the Community’s original horizontal commitments concluded at the end of the Uruguay 
Round, the entry conditions and periods of stay largely vary between the Member States.433 Within 
the consolidated schedule of EU-25 the diversity is manifold compared to the Doha Round offers.434 
                                                                                                                                                            
professional qualifications). See Guild 2007, 2-3. The exclusion of TCNs from the coverage of the recognition rules is 
also specified in all EU’s EIAs. 
430 However, often they do include violations of NT as well. There are numerous Member State-specific examples of 
nationality and residency requirements in various service professions. The differences between the Member States’ 
regulations (the diversity) is easily visible in such instances. 
431  Klamert 2015, 68-69 and Langhammer 2005, 323. Since the EU’s latest offer, the Doha Round has become 
embroiled in deep controversies and the offers are no longer relevant as such. Nonetheless, they can be reviewed to 
analyse to what extent the EU has managed to formulate a unified stand on services before the halt of the Doha Round. 
432 Communication from the European Communities and its Member States – Conditional Initial Offer, 10 June 2003, 
TN/S/O/EEC and Communication from the European Communities and its Member States – Conditional Revised Offer, 
29 June 2005, TN/S/O/EEC/Rev.1. According to Persin, the EU’s original Doha Round offer of 2003 is more generous 
on Mode 4 than those of most other WTO Members, the U.S. included. See Persin 2008, 840, fn. 2. 
433 In the original commitments of 1994 the duration of stay and several other rules were left to the discretion of the 
Member States and were mostly not specified in the schedule. In the draft consolidated schedule of EU-25 several of 
such Member State-specific measures are explicitly mentioned in the horizontal part of the schedule, which makes it 
falsely appear more diverse than the Community schedule of 1994. 
434 See the study on the EU’s Doha Round offers on Mode 4 in Jacobsson (2013). The draft consolidated schedule, 
which at least in the time of writing was still in the process of being ratified in some of the Member States, is included 
in the WTO document S/C/W/279 of 9 October 2006. The schedules of Bulgaria and Romania were not yet 





The EU’s GATS offers of 2003 and 2005 also show that there are at least two occasions where the 
Member States’ offers have deteriorated with the adoption of a more unified offer since the 
consolidated Uruguay Round commitments. However, their overall importance is not significant 
and there are also several examples of situations where individual Member States’ commitments 
have ameliorated with the more streamlined EU offer.435 
 
We have not compared the EU’s EIAs to the EU’s GATS commitments and offers, but what is 
noteworthy is that in the EIAs a big part of the horizontal commitments on TCNs regarding their 
entry and stay in the EU’s territory have been included in the actual text of the agreement. There are 
still numerous Member State –specific deviations in the sectoral commitments but horizontal 
commitments have been largely harmonized. 
 
As noted by Hoekman and Sauvé, integration agreements, even when not formally seeking to 
establish a common external policy, often involve some degree of harmonization of regulatory 
policies at least in certain sectors. This may imply that some participating countries become more 
liberal, while others need to be more restrictive. As the authors note, harmonization up is 
nevertheless the more likely result than harmonization down and thus the balancing requirement of 
Art. V:4 towards outsiders is usually not risked.436 
 
It is, however, important to keep in mind that the EU’s more unified stand on Mode 4 in the 2003 
and 2005 offers has not been attained by harmonizing EU legislation but by coordinating the 
positions of the Member States. The common position is thus dependent on the flexibility provided 
by the Member States’ national legislation. That is necessary since the EU has so far succeeded in 
enacting only very limited legislation on the conditions for the entry and stay of TCN service 
suppliers (basically, only the ICT Directive). Moreover, in the study referred to here, only the EU’s 
horizontal commitments under Mode 4 were analyzed. Horizontal entry commitments are most 
suitable for a unified formulation across Member States, even without harmonizing EU rules. 
Further difficulties arise when sector-specific commitments come into play in which case the 
complexity and variety of services regulations across the Member States becomes quickly evident. 
                                                
435 Jacobsson 2013, 255-256. 
436 Hoekman and Sauvé 1994a, 58-59. The balancing requirement towards outsiders means that the overall level of 




The sectoral commitments offered in the Doha Round still reveal a considerable amount of Member 
State-specific limitations. 
 
Eschenbach and Hoekman have carried out an interesting analysis of the EU’s GATS commitments 
and Doha Round offers. 437  They use the index score (from 0 to 100) of Hoekman 1996 to 
characterize EU’s GATS commitments.438  As the authors note, the index used is a somewhat 
arbitrary measure of the depth of commitments in that its value is unlikely to be very informative of 
the actual policies that prevail. However, it provides a way of weighting commitments and allowing 
cross-country comparisons, thus permitting to assess the degree to which there is certain uniformity 
in GATS commitments across EU members. They find that the pre-Doha level of commitment for 
the EU-15 as a whole was 47%. Most EU members do not deviate much from this average 
‘benchmark’ in terms of national commitments across modes. At 46%, the EU weighted average is 
only one percentage point below the benchmark value.  
 
Among the most interesting findings is that the greatest variance in specific commitments is found 
for Mode 3. The standard deviation of the commitments is twice as high for Mode 3 commitments 
as for other modes on market access. Although Modes 1 and 4 are more ‘sensitive’ for all countries, 
the sensitivities on Mode 3 vary more between the Member States. They also find that the GATS 
Doha Round offers made by the EU substantially increase the EU’s average commitment index. At 
the aggregate level, the standard deviation falls from 2 to 1.6, indicating an increase in uniformity at 
the EU Member State level. With the Doha offers, the variance across EU members would fall for 
Mode 3 market access commitments, but the structure of commitments remains similar to the pre- 
Doha status quo. They find that the ‘lagging’ countries are mostly the same – only Greece would 
converge to the EU average as a result of the offers that were on the table as of 2004.  
 
Langhammer (2005)439 uses the same methodological approach as the Hoekman commitment index 
(1996), except that he modifies the index by also taking account of differences in in-between 
commitments (ranging between ‘unbound’ and ‘none) and assigning them values 0.25 and 0.75. 
Similarly to Hoekman and Eschenbach, he finds relatively low coefficients of variation. The 
                                                
437 Eschenbach and Hoekman (2006). 
438 As explained in the chapter on methodology, the Hoekman method (1996) assigns a value of 1 to full commitment to 
liberalization; 0.5 (partial) to specific limitations; and 0 (‘unbound’) to instances where no commitments at all are made 
for a subsector. Average scores are provided for MA and NT (also combined) across all four modes and 155 sub-sectors. 




average levels of commitments thus do not differ much between the Member States. Overall, there 
is most diversity under Mode 4. 
 
Both studies give useful insight into the uniformity, or lack of uniformity, in the EU’s services 
commitments. However, they only note the existence of restrictions and distinguish between severe 
and minor trade restrictions to a limited extent. The fact that with the Doha Round offers more EU 
Member States have a similar number of bounds, unbounds and partial commitments than in the 
original GATS commitments does not mean that the commitments provide for identical conditions 
towards third-country service suppliers. The actual content of the conditions would be very hard to 
index. As noted by Langhammer, because of the non-quantitative nature of trade restrictions in 
services, it is very difficult to assess how far the EU is from a customs union (common external 
policy) in services. The heterogeneity of both service sub-sectors and policy measures makes the 
quantification of services barriers virtually impossible.440 Also in our study, we only note the 
existence or lack of NT, not the reason for it. To learn more of the types of differences existing 
between different Member States in their services commitments, a more qualitative study would be 
needed. 
  
                                                




V.3 THE RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
1. An overview of the reviewed agreements 
 
The reviewed agreements include four different international agreements concluded between the 
EU and its Member States on the hand and partner countries on the other hand. The agreements 
represent three different types of EU’s trade agreements: they comprise an economic and 
partnership agreement (EPA), a free trade agreement (FTA) and two association agreements (AAs). 
Two of the agreements are bilateral (EU-South Korea FTA and EU-Georgia AA) and two regional 
(EU-Central America AA and EU-CARIFORUM EPA). The first, with CARIFORUM countries, 
was concluded in 2008 and the last one, with Georgia, in 2014. The EU-Georgia AA entered into 
force in July 2016, and it is the latest of the EU’s so-called “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreements” (DCFTAs) that has entered into force (the AAs with Moldova and Ukraine being only 
provisionally applied)441.  
 
The objectives of the reviewed agreements differ. The commercially oriented FTA with South 
Korea is focused mostly on trade, whereas the three other agreements cover also other areas of 
cooperation in addition to a chapter on trade. The AA with Georgia relates to the EU’s framework 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy and its eastern regional dimension, the Eastern Partnership. 
The key goal is to extend the EU’s influence in its close neighbourhood and to bring Georgia closer 
to the EU by requiring it to adopt a significant amount of the Union’s internal market regulation. 
After implementing the agreement, Georgian business may access the EU's internal market in 
selected sectors and will function in those sectors in the same regulatory environment as businesses 
in the EU. This objective and method separates the EU-Georgia AA from the other reviewed 
agreements. However, the agreement includes a GATS-type services schedule, which makes it 
possible to analyze the EIA by employing our methodology. The most significant difference to the 
other reviewed EIAs is that Mode 3 has been scheduled according to the so-called negative listing 
                                                
441 Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) open up markets on services, investment, public 
procurement and include regulatory issues, on top of removing tariffs. See the Commissions website on its trade policy 
and agreements: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/agreements/index_en.htm. (accessed 15 August 
2016). DCFTAs have been concluded with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, all of which require the partner countries 
also to match a significant part of their trade-relevant regulation with that of the EU. On 14th December 2011, the 
Council authorized the Commission to open bilateral negotiations to conclude DCFTAs with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco 
and Tunisia. The EU already has AAs with all of theses countries and at least in the negotiations with Morocco the goal 
is the gradual integration of the Moroccan economy into the EU single market. See the overview of the EU’s trade 
negotiations available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf (updated in May 





modality. Its analysis is significantly more burdensome than for positively listed schedules but the 
same method can be used. 
 
The AA with Central America, on the other hand, is the EU’s first ever region-to-region AA. It 
aims at closer political and economic cooperation between the EU and the participating countries by 
relying on three mutually reinforcing pillars, namely political dialogue, cooperation, and a trade 
agreement.442 The agreement, however, does not require the Central American countries to adopt 
EU legislation similarly to the Eastern Neighbourhood AAs. Instead, the Central America AA aims 
at supporting the region’s own integration process. An important factor in the negotiations for the 
agreement was the need to replace the unilateral preferential access to the EU market, which was 
granted to Central America under the EU’s General Scheme of Preferences (GSP). Being expirable, 
GSP preferences are more unpredictable than preferences given under a PTA, and countries having 
achieved high or upper-middle income per capita no longer benefit from the scheme. One of the 
main benefits of the AA with Central America was thus considered to be a unilateral system with a 
stable, predictable and reciprocal framework.443 
 
Out of the four reviewed agreements, the EU-CARIFORUM EPA444 has the strongest development 
agenda. EPAs are development-oriented PTAs that are being concluded with African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries that participate to the Cotonou Agreement.445 The ACP-EU Partnership 
Agreement, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, was concluded for a 20-year period from 2000 to 
2020. It is a comprehensive partnership agreement and has been the framework for EU's relations 
with the 79 ACP countries. With the expiry of the WTO waiver that allowed their existence, the 
                                                
442 The trade pillar of the AA has been provisionally applied since 1 August 2013 with Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Panama, since 1 October 2013 with Costa Rica and El Salvador, and since 1 December 2013 with Guatemala. 
443  The Commission’s webpage on the trade agreement with Central America, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/central-america/ (accessed 15 August 2016). According 
to the Commission, the strengthening of the regional integration process in Central America in practical terms means 
the creation of a customs union and economic integration between the region’s countries. The EU supports this process 
through the trade agreement and its trade-related technical cooperation programs. For a comparison of different trends 
of regional intergration and on the links between the EU and other regional processes, see Warleigh-Lack, Robinson, 
and Rosamond (2011). On the effects of EU trade preferences on developing countries’ exports, see Persson and 
Wilhelmsson (2007). 
444 CARIFORUM’s membership comprises Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, 
Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Surinam, Trinidad, Tobago, 
and the Dominican Republic.  
445 The relations between the EU and the ACP countries date back to 1975 and the first Lomé convention. The latter 
was a successor to the first Convention of Yaoundé in 1963, binding the then European Economic Community and 
former colonies of some of its Member States. Since then, successive partnership agreements have been concluded until 
the present time. The currently applied Cotonou Agreement was revised in 2005 and 2010. It was concluded for a 
twenty-year period and will expire on 29 February 2020. On the Cotonou Agreement, the EPAs and the participating 




trade preferences of the agreement expired at the end of 2007. EPAs have been negotiated to 
replace the preferences. According to the EU, EPAs are WTO-compatible agreements but go 
beyond free trade by focusing on ACP countries’ development, taking account of their socio-
economic circumstances and including co-operation and assistance. They are reciprocal but allow 
ACP countries long transition periods to open up partially to EU imports while providing protection 
for sensitive sectors. EU tariffs are liberalized immediately.446 The story is, however, very different 
for services, as our results show. ACP’ countries access to the EU’s services market is restrained, as 
it is in all EU’s EIAs. 
 
The EU-Korea FTA is an example of the EU’s most recent, primarily commercially driven 
agreements. The agreement can be seen as the flagship of the EU’s Global Europe strategy of 2006, 
which marked the debut for bilateral trade negotiations with commercially meaningful partner 
countries with limited non-trade agendas.447 So far, it remains the only such agreement that has 
entered into force. As explained above, negotiations on a FTA with Singapore were concluded 
already in October 2014 but the initialled agreement still needs to be formally approved by the 
European Commission and then agreed upon by the Council of Ministers and ratified by the 
European Parliament. Another important and already negotiated trade agreement, the CETA with 
Canada, is still waiting to be signed in the midst of uncertainty. As the EU’s commercial trade 
agenda has encountered difficulties, including large resistance among some parts of the European 
population, the EU-Korea FTA remains the EU’s most liberal trade-focused agreement so far. Our 
results put the EU-Korea EIA approximately on the same level with the EU-Georgia AA. 
 
2. Detailed results of the review 
 
The section on the results is structured as follows. First, we note some of the common features in all 
of the reviewed EIAs. These are the type of features that directly affect the level of liberalization 
                                                
446  See the Commission’s webpage on EPAs: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/development/economic-partnerships/ (accessed 19 August 2016). In practice, the negotiations of EPAs have 
proved difficult. According to critics, the EU has sent mixed signals: its partners have believed that the main idea was to 
make existing preferential relationships WTO compatible whereas the EU wanted to move forward on trade. The EU 
also seems to have underestimated how difficult it is for partners from regional organizations of developing countries to 
negotiate trade deals in view of their poor capacities and the need to find agreement among one another. See Ramdoo 
and Bilal (2013). 
447 The Global Europe agenda marked a strategic shift in the EU’s trade policy. It ended the EU’s PTA moratorium, 
which the Commission had put in place to focus on the WTO’s Doha Round. Bilateral engagement between the richest 
economies of the world were seen to undermine the Doha Agenda but ever since 2006, the Commission, backed by a 
trade-oriented coalition of Member States in the Council, has been aiming at creating economic growth through “deep 
and comprehensive” trade integration with some of the most commercially attractive regions of the world. See 




granted by the agreement. As our analysis is focused on assessing the agreements’ level of 
discrimination in terms of NT, the issues brought up in our review are directly related to that aspect. 
After presenting the common features affecting NT across the agreements, we provide separate 
results for each agreement. In this section we give the average scores for each mode across the 
entire EIA as well as for certain selected service sectors. Here the results are summarized but the 
detailed results for each single sub-sector can be viewed in Annex 4, which includes the sector-
specific analysis of each EIA. The detailed review sheets of Annex 4 also note such ingredients of 
the EIAs that we consider to be relevant for the so-called “wider process of economic integration” 
under Art. V:2 GATS. These additional ingredients are analyzed in more detail in Chapter VI where 
the results presented here are assessed in light of the GATS rules on EIAs. 
 
i. Common features of the reviewed EIAs 
 
In its EIAs, the EU groups Modes 1 and 2 together as “Cross-Border Supply of Services”. The two 
modes are defined similarly to the GATS. In the EU-CARIFORUM EIA, Mode 3 is referred to as 
“Commercial presence” (using the GATS terminology), but in the three other EIAs the EU is using 
the term “Establishment”. Mode 4 is referred to as “Temporary presence of natural persons for 
business” in all of the agreements. All modes of supply are thus covered by the agreements, even 
though the level of commitments greatly differs depending on the mode and the sectors. There are 
commitments in most of the sectors by at least some EU Member States. 
 
According to Art. 65 of the EU-CARIFORUM EIA, commercial presence means “any type of 
business or professional establishment” through constitution, acquisition or maintenance of a 
juridical person or the creation or maintenance of a branch or representative office within the 
territory of the EU for the purpose of performing an economic activity. The other EIAs define 
“establishment” in a similar manner. For the EU, the two concepts thus appear to have the same 
meaning.448 Both concepts cover also branches and representative offices, in accordance with the 
definition of commercial presence in Art. XXVIII GATS. Considering that the establishment of 
branches and representative offices is an essential and legally accepted part of commercial presence 
                                                
448 In EU-CARIFORUM EIA, another concept, “Investment”, is used in the heading of Title II (“Investment, trade in 
services and e-commerce”). “Investment” seems to be equivalent to GATS Mode 3, combined with investment in 
certain non-services sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, mining). The content of the Chapter on “Commercial 
presence” (Mode 3) is, however, similar to “Establishment” in the other agreements (which also include certain non-
service sectors). If not in the title, all of the agreements seem to use the term ‘investment’ interchangeably with 
Establishment/Commercial Presence at least under certain provisions (e.g. in the Article “Review of the investment 
legal framework” at the end of each chapter on Establishment, except for EU-Georgia). For a comparison of the EU’s 




also under the EU’s EIAs, limitations to their use can be seen discriminatory. The denial of their use 
modifies conditions of competition in favour of services suppliers of national origin as foreign 
service suppliers are required to fully establish themselves even though they already have a legal 
establishment in their home country. As to domestic suppliers, limitations to the use of branches do 
not concern them at all.449 The EU’s scheduling practice also appears to support the conclusion that 
the requirement of a subsidiary or other type of incorporation in the EU Member States is to be 
considered discriminatory. All reviewed EIAs include a statement according to which non-
discriminatory requirements as regards the types of legal form of an establishment are not included 
in the schedules of commitments.450 However, reservations on the use of branches are inscribed as 
limitations in the EU’s schedules. In addition to a few sector specific limitations, there are 
horizontal limitations to the use of branches in all of the EIAs (see below in the results). As we have 
not factored horizontal limitations in the scores, limitations on the use of branches or representative 
offices do not affect our scoring results in any significant manner. 
 
Under Mode 3, the Member States have undertaken commitments relating also to such economic 
activities that are not purely in the field of services.451 Such commitments relate to agriculture, 
hunting, forestry, logging, fishing and aquaculture, mining and quarrying and manufacturing 
(referred to by the EU typically as non-service activities). For the non-service sectors, reservations 
are scheduled on a negative list basis. They are always listed before the section of “Business 
Services” which are the services corresponding to the WTO’s Sectoral Classification List. Under 
Business Services, the Member States have also on some occasions included certain service 
activities that are not included in the WTO’s Classification.452 As they extend the scope of the 
agreement, such extra service activities are listed in the results for each EIA. 
 
Each reviewed EIA specifies in the beginning of each schedule that it does not apply to any 
subsidies or grants provided by any of the EU Member States, including government-supported 
                                                
449 Setting up of a subsidiary instead of a branch may bring with it many advantages, for example in terms of liabilities 
(because the subsidiary and the parent company are distinct legal entities, the parent company is not usually exposed to 
any liabilities of its subsidiary). What is central here is, however, the free choice among the types of establishment 
enabled by Mode 3. We recognize that it may sometimes be desirable for public policy reasons to demand incorporation 
but the requirement goes similarly against the nature of Mode 3 as residency requirements for foreign natural persons 
under Mode 4. 
450 See, e.g., para. 5 of Annex 7-A-2 of the EU-South Korea EIA (“List of commitments in conformity with Article 7.13 
(Establishment)”). 
451 In the EIAs with South Korea, CARIFORUM and Central America, there is one non-service related activity also 
under Mode 4: ”Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media” (part of ”Manufacturing”).    
452 It is possible that the extra services are on some occasions part of “Other services” that is an additional category in 




loans, guarantees and insurance. It is also separately specified under some sectors (especially under 
Research and Development Services (1.C.) that publicly funded R&D services, exclusive rights 
and/or authorizations can only be granted to EU nationals and to EU juridical persons having their 
headquarters in the EU.453 Thus, even though the EU’s commitments on R&D services under 
Computer and Related Services are liberal, public funding covers EU establishments only. 
 
In the commitments regarding health services and social services, as well as most education 
services, it is specified that the commitments cover only privately funded services. None of the EU 
Member States have thus allowed access to their publicly funded education and health services 
networks. In addition, in the EU-Korea, EU-Central America and EU-CARIFORUM EIAs it is 
specified that the participation of private operators in the education network is subject to 
concessions. 
 
In financial services, the EU Member States have typically grouped several sub-sectors together 
under the two main sectors. Therefore, there are only two overall scores: one for insurance-related 
services and one for banking and other financial services. The EU’s scores are low for both 
insurance and banking services. This is due to the high number of discriminatory limitations that the 
Member States have inscribed and which thus bring the score close to zero. There is also a high 
number of ‘unbounds’ which often brings also the SC score close to zero. 
 
It is noteworthy that the EU’s Mode 1 commitments are sometimes relatively low also for such 
services that are not easily supplied cross-border (such as maintenance and repair of vessels and 
pushing and towing services as well as beauty services). It is not always easy to understand what 
goals such reservations serve. On some occasions it may mean that the Member States want to limit 
cross-border consulting relating to such services.  
 
Under Mode 4, there is a large number of excluded sub-sectors across the EIAs. They are easily 
visible as the grey areas in the review sheets of Annex 4. The most often-occurring NT limitations 
are nationality and residency requirements. It is crucial to notice that the EU’s commitments apply 
only to the limited categories of persons covered by each EIA. The commitments on key personnel 
and graduate trainees apply only with regard to services liberalized under Mode 3. The entry of 
foreign nationals is also subject to many other criteria regarding their legal entry and stay and non-
                                                




access to the host-state’s employment market. As will be discussed in the following chapter, all of 
the reviewed agreements confirm our position on the scope of Mode 4: they do not allow for any 
access to the Member States’ employment markets. 
 
All the EIAs’ cover pages for the Mode 4 schedules include a statement on economic needs tests 
(ENTs). They state the criteria used for ENTs454 but do not specify whether ENTs are applied in a 
discriminatory or non-discriminatory manner. However, we consider that under Mode 4 ENTs are 
especially likely to be applied in a discriminatory manner. EU Member States do not usually restrict 
the employment of their own nationals and thus ENTs applied to natural persons are likely to 
concern third-country nationals only. However, it is possible that in certain regulated professions, 
EU Member States may restrict the entry of new suppliers among their own nationals as well. As 
we have regarded all ENTs discriminatory under Mode 4, there is some scope for interpretation 
errors in the reading of the schedules in this sense. 
 
All schedules on Mode 4 also note that the lists of commitments do not include measures relating to 
qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements and 
procedures when they do not constitute a limitation within the meaning of NT. Those measures (e.g. 
need to obtain a license or need to pass specific examinations) apply to the categories of admitted 
natural persons even if not listed in the EU’s schedule. Among such measures the EU has included 
also the “need to have a legal domicile in the territory where the economic activity is performed”. 
In our view, such a measure is, however, in principle discriminatory under Mode 4 if it requires 
residence. In our analysis, all explicit residency requirements in the scheduled commitments reduce 
NT to zero. 
 
ii. The results 
 
Below each of the four EIAs is presented separately. We first give the average scores for each mode 
across the entire services schedule of the agreement. All scores represent percentages and are shown 
as decimals between 0 and 1 in order to follow the presentation model of the detailed review sheets 
of Annex 4. Thus, a score of 0,75 refers to 75 % of the EU Member States (27 or 28 states, 
depending on the agreement). 
                                                
454 The main criteria are ”the assessment of the relevant market situation in the Member State of the European Union or 
the region where the service is to be provided, including with respect to the number of, and the impact on, existing 





There are two different scores: the first for sectoral coverage (SC) and the second for national 
treatment (NT). The SC score shows the percentage of EU Member States that have given a binding 
commitment under each mode. The commitments counted under SC do not need to provide for NT 
but any commitment suffices. This method of providing a separate score for SC allows us to note 
the overall number of sectors covered by the EIA even without full NT. For example, in the EU-
Korea EIA, the EU’s SC score for Mode 1 is 0,40, which means that, in average, 40 % of the 
Member States have given some type of a commitment across all sectors of the WTO’s Sectoral 
Classification under Mode 1.  A commitment under SC means any type of commitment except for 
‘unbound’ or a complete exclusion of the sector or sub-sector in the EU’s schedule. 455  An 
‘unbound’ or outright exclusion always gives the score 0.  
 
The second score, NT, on the other hand, gives the score that we are most interested in: the 
percentage of EU Member States that have granted full NT. This score gives the number of Member 
States providing non-discriminatory treatment under each sector and sub-sector. It is important to 
note that sectoral exclusions do not affect the overall average score for NT. This is because under 
Art. V:1(b), there is a requirement to eliminate discrimination only in the sectors covered by the 
agreement. Even though it is not entirely clear what this requirement means, we have opted to 
provide the overall NT score only for such sectors that the EU has not excluded from its specific 
commitments.456 Therefore, as the NT score is provided only for liberalized sectors, the NT score 
may occasionally be higher than the SC score.457 
 
The average scores for both SC and NT under each mode are counted on the highest sectoral level 
(e.g. 1. BUSINESS SERVICES). In case the main sector is divided further into two lower sub-
groups (on the level of A, B, C… and further into a, b, c…), the average scores for both the 
numerical level (1, 2, 3…) and the following sectoral level (A, B, C…) are marked with a bold font 
in the review sheet. If no sub-sectors (a, b, c…) are specified, the upper sector (A, B, C…) alone is 
marked by a bold font. On some instances the Member States have given identical commitments 
under all sub-sectors of a specific sector in which case the sub-sectors have been hidden to save 
                                                
455 An example of a complete exclusion of an entire sector is the exclusion of audiovisual services in all EU’s EIAs. In 
addition, there are several examples of partial exclusions of sectors, for example in air transport services. 
456 See the explanation for choosing this more conservative method in section 2(iii) of Chapter III. 
457 Some of the sectoral (or sub-sectoral) exclusions apply to all four modes, some only to one or two of them. As 
sectoral coverage is understood in terms of number of sectors and modes of supply, NT score under a specific mode is 
not affected by a sectoral exclusion even if only that specific mode has been excluded in the sector in question. The NT 




space (the scores being the same and thus giving an identical average).458 There are also certain 
occasions where the Member States have given their sub-sectoral commitments combined on a 
higher sectoral level (e.g. in the EU’s EIAs all sub-sectors are combined under “1B. Computer and 
Related Services”).  In that case, the smallest sub-sectors are also hidden. The overall average score 
for each mode (“AVERAGE FOR MODE”) is the combined average of the highest level of sectors 
(the main service sectors from 1 to 11)459. The score for each main sector from 1 to 11, on the other 
hand, is the average of the scores for the sectors below it (A, B, C…), which themselves are the 
average of the scores for the lowest level of sub-sectors (a, b, c…). Each average is marked by a 
bold font in the review sheet. 
 
When looking at specific sectors and sub-sectors one soon notices that there are significant 
differences in the scores between them. Therefore, instead of focusing on the overall average scores 
across the modes, it is more informative to look at the average scores across specific sectors and at 
the exact scores for specific sub-sectors. For this reason, we have chosen a few important service 
sectors for which we provide the NT score separately. The score is the average NT score across the 
sub-sectors for that specific sector. For example, in the EU-Korea EIA the NT score for 
professional services under Mode 1 is 0,45 – meaning that, in average, 45 % of the EU Member 
States have given non-discriminatory commitments to Korean service suppliers in professional 
services under Mode 1. Again, the more specific scores by sub-sector can be viewed in Annex 4. 
There one can see that, for example, in the sub-sector of engineering services, the EU’s score is 
0,70. Thus, 70 % of the EU Member States give full NT for engineering services through Mode 1. 
That can be compared to the “services provided by midwives, nurses, physiotherapists and para-
medical personnel” where the EU’s score is as low as 0,04 – meaning that only 4 % of the Member 
States have given full NT to Korean professionals in this specific sub-sector (representing actually 
just one Member State). 
 
We present the summary of our results in the following order, from the oldest to the most recent 
agreement (the year refers to the timing of the signing the agreement): 
 
                                                
458 The hidden sub-sectors can be seen in Annex 3, where we have provided a clean, model review sheet with all sub-
sectors untouched. 
459 In the WTO’s Sectoral Classification list there are altogether twelve main service sectors (see the model review sheet 
in Annex 3). Because the EU has not included any commitments under sector 12 (”Other services not included 
elsewhere”), that sector is not shown in the review sheets. The fact that there are no EU commitments under this ”left-
over” sector, has not affected the results. It is not clear as to what exactly should be included under the sector from the 




EU-CARIFORUM EPA 2008 
EU-Korea FTA 2010 
EU-Central America AA 2012 
EU-Georgia AA 2014 
 
To provide a full picture of the agreements, we also note such service activities regarding which the 
EU has included commitments but which are not part of the WTO’s Sectoral Classification List. To 
save space, the different modes are marked as M1, M2, M3 and M4. Only the NT score is noted 
with respect to these additional services. 
 
The EIAs with the CARIFORUM countries and Georgia include two different categories of Mode 4 
service suppliers. In addition to key personnel and graduate trainees that appear in all reviewed 
EIAs and are marked as Category 1 (Cat. 1) in these two EIAs, these two agreements include 
specific commitments also on contractual service suppliers (CSSs) and independent professionals 
(IPs). CSSs and IPs are marked as Category 2 (Cat. 2). In the EU-Georgia EIA, the EU has 
scheduled specific commitments for business sellers (good and services) together with key 
personnel and graduate trainees, and they are thus all included in Cat. 1. In the EU-CARIFORUM 
EIA, the EU has covered business services sellers and short-term visitors for business purposes 
(endeavour to facilitate such visits) but there are no specific commitments on these two groups of 
natural persons. 
 
The EU’s EIA with South Korea has specific commitments with regard to key personnel, graduate 
trainees and business services sellers. They are scheduled together and thus noted as one group 
under Mode 4. The EIA with the Central American countries has specific commitments in respect 
of key personnel and graduate trainees only (scheduled together). 
 
In our review, we have noted all the horizontal limitations applied by the EU Member States. As 
they are not factored in the scores, they deserve special attention. On some occasions, such 
horizontal limitations applied across the sectors can greatly diminish the value of the sector specific 
commitments. The limitations are analyzed in more detail in the following chapter. Here below, in 
the results concerning horizontal limitations, the number in the parentheses indicates the number of 
EU Member States having inscribed some type of a horizontal limitation for the type of issue in 
question. For example, “types of establishment (EU (branches) + 10)” means that all EU Member 




addition to which ten Member States have inscribed some other types of cross-cutting 
discriminatory reservations concerning the types of establishment available to service suppliers of 
the partner country. These measures are discriminatory if the foreign service suppliers’ choice of 
legal form for the establishment is restricted as compared to domestic suppliers or if the foreign 
suppliers are subjected to more burdensome establishment requirements than domestic suppliers. 
 
The detailed scores on SC and NT can be viewed in the review sheets of Annex 4. In the beginning 
of each review sheet of Annex 4, we have noted issues that may be considered relevant under Art. 
V:2 (the wider process of economic integration or trade liberalization). The presentation of the 
service sectors depends on the EU’s commitments. Where the commitments are identical across the 
entire main sector (as they generally are e.g. for all sub-sectors of “Computer and Related 
Services”), only the main sector is shown. Where the EU has provided different commitments 






EU-CARIFORUM EPA 2008 
 
AVERAGE SCORES (27 Member States) 
 
SC = sectoral coverage 
NT = national treatment  (the level of non-discrimination) 
 





















All Mode 4 commitments 
 
Category 1  Category 2 
 
SC: 0,51  SC: 0,22 
NT: 0,82  NT: 0,33 
 




Mode 1: 0,44 
Mode 2: 0,95 
Mode 3: 0,85 
Mode 4 Cat 1: 0,66 / Cat. 2: 0,31 
 
Other business services 
 
Mode 1: 0,72 
Mode 2: 0,88 
Mode 3: 0,86 
Mode 4: Commitments only in certain sub-sectors 






Mode 1: 1,00 
Mode 2: 1,00 
Mode 3: 1,00 





Mode 1: Insurance 0,04 / Banking and other 0,00 
Mode 2: Insurance 0,07 / Banking and other 0,93 
Mode 3: Insurance 0,63 / Banking and other 0,52 
Mode 4: Insurance 0,81 / Banking and other 0,81 (Cat. 1 only, Cat. 2 excluded in its entirety) 
 
 
Transport services (excludes much of air transport services and all space transport services) 
 
Mode 1: 0,40 
Mode 2: 0,79 
Mode 3: 0,62 
Mode 4: 0,64 (Cat. 1 only, Cat. 2 mostly excluded) 
 
 
HORIZONTAL LIMITATIONS OF THE EU MEMBER STATES 
 
 
Modes 1 and 2:  
 
Real estate (18) 
 
Mode 3:  
 
Real estate (19) 
Public utilities (all EU) 
Types of establishment (7) 
Investment (1) 





Certain Member States have prescribed horizontal reservations relating to: 
 
Economic needs test for graduate trainees (2) 
Scope of intra-corporate transfers (2) 
Residency and citizenship requirements for managing directors and/or auditors (5) 
Mutual recognition directives apply to EU citizens only (EU) 
Transitional periods (12) 
 




The EU has excluded the following sectors:  
 
Mining, manufacturing and processing of nuclear materials; 
Production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; 
Audiovisual services; 
National maritime cabotage; and 
Most national and international air transport services (excl. aircraft repair and maintenance, selling 
and marketing of air transport services, computer reservation system services, and other ancillary 
services that facilitate the operation of air carriers as contained in the specific commitments). 
 
In addition, the EU’s schedule shows that there are no commitments on Space transport services. 
 
The EU has commitments in the following services not appearing in the WTO’s classification: 
 
The EU has included certain sub-sectors of energy services that do not appear in the WTO’s model 
list (see section 18. Energy Services). They include “Wholesale trade services of solid, liquid and 
gaseous fuels and related products (CPC 62271), wholesale trade services of electricity, steam and 
hot water (NB: the horizontal limitation on public utilities applies), and retailing services of motor 
fuel (CPC 613) as well as retail sales of fuel oil, bottled gas coal and wood (CPC 63297) and 
retailing services of electricity, (non bottled) gas, steam and hot water. However, the Member 
States’ commitments under these sub-sectors are modest (except for Mode 2 where the EU has 
given full commitments almost under each of these sub-sectors). 
 
Under business services (F. Other Business Services), the EU has included certain services that 
appear in the WTO’s model list only in the aggregated form “Other (CPC 8790) under F. Other 
Business Services. The EU’s schedule specifies translation and interpretation services (M1 89 % / 
M2 100 % / M3 81 % / M4 Cat. 1 93 %)460, interior design services (M1 100 % / M2 100 % / M3 
100 %), collection agency services (M1 7 % / M2 7 % / M3 93 % / M4 Cat. 1 89 %), credit 
reporting services (M1 7 % / M2 7 % / M3 88 % / M4 Cat. 1 89 %), duplicating services (M1 4 % / 
M2 100 % / M3 100 %), telecommunications consulting services (M1 / 100 % and M2 / 100%) and 
telephone answering services (M1 100 % / M2 100 % / M3 100 %).  
 
In addition, under section 12 (services auxiliary to transport), the EU has included certain sub-
categories that are not part of the CPC system and thus are not present in the WTO’s model list. The 
services in question are customs clearance services, container station and depot services, maritime 
agency services and maritime freight forwarding services. The EU has given a full commitment for 
these services both for M1 and M2. Under M3, the score is 96 % for customs clearance and 100 % 
for the rest of these sub-sectors. Under M4, there are no non-discriminatory commitments. 
 
Under the heading “Other services not included elsewhere” (Included under 12. “Other services not 
included elsewhere” in the WTO’s model list), the EU has prescribed the following: Washing (M2 
100 % / M3 100 %), hairdressing (M2 100 % / M3 96 %), cosmetic treatment (M2 100 % / M3 96 
%), other beauty treatment services (M2 100 % / M3: 96 %) and spa services (M2 100 % / M3 100 
%). Included here are also telecommunications connection services (M1, M2 and M3 100 %). For 
Mode 4 Cat. 1, there is no coverage for telecommunications connections services and all the 
commitments for the rest of these sub-sectors are discriminatory. 
 
 
                                                
460 Cat. 1 = key personnel and graduate trainees / Cat. 2 = contractual service suppliers and independent professionals. 
All values represent NT. If there is no value for a specific mode, it means that the value is zero. 






Under rental/leasing services without operators, the EU has included telecommunications 
equipment rental (CPC 7541) (100 % for M1, M2 and M3, no NT for M4). In addition, there are 
retail sales of pharmaceuticals and retail sales of medical and orthopaedical goods (CPC 63211) and 
other services supplied by pharmacists (M1 4 % / M2 100 % / M3 22 % / M4 Cat. 1 74 %). 
 
Concerning Mode 4 
 
The EIA with CARIFORUM includes six different types of natural persons – more than in any of 
the other reviewed EIAs. There are specific commitments on four of them: key personnel and 
graduate trainees (Category 1) and CSSs and IPs (Category 2). The key personnel includes business 
visitors setting up a commercial presence and intra-corporate transferees. In addition, there are 
short-term business visitors – a type of Mode 4 appearing only in this EIA out of the four 
agreements. However, there are no binding commitments: Art. 84 includes an endeavour to 
facilitate short-term business visits for specific purposes (such as for research and design, training 
seminars, trade fairs and exhibitions). The last category comprises business services sellers for 
which there are no specific commitments but under Art. 82 their entry and stay is allowed for a 
period of up to 90 days in any 12-month period, subject to the EU’s scheduled reservations across 
the liberalized service sectors. 
 
The commitments on key personnel and graduate trainees include a limited commitment for a 
manufacturing activity outside business services: publishing, printing and reproductions of recorded 
media (Section 4 H). 
 
According to Art. 81 of the EIA, the temporary entry and stay of key personnel and graduate 
trainees shall be permitted for a period of up to three years for intra-corporate transferees, one year 
for graduate trainees, and 90 days in any 12-month period for business visitors and business 
services sellers. Art. 83 includes the requirements for CSSs and IPs. Their entry and stay is subject 
to a number of conditions. Most importantly, the natural persons must be engaged in the supply of a 
service on a temporary basis as employees of a juridical person, which has obtained a service 
contract for a period not exceeding 12 months. In addition, the temporary entry and stay of CSSs 
and IPs shall be for “a cumulative period of not more than six months or, in the case of 
Luxembourg, 25 weeks, in any 12-month period or for the duration of the contract, whichever is 
less”. The EU’s sector-specific commitments on CSSs and IPs are so heavily restricted that only a 
small part of the sectors are in reality covered. 




EU-SOUTH KOREA FTA 2010 
 
AVERAGE SCORES (27 Member States) 
 
SC = sectoral coverage 
NT = national treatment  (the level of non-discrimination) 
 
































Mode 1: 0,45 
Mode 2: 0,95 
Mode 3: 0,81 
Mode 4: 0,73 
 
Other business services 
 
Mode 1: 0,72 
Mode 2: 0,88 
Mode 3: 0,84 
Mode 4: Mostly no commitments 






Mode 1: 1,00 
Mode 2: 1,00 
Mode 3: 1,00 
Mode 4: Excluded in its entirety 
 
 
Financial services  
 
Mode 1: Insurance 0,07 / Banking and other 0,00 
Mode 2: Insurance 0,11 / Banking and other 0,93 
Mode 3: Insurance 0,59 / Banking and other 0,00 
Mode 4: Insurance 0,81 / Banking and other 0,81 
 
 
Transport services (excludes much of air transport services and all space transport services) 
 
Mode 1: 0,43 
Mode 2: 0,75 
Mode 3: 0,76 




HORIZONTAL LIMITATIONS OF THE EU MEMBER STATES 
 
 
Modes 1 and 2:  
 
Real estate (16)  
 
Mode 3:  
 
Real estate (18) 
Public utilities (EU) 
Types of establishment (EU (branches) + 10) 
Investment (6) 





Certain Member States have prescribed reservations relating to: 
 
Economic needs test for graduate trainees (2) 
Scope of intra-corporate transferees (2) 
Training of graduate trainees (5) 
Residency and citizenship requirements for managing directors and/or auditors (5) 
Mutual recognition directives apply to EU citizens only (EU) 




The EU has excluded the following sectors:  
 
See above the EU-CARIFORUM EIA 
 
 
The EU has commitments in the following services not appearing in the WTO’s classification: 
 
Energy services: certain sub-sectors (similar to the EU-CARIFORUM EIA, see above). 
 
Under business services (F. Other Business Services): translation and interpretation services (M1 89 
% / M2 100 %), interior design services (M1 100 % / M2 100 %), collection agency services (M1 7 
% / M2 7 %), credit reporting services (M1 7 % / M2 7 %), duplicating services (M1 4 % / M2 100 
%) and telephone answering services (M1 100 % / M2 100 %).  
 
In addition, under section 12 (services auxiliary to transport), the EU has included the following 
“Other services not included elsewhere”: washing, hairdressing, cosmetic treatment, and spa 
services. All are unbound for M1 (100 %) provide full NT for M2 (100 %) and M3 (100 %). 
 
Under rental/leasing services without operators, the EU has included telecommunications 
equipment rental (CPC 7541) (100 % for M1, M2 and M3, 0 % for M4). There are also 
commitments on the retails sales of pharmaceuticals and retail sales of medical and orthopaedical 
goods (CPC 63211) and other services supplied by pharmacists (M3: 22 %, M4: 74 %). 
 
Concerning Mode 4  
 
The EU’s schedule on Mode 4 includes a limited commitment for one manufacturing activity: 
publishing, printing and reproductions of recorded media (Section 4 H). 
 
According to Art. 7.18 of the EIA, the temporary entry and stay of key personnel and graduate 
trainees shall be permitted for a period of up to three years for intra-corporate transferees, one year 
for graduate trainees, and 90 days in any 12 month period for business visitors and business services 
sellers. The scheduled commitments concern only key personnel (including business visitors 
responsible for setting up an establishment), graduate trainees and business service sellers. There 
are no commitments on CSSs and IPs. Instead, Art. 7.20(1) provides that “the Parties reaffirm their 
respective obligations arising from their commitments under the GATS”. According to the second 
paragraph, the Parties’ commitments in respect of CSSs and IPs depend on the results of the Doha 
Round and thus remain to be negotiated.  




EU-CENTRAL AMERICA AA 2012 
 
AVERAGE SCORES (27 Member States) 
 
SC = sectoral coverage 
NT = national treatment  (the level of non-discrimination) 
 
































Mode 1: 0,44 
Mode 2: 0,94 
Mode 3: 0,85 
Mode 4: 0,67 
 
Other business services 
 
Mode 1: 0,72 
Mode 2: 0,89 
Mode 3: 0,87 
Mode 4: Commitments only in certain sub-sectors 






Mode 1: 1,00 
Mode 2: 1,00 
Mode 3: 1,00 
Mode 4: Excluded in its entirety 
 
 
Financial services  
 
Mode 1: Insurance 0,00 / Banking and other 0,00 
Mode 2: Insurance 0,11 / Banking and other 0,96 
Mode 3: Insurance 0,56 / Banking and other 0,00 
Mode 4: Insurance 0,81 / Banking and other 0,81 
 
 
Transport services (excludes much of air transport services and all space transport services) 
 
Mode 1: 0,38 
Mode 2: 0,74 
Mode 3: 0,56 
Mode 4: 0,80 
 
 
HORIZONTAL LIMITATIONS OF THE EU MEMBER STATES 
 
Modes 1 and 2:  
 
Real estate (18) 
 
Mode 3:  
 
Real estate (19) 
Public utilities (EU) 
Types of establishment (EU (branches) + 9) 
Investment (6) 
Geographical zones (1) 
 
 
Mode 4 (key personnel and graduate trainees): 
 
Certain Member States have prescribed reservations relating to: 
 
Economic needs test for graduate trainees (2) 
Scope of intra-corporate transferees (2) 
Training of graduate trainees (5) 
Residency and citizenship requirements for managing directors and/or auditors (5) 
Mutual recognition directives apply to EU citizens only (EU) 
 
 




The EU has excluded the following sectors:  
 
See above the EU-CARIFORUM EIA 
 
 
The EU has commitments in the following services not appearing in the WTO’s classification: 
 
Energy services: certain sub-sectors (similar to the EU-CARIFORUM EIA, see above). 
 
Under business services (F. Other Business Services), translation and interpretation services (M1 89 
% / M2 100 % / M3 81 % / M4 93 %), interior design services (M1, M2 and M3 100 %), collection 
agency services (M1 7 % / M2 7 % / M3 93 % / M4 89 %), credit reporting services (M1 7 % / M2 
7 % / M3 89 % / M4 89 %), duplicating services (M1 4 % / M2 and M3 100 %) and telephone 
answering services (M1, M2 and M3 100 %). 
 
Under section 12.A. (services auxiliary to maritime transport), the EU has included customs 
clearance services, container station and depot services, maritime agency services and maritime 
freight forwarding services. The EU has given a full commitment for these services only under M2. 
Under M1, there is a full binding only for maritime agency services and maritime freight 
forwarding services (unbound for customs clearance services and container station and depot 
services). Under M3, the score is 96 % for customs clearance and 100 % for the rest. 
 
“Other services not included elsewhere”: washing, cleaning and dyeing services; hairdressing 
services; cosmetic treatment, manicuring and pedicuring services; other beauty treatment services 
and spa and non-therapeutical services (non-medical): unbound for M1 and M4 and bound for M2 
(100 %) and M3 (100 %). Included here are also telecommunications connection services (M1, M2 
and M3 100 %). 
 
Under rental/leasing services without operators, the EU has included telecommunications 
equipment rental (CPC 7541) (100 % for M1, M2 and M3). Retails sales of pharmaceuticals and 
retail sales of medical and orthopaedical goods (CPC 63211) and other services supplied by 
pharmacists ((M1 4 % / M2 100 % / M3 22 % / M4: 74 %). 
 
For Environmental Services, the EU has included some more sub-sectors than specified in the 
WTO’s model list (sub-sectors C-G of 6. Environmental Services). However, under Mode 1 they 
are unbound except for consulting services. Under Mode 2, there are no reservations. 
 
Concerning Modes 1 and 2 
 
In this agreement, the EU has more tendency to schedule simple ‘unbounds’ under modes 1 and 2 
instead of qualifying discriminatory reservations. Therefore the score is often the same for SC and 
NT for both modes. 
 
Concerning Mode 4  
 
The AA with Central America covers the same categories of persons as the EU-Korea FTA. A 
slight difference is that there are no sector-specific commitments their entry is subject to 
commitments under the other modes (entry and stay is similarly allowed for a period of up to 90 
days in any 12-month period). There are no commitments on CSSs and IPs but parties simply 
reaffirm their respective commitments under the GATS.  




EU-GEORGIA AA 2014 
 
AVERAGE SCORES (28 Member States) 
 
SC = sectoral coverage 
NT = national treatment  (the level of non-discrimination) 
 





















All Mode 4 commitments 
 
Category 1  Category 2 
 
SC: 0,50  SC: 0,19 
NT: 0,84  NT: 0,40 
 




Mode 1: 0,45 
Mode 2: 0,95 
Mode 3: 0,79 
Mode 4: Cat 1: 0,66 / Cat. 2: 0,43 
 
Other business services 
 
Mode 1: 0,72 
Mode 2: 0,91 
Mode 3: 0,83 
Mode 4: Commitments only in certain sub-sectors 






Mode 1: 1,00 
Mode 2: 1,00 
Mode 3: 1,00 





Mode 1: Insurance 0,00 / Banking and other 0,00 
Mode 2: Insurance 0,11 / Banking and other 0,93 
Mode 3: Insurance 0,54 / Banking and other 0,54 
Mode 4: Insurance 0,79 / Banking and other 0,79 
 
 
Transport services (excludes much of air transport services and all space transport services) 
 
Mode 1: 0,29 
Mode 2: 0,70 
Mode 3: 0,86 
Mode 4: Cat 1: 0,79 / Cat. 2: 0,54 (several sub-sectors excluded in both categories) 
 
 
HORIZONTAL LIMITATIONS OF THE EU MEMBER STATES 
 
 
Modes 1 and 2:  
 
No horizontal limitations. Only subsidies are mentioned in the beginning of the annex (in 
accordance with Art. 76(3) of the agreement. 
 
Mode 3:  
 
Real estate (16) 
Public utilities (EU) 






Certain Member States have prescribed reservations relating to: 
 
Economic needs test for graduate trainees (2) 
Scope of intracorporate transferees (2) 
Training of graduate trainees (6) 
Residency and citizenship requirements for managing directors and/or auditors (5) 
Mutual recognition directives apply to EU citizens only (EU) 
 




The EU has excluded the following sectors:  
 
See above the EU-CARIFORUM EIA 
 
 
The EU has commitments in the following services not appearing in the WTO’s classification: 
 
Energy services: certain sub-sectors (similar to the EU-CARIFORUM EIA, see above). 
 
Under business services (F. Other Business Services, translation and interpretation services (M1 86 
% / M2 100 % / M3 % 86 % / M4 Cat. 1 96 %, for Cat. 2 only translation services: 39 %), interior 
design services (M1 96 % / M2 100 %), collection agency services (M1 7 % / M2 7 % / M3 93 % / 
M4  Cat 1. 89 %, not covered for Cat. 2), credit reporting services (M1 7 % / M2 7 % / M3  93 % / 
M4 Cat. 1 89 %, not covered for Cat. 2), duplicating services (M1 4 % / M2 100 % and M3 % / M4 
Cat. 1 0 %, not covered for Cat. 2) and telephone answering services (M1, M2 100 %). Included 
here are also telecommunications connection services (M1, M2 100 %). 
 
For Environmental Services, the EU has included some more sub-sectors than specified in the 
WTO’s model list (sub-sectors C-G of 6. Environmental Services). However, under Mode 1 they 
are mostly unbound (only 3-5 MSs bound) except for consulting services. Under Mode 2, there are 
no reservations. Under professional services, there are retail sales of pharmaceuticals and retail 
sales of medical and orthopaedical goods (CPC 63211) and other services supplied by pharmacists 
(M1 7 % / M2 100 % / M4 Cat. 1 75 %, not covered for Cat. 2). 
 
Under section 12.A. (services auxiliary to maritime transport), the EU has included customs 
clearance services, container station and depot services, maritime agency services and maritime 
freight forwarding services. The EU has given a full commitment for these services only under M2. 
Under M1, there is a 96 % binding only for maritime agency services and maritime freight 
forwarding services (unbound for customs clearance services and container station and depot 
services). These auxiliary services are not mentioned in the negatively listed Mode 3 commitments 
and are therefore presumably covered by Mode 3. 
 
In addition, the EU has included a section 13. Other transport services, which includes “Provision 
of combined transport services”. The score is 46 % for Modes 1 and 2 but it is specified that the 
commitment is without prejudice to the EU’s schedules’ limitations affecting any given mode of 
transport. 
 
“Other services not included elsewhere”: washing, cleaning and dyeing services; hairdressing 
services; cosmetic treatment, manicuring and pedicuring services; other beauty treatment services 
and spa and non-therapeutical services (non-medical): unbound for M1 and for a part of M4 (0 % 
for specialists and for graduate trainees, otherwise 100 %) and bound for M2 (100 %) and M3 ( %). 
Included here are also telecommunications connection services (M1, M2 and M3 100 %). 
 
Mode 4 Cat. 2 includes site investigation work (CPC 5111) where NT score is 61 % (covers CSSs 
only). 
 
Concerning Mode 3 
 
A negative scheduling modality. MFN exceptions are included in the sector-specific commitments 
where as in the other EIAs they are listed in a separate annex. Similar horizontal limitations and  






sectoral exclusions to the other EIAs (Art. 78: audiovisual services, national maritime cabotage and 
most of air transport services excluded completely) but a high coverage of sectors and sub-sectors 
in the sector-specific commitments (SC 93 %). 
 
Relating to air transport services: The conditions of mutual market access in air transport are to be 
dealt with by the Common Aviation Area Agreement between the EU and Georgia. 
 
Concerning Mode 4 
 
There are five different Mode 4 categories covered by the agreement (the same as in the EU-
CARIFORUM EIA, except for short-term visitors for business purposes who are not included).  
 
The conditions for the entry of key personnel, graduate trainees, CSSs and IPs are very similar to 
the text of the agreement in the EU-CARIFORUM EIA. A slight difference is that in the agreement 
with Georgia, there are sector specific commitments on business service sellers (scheduled together 
with key personnel and graduate trainees). In the agreement with CARIFORUM, the entry and stay 
of service sellers is subject to the reservations across the other modes. In addition, in the agreement 
with Georgia, the specific group of natural persons is referred to as “business sellers” as the EU 
covers in this agreement the sellers of both goods and services (except for the UK that covers only 
the sellers of services). 
  
  




VI. EU’S EIAs THROUGH THE LENS OF WTO LAW 
 
1. Introduction to the discussion of the results 
 
In the present chapter we give a concise view on the reviewed EIAs from the point of view of WTO 
law, and particularly Art. V GATS. In accordance with our methodology, our analysis is focused on 
the level of liberalization included in the EU’s sector-specific commitments. Where necessary, we 
bring up issues in the actual texts of the agreements but instead of interpreting the articles of the 
agreements, we focus on discussing the EU’s EIAs’ relationship to the Art. V requirements of 
sectoral coverage and elimination of discrimination.461 
 
First it can be noted that only one of the reviewed EIAs includes a statement on the agreement’s 
compatibility with the GATS. In the EU-South Korea FTA the parties list among the objectives of 
the agreement “to liberalise trade in services and investment between the Parties, in conformity with 
Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services”. It is hard to say what type of 
conclusions can be drawn in this regard. What is clear is that according to the EU itself, the FTA 
with South Korea goes further than any previous EU agreement in lifting trade barriers.462 The 
Commission has stated that “both in terms of sectoral coverage and depth of market access 
commitments, the EU-Korea FTA is by far the most ambitious services FTA ever concluded by the 
EU and goes beyond any services agreement Korea has concluded so far.”463  
 
The fact that the EU has not included a similar compatibility statement in its other EIAs does not 
necessarily mean that the EU has doubts about those EIAs’ compliance with Art. V GATS. But the 
conclusion of the statement in the EIA with South Korea may mean that the EU wants to explicitly 
underline its view of WTO-compliance in respect of this specific agreement. Legally, all EU’s EIAs 
should comply with Art. V. However, the EU may be especially willing to emphasize such 
compatibility with its most commercially driven PTA as that agreement lacks such other factors that 
could be considered to contribute to extensive trade liberalization in longer term.464 Moreover, for 
this particular PTA’s economic significance and strategic importance (concluded with a central 
                                                
461 For a recent and comprehensive interpretation of the EU’s treaty obligations both under the GATS and EIAs, see 
Natens (2016). The author analyzes the EU’s obligations especially from the point of view of regulatory autonomy. 
462 The Commission’s web page on the EU-South Korea FTA, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-
and-regions/countries/south-korea/ (accessed on 1 September 2016). 
463  The EU Commission’s brochure “The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement in practice”, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/october/tradoc_148303.pdf (accessed on 1 September 2016). 
464 Such long-term trade liberalization and/or economic integration being a possible factor in the compliance analysis 




Asian economy), the emphasis on GATS-compatibility may also be planned to play down legal 
threats by other Members. 
 
In this chapter we give some appraisal of the level of liberalization reached in the four reviewed 
EIAs. However, we refrain from any judgment on their GATS-compatibility. Reaching any exact 
conclusions in that regard would be challenging for two reasons. First, our methodology is only one 
possible way to analyze EIAs and it does not give any ultimate correct answer in this regard. Our 
results show how many Member States have provided NT under each sub-sector of the WTO’s 
Sectoral Classification List. Our methodology does not take into account differences in the gravity 
of the limitations to NT. However, we consider such an approach to be in line with Art. V:1(b) 
since it defines non-discrimination in terms of NT. One either grants NT or does not. The empirical 
exercise of the four EIAs revealed that a large number of the inscribed reservations were serious NT 
limitations, for example nationality and residency requirements. However, it should be kept in mind 
that also small discriminatory elements in the commitments bring the value of the commitment to 0. 
Under the SC column, however, we have included all types of commitments, also discriminatory 
ones. One can thus see the difference between a binding (any kind of binding) and a non-
discriminatory binding by comparing the SC and NT scores on the lowest sub-sectoral level. The 
score for SC is often higher, but only slightly. That shows that in a large number of the Member 
States’ commitments only non-discriminatory bindings are given. The other alternative is a simple 
‘unbound’ (giving a zero also under SC). In the average scores, which are counted across several 
sub-sectors, the SC score is sometimes lower than the corresponding NT score. That is because 
sectoral exclusions affect the SC score but do not affect the NT score. The choice is based on Art. 
V:1(b) which requires the elimination of discrimination only in the sectors covered by the 
agreement. 
 
All in all, the results are most informative on the lowest sub-sectoral level. That relates to the 
second challenge in our chosen methodology. The EU’s own structure as an FTA itself makes it 
hard to come up with any exact scores as to the sectoral coverage and level of non-discrimination 
provided in the EU’s EIAs. The EU’s commitments in the reviewed EIAs comprise the 
commitments of 27 or 28 different countries. Even though in some instances there is an identical 
commitment from all Member states, the much more often occurring situation is that there are at 
least a few different types of commitments with varying degrees of restrictiveness. On some 
occasions, often in the most sensitive sectors (e.g. in financial services and health services), there 




values to the EU’s commitments under each sub-sector. Thus, our results do not give the percentage 
of sectoral coverage and level of non-discrimination granted by the EU as a whole.465 What they do 
give is the percentage of EU Member States providing for sectoral coverage (by granting some type 
of a commitment) and non-discrimination (by granting NT) under each sub-sector of the WTO’s 
Sectoral Classification List. This can be considered to give some guidance as to the overall 
coverage of each EIA by the EU as a whole. However, one should not focus on the average 
percentages counted across all the sectors. They do not give very relevant information because there 
is a great variety in the sector-specific percentage scores. In a specific sub-sector the score may be 
100 % (NT by 28 Member States) and in another it may be 0 % (a discriminatory commitment by 
28 Member States). An average of 50 % of these two sub-sectors does not tell much. The averages 
should therefore be approached cautiously, and mainly to compare different EIAs to each other. Our 
analysis is best suited for looking at the scores on the sub-sectoral level. They show what 
percentage of the EU in terms of Member States provides for NT in each sub-sector. They also 
show the degree of dispersion among the Member States. Very high and very low scores tell of 
similarity in policies, whereas the scores closest to the middle tell about large diversity in the 
Member States’ policies in that specific sub-sector. 
 
As in the rest of the thesis, we discuss the EU’s commitments under Mode 4 in more depth than the 
other modes. An essential caveat to keep in mind is that the assessment of Mode 4 commitments is 
especially difficult since it is hard to say what exactly are the categories of persons that should be 
covered from the point of view of Art. V. With respect to Mode 4 the question is not only “to what 
extent” but also “in respect of who”. 
 
2. Discussion of the results 
 
i. Issues of interpretation 
 
Liberalization of services is a complex exercise and it can be conducted in a number of ways. Art. 
V GATS includes a significant degree of choice as to the method of liberalization. In contrast to the 
elimination of duties, the Members are not required to use any specific template for scheduling their 
commitments across services sectors. Even though most Members have opted for the W/120 
                                                
465 If the methodology was applied to a singular state giving one commitment for its entire territory in each sub-sector, 
the score under each sub-sector would be either 1 or 0. In that case, the average score across all the sectors would 




template recommended by the WTO Secretariat, there are differences in the grouping of the sectors. 
This is especially evident in EIAs where approaches to services liberalization are more varied than 
in the WTO context. The comparison of services schedules is challenging, especially between such 
agreements that employ different methodologies in their scheduling. 
 
There are two principal methods: the so-called positive and negative scheduling, often referred to as 
“top-down” (negative) and “bottom-up” (positive) approach. The most famous example of a top-
down agreement is the NAFTA, whereas the GATS is a positively-listed agreement.466 Whereas, in 
principle, both methods can lead to exactly same level of liberalization, there are, however, a 
variety of opinions as to the supposed superiority of one of the methods to the other one. It is often 
considered that, at least in practice, negative scheduling leads to higher levels of liberalization. 
Negative scheduling starts from an empty board and only non-conforming measures are inscribed. 
This may, partly maybe even for psychological reasons, lead to fewer restrictions being inscribed. 
In positive scheduling, the listing of restrictions takes place through a specific set of service sectors 
(for example, based on the WTO’s Sectoral Classification List) and the state can decide with each 
sector whether it wants to include and liberalize it or not. However, also under this method, the 
restrictions applied under each sector must be inscribed “negatively”. From the national authorities’ 
point of view, it may be easier to grasp the types of national measures requiring explicit limitations 
under positive scheduling. However, if the state has already liberalized trade through a positive 
schedule earlier, it is likely to be easier to adjust the desired restrictions to the negative model in 
another agreement.467 
 
Whereas the EU has traditionally engaged in GATS-type positive scheduling, in its current trade 
negotiations the EU is actively using both methods. In the CETA with Canada, the parties have 
opted for negative scheduling across all modes. The same applies to the ongoing negotiations with 
Japan. In the recently negotiated agreements with Singapore and Vietnam, on the other hand, a 
                                                
466 In reality, the GATS approach is ”hybrid” as only sectors are inscribed positively. Restrictions, on the other hand, 
are inscribed negatively. On differences between the approaches and on possible implications for the resulting level of 
liberalization, see e.g. Houde, Kolse-Patil, and Miroudot (2007) and Adlung and Mamdouh (2014). Adlung and 
Mamdouh are of the opinion that the method of scheduling has limited, if any, impact on the results achieved. They 
consider that what ultimately matters are not negotiating or scheduling techniques, but the political impetus that the 
governments concerned are ready to generate. However, it may be considered whether it is actually the political impetus 
that determines the scheduling technique in the first place. This may be visible in the EU’s latest, primarily 
commercially driven trade negotiations where the scheduling technique is negative in contrast to the EU’s earlier, 
positively listed services agreements. 
467 Most Members use positive scheduling on the basis of the CPC Product Classification (used in the WTO’s Sectoral 
Classification List). The U.S. generally uses negative scheduling and also a specific NAFTA classification system. See 




positive listing was used.468 In the reviewed EIAs, the EU has used the so-called positive method 
for the scheduling of its sector-specific commitments. The only exception is the chapter on 
“Establishment” with Georgia where negative scheduling is used. Our methodology is planned 
primarily for analyzing positively listed services schedules. It works for negative scheduling as 
well, but the analysis is much more burdensome in the case of negatively listed schedules. Each 
commitment has to be “built” by looking at all possible restrictions applying under a sector. In the 
case of the EU-Georgia EIA, the negatively listed restrictions are nevertheless organized under the 
same eleven main sectors as in the WTO’s Sectoral Classification List, which facilitated our work. 
Altogether, it was, however, hard to understand which sub-sectors were meant to be covered by the 
negative schedule. We assumed that the liberalized sectors were meant to be the same as under the 
other modes of the same agreement. However, it if all modes were negatively scheduled, one would 
not know for certainty which sectoral classification list to us as a point of comparison, unless that 
was specifically specified in the agreement.  
 
In the EU-Georgia EIA, the EU has included in its commitments under modes 1, 2 and 3 certain 
sub-sectors which do not appear under the WTO’s Sectoral Classification List (the relevant sub-
sectors are all written out in the chapter on results).469 Most of these sub-sectors are not mentioned 
under the negatively scheduled chapter on Establishment. Considering that the sub-sectors are 
liberalized to a certain extent under the other modes, one could maybe assume that they are meant 
to be covered also under Establishment. However, we cannot be certain, as it is not clear towards 
which list of service sectors the commitments under the negatively-listed Establishment should be 
compared to. 
 
By far the most challenging part of our empirical analysis is, nevertheless, the interpretation of the 
EU’s sector-specific restrictions. In this context it is maybe more correct to say “the Member 
States’ restrictions” as the difficulty is most often related to the specific way that each Member 
State has formulated its commitments. Some Member States are clearer than others. The repetition 
of the same restrictions under several sectors and across the agreements, however, helps the 
exercise. 
 
                                                
468 See the Commission’s brochure “Services and investment in EU trade deals: Using ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ lists”. 
Available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/april/tradoc_154427.pdf (accessed on 2 September 2016). 
469 Such “additional” sub-sectors could possibly be referred to as GATS-x services similarly to WTO-x areas in PTAs. 
“WTO-x” has been used to signify commitments dealing with issues going beyond the current WTO mandate. See 





Pursuant to Art. XX:3 GATS, the Members’ schedules form an integral part of the agreement.  In 
principle, services schedules are thus interpreted as any other kind of treaty language.470 That means 
that the interpretational rules of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
apply also to services schedules. Their interpretation must thus take into account the common 
intention of the Members.471 
 
However, as noted by the Appellate Body, each schedule has its own intrinsic logic.472 Other 
Members’ schedules are of “limited utility in elucidating the meaning of the entry to be 
interpreted”.473 This finding is clearly evident in our analysis. In practice, service schedules follow 
their own intrinsic logic. That is because they are formulated only by one side to the agreement and 
because they form a certain collective entity where the meaning of each commitment is often 
revealed only in connection with the other commitments of the same party. Naturally, the general 
rules of treaty interpretation must be applied but in an empirical exercise that goes through 
hundreds, or even thousands of commitments, certain short-cuts must be created. Therefore, in 
unclear situations, we have opted to give to particularly blurry commitments the value zero (mainly 
under NT). That is because of the lack of clarity as regards the value of the commitment: the state 
may, in practice, choose to apply it in a discriminatory way. A good example of such a situation are 
economic needs tests for which certain EU Member States do not always specify whether they 
apply them only to foreigners or to the state’s own nationals as well. As there is a wide margin of 
discretion left to the state in this regard, we have chosen to give such unclear ENTs the score zero 
under NT. 
 
There are two different ways of interpreting the results. First, the higher the score for NT, the higher 
is the level of non-discriminatory access to the EU market for the partner countries’ service 
suppliers. The lower the score, the lower the access. However, as the scores represent percentages 
of Member States providing for SC and NT under each sector, the scores do not directly show the 
level of sectoral coverage and non-discrimination for the entire EU party. The second way to 
interpret the results is to consider the internal dispersion across the EU Member States. The very 
high and the very low scores show that the either the majority or the minority of the Member States 
                                                
470 For an extensive account of the interpretation of WTO Members schedules both under the GATT and the GATS, see 
Van Damme 2009, 305-353. 
471 United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Report of the 
Appellate Body, WT/DS285/AB/R, circulated 7 April 2005, para. 160 and China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights 
and Distribution Services for Certain Publication and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, Report 
of the Appellate Body, circulated 21 December 2009, para. 405. 
472 U.S.-Gambling, para, 182. 




is willing to provide SC and NT. The commitments are often not identical and the reasons for the 
denial of NT may differ but the result is that the foreign service supplier either has or does not have 
non-discriminatory access to the EU market. But there is also a large number of scores that are 
somewhere in the middle, on either side of 50 %. In these cases there is more dispersion among the 
Member States as a large number of them provides for NT and an equally, or close to equally, large 
number does not. 
 
ii. Sectoral coverage 
 
In the following, we make some observations on the results of the empirical analysis concerning the 
sectoral coverage, the modal coverage and the level of non-discrimination of the four reviewed 
EIAs. We focus on certain general remarks only. The detailed results on each agreement can be 
viewed in Annex 4, in addition to which a summary of the results on each EIA has been presented 
above in Section 2(ii) of Chapter V:3.  
 
As has been noted by Krajewski, the development of the scope of the CCP with regard to trade in 
services can be described as “movement from sensitive modes to sensitive sectors”. 474  This 
development relates to the extension of the EU’s external trade competencies from a partial 
coverage of services trade to complete competence in the field. Whereas there are no longer any 
specific decision-making procedures applying to any particular modes, the sensitivity of certain 
modes can still be visible in the EU Member States’ sector-specific commitments. 
 
All four modes are covered in all of the reviewed agreements but there are significant differences in 
coverage as well as in the level of non-discrimination. The results show that, in average, the EU 
Member States have given the highest number of sectoral commitments under Mode 3. The average 
score for the percentage of Member States having given commitments across all the sectors under 
Mode 3 is 77 % in the EIA with Central America, 78 % with CARIFORUM, 80 % with Korea and 
as high as 93 % with Georgia. As the Mode 3 Chapter with Georgia has been negatively scheduled, 
it is possible that the negative scheduling modality has increased the overall level of coverage by 
the EU Member States in that specific agreement. However, the high number of sectoral 
commitments under Mode 3 with Georgia may also relate to one of the main objectives of the 
agreement, which is the gradual approximation of the Georgian trade-relevant legislation to that of 
                                                




the EU’s. This integration aspect of the agreement may have prompted more liberal attitude from 
the Member States as they can already anticipate future approximation in regulation. The especially 
high score for SC in the EU-Georgia EIA for Mode 3 is, however, not reflected in the NT score (74 
%), which is on the level of the other agreements. 
 
The overall average score for Mode 3 is higher for SC than for NT in all of the reviewed 
agreements. This is different to the other modes and is because of the lower level of sectoral 
exclusions under Mode 3 than under other modes.475 
 
The overall lowest sectoral coverage scores are found to apply to CSSs and IPs under Mode 4. The 
movement of CSSs and IPs has, however, been liberalized only in two of the agreements. In the 
agreement with CARIFORUM, there are, in average, commitments from 22 % of the Member 
States across the sectors. For the EU-Georgia EIA, the score is 19 %. The low scores reflect the 
high number of sectoral exclusions for the CSSs and IPs. A quick look at the score sheets of Annex 
4 shows that about half of the sectors are excluded. In addition to outright exclusions of certain 
sectors on the level of the text of the agreement, several and sometimes all Member States have 
excluded more sub-sectors in their sector-specific commitments. The average scores for the first 
category of Mode 4 (key personnel and graduate trainees, i.e. ICTs) are also relatively low: around 
50 % in each agreement. However, direct comparison of scores under Mode 4 to the scores under 
other modes is problematic as treatment under Mode 4 is provided to a few limited categories of 
persons only. We give more insight into the Member States’ commitments on Mode 4 below. 
 
Notwithstanding the very limited category of CSSs and IPs, the lowest average number of Member 
States having given sectoral commitments is found under Mode 1. The result is the same in each 
                                                
475 Of the four EIAs reviewed in this study, three of them refer to Mode 3 as ‘establishment’. As an exception, the oldest 
of the agreements, EU-CARIFORUM EIA of 2008, employs the traditional GATS term, ‘Commercial Presence’. The 
EU’s most recently negotiated trade and investment agreements with Vietnam and Canada employ the term 
‘investment’. In the negotiated, and also not yet concluded, agreement with Singapore the term “Establishment” is used. 
The CETA and Vietnam agreements are the first examples of deals where the EU’s “Investment” chapter combines 
Mode 3 with one overall framework for the market access and protection of investments, including investor-state 
dispute settlement.  The consolidated text of the CETA has been made available by the Commission at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf (accessed 15 May 2016). In CETA, there are 
separate chapters for “Investment”, “Cross-Border Trade in Services” (Modes 1 and 2) and “Temporary Entry and Stay 
of Natural Persons for Business Purposes” (Mode 4). The EU’s proposal in the TTIP agreement follows the same logic: 
there is no separate chapter or section on Mode 3 but one common chapter for investment which covers both service 
and non-service activities. The EU’s proposal for “Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce” in the TTIP 
negotiations is available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153669.pdf (published in July 2016, 
accessed last on 1 September 2016). In the EU’s previous trade agreements, the chapters on Establishment/Commercial 
Presence have concentrated on Mode 3 type of investment and covered non-service activities only in a very limited 




agreement. The lowest numbers of Member States have given commitments in services relating to 
transport, energy distribution (“services incidental to energy distribution”) and certain professional 
services (e.g. nurses, midwives and physiotherapists; accountants and auditors and veterinarians). 
Only one or two Member States have provided any commitments on the placement and supply 
services of personnel as well as on investigation and security services. A low number of bindings 
applies also to wholesale trade services.  
 
In the important sector of financial services, there are almost no binding commitments under Mode 
1. However, this does not mean that no insurance or banking services were liberalized at all. The 
grouping of financial services is quite special in the sense that they are grouped together under the 
large headings of “All insurance and insurance-related services” and “banking and other financial 
services”. Typically, each Member State has provided an ‘unbound’ with regard to at least certain 
sub-sectors that belong to these two big categories. However, the exclusion of even a small fraction 
of insurance and/or banking services takes the score to zero for the entire sector. 
 
Overall, we should be especially wary about making far-reaching conclusions on the average scores 
across entire modes or even across specific service sectors. Because the scores are averages, they 
are not very informative as to the level of liberalization reached in each individual sub-sector. A 
better way to read the results is to look at individual sub-sectors and draw conclusions on the 
overall impression that the scores give. The average scores on sectoral and modal level give only 
some guidance on the openness of the EU Member States as a whole. What is especially noteworthy 
in the average scores, however, is how similar they are across the agreements. The sectoral 
exclusions are almost identical across the reviewed EIAs (meaning no commitments from any of 
the Member States). Between the EIAs, certain differences in excluded sectors are to be found 
mainly under Mode 4 only. 
 
iii. The level of non-discrimination 
 
The scores for NT are occasionally higher than for SC. This is because we have counted the NT 
score only for such sectors that have been bound. According to Art. V:1(b) GATS, elimination of 
substantially all discrimination is required only in the sectors covered by the agreement. If the NT 
score was provided for all sectors, also to such sub-sectors that have been excluded by the EU, the 





Our results show that the number of Member States providing for full NT under the agreements 
varies on the level of entire modes between 40 % and 80 %. However, there are big differences 
between different modes and sectors. The lowest level of liberalization is granted under Mode 1. 
This applies to all of the reviewed EIAs. The average NT scores for Mode 1 in all of the agreements 
are between 43 % and 46 %. The low numbers are not due only to one or two sectors but there is a 
large number of sectors that are more poorly liberalized under Mode 1 than under the rest of the 
modes. Especially poor levels of liberalization appear under professional services. The same applies 
to real estate services, certain tourism and travel-related services, health services, recreational and 
cultural services, as well as transport services. Only in computer and related services, R&D 
services, educational services476 as well as construction and related services the number of Member 
States providing for NT is on the level of the other modes. The low commitment levels under Mode 
1 may reflect the difficulty in regulating services supplied especially through the internet. Whereas 
countries may more easily retain control over movement taking place under the other modes, 
provision of services under Mode 1 may be especially disruptive. A significant part of 
discrimination under Mode 1 is due to residency requirements, which, in practice, make empty any 
commitments for the supply of services through the internet. Such requirements are thus scored at 
zero for NT. 
 
Under Mode 3, there is in most cases some type of commitment from all of the Member States 
(bringing the sectoral coverage to 100 %) but the commitment is then qualified by a discriminatory 
element. The most often appearing discriminatory elements are limitations to the participation of 
foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or measures which 
restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint venture through which the service can be 
supplied. The latter is considered discriminatory if the specific form of legal entity clearly applies to 
foreigners only. 
 
The average levels of Member States providing for NT are quite similar under Modes 2 and 3. The 
NT scores for modes 2 and 3 are the highest across the four modes. Mode 2 is typically the most 
liberalized mode in EIAs. However, the Member State’s commitments show that they remain wary 
also under this particular mode. There is a lack of NT typically in the same sectors as under the 
other modes. The denial of NT in the case of movement of one’s own consumers may reflect 
caution in accepting regulatory difference especially in sensitive sectors, even if the consumption of 
                                                




the service would take place outside the national territory. Limitations to Mode 2 typically also 
relate to sectors that may affect domestic employment. For example, placement and supply services 
of personnel are heavily limited under all modes, also under Mode 2. The same concerns, for 
instance, technical testing and analysis services (CPC 8676). Some types of testing services may be 
supplied relatively easily over the internet. The limitations under Mode 2 may reflect the purpose of 
making sure that both supply side (Mode 1) and demand side (Mode 2) are covered by the 
limitations.477 
 
The average level of NT under Mode 3 is 79 % in the EU-Korea EIA, 74 % with Georgia, 72 % 
with the CARIFORUM states and 67 % with the Central-American states. Whereas the negatively 
scheduled Mode 3 chapter with Georgia scored the highest average for SC (93 %), a similar level of 
liberalization does not apply to NT. The EU’s NT score with Georgia is in line with the provision of 
NT under Mode 3 to Korea and the CARIFORUM states. The NT score with Central America is 
somewhat lower at 67 %. The results show that, in average, EU Member States are slightly more 
discriminatory towards Georgian undertakings willing to establish in the EU than towards 
undertakings originating in Korea, and slightly less discriminatory than towards undertakings 
originating in the CARIFORUM states. 
 
Overall, there is a somewhat higher number of Member States providing NT under the agreements 
with Korea and Georgia than in the EIAs with the CARIFORUM and Central American states. 
However, differences are small and depend on the mode and sectors. It is not possible to point 
towards a generally much higher liberalization level in any of the agreements. What is common to 
the agreements, is the generally low levels of NT especially under modes 1 and 4 (a low number of 
Member States providing for NT under several sectors) and the higher NT scores under Modes 2 
and 3. Under these two modes, in most sectors more than half of the Member States have provided 
for NT. In general, the results are best interpreted on a sub-sectoral basis. 
 
The second paragraph of Art. V:1 allows for the elimination of existing discriminatory measures 
and/or prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures to take place on the basis of a 
reasonable time-frame. We have identified only once instance where the EU has provided for 
                                                
477 A low number of NT bindings from the Member States for Mode 2 are found also under investigation and security 
services, commission agents’ and wholesale trade services, insurance and insurance-related services, certain transport 
services as well as – quite surprisingly - library, archives, museums and other cultural services. The rational for 
reserving the right to place restrictions on the use of foreign insurances by one’s own nationals is maybe more 




liberalizing measures to take place on a later date. In the EIA with the CARIFORUM certain EU 
Member States have applied transitional periods to their commitments with regard to CSSs and IPs. 
Ten Member States have stated that their commitments enter into force on 1 January 201, and two 
Member States have provided for an entry into force on 1 January 2014.478 The dates have already 
passed, and we have not taken them into account in our analysis. The results thus reflect the level of 
liberalization in the EU’s EIAs as they stand in their final form. 
 
The AA with Georgia is a special case as it provides for a gradual approximation of a significant 
part of Georgia’s trade-relevant legislation with the EU’s legislation. Therefore, a full 
implementation of the agreement is to be attained only through such a gradual process. This special 
characteristic of the agreement with Georgia, however, does not affect the way the EU has given its 
commitments. They can thus be analyzed similarly to the other agreements. It is possible that the 
gradual integration process leads to a more level playing field for Georgian service suppliers in the 
long-term but any higher level of elimination of discrimination is not visible in the sector-specific 
commitments as they stand today as compared to the other types of EIAs (the most visible 
difference being the wider than usual sectoral coverage under Mode 3). The overall process of 
integrating Georgia further into the EU’s legislative framework can possibly be taken into account 
under Art. V:2  to which we now turn. 
 
iv. Wider process of economic integration 
 
Art. V:2 includes a possible remedy for EIAs remaining below the required level of non-
discrimination. Its provisions give the possibility to take the wider process of economic integration 
or trade liberalization into account in the estimation of the attainment of the conditions under Art. 
V:1(b). However, the provision does not give any leeway as to the requirement of substantial 
sectoral coverage of Art. V:1(a). 
 
As has been noted in Chapter III, there is no consensus as to the exact issues that can be taken into 
account under Art. V:2. The most common understanding is that the “wider process of economic 
                                                




integration” refers especially to the liberalization of trade in goods in the terms of Art. XXIV:5 
GATT.479 However, it is not specified how the relationship should be considered.480  
 
In our review of the EU’s EIAs, we have noted a wide range of issues that may tell about a wider 
economic integration or trade liberalization taking place between the contracting parties. We do not 
argue that all these issues should definitely be taken into account and we cannot say how they 
should affect the assessment of the liberalization levels of any specific agreement. The purpose is to 
shed some light into the overall framework in which services liberalization is taking place. Such 
liberalization does not happen in a vacuum but often requires different types and levels of 
cooperation between national authorities. For example, cooperation in the fields of mutual 
recognition or transparency may be required for countries to open their markets to foreign suppliers. 
 
Within the issues listed under “Wider process of economic integration” in the review sheets of 
Annex 4, we have included different topics ranging from harmonization and regulatory cooperation 
to policies on competition and environment. The list is not based on any specific formula but 
exemplary of the types of issues included in modern trade agreements. We have not given much 
detail but simply marked whether such disciplines are included in the EIAs, without paying 
attention to their legal enforceability. The noted issues do not affect the sector-specific scores in any 
way but bring some additional light into the contents of each agreement. 
 
One way to approach elements of a “wider process” is to analyze the relationship of the 
liberalization levels of each agreement to the extent that such elements are included in an EIA. 
When comparing the lists of issues in the analyzed agreements, one notices, once again, that they 
are quite similar to each other. Even though the reviewed agreements range from a development-
oriented agreement (the EPA with the CARIFORUM) to a commercially driven “deep” FTA with a 
highly developed industrial nation (the FTA with Korea), they all follow similar patterns. The 
similarity in the negotiation templates that the EU is using is visible both in the types of issues 
covered (both in general and especially in relation to services) as well as in the liberalization levels 
in the field of services, both in terms of SC and NT. The most significant difference between the 
types of issues covered in the four EIAs is the inclusion of regulatory cooperation in the agreements 
with Korea and Georgia. Whereas the EIAs with the CARIFORUM and the Central American states 
                                                
479 Members’ views on the issue are found e.g. in the document WT/REG/W/34, “Systemic Issues Arising from Article 
V of the GATS, Communication from Hong Kong, China, Committee of Regional Trade Agreements, 19 February 
1999, para. 11. See also WTO (2000), para. 85. 




provide for regulatory dialogues only, the agreements with Korea and Georgia include a more 
specialized institutional setting for regulatory cooperation.481 Such a setting is taken the furthest in 
the EU-Georgia EIA, which is the only EIA among the four agreements that provides also for 
harmonization (to take place through Georgia’s approximation to the EU legislation). These two 
agreements are also the ones providing for the highest levels of SC and NT across the four EIAs. 
 
3. The scope and depth of the EU’s Mode 4 commitments 
 
i. Mode 4 commitments in the EU’s EIAs 
 
In order to be GATS-consistent, EIAs should not, a priori, exclude any mode of supply.482 The 
question of coverage is especially complicated with Mode 4, which is liberalized through different 
categories of persons. Such categories do not have their basis in the GATS but have been formed in 
the Members’ practice. Each country determines its own categories and there is thus great variety in 
the types of persons admitted as well as in the conditions for their entry and stay. 
 
In the GATS, Mode 4 is defined as the supply of a service “by a service supplier of one Member, 
through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member”.483 As 
explained in Chapter IV, further indications as to the types of situations covered by Mode 4 are 
given under Art. XXVIII (“Definitions”). We are not aware of any Member having liberalized the 
supply of services by all natural persons of other Members without any further specifications. 
Typically, the main types of specifications relate to the type of persons admitted and to the period 
of their stay. In light of Art. XXIII and taking into account the Members practice, it is therefore 
possible to conclude that Mode 4 does not need to cover all possible service supply by natural 
persons. Instead, Mode 4 can be liberalized through specific categories of persons. However, we are 
left in the dark as to how many and what types of categories exactly should there be and what type 
of entry and stay conditions should be applied. 
 
                                                
481 The EU-Korea FTA establishes a Trade Committee, as well as more specialized committees and working groups that 
are responsible for ensuring the operation of the agreement. According to the Commission, the different bodies provide 
an opportunity both to seek resolution of market access concerns and to engage in closer regulatory cooperation. See the 
Commission’s brochure “The EU-Korea FTA in practice”, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/october/tradoc_148303.pdf (accessed on 5 September 2016). Even if most 
regulatory cooperation relates to trade in goods, institutionalized contacts between each party’s authorities may improve 
transparency and reduce regulatory conflicts also in other areas.  
482 The footnote to Art. V:1(a) GATS. 




What appears to be clear is that some movement of natural persons should be allowed at least. In 
this respect, it would seem that the U.S. is in an outright breach of Art. V as no PTA negotiated by 
the U.S. for over a decade has contained commitments aimed to facilitate the movement of natural 
persons.484 The exclusion of an entire mode of supply cannot fulfill the requirement of substantial 
sectoral coverage under Art. V GATS, especially as the condition is understood not only in terms of 
number of sectors and volume of trade affected but also in terms of modes of supply.485 
 
The EU is in a much safer zone in this regard. All of the reviewed EIAs include commitments on 
Mode 4. They thus seem to comply with the requirement that EIAs should not provide for the a 
priori exclusion of any mode of supply. Altogether another question is to what extent Mode 4 is 
covered in the EU’s agreements. As we have established earlier, the GATS does not extend to 
labour mobility per se, and its exclusion in EIAs does thus not amount to a violation of Art. V. 
Parties should, nevertheless, cover the scope of Mode 4 as provided by the GATS.486 
 
Therefore, whereas under Modes 1-3 there are two essential issues to check (the level of SC and 
NT), under Mode 4 there are three separate issues that arise. The first issue is the categories of 
persons covered, and only then come the sectoral coverage and the level of non-discrimination 
provided to such persons. Whereas one could argue that also under Mode 3 there are several ways 
to access the host state and that countries impose requirements as to the use of specific legal 
entities, the GATS clearly provides that “commercial presence” (Mode 3) for the purpose of 
supplying a service means “any type of business or professional establishment”, including through 
“the constitution, acquisition or maintenance of a juridical person” or “the creation or maintenance 
of a branch or a representative office”.487 Thus, the parameters for Mode 3 are largely set by the 
GATS, whereas the types of natural persons to be admitted under Mode 4 is, in practice at least, 
determined by the Members themselves. The GATS gives some guidance as to types of persons 
                                                
484 See, for example, Art. 12:1(7) of the FTA between the U.S. and South Korea, which states that “Nothing in this 
Chapter or any other provision of this Agreement shall be construed to impose any obligation on a Party regarding its 
immigration measures, including admission or conditions of admission for temporary entry.” According to a report 
prepared for the Members and Committees of the U.S. Congress by the Congressional Research Service, “No U.S. FTA 
negotiated after the agreements with Chile and Singapore agreements includes provisions on the temporary movement 
of personnel”. See “The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Negotiations and Issues for Congress”, March 20, 2015, 
available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42694.pdf (date accessed 15 August 2016). See also Stephenson and 
Hufbauer 2011, 282. 
485 Footnote to Art. V:1(a) GATS. 
486 Similarly in Cottier and Molinuevo 2008, 134-135. 
487 Art. XXVIII GATS (”Definitions”). Moreover, under the MA discipline of the GATS (Art. XVI), measures which 
restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint ventures are prohibited unless otherwise specified in the 




covered, but there are no legal definitions for the exact categories persons and the conditions for 
their entry and stay. 
 
In Chapter IV we listed the four basic categories of persons that are typically seen as resulting from 
the GATS and the Members’ commitments on Mode 4: 1) IPs, 2) ICTs, 3) CSSs, and 4) BVs 
(business visitors) and services salespersons. 488  Only two of the EU’s EIAs cover all these 
categories: the EIAs with the CARIFORUM and Georgia. The two other EIAs do not contain any 
commitments on CSSs and IPs but simply refer to possible advancement to be made in the GATS 
negotiations. 
 
The covered categories of persons are thus not identical across the EU’s agreements. Among the 
reviewed EIAs, the most extensive Mode 4 coverage is found in the EU-CARIFORUM agreement. 
The agreement covers six different types of natural persons: CSSs, IPs, key personnel, graduate 
trainees, short-term business visitors and business services sellers. 489  ‘Key personnel’ covers 
business visitors (responsible for setting up a commercial presence) and ICTs (which is further 
divided into managers and specialists). ‘Graduate trainees’ are, in essence, a sub-group of ICTs as 
they cover persons who have been employed by the transferring undertaking in the home country 
for at least one year and are temporarily transferred to a commercial presence or to the parent 
company of the same undertaking in the host state. They must possess a university degree and the 
transfer must take place for career development purposes or to obtain training in business 
techniques or methods. Business services sellers, on the other hand, are representatives of a service 
supplier seeking temporary entry for the purpose of negotiating the sale of services or to enter into 
agreements to sell services in the host state. It is specifically specified that they cannot engage in 
making direct sales to the general public or receive remuneration from a source located within the 
host state. However, the EU’s sector-specific commitments under Category 2 of Mode 4 (CSSs and 
IPs) cover IPs only in about 50 % of the commitments.490 
 
The EU has chosen to specify the sectors in which the supply of services into its territory by CSSs 
and IPs in the beginning of its schedule for CSSs and IPs. That is probably to make clear in which 
(limited) sectors such service supply is allowed. Both lists represent less than 50 % of all service 
                                                
488 See Section 2(ii) of Chapter IV. 
489 The categories of persons for each reviewed EIA are explained under the results of the empirical analysis in Chapter 
V.3. 
490 The exclusion of IPs under about a half of the EU’s Category 2 commitments in the EIAs with CARIFORUM and 
Georgia has not been noted in the review sheets of Annex 4 as it would have excessively complicated their reading. 




sectors but the list for IPs is even shorter than for CSSs. Both lists include a mix of main service 
sectors and sub-sectors. It is also specifically highlighted that “the Union does not undertake any 
commitment for contractual service suppliers and independent professions for any sector of 
economic activity other than those which are explicitly listed below”.491 
 
As there are commitments on CSSs and IPs only in two of the EIAs, the overall coverage for Mode 
4 in terms of categories of persons cannot be considered comprehensive. Most EU’s commitments 
apply to ICTs and business visitors and service sellers only. There are numerous sectoral exclusions 
and discriminatory limitations that apply to CSSs and IPs in the two EIAs that cover them. There is 
also another factor that is questionable from the point of view of Art. V requirements. The EU’s 
Mode 4 commitments are not subjected to the MFN and NT disciplines as the rest of the modes 
are.492 The chapters on the temporary presence of natural persons for business purposes simply 
provide for the definitions of the persons covered but do not grant any non-discrimination 
obligations for them. Therefore, it would seem that the EU is not promising any non-discrimination 
in terms of MFN and NT to service suppliers under Mode 4. The level of treatment granted is 
revealed solely by reading the sector-specific commitments. There, as shown by our results, the 
level of NT is revealed. But it is noteworthy that there is no GATS-like NT treatment discipline on 
the level of the text of the agreement. Moreover, MFN does not seem to apply to Mode 4 at all. This 
is probably due to the EU’s, or all contracting parties’, desire to protect its policy space with 
admitting persons on more favorable conditions from other countries. However, such exclusion of 
MFN and NT does not find support in the GATS discipline on EIAs as the provisions of Art. V do 
not differentiate between the modes of supply in this regard. 
 
In addition to this obvious shortcoming, once one turns into the actual commitments, one notices 
that also the sector-specific commitments under Mode 4 are quite modest. In general, there is also a 
large number of sectoral exclusions. There are more exclusions under Mode 4 than under any other 
mode in the EU’s EIAs. That is easy to spot by viewing Annex 4 where the sectoral exclusions are 
marked by grey color. As to the level of non-discrimination, the level of NT provided to ICTs is, in 
the average, higher than under Mode 1 but lower than under Modes 2 and 3. However, this applies 
only to the first category of Mode 4. For the second category (CSSs and IPs), the NT scores are 
much lower and an even higher number of sectoral exclusions are applied. The most common 
                                                
491 E.g. the front page of Annex XIV-D of the EU-Georgia EIA. 
492 In the EU-Georgia EIA, MFN applies only to Establishment (Art. 79(1) and 79(2), subject to reservations in Annex 
XIV-A and XIV-E). All of the other EIAs are subject to MFN reservations as well but a general MFN discipline is 




applied restriction are nationality and residence requirements. They immediately take the NT score 
to 0, which greatly decreases the value of the EU’s commitments under Mode 4. 
 
Finally, it can be noted that similarly to Mode 3, not all of the economic activities listed by the EU 
relate to services activities. Mode 4 has thus been partly extended to manufacturing businesses.493 
 
ii. The EU’s approach to the issue of employment market access 
 
All of the reviewed EIAs include the following statements in the beginning of the chapter on 
services:  
 
“This Chapter shall not apply to measures affecting natural persons seeking access to 
the employment market of a Party, nor shall it apply to measures regarding 
citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis.” 
 
“Nothing in this Title shall prevent the [Parties or the Signatory CARIFORUM States] 
from applying measures to regulate the entry of natural persons into, or their 
temporary stay in, their territory, including those measures necessary to protect the 
integrity of, and to ensure the orderly movement of natural persons across their 
borders, provided that such measures are not applied in such a manner as to nullify 
or impair the benefits accruing to any Party under the terms of a specific 
commitment.”494 
 
In addition to these straightforward carve-outs designed to protect the integrity of the EU Member 
States’ labour markets and national borders, a careful reading of the definitions of the categories of 
persons covered in the texts of the agreement reveals that the purpose is to avoid employment 
market access from taking place. 
 
In that light, it is somewhat contradictory that the Member States have included so many limitations 
in their sector-specific commitments. There is a large number of nationality and residency 
conditions for ICTs, as well as occasional ENTs. Such requirements show that the Member States 
choose to retain the opportunity to give preference to local workers. This is understandable in the 
case of CSSs (for whom such requirements are applied even more often) but creates blurriness 
around the issue of employment market access in the case of ICTs. According to the EU’s own 
                                                
493 See Descheemaeker (2016) who deals with the EU’s practice of extending Mode 3 and Mode 4 to non-services 
sectors. 
 




definition of ICTs, their movement is designed to facilitate the business motivations of the foreign 
service supplier. ICTs must either get training in the host state or help in the development of the 
host state undertaking. A critical factor is that they have company-specific knowledge, which is 
typically confirmed by prior-employment requirements in the same undertaking. It is thus hard to 
imagine that they would be replaced by local workers who lack such a connection to the 
undertaking and the country of origin. Nevertheless, the EU Member States’ commitments do not 
always reflect this reality. 
 
In the EU’s EIAs, Mode 4 is clearly temporary in nature. ‘Temporary’ is included already in the 
title of the chapters on Mode 4 (“Temporary entry and stay of natural persons for business 
purposes”). Clear time limits are provided for the stay in each category of persons covered.495 With 
regard to the periods of stay (as well as to the definitions of the categories of persons), the EU 
Member States are perfectly aligned. However, there is once again no clarity as to what is required 
by Art. V. Beyond the exclusion of permanent migration, the GATS does not draw lines concerning 
periods of stay. For example, Japan’s GATS commitments allow foreign business travelers to stay 
for a maximum of 90 days, but certain categories of ICTs can stay up to five years.496 
 
When using foreign labour, the situation of TCN service suppliers established outside the EU is 
different to service suppliers who are established within the Union. In the EU, according to the 
Court’s established case law, service suppliers posting workers to another EU Member State do not 
need to obtain work permits for their TCN employees (unless they are temporary work agencies). In 
contrast, third-country service suppliers established outside the EU typically must do so, although in 
some instances the service supply may take place with no permit if the service supplier is 
established in a country whose nationals do not need any visa to enter the Union. In this regard, 
there is internal EU diversity depending on whether the EU Member State is in the Schengen area 
or not. 
 
The EU case law in question relates to the use of non-EU national workers in the intra-EU provision 
of services.497 In that line of case law, the Court of Justice has built its legal analysis of cross-border 
                                                
495 For example, the temporary entry and stay of key personnel and graduate trainees “shall be for a period of up to three 
years for intra-corporate transfers, 90 days in any 12-month period for business visitors, and one year for graduate 
trainees”. See Art. 81 in the EU-CARIFORUM EIA. The periods are the same across the reviewed EIAs.  
496 Mattoo and Carzaniga 2003, 3. 
497 When analysing the EU’s own case law, it is important to keep in mind that services are understood in somewhat 
different terms in the EU and in the WTO. The GATS drafters did not use the EU example. Instead, they followed a 




service supply around the question of employment market access.498 In 2011, the Court ruled that 
hired workers (temp-agency workers) are a group of service suppliers that specifically seek access 
to the host state’s employment market and thus belong to the category of workers.499 In cases where 
such workers are not EU nationals and are sent from one EU Member State to work in another, 
work permits may still be required (a requirement otherwise prohibited in intra-EU provision of 
services).500  
 
The situation is different in the case of posted workers who are not hired out to the host-country 
company but are engaged in the direct provision of services by their home-state company under a 
service contract (corresponding to CSSs). According to the Court, such workers, employed by an 
undertaking established in one Member State and temporarily sent to another Member State to 
provide services, “do not in any way seek access to the labour market in that second State, if they 
return to their country of origin or residence after completion of their work”.501 Requiring work 
permits from such TCN service suppliers in the internal market has been illegal already for over 20 
years, as it hinders the service provision by their employer. However, it is not difficult to imagine 
that sometimes separating such contractual service suppliers from hired temp-agency workers may 
be challenging.502 The EU’s Posted Workers Directive covers both situations, but the applicability 
of local labour laws is, to a certain extent at least, dependent on the national legislation.503 
                                                                                                                                                            
Modes 1, 2 and 4 coincide with the concept of services as it stands in EU law. Mode 3, by contrast, is the closest 
equivalent to the EU’s freedom of establishment. In respect of Mode 4, the basic concept in EU law is the free 
movement of services, which, similarly to the GATS, encompasses legal entities and self-employed persons alike. EU 
law makes an important differentiation between workers and service suppliers. The dividing line is the relationship 
between the service supplier and the service recipient. If the relationship can be characterized as one of employment, 
the rules governing free movement of workers apply. Under the GATS, the exact division depends on each Member’s 
national regime. See for EU case law Hatzopoulos and Do 2006, 951. 
498 See especially cases C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa Ldª v Office national d'immigration [1990] ECR I-1417, paras. 13-
15, C-43/93, Raymond Vander Elst v Office des migrations Internationales [1994] ECR I-3803, para. 21, joined cases 
C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98 Finalarte and Others [2001] ECR I-7831, para. 22 and 
case C-445/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2004] ECR I-10191, para. 38. 
499 Joined Cases C-307/09 to C-309/09, Vicoplus [2011] ECR I-00453. 
500 In one case the Court did not only reject the work permit/specific authorization requirement, but it also rejected the 
automatic expulsion of such third-country workers who had entered the host state’s territory unlawfully. The Court 
concluded that by making it impossible to regularize the situation of a TCN worker that was lawfully posted by an 
undertaking established in another Member State but who had entered the host state without a required visa, the host 
state was imposing a restriction on that undertaking’s freedom to provide services. Such an act exposes the worker in 
question to the risk of being excluded from the national territory, which is liable to jeopardize the planned posting. See 
Case C-168/04, Commission v Austria [2006] ECR I-9041, para. 61. The posted TCN workers did not enjoy any free 
movement rights on their own but rather a derived right stemming from their employer’s freedom to provide services in 
the EU’s internal market. The concept of “derived rights” is typically used in connection with TCN family members 
who sometimes enjoy a derived right to move within the EU together with their EU national family member. As with 
posted workers, in reality it is rather the EU national who has the right to move with his or her TCN family member. 
See Craig and De Búrca 2015, 857. 
501 Para. 21 of C-43/93, Raymond Vander Elst v Office des migrations Internationales [1994] ECR I-3803. 
502 To help in drawing the difference, the Court of Justice has put forward a method that is often employed in domestic 





The EU’s internal development with regard to temporary supply of personnel is reflected also in the 
EU’s EIA commitments. All Member States have excluded the temporary supply of personnel in 
their Mode 4 commitments. Also under other modes, the commitments are of very limited nature.504 
There are, however, differences between the agreements. There are only one or two Member States 
that have given a commitment under Mode 1 in all of the four EIAs, but under Mode 3 there is a NT 
commitment from 37 % of the Member States in the EIAs with Central America and the 
CARIFORUM states (ten Member States out of 27 providing for non-discrimination under Mode 
3). In the EU-Korea EIA, the score is 4 % (one Member State out of 27) and with Georgia it is 7 % 
(two Member States out of 28).  The higher levels with the Central American and the 
CARIFORUM states may relate to less concern over those countries’ service suppliers’ potential 
activity in the placement services of personnel, or to a growing concern in the EU Member States 
over the liberalization of temp-agency services since the conclusion of those agreements and up to 
the conclusion of the more recent agreements with Korea and Georgia. 
 
Considering the complexity involved in the liberalization of Mode 4, it is impossible to give any 
clear answer to the level of non-discrimination provided by the EU’s EIAs. As has been noted 
before, the conditions to access a country through Mode 4 are typically by their nature 
discriminatory. The movement of natural persons is never entirely liberalized – passports and visas 
are required to access any country. Even within the EU, the EU citizens do not enjoy unlimited right 
                                                                                                                                                            
workers perform their duties. In the Vicoplus case, the Court said that “ - - as has been noted by all of the Governments 
which have submitted observations to the Court and also by the Commission, a worker who is hired out, within the 
meaning of Article 1(3)(c) of Directive 96/71 [The Directive on Posted Workers], works under the control and direction 
of the user undertaking. That is the corollary of the fact that such a worker does not carry out his work in the context of 
a provision of services undertaken by his employer in the host Member State”. See Joined Cases C-307/09 to C-309/09, 
Vicoplus [2011] ECR I-00453, para. 47. In practice, however, it is not always straightforward to say under whose 
control and direction CSSs work. For example, one can imagine a construction site where workers posted by a sub-
contractor in another Member State perform their part of the project in close cooperation with the main contractor. 
Their superiors might be in another country and the workers, in effect, under the direction of the main contractor. 
503 The Posted Workers Directive (“PWD”) covers three categories of workers, two of which correspond roughly to the 
GATS-type CSSs and ICTs. The third category is temp-agency workers. The PWD sets the mandatory, host-state rules 
of employment that must be applied to all intra-EU posted workers (including the host state’s minimum rates of pay). 
See Art. 3 of Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. The applicability to intra-EU CSSs of certain local 
labour laws and/or collective agreements outside the mandatory rules for minimum protection of the PWD has been 
restricted in the Court’s case law. See especially Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd [2007] ECR I-11767 (para. 80-
81). Because of the political controversy concerning the PWD, especially after the judgment in Laval, the Commission 
has, under pressure from several Member States, recently proposed modifications to the Directive. See Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, 
See COM(2016) 128 final. 
504 “Placement and supply services of personnel” are listed under (k.) in F. Other Business Services which is located in 




to remain in each other’s territory. Keeping the overall restrictiveness of Mode 4 in mind, the EU’s 
EIAs show that the EU is relatively liberal as to the categories of persons covered. However, the 
especially meaningful categories of IPs and CSSs are covered only by two of the four agreements 
(EU-CARIFORUM EPA and EU-GEORGIA AA), and even in them the sectoral coverage 
especially for IPs is low. The average sector-specific scores for sectoral coverage are relatively low 
but for NT they are at around 80 %. Here one must, however, pay attention to the definitions of the 
Mode 4 categories already in the text of the agreement. The value of the NT score is limited. In the 
case of CSSs and IPs, the average non-discrimination score is as low as 33 % in the CARIFORUM 
EIA. In this sense, the coverage of Mode 4 is most extensive in the Georgia EIA, where the average 
NT score for ICTs (key personnel and graduate trainees) is 84 % and 40 % for CSS and IPs. 
However, all in all, and considering especially the overall poor level of commitments for CSSs and 
IPs, the EU can be considered to stay quite far from attaining the threshold of eliminating 
substantially all discrimination towards its preferential partners’ service suppliers supplying 
services through the presence of natural persons. 
 
Overall, there is much similarity in the scores for individual sub-sectors in all of the reviewed EIAs. 
The similarity in the commitments across the agreements is confirmed by reading the schedules. 
They are not identical and in some instances there are significant differences (the most radical being 
the higher than average sectoral coverage under Mode 3 in the EU-Georgia EIA), but the overall 
impression based on reading hundreds of pages of commitments is that many of the same 
restrictions keep repeating from one agreement to the other. The finding applies both to horizontal 
as well as sector-specific commitments. The reviewed agreements have been concluded within a 
relatively short period of time (2008-2014). It may be that the commitments reflect a status quo – a 
level of accession conditions that has taken place mostly through unilateral opening. They would 
thus not provide for new opening but simply lock-in the access conditions that are already applied. 
Another option is that the EU Member States have chosen to provide a relatively similar level of 
market opening across the agreements. However, considering that liberalization of service 
regulations is typically put into effect in a non-discriminatory manner (except maybe for Mode 4), 
any new openings granted in earlier agreements may possibly feed into later agreements as they 
have already become applied on a MFN basis in any case.505 
                                                
505 Roy, Marchetti and Lim note that it is very difficult to identify with exactitude the extent to which EIAs lead to real 
liberalization (i.e. to the removal of applied restrictions). Some countries may bind the status quo (the applied regime) 
while others may decide to withdraw certain restrictions and accordingly not list them as reservations or limitations in 





This may be reflected also in the EU’s EIAs. Instead of providing for new liberalization, they may 
rather reflect the status quo.506 Our results point towards similarity in the commitments between the 
agreements but more qualitative analysis would be needed to find out to what extent the Member 
States’ commitments have changed from the EPA with the CARIFORUM (2008) to the AA with 
Georgia (2014).507 Such an analysis would also show which Member States are more liberal than 
others. However, our results give reason to conclude that the number of Member States having 
granted non-discriminatory access conditions to service suppliers of the partner countries in each 
agreement has not changed in any significant amount. 
  
                                                                                                                                                            
each country and compare the applied regime before and after the conclusion of the agreement. See Roy, Marchetti, and 
Lim 2007, 178. 
506 Considering the generally low levels of liberalization in EIAs, binding the currently applied regulations may already 
be considered some sort of an achievement. Mattoo and Sauvé note that a negative list approach can be more effective 
in locking in the regulatory status quo, whereas positive scheduling can more easily lead to levels below it. See Mattoo 
and Sauvé (2010). 
507 Tracking changes can be done, for example, by measuring consistency in the language of the commitments. One 
method for measuring consistency in treaty language is used by Alschner and Skougarevskiy who measure the textual 
similarity of investment treaties through a specific “heat map” which shows the overlap of the various textual 
components of each investigated agreement. See Alschner and Skougarevskiy (2016): “Mapping the Universe of 
International Investment Agreements”, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2801608 






There is a certain paradox in the liberalization of trade today. The most central issues on the table 
involve at least some regulatory reform in the domestic setting. This applies to investment, public 
procurement, competition rules, and, of course, services. Agreeing over market-opening regulatory 
reforms, and related regulatory cooperation, is nevertheless extremely challenging in a multilateral 
organization with over 160 members. Countries are therefore entering smaller clubs with similarly 
thinking or otherwise willing partners. The paradox lies in the fact that regulatory reforms are 
nevertheless ideally implemented in a non-discriminatory manner. This is clearly the case in 
services. New market opening in services is typically likely to benefit outsiders as well. The 
incentives for negotiating preferential deals on services are therefore different to preferential deals 
in goods where tariff liberalization can be easily implemented on a discriminatory basis.  
 
This is maybe partly behind the modest liberalization levels of EIAs so far. Countries lack incentive 
to commit to genuine market opening when they know that the preferences granted by their 
negotiation partner are likely to benefit at least some outsiders as well. Most EIAs go deeper than 
the same countries GATS commitments, but the GATS was over 20 years ago. In practice, EIA 
commitments typically do not provide for much new market opening but by committing to status 
quo they simply guarantee that the situation does not get worse. 
 
At the same time, the significant economic advantages of services liberalization are of course well 
understood. That is why the so-called “Really Good Friends of Services”, currently composed of 23 
Members of the WTO, including the EU and the U.S., have practically abandoned the GATS and 
moved to negotiate a new trade agreement in services, the TiSA. What is essential is that together, 
the participating countries account for 70 % of world trade in services. Even if some important 
Members, such as China, are not included at least for the moment, the wide coverage alleviates 
concerns of significant free riding. From the outsiders’ point of view, it would be important that the 
agreement was implemented on an MFN basis. Some more participants are possibly needed for 
MFN to become reality but if the agreement succeeds, that is a likely scenario. As we have 
discussed in this thesis, discriminatory application of service regulation is unpractical and risks 
being welfare-reducing as a whole. 
 
In our view, the core conditions of Art. V relate to the overall positive spill-over effects that EIAs 




elimination of substantially all discrimination. Art. V:6 requires the application of very liberal rules 
of origin. The provision of ‘wider process of economic integration or trade liberalization” (Art. V:2) 
allows some flexibility in the elimination of discrimination but for the overall objective of creating 
a more integrated market. Such a development is likely to benefit outsiders as well. The EU is a 
case in point. The creation of a single market in goods has made it possible for third-country 
importers to sell their products on similar conditions anywhere in the EU. In the field of services, 
such a situation is not yet a reality but a single market in services is progressing step by step. A 
highly integrated services market would fuel economic growth and provide interesting trading 
opportunities also for service suppliers from third countries. We consider that to be the objective of 
Art. V GATS as well. 
 
We have refrained from making any ultimate determination as to the compliance of the EU with 
Art. V GATS in its external trade agreements. The results show varying degrees of liberalization 
across the different sub-sectors. All in all, a large number of sub-sectors have low scores on 
national treatment, meaning that there is only a part of the EU providing for a non-discriminatory 
access in those sectors. The practical relevance of that “part of the EU” depends on the significance 
of those individual Member States’ markets to the foreign service supplier, either for selling 
services there or as an access point to other EU Member States. As there is no legal clarity on the 
exact meaning of the Art. V requirements, nor on their application to an entity such as the EU, we 
cannot say what percentage exactly of the EU is required to reach compliance with Art. V. 
Moreover, as our results show the percentage of Member States committed under each sub-sector, 
further calculations and methodological choices would need to be done to propose an overall score 
for the coverage of the entire EIA by the EU. However, from a legal point of view, it may be 
proposed that the Art. V thresholds should be separately reached both by the individual Member 
States (who are WTO Members also in their own right) and by the EU as a whole. A particular 
percentage of the Member States (for example, 90 %) could be considered to show committal by the 
EU “as a whole”. Certain weights depending on the relevance of the individual Member States 
might need to be applied. 
 
One way to approach the issue would be to compare the EU’s EIAs to other Members’ agreements. 
Similar (low) levels of liberalization in other agreements could demonstrate a Members’ practice in 
this regard, or at least a general negligent attitude toward Art. V. It is not just the EU’s EIAs, but 
EIAs in general, that have so far provided for only modest levels of liberalization. This thesis has, 




concluded by other Members of the WTO. Nevertheless, we would consider that no matter how low 
is the overall level of liberalization in the Members’ EIAs in general, it would be questionable to let 
it affect the interpretation of Art. V in any significant manner.  It may be possible to debate, in light 
of the Members’ practice or without it, whether ‘substantially all’ means 60 % or 90 %, but hardly 
anyone can reasonably claim that the threshold for ‘substantial’ or ‘substantially all’ could be lower 
than 50 %. 
 
Our parameters for the study of EIAs are based directly on Art. V. The Members themselves have 
decided upon these parameters and they are thus a legitimate tool for a legal assessment of EIAs. 
However, instead of a strict legal scrutiny, and in the face of the seemingly impossible task of 
enforcing the WTO disciplines on preferential trade, the Members have opted for a more relaxed 
Transparency Mechanism to keep track of PTAs. The gathering of information on PTAs and the 
evaluation of their possible effects on multilateral trade liberalization is increasingly becoming a 
task for the academia. 
 
That has been the main motivation for our work as well. The thesis develops a methodology that 
aims at providing new information on how one of the biggest Members is concluding its EIAs. The 
method takes into account the internal diversity that still exists between the EU Member States 
when they liberalize services internationally. But such an approach is not relevant only in the case 
of the EU. Services are in the center of attention in almost any current PTA project. In those 
negotiations, it is becoming increasingly topical, and urgent, to address also such restrictions that 
are applied by local entities beyond the central state. Arguably some of the most significant 
economic advantages would be realized if such sub-central entities (states, regions and 
municipalities) engaged in deeper liberalization of services. The thesis provides one possible 
method for analyzing services commitments across various levels of government. 
 
In the context of the EU, the thesis demonstrates the diversity that still exists in the Member States’ 
external services trade commitments. As services are now occupying a central place in trade 
negotiations, individual Member States may in the future face an increasing number of bilateral 
requests to open up their national service markets, especially in the economically most relevant 
sectors. A higher level of homogeneity within the EU, whether through internal harmonization or 
by simple coordination of the EU Member States’ positions, would provide for more clarity and 
predictability for third-country service suppliers. The goal for the EU should be the creation of a 




provision of services. At the same time, it would enhance the EU’s international negotiation 
position. The dismantling of barriers within the EU would make it possible to extend similar 
treatment also to third country partners. Such a development is desirable as the reduction of trade 
barriers towards service suppliers from certain countries only is likely to create economic 
distortions that result in general productivity losses. However, it is realistic to anticipate that due to 
the numerous political and cultural sensitivities relating to the cross-border liberalization of 
services, significant advancement in the most sensitive areas, such as mutual recognition, is most 
likely to take place only in relatively closed groups of like-minded countries. An openly 
implemented, integrated services market along the lines of Art. V GATS is, nevertheless, an 









TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
GATT/World Trade Organization 
 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The legal texts: the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) 
 
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, The legal texts: the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations 284 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) 
 
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries, Decision of 28 November 1979 by Signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, L/4903 
 
Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, General Council, Decision of 14 
December 2006, WT/L/671, 18 December 2006 
 
Preferential Treatment to Services and Services Suppliers of Least-Developed Countries, 






Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations opened for signature in Rome on 19 
June 1980, Official Journal of the European Union L 266, 9.10.1980 
 
Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, of the other part, Official Journal of the European 





Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Korea, of the other part, Official Journal of the European Union, L 127, 14 May 2011 
 
Agreement Establishing an Association between Central America, on the one hand, and the 
European Community and its Member States, on the other, Official Journal of the European Union 
L 346 of 15 December 2012 
 
Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community 
and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, Official Journal of the 




Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty establishing the European 




Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ L 18, 
21.1.1997, p. 1–6 
 
Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the 
recognition of professional qualifications, OJ L 255, 30.9.2005, p. 22–142 
 
Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the internal market, OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p. 36–68 
 
Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on 
Temporary Agency Work, OJ L 327, 5.12.2008, p. 9–14 
 
Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a 




territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally 
residing in a Member State, OJ L 343, 23.12.2011, p. 1–9 
 
Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014, on the 
conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal 
workers, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 375–390 
 
Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate 
transfer, OJ L 157, 27.5.2014, p. 1–22 
 
TABLE OF CASES 
 
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
 
European Community — Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products from Certain Countries in 
the Mediterranean Region, L/5776, 7 February 1985, GATT Panel Report, unadopted 
 
Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, Report 
of the Appellate Body, circulated 4 October 1996 
 
European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Report of 
the Appellate Body, WT/DS27/AB/R, circulated 9 September 1997 
 
United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate 
Body, WT/DS58/AB/R, circulated 12 October 1998 
 
Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/R, Report of the 
Panel, circulated 31 May 1999 
 
Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/AB/R, Report of the 





Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, 
Report of the Panel, circulated 11 February 2000 
 
United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line 
Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, circulated 15 February 2002 
 
Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, Report of the Panel, WT/DS204/R, 
circulated 2 April 2004 
 
United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS285/AB/R, circulated 7 April 2005 
 
China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Products, WT/DS363/R, Report of the Panel, circulated 12 August 2009 
 
China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publication and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, circulated 
21 December 2009 
 
China - Electronic Payment Services, WT/DS413/R, Report of the Panel, circulated 16 July 2012 
 
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, WT/DS453/AB/R, Report of the 
Appellate Body, circulated 14 April 2016 
 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
Case 22/70, Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263 
 
Case 804/79, Commission v United Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045 
 
C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa Ldª v Office national d'immigration [1990] ECR I-1417 
 





Joined cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98, Finalarte Sociedade 
de Construção Civil Ldª (C-49/98), Portugaia Construções Ldª (C-70/98) and Engil Sociedade de 
Construção Civil SA (C-71/98) v Urlaubs- und Lohnausgleichskasse der Bauwirtschaft and 
Urlaubs- und Lohnausgleichskasse der Bauwirtschaft v Amilcar Oliveira Rocha (C-50/98), Tudor 
Stone Ltd (C-52/98), Tecnamb-Tecnologia do Ambiante Ldª (C-53/98), Turiprata Construções Civil 
Ldª (C-54/98), Duarte dos Santos Sousa (C-68/98) and Santos & Kewitz Construções Ldª (C-69/98) 
[2001] ECR I-7831 
 
C-445/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2004] ECR I-10191 
 
C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR 
I-11767 
 
Joined cases C-307/09 to C-309/09, Vicoplus SC PUH (C-307/09), BAM Vermeer Contracting sp. 
zoo (C-308/09) and Olbek Industrial Services sp. zoo (C-309/09) v Minister van Sociale Zaken en 
Werkgelegenheid [2011] ECR I-00453 
 
C-414/11, Daiichi Sankyo Co. Ltd, Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. DEMO Anonimos 
Viomikhaniki kai Emporiki Etairia Farmakon [2013] EU:C:2013:520 
 
C-137/12, Commission v. Council (Conditional Access Services) [2013] EU:C:2013:675 
 
C-28/12, European Commission v. Council of the European Union [2015] EU:C:2015:282 
 
Opinion 1/75, Opinion of the Court of 11 November 1975 given pursuant to Article 228 of the EEC 
Treaty [1975] ECR 01355 
 
Opinion 2/92, Third Revised Decision of the OECD on national treatment [1995] ECR I-521 
 
Opinion 1/94, Opinion of the Court of 15 November 1994 - Competence of the Community to 
conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual property 





Opinion 1/08, Opinion of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 30 November 2009 — Opinion pursuant to 





Adlung, Rudolf. 2016. "International Rules Governing Foreign Direct Investment in Services: 
Investment Treaties versus the GATS."  The Journal of Worl Investment and Trade 17 (1): 
47-85. 
Adlung, Rudolf, and Hamid Mamdouh. 2014. "How to Design Trade Agreements in Services: Top 
Down or Bottom-Up?"  Journal of World Trade 48 (2): 191–218. 
Alschner, Wolfgang, and Dmitriy Skougarevskiy. 2016. "Mapping the Universe of International 
Investment Agreements."  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2801608. 
Andenæs, Mads Tønnesson, and Kern Alexander. 2008. The World Trade Organization and Trade 
in Services. Leiden: Brill. 
Anderson, Robert D., and Anna Caroline Müller. 2008. "Market access for the government 
procurement of services: comparing recent PTAs with WTO achievements." In Opening 
markets for trade in services: countries and sectors in bilateral and WTO negotiations, 
edited by Juan A. Marchetti and Martin Roy. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ankersmit, Laurens. 2014. "The Scope of the Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: The 
Daiichi Sankyo and Conditional Access Services Grand Chamber Judgments."  Legal Issues 
of Economic Integration 41 (2): 193-210. 
Bagwell, Kyle, and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2011. Preferential Trade Agreements: A Law and 
Economics analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Bartels, L., S. Silva, H.  Hijazi, H.  Schloemann, and T. Cottier. 2013. "Re-Thinking Reciprocity: A 
New Framework for WTO Disciplines on North-South Regional Trade Agreements."  
NCCR Trade Regulation Working Paper (No. 2013/20): 3-36. 
Bartels, Lorand. 2004. "WTO Dispute Settlement Practice on Article XXIV of the GATT." In The 
WTO dispute settlement system, 1995-2003, edited by Federico Ortino and Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, 263-274. The Hague; New York: Kluwer Law International. 
Bartels, Lorand, and Federico Ortino. 2006. Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal 
System, International economic law series. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bast, Jürgen. 2008. "Commentary on the Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying 
Services Under the Agreement." In WTO - Trade in Services, edited by Rüdiger Wolfrum, 
Peter-Tobias Stoll and Clemens Feinäugle, 573-595. Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers. 
Betts, Alexander, and Kalypso Nikolaidis. 2009. "The Trade-Migration Linkage: GATS Mode IV."  
Memo prepared for the ‘Global Trade Ethics Conference’, presented at Princeton 
University, 19 February 2009. 
Beviglia-Zampetti, Americo. 2000. "Mutual Recognition in the Transatlantic Context: Some 
Reflections on Future Negotiations." In Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-
discrimination in World Trade Law, edited by Thomas Cottier, Petros C. Mavroidis and 
Patrick Blatter, 303-328. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish. 2008. Termites in the trading system: how preferential agreements undermine 




Bhagwati, Jagdish, and Arvind Panagariya. 1996. The economics of preferential trade agreements. 
Washington: AEI Press. 
Bosworth, Malcolm, and Ray Trewin. 2008. "The domestic dynamics of preferential services 
liberalization: the experience of Australia and Thailand." In Openign Markets for Trade in 
Services: Countries and Sectors in Bilateral and WTO Negotiations, edited by Juan 
Marchetti and Martin Roy, 633-666. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bungenberg, Marc. 2010. "Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon." In 
European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2010, edited by Christoph Herrmann 
and Jörg Philipp Terhechte, 123-151. Heidelberg: Springer. 
Carzaniga, Antonia. 2003. "The GATS, Mode 4, and Pattern of Commitments." In Moving People 
to Deliver Services, edited by Aaditya Mattoo and Antonia Carzaniga, 21-26. World Bank 
and Oxford University Press. 
Carzaniga, Antonia. 2008. "A warmer welcome? Access for natural persons under PTAs." In 
Opening Markets for Trade in Services: Countries and Sectors in Bilateral and WTO 
Negotiations, edited by Juan Marchetti and Martin Roy. Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Chanda, Rupa. 2001. "Movement of Natural Persons and the GATS."  The World Economy 5 (24): 
631-654. 
Chanda, Rupa. 2004. "Movement and Presence of Natural Persons and Developing Countries: 
Issues and Proposals for the GATS Negotiations."  South Centre Working Paper No. 19. 
Chanda, Rupa. 2009. "Mobility of Less-Skilled Workers under Bilateral Agreements: Lessons for 
the GATS."  Journal of World Trade 43 (3): 479-506. 
Chase, Kerry. 2006. "Multilateralism compromised: the mysterious origins of GATT Article 
XXIV."  World Trade Review 5 (1): 1-30. 
Chaudhuri, Sumanta, Aaditya Mattoo, and Richard Self. 2004. "Moving People to Deliver Services: 
How can the WTO Help?"  Journal of World Trade 38 (3): 363-393. 
Cholewinski, Ryszard. 2015. "Evaluating Bilateral Labour Migration Agreements in the Light of 
Human and Labour Rights." In The Palgrave Handbook of International Labour Migration: 
Law and Policy Perspectives, edited by Marion Panizzon, Gottfried Zürcher and Elisa 
Fornalé. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Condon, Bradly J. 2009. "European Union-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination 
and Cooperation Agreement." In Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements: Case Studies, 
edited by Simon Lester and Bryan Mercurio, 74-96. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Cossy, Mireille. 2006. "Determining "likeness" under the GATS: squaring the circle?"  WTO Staff 
Working Paper (ERSD-2006-08 ). 
Cottier, Thomas, Panagiotis Delimatsis, and Nicolas Diebold. 2008. "Article XIV GATS General 
Exceptions." In WTO - Trade in Services, edited by Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll 
and Clemens Feinäugle, 287-328. Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Cottier, Thomas, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Patrick Blatter. 2000. Regulatory Barriers and the 
Principle of Non-discrimination in World Trade Law, World Trade Forum. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Cottier, Thomas, and Martin Molinuevo. 2008. "Article V GATS." In WTO - Trade in Services, 
edited by Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Clemens Feinäugle, 125-164. Leiden; 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Cottier, Thomas, and Matthias Oesch. 2011. "Direct and Indirect Discrimination in WTO Law and 
EU Law."  NCCR Trade Regulation Working Paper No 2011/16. 




Cremona, Marise. 2010a. "Balancing Union and Member State interests: Opinion 1/2008, choice of 
legal base and the common commercial policy under the Treaty of Lisbon."  European Law 
Review 35 (5): 678-694. 
Cremona, Marise. 2010b. "The European Union and Regional Trade Agreements." In European 
yearbook of international economic law 2010, edited by Christoph Herrmann and Jörg 
Philipp Terhechte, 245-268. Heidelberg: Springer. 
Cremona, Marise, David Kleimann, Joris Larik, Rena Lee, and Pascal Vennesson. 2015. ASEAN's 
external agreements: law, practice and the quest for collective action, Integration through 
law: the role of law and the rule of law in ASEAN integration. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Damro, Chad. 2006. "The Political Economy of Regional Trade Agreements." In Regional Trade 
Agreements and the WTO Legal System, edited by Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino, 23-
42. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
De Baere, Geert. 2011. "The Basics of EU External Relations Law: An Overview of the Post-
Lisbon Constitutional Framework for Developing the External Dimensions of EU Asylum 
and Migration Policy." In External Dimensions of European Migration and Asylum Law and 
Policy / Dimensions Externes du Droit et de la Politque d’Immigration et d’Asile de l’UE, 
edited by Maes M., Foblets M. and De Bruycker P., 121-174. Brussels: Bruylant. 
Descheemaeker, Sidonie. 2016. "Ubiquitous Uncertainty: The Overlap between Trade in Services 
and Foreign Investment in the GATS and EU RTAs."  Legal Issues of Economic Integration 
43 (3): 265-294. 
Dey, Dipankar. 2007. "The Movement of Natural Persons (Mode 4) Under GATS: Advantage 
Developing Countries!" In GATS: An Introduction, edited by Dipankar Dey, 78-104. 
Hyderabad: The Icfai University Press. 
Diebold, Nicolas F. 2010. Non-discrimination in international trade in services: 'Likeness' in 
WTO/GATS, Cambridge international trade and economic law. Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Dür, Andreas, Leonardo Baccini, and Manfred Elsig. 2014. "The design of international trade 
agreements: Introducing a new dataset."  The Review of International Organizations 9 (3): 
353-375. 
Eeckhout, Piet. 2011. EU External Relations Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Eisele, Katharina. 2014. The External Dimension of the EU’s Migration Policy: Different Legal 
Positions of Third-Country Nationals in the EU: A Comparative Perspective. Leiden; 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Epps, Tracey, and M. J. Trebilcock. 2013. Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers 
to Trade, Research handbooks on the WTO. Cheltehnham, UK; Northampton, USA: Edward 
Elgar. 
Eschenbach, Felix, and Bernard Hoekman. 2006. "Services policies in transition economies: on the 
EU and WTO as commitment mechanisms."  World Trade Review 5 (3): 415-443. 
Espa, Ilaria. 2012. "The Appellate Body Approach to the Applicability of Article XX GATT in 
Light of China – Raw Materials: A Missed Opportunity?"  Journal of World Trade 46 (6): 
1399-1142. 
Fink, Carsten, and Marion Jansen. 2009. "Services provisions in regional trade agreements: 
stumbling blocks or building blocks for multilateral liberalization?" In Multilateralizing 
Regionalism: Challenges for the Global Trading System, edited by Richard Baldwin and 
Patrick Low. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fink, Carsten, and Martin Molinuevo. 2008. "East Asian preferential trade agreements in services: 
liberalization content and WTO rules."  World Trade Review 7 (4): 641-673. 
Fiorentino, Roberto V., Luis Verdeja, and Christelle Toqueboeuf. 2007. "The Changing Landscape 




Gathii, James T. 2013. "The Cotonou Agreement and economic partnership agreements." In The 
Right to Development and Implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, edited by 
Realizing the Right to Development: Essays in Commemoration of 25 Years of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Right to Development. New York ; Geneva: United Nations. 
Gibson, J., and D. McKenzie. 2011. "Eight Questions about Brain Drain."  Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 25 (3): 107-128. 
Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 1995. "The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements."  The 
American Economic Review 85 (4): 667-690. 
Grynberg, Roman, and Veniana Qalo. 2007. "Migration and the World Trade Organization."  
Journal of World Trade 41 (4): 751-781. 
Guild, Elspeth. 2007. "European Union and Third Party Service Trades: Four Essays on EU 
Services." In Global Economic Issues Publications, edited by Quaker United Nations 
Office. 
Hatzopoulos, Vassilis, and Thien Uyen Do. 2006. "The Case Law of the ECJ Concerning the Free 
Provision of Services: 2000-2005."  Common Market Law Review 43 (4): 923-991. 
Hepple, B. A. 2005. Labour laws and global trade. Oxford: Hart. 
Heydon, Kenneth, and Stephen Woolcock. 2009. The Rise of Bilateralism: Comparing American, 
European and Asian Approaches to Preferential Trade Agreements. Tokyo, New York, 
Paris: United Nations University Press. 
Hoekman, Bernard. 1995. "Tentative first steps: an assessment of the Uruguay Round agreement on 
services, Volume 1."  World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (No. 1455): 60. 
Hoekman, Bernard. 1996. "Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services." In The 
Uruguay Round and the developing countries, edited by Will Martin and Alan L. Winters, 
88-124. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hoekman, Bernard. 2006. "Liberalizing Trade in Services: A Survey."  World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper (No. 4030). 
Hoekman, Bernard, and Aaditya Mattoo. 2013. "Liberalizing Trade in Services: Lessons from 
Regional and WTO Negotiations."  International Negotiation 18 (1): 131-151. 
Hoekman, Bernard, and Niall Meagher. 2014. "China - Electronic Payment Services: 
discrimination, economic development and the GATS."  World Trade Review 13 (2): 409-
442. 
Hoekman, Bernard, and Pierre Sauvé. 1994a. "Liberalizing Trade in Services."  World Bank 
Discussion Papers (WDP243). 
Hoekman, Bernard, and Pierre Sauvé. 1994b. "Regional and Multilateral Liberalization of Service 
Markets: Complements or Substitutes?"  Journal of Common Market Studies 32 (3): 283–
318. 
Horn, Henrik, Petros C. Mavroidis, and André Sapir. 2010. "Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU 
and US Preferential Trade Agreements."  The World Economy 33 (11): 1565-1588. 
Houde, M., A. Kolse-Patil, and S. Miroudot. 2007. "The Interaction between Investment and 
Services Chapters in Selected Regional Trade Agreements."  OECD Trade Policy Papers 
(No. 55). 
Jacobsson, Johanna. 2013. "Liberalisation of Service Mobility in the EU’s International Trade 
Agreements: As External as it Gets."  European Journal of Migration and Law 15 (3): 245-
261. 
Jacobsson, Johanna. 2015. "GATS Mode 4 and Labour Mobility: The Significance of Employment 
Market Access." In The Palgrave Handbook of International Labour Migration: Law and 
Policy Perspectives, edited by Marion Panizzon, Gottfried Zürcher and Elisa Fornalé, 61-94. 




Jansen, Marion. 2008. "Comment: Is services trade like or unlike manufacturing trade?" In GATS 
and the Regulation of International Trade in Services, edited by Marion Panizzon, Nicole 
Pohl and Pierre Sauvé, 139-142. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Jensen, J. Bradford. 2011. Global Trade in Services: Fear, Facts, and Offshoring. Washington, DC: 
Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
Joshi, Manoj. 2004. "Are Eco-Labels Consistent with World Trade Organization Agreements?"  
Journal of World Trade 38 (1): 69-92. 
Kelsey, Jane. 2010. "How 'trade in services' transforms the regulation of temporary migration for 
remittances in poor countries." In International Economic Law and National Autonomy, 
edited by Meredith Kolsky Lewis and Susy Frankel. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Klamert, Marcus. 2015. Services liberalization in the EU and the WTO: Concepts, Standards and 
Regulatory approaches, Cambridge studies in European law and policy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kleimann, David, ed. 2013. EU Preferential Trade Agreements: Commerce, Foreign Policy, and 
Development Aspects. Florence: Global Governance Programme, European University 
Institute. 
Krajewski, Markus. 2003. National Regulation and Trade Liberalization in Services: The Legal 
Impact of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National Regulatory 
Autonomy: Kluwer Law International. 
Krajewski, Markus. 2008. "Of Modes and Sectors: External Relations, Internal Debates, and the 
Special Case of (Trade in) Services." In Developments in EU External Relations Law, edited 
by Marise Cremona, 172-215. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Krajewski, Markus, and Maika Engelke. 2008. "Article XVII GATS." In WTO - Trade in Services, 
edited by Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Clemens Feinäugle, 396-420. Leiden; 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Kudryavtsev, Arkady. 2013. "The TBT Agreement in context." In Research Handbook on the WTO 
and Technical Barriers to Trade, edited by Tracey Epps and M. J. Trebilcock, 17-80. 
Cheltehnham, UK; Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar. 
Langhammer, Rolf J. 2005. "The EU Offer of Service Trade Liberalization in the DOHA Round: 
Evidence of a Not-Yet-Perfect Customs Union."  Journal of Common Market Studies 43 (2): 
311-325. 
Leal-Arcas, Rafael. 2003. "Exclusive or Shared Competence in the Common Commercial Policy: 
from Amsterdam to Nice."  Legal Issues of Economic Integration 30 (1): 3-14. 
Lee-Makiyama, Hosuk. 2012. "The International Services Agreement (ISA) - from the European 
vantage point."  ECIPE Policy Brief (No 3/2012): 14. 
Lester, Simon, Bryan Mercurio, and Lorand Bartels. 2015. Bilateral and Regional Trade 
Agreements: Commentary and Analysis (Volume 1). Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lianos, Ioannis, and Okeoghene Odudu. 2012. Regulating Trade in Services in the EU and the 
WTO: Trust, Distrust and Economic Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lim, Aik Hoe, and Bart De Meester. 2014. WTO Domestic Regulation and Services Trade: Putting 
Principles into Practice. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Liukkunen, Ulla. 2004. The Role of Mandatory Rules in International Labour Law. Helsinki: 
Talentum. 
Liukkunen, Ulla. 2006. Cross-Border Services and Choice of Law. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. 
Magdeleine, J., and A. Maurer. 2008. "Measuring GATS Mode 4 Trade Flows."  WTO Staff 
Working Paper ERSD-2008-05. 
Marchetti, Juan A., and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2011. "The genesis of the GATS (General Agreement 




Marchetti, Juan A., and Martin Roy. 2008. Opening markets for trade in services: countries and 
sectors in bilateral and WTO negotiations. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Marchetti, Juan, and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2012. "I now recognize you (and only you) as equal: an 
anatomy of (mutual) recognition agreements in the GATS." In Regulating Trade in Services 
in the EU and the WTO, edited by Ioannis Lianos and Okeoghene Odudu, 415-443. 
Cambridge: Cambridge. 
Marchetti, Juan, Martin Roy, and Laura Zoratto. 2012. "Is there Reciprocity in Preferential Trade 
Agreements on Services?"  WTO Staff Working Paper (ERSD-2012-16). 
Mathis, James H. 2002. Regional trade agreements in the GATT-WTO : Article XXIV and the 
internal trade requirement. The Hague 
Norwell, MA: T.M.C. Asser Press ; 
distributed by Kluwer Law International. 
Mathis, James H. 2006. "Regional Trade Agreements and Domestic Regulation: What Reach for 
'Other Restrictive Regulations of Commerce'?" In Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO 
Legal System, edited by Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino, 79-108. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Mathis, James H. 2011. "The "Legalization" of GATT Article XXIV - Can Foes Become Friends?" 
In Preferential Trade Agreements: A Law and Economics analysis, edited by Kyle Bagwell 
and Petros C. Mavroidis, 31-39. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Matsushita, Mitsuo, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2006. The World Trade 
Organization: law, practice, and policy. 2nd ed. Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Mattoo, Aaditya. 1997. "National Treatment in the GATS: Corner-stone or Pandora's Box?"  
Journal of World Trade 31 (1): 107-135. 
Mattoo, Aaditya. 2000. "MFN and the GATS." In Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-
discrimination in World Trade Law, edited by Thomas Cottier, Petros C. Mavroidis and 
Patrick Blatter, 51-99. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Mattoo, Aaditya, and Antonia Carzaniga, eds. 2003. Moving People to Deliver Services: World 
Bank and Oxford University Press. 
Mattoo, Aaditya, and Carsten Fink. 2002. "Title." Policy Research Working Paper 2852. 
Mattoo, Aaditya, and Pierre Sauvé. 2010. "The Preferential Liberalization of Services Trade."  
NCCR Trade Regulation Working Paper 2010/13. 
Mavroidis, Petros C. 2005. The general agreement on tariffs and trade: a commentary, Oxford 
commentaries on international law. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Mavroidis, Petros C. 2006. "If I Don't Do It, Somebody Else Will (Or Won't)."  Journal of World 
Trade 40 (1): 187-214. 
Mavroidis, Petros C. 2007. "Highway XVI re-visited: the road from non-discrimination to market 
access in GATS."  World Trade Review 6 (1): 1-23. 
Mavroidis, Petros C. 2010. "WTO and PTAs: A Preference for Multilateralism? (or, the Dog That 
Tried to Stop the Bus)."  Journal of World Trade 44 (5): 1145–1154. 
Mavroidis, Petros C. 2011. "Always look on the bright side of non-delivery: WTO and preferential 
trade agreements, yesterday and today."  World Trade Review 10 (3): 375-387. 
Mavroidis, Petros C., George A. Bermann, and Mark Wu. 2013. The law of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO): documents, cases & analysys, American casebook series. St. Paul, 
MN: Thomson/West. 
Miroudot, Sébastien, Jehan  Sauvage, and Marie Sudreau. 2010. "Multilateralising Regionalism: 
How Preferential Are Services Commitments in Regional Trade Agreements?"  OECD 




Miroudot, Sébastien, and Ben Shepherd. 2014. "The Paradox of ‘Preferences’: Regional Trade 
Agreements and Trade Costs in Services."  The World Economy 37 (12): 1751-1772. 
Mitchell, Andrew D., and Nicolas Lockhart. 2015. "Legal requirements for PTAs under the WTO." 
In Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements: Commentary and Analysis (Volume 1), edited 
by Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio and Lorand Bartels, 81-114. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mitchell, Andrew D., and Nicolas J. S. Lockhart. 2009. "Legal requirements for PTAs under the 
WTO." In Bilateral and regional trade agreements: commentary and analysis, edited by 
Simon Nicholas Lester and Bryan Mercurio, 81-113. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mukherjee, N. 1996. "Exporting Labour Services and Market Access Commitments under GATS in 
the World Trade Organization."  Journal of World Trade 30 (5): 21-42. 
Müller-Graff, Peter-Christian. 2008. "The Common Commercial Policy enhanced by the Reform 
Treaty of Lisbon." In Law and practice of EU external relations: salient features of a 
changing landscape, edited by Alan Dashwood and Marc Maresceau, 188-201. Cambridge, 
N.Y: Cambridge University Press. 
Munin, Nellie. 2010. Legal guide to GATS, Global trade law series. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer 
Law International. 
Natens, Bregt. 2016. Regulatory Autonomy and International Trade in Services: The EU Under 
GATS and RTAs. Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 
Neven, Damien J., and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2006. "El mess in TELMEX: a comment on Mexico – 
measures affecting telecommunications services."  World Trade Review 5 (2): 271–296. 
OECD, IOM, and the World Bank. 2004. Trade and migration: building bridges for global labour 
mobility. Paris: OECD. 
Ortino, Federico. 2008. "The Principle of Non-Discrimination and its Exception in GATS: Selected 
Legal Issues." In The World Trade Organization and Trade in Services, edited by Kern 
Alexander and Mads Tønnesson Andenæs, 173-204. Leiden: Brill. 
Panizzon, Marion. 2010. "International Law of Economic Migration: A Menage à Trois? GATS 
Mode 4, EPAs, and Bilateral Migration Agreements."  Journal of World Trade 44 (6): 1207-
1252. 
Panizzon, Marion, Gottfried Zürcher, and Elisa Fornalé. 2015. The Palgrave Handbook of 
International Labour Migration: Law and Policy Perspectives. Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Pauwelyn, Joost. 2005. "Rien ne Va Plus? Distinguishing Domestic Regulation from Market Access 
in GATT and GATS."  World Trade Review 4 (2): 131-170. 
Persin, Daniela. 2008. "Free Movement of Labour: UK Responses to the Eastern Enlargement and 
GATS Mode 4."  Journal of World Trade 42 (5): 837-864. 
Persin, Daniela. 2010. "Market Access for Small versus Large Service Enterprises: The Preferential 
and Multilateral Trade Liberalization Tracks Compared."  Journal of World Trade 45 (4): 
785-819. 
Persson, Maria, and Fredrik Wilhelmsson. 2007. "Assessing the effects of EU trade preferences for 
developing countries " In The European Union and Developing Countries, edited by Yves 
Bourdet, Joakim Gullstrand and Karin Olofsdotter. Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA: E. 
Elgar. 
Ramdoo, Isabelle, and Sanoussi Bilal. 2013. "European Trade Policy, Economic Partnership 
Agreements and Regional Integration in Africa." In EU Preferential Trade Agreements: 
Commerce, Foreign Policy, and Development Aspects, edited by David Kleimann. Florence: 
European University Institute. 





Reinisch, August. 2014. "The EU on the Investment Path - Quo Vadis Europe? The Future of EU 
BITs and other Investment Agreements."  Santa Clara Journal of International Law 12 (1): 
111-157. 
Reyna, Jimmie V., and Terence P. Stewart. 1993. The GATT Uruguay Round: a negotiating history 
(1986-1992): Services. Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation. 
Robert, Maryse, and Sherry Stephenson. 2008. "Opening services markets at the regional level 
under the CAFTA-DR: the cases of Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic." In Opening 
markets for trade in services: countries and sectors in bilateral and WTO negotiations, 
edited by Juan Marchetti and Martin Roy, 537-572. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Rosas, Allan, and Lorna Armati. 2010. EU Constitutional Law: An Introduction. Oxford: Hart. 
Roy, Martin. 2011. "Services Commitments in Preferential Trade Agreements: An Expanded 
Dataset."  WTO Staff Working Paper (ERSD-2011-18). 
Roy, Martin, Juan Marchetti, and Hoe Lim. 2007. "Services liberalization in the new generation of 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs): how much further than the GATS?"  World Trade 
Review 6 (2): 155-192. 
Sampson, Gary, and Richard Snape. 1985. "Identifying Issues in Trade in Services."  The World 
Economy 8 (2): 171-182. 
Sauvé, Pierre, and Anirudh Shingal. 2011. "Reflections on the Preferential Liberalization of 
Services Trade."  Journal of World Trade 45 (5): 953-963. 
Schmitz, Jan. 2015. "The Temporary Movement of Natural Persons in the Context of Trade in 
Services: EU Trade Policy under Mode 4 (WTO/GATS)." In The Palgrave Handbook of 
International Labour Migration: Law and Policy Perspectives, edited by Marion Panizzon, 
Gottfried Zürcher and Elisa Fornalé, 382-402. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Schott, Jeffrey. 1989. "More Free Trade Areas?" In Free Trade Areas and US Trade Policy, edited 
by Jeffrey Schott, 1-58. Washington D.C.: Institute of International Economics. 
Self, Richard J., and B. K. Zutshi. 2003. "Mode 4: Negotiating Challenges and Opportunities." In 
Moving People to Deliver Services, edited by Aaditya Mattoo and Antonia Carzaniga, 27-
58. World Bank and Oxford University Press. 
Sheppard, Audley, and Federico Ortino. 2006. "International Agreements Covering Foreign 
Investment in Services: Patterns and Linkages." In Regional Trade Agreements and the 
WTO Legal System, edited by Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino, 201-214. Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Shingal, Anirudh, and Peter Egger. 2014. "Determinants of services trade agreements: Regulatory 
incidence and convergence."  NCCR Trade Working Papers No 2014/06. 
Sieber-Gasser, Charlotte. 2016. "Developing Countries and Preferential Services Trade." In. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
http://ezproxy.eui.eu/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316569412. 
Snape, Richard. 1993. "History and Economics of GATT's Article XXIV." In Regional Integration 
and the Global Trading System, edited by Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst. London: 
Harvester-Wheatsheaf. 
Snell, Jukka. 2008. "Free Movement of Services and the Services Directive: The Legitimacy of the 
Case Law." In EU and WTO Law on Services: Limits to the realization of General Interest 
policies within the services markets, edited by Johan van de Gronden, 31-54. The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International. 
South Centre, the. 2009. "Negotiating Services Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the European 
Union: Some Issues for Developing Countries to Consider."  Analytical Note 
SC/AN/TDP/EPA/21, June 2009. 
Stephenson, Sherry. 2000a. "Regional Agreements on Services in Multilateral Disciplines: 




Liberalization, Integration and Reform, edited by Sherry Stephenson, 86-104. Washington 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and Organization of American States. 
Stephenson, Sherry M. 2000b. "GATS and Regional Integration." In GATS 2000: new directions in 
services trade liberalization, edited by Pierre Sauvé and Robert M. Stern, 509-529. 
Washington, D.C.: Center for Business and Government Brookings Institution Press. 
Stephenson, Sherry M., and Gary Hufbauer. 2011. "Labor Mobility." In Preferential trade 
agreement policies for development: a handbook, edited by Jean-Pierre Chauffour and Jean-
Christophe Maur, 275-306. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Tans, Simon. 2011. "The Unwanted Service Provider: Implementation of WTO and EU 
Liberalisation of Service Mobility in the Dutch Legal Order."  Refugee Survey Quarterly 30 
(2): 67-95. 
Trachtman, Joel P. 2008. "The Role of International Law in Economic Migration."  Society of 
International Economic Law, Online Proceedings, Working Paper No. 24/08. 
Trachtman, Joel P. 2009. The international law of economic migration: toward the fourth freedom. 
Kalamazoo, Mich.: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
Trachtman, Joel P. 2014. "Mutual recognition of services regulation at the WTO." In WTO 
Domestic Regulation and Services Trade: Putting Principles into Practice, edited by Aik 
Hoe Lim and Bart De Meester. New York Cambridge University Press. 
Van Damme, Isabelle. 2009. Treaty interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Van der Marel, Erik, and Sébastien Miroudot. 2014. "The economics and political economy of 
going beyond the GATS."  The Review of International Organizations 9 (2): 205-239. 
van Elsuwege, Peter. 2014. "The Potential for Inter-Institutional Conflicts before the Court of 
Justice: Impact of the Lisbon Treaty." In The European Court of Justice and External 
Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges, edited by Marise Cremona and Anne Thies. 
Oxford; Portland: Hart Publishing. 
Van Vooren, Bart, and Ramses A. Wessel. 2014. EU External Relations Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Viner, Jacob. 1950. The Customs Union Issue. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. 
Waele, Henri de. 2011. Layered Global Player: Legal Dynamics of EU External Relations. 
Heidelberg; Dordrecht; New York: Springer. 
Wang, Heng. 2012. "The Interpretation of GATS Disciplines on Economic Integration: GATS 
Commitments as a Threshold?"  Journal of World Trade 46 (2): 397-438. 
Warleigh-Lack, Alex, Nick Robinson, and Ben Rosamond, eds. 2011. New Regionalism and the 
European Union. New York: Routledge. 
Winters, Alan L. 2002. Liberalising labour mobility under the GATS, Commonwealth Economic 
Paper Series. London: Commonwealth Secretariat. 
Winters, Alan L. 2008a. "Preferential Liberalization of Services Trade: Economic Considerations." 
In A Handbook of International Trade in Services, edited by Aaditya Mattoo, Robert M. 
Stern and Gianni Zanini. 
Winters, Alan L. 2008b. "The Temporary Movement of Workers to Provide Services (GATS Mode 
4)." In A Handbook of International Trade in Services, edited by Aaditya Mattoo, Robert M. 
Stern and Gianni Zanini. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Winters, Alan L., Terrie L. Walmsley, Zhen Kun Wang, and Roman Grynberg. 2002. Negotiating 
the Liberalization of the Temporary Movement of Natural Persons. Economics Discussion 
Paper 87, University of Sussex. 
Wolfrum, Rüdiger, Peter-Tobias Stoll, and Clemens Feinäugle. 2008. WTO - Trade in services, Max 




Woolcock, Stephen, and Jean Heilman Grier. 2015. "Public Procurement in the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership Negotiations."  CEPS Special Report (No. 100). 
Worster, William Thomas. 2006. "Conflicts Between United States Immigration Law and the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services: Most-Favored Nation Obligation."  The Texas 
International Law Journal 42 (1): 55-117. 
WTO. 1998. Presence of Natural Persons (Mode 4), Background Note by the Secretariat, Council 
for Trade in Services, WTO Doc. S/C/W/75 of 8 December 1998. 
WTO. 2000. Synopsis of "systemic" issues related to regional trade agreements, Note by the 
Secretariat, Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, WTO Doc. WT/REG/W/37 of 2 
March 2000. 
WTO. 2009. Presence of Natural Persons (Mode 4), Background Note by the Secretariat, WTO 
Doc. S/C/W/301 of 15 September 2009. 
WTO. 2011. World Trade Report 2011 - The WTO and preferential trade agreements: From co-
existence to coherence. Edited by WTO. Geneva: WTO. 
WTO, and OECD. 2005. "Background Note on GATS Mode 4 and its Information Needs."  United 













Annex 1: Preferential trade agreements notified by the EU to the WTO 
Annex 2: The agreements reviewed in the empirical study 
Annex 3: The model review sheet (WTO’s Sectoral Classification List) 















































































































Goods FTA 09-Feb-12 GATT	Art.	
XXIV
14-May-12 In	Force




















































































































































































Goods FTA 27-Oct-72 GATT	Art.	
XXIV
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Services EIA 13-Sep-96 GATS	Art.	V 01-Jan-94 In	Force
ANNEX 2 
 





THE AGREEMENTS REVIEWED IN THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
 
EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement 2008 
Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, of the other part 
 
Official Journal of the European Union L 289 of 30 October 2008 
 
The CARIFORUM parties: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Surinam, Trinidad, Tobago, and the Dominican Republic. Haiti signed the agreement in December 




EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement 2011 
 
Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Korea 
 




EU-Central America Association Agreement 2013 
 
Agreement Establishing an Association between Central America, on the one hand, and the 
European Community and its Member States, on the other 
 
Official Journal of the European Union L 346 of 15 December 2012 
 
The Central America parties: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Panama. The trade pillar of the Association Agreement has been provisionally applied since 1st 
August 2013 with Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, since 1st October 2013 with Costa Rica and El 




EU-Georgia Association Agreement 2014 
 
Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community 
and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part 
 
Official Journal of the European Union L 261 of 30 August 2014 
 




THE MODEL REVIEW SHEET WITH ALL SUB-SECTORS INCLUDED (THE WTO 
SECRETARIAT’S SECTORAL CLASSIFICATION LIST W/120) 
 
ANNEX 3: MODEL REVIEW SHEET
NAME OF AGREEMENT
PARTIES
Type Bilateral Regional Number of EU Member State parties:
Development level of the non-EU partyDeveloped Developing
Signature In Force Notification
STATUS OF THE AGREEMENT
ELEMENTS RELATED TO NON-DISCRIMINATION Yes No Explanation
MFN
Standstill (prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures)
WIDER PROCESS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION Yes No Explanation
Progressive liberalization
Art. XXIV GATT agreement
Art. V bis GATS agreement
















OTHER ELEMENTS (related to services only) Yes No Explanation
Time frame for implementation
Ratchet clause (autonomous liberalization included)
Safeguards
Subsidies
Exceptions Art. XI XII XVI XIVbis Other
Compatibility clause (relationship to Art. V GATS)







Short term visitors for 
business purposes
SECTORS CPC MODE 1 MODE 2 MODE 3 MODE 4




a. Legal Services                                         861
b.
Accounting, auditing and 
bookeeping services           
862
c. Taxation Services                                      863
d. Architectural services 8671
e. Engineering services 8672
f. Integrated engineering services 8673
g.




h. Medical and dental services 9312
i. Veterinary services 932
j.






B. Computer and Related Services
a.
Consultancy services related 
to the  installation of 
computer hardware   
841
b. Software implementation services 842
c. Data processing services 843
d. Data base services 844
e. Other 845+849
C. Research and Development Services
a. R&D services on natural sciences 851
b.
R&D services on social 
sciences and humanities
852
c. Interdisciplinary R&D services 853
D. Real Estate Services
a. Involving own or leased property 821
b. On a fee or contract basis 822
E. Rental/Leasing Services without Operators
a. Relating to ships 83103
b. Relating to aircraft 83104









F. Other Business Services
a. Advertising services 871
b.
Market research and public 
opinion  polling services  
864
c. Management consulting service 865
d. Services related to man. consulting 866
e. Technical testing and analysis serv. 8676
f.
Services incidental to 
agriculture, hunting and 
forestry
881
g. Services incidental to fishing 882
h. Services incidental to mining 883+5115      
i.










Placement and supply 
services of personnel
872       
l. Investigation and security 873       
m.
Related scientific and 
technical consulting  
services
8675           
n.
Maintenance and repair of 
equipment (not including 
maritime vessels, aircraft  or 
other transport equipment)        
633+ 8861-
8866      
o. Building-cleaning services 874       
p. Photographic services 875       
q. Packaging services 876       
r. Printing, publishing 88442
s. Convention services 87909
t. Other 8790
2. COMMUNICATION SERVICES
A. Postal services 7511
B. Courier services 7512
C. Telecommunication services









d. Telex services 7523
e. Telegraph services 7522        
f. Facsimile services 7521+7529    
g. Private leased circuit services 7522+7523      
h. Electronic mail 7523
i. Voice mail 7523
j.
On-line information and 
data base retrieval
7523
k. Electronic data interchange (EDI) 7523
l.
Enhanced/value-added 
facsimile services, incl. 
store and forward, store and 
retrieve
7523
m. Code and protocol conversion n.a.       
n.







Motion picture and video 
tape production and 
distribution services
9611
b. Motion picture projection service 9612
c. Radio and television services 9613
d.
Radio and television 
transmission services
7524
e. Sound recording n.a.       
f. Other
E. Other
3. CONSTRUCTION AND RELATED ENGINEERING SERVICES 
A. General construction work for buildings 512
B.
General construction work f
or civil engineering 
513
C. Installation and assembly work 514+516
D. Building completion and finishing work 517
E. Other 511+515+518
4. DISTRIBUTION SERVICES    
A. Commission agents' services 621






5. EDUCATIONAL SERVICES                                          
A. Primary education services 921
B. Secondary education services 922
C. Higher education services 923
D. Adult education 924
E. Other education services 929
6. ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES                                   
A. Sewage services 9401
B. Refuse disposal services 9402








Life, accident and health 
insurance services
8121
b. Non-life insurance services 8129        
c. Reinsurance and retrocession 81299
d.
Services auxiliary to 
insurance (including broking 
and agency services)
8140
B. Banking and other financial services (excl. insurance)
a.
Acceptance of deposits and 




Lending of all types, incl., 
inter alia, consumer credit, 
mortgage credit, factoring 
and financing of commercial 
transaction
8113
c. Financial leasing 8112
d.
All payment and money 
transmission services
81339
e. Guarantees and commitments 81199
f.
Trading for own account or 
for account of customers, 
whether on an exchange, in 
an over-the-counter market 






Participation in issues of all 
kinds of securities
8132
h. Money broking 81339
i. Asset management 8119+
j.
Settlement and clearing 
services for financial assets
81339
k.
Advisory and other auxiliary 
financial services on all the 




Provision and transfer of 
financial information, and 
financial data processing 
and related software by 
providers of other financial 
8131
C. Other
8. HEALTH RELATED AND SOCIAL SERVICES
(other than those listed under 1.A.h-j.) 
A. Hospital services 9311
B.




C. Social Services 933
D. Other
9. TOURISM AND TRAVEL RELATED SERVICES
A.




Travel agencies and tour ope
rators services
7471
C. Tourist guides services 7472
D. Other
10. RECREATIONAL, CULTURAL AND SPORTING SERVICES
(other than audiovisual services)
A.
Entertainment services (incl. 
theatre, live bands and 
circus services)
9619
B. News agency services 962
C.
Libraries, archives, 









A. Maritime Transport Services  
a. Passenger transportation 7211
b. Freight transportation 7212
c. Rental of vessels with crew 7213
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
vessels
8868
e. Pushing and towing services 7214
f.






a. Passenger transportation 7221
b. Freight transportation 7222
c. Rental of vessels with crew 7223
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
vessels
8868
e. Pushing and towing services 7224
f.
Supporting services for 
internal waterway transport
745
C. Air Transport Services   
a. Passenger transportation 731
b. Freight transportation 732
c. Rental of aircraft with crew 734
d.




Supporting services for air 
transport
746
D. Space Transport 733
E. Rail Transport Services
a. Passenger transportation 7111
b. Freight transportation 7112
c. Pushing and towing services 7113
d.




Supporting services for rail 
transport services
743




b. Freight transportation 7123
c.













a. Transportation of fuels 7131
b.




Services auxiliary to all mod
es of transport
a. Cargo-handling services 741
b.








I. Other Transport Services





THE REVIEW SHEETS OF THE ANALYZED AGREEMENTS 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE EU-CARIFORUM EIA
NAME OF AGREEMENT Economic Partnership Agreement
PARTIES CARIFORUM states, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part 
Type Bilateral Regional Number of EU Member State parties: 27
x
Development level of the non-EU partyDeveloped Developing
x
Signature In Force Notification
STATUS OF THE AGREEMENT 15-Oct-08 Provisional 16-Oct-08 Haiti signed on 11-Dec-09, pending ratification. For the EU side, provisional application as from 29-Dec-08
ELEMENTS RELATED TO NON-DISCRIMINATION Yes No Explanation
MFN x Under Modes 1-3, subject to exceptions
Standstill (prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures) x Applies only to the CARIFORUM states with respect to Modes 1, 2 and 3
WIDER PROCESS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION Yes No Explanation
Progressive liberalization x
Art. XXIV GATT agreement x
Art. V bis GATS agreement x
Mode 3 relating also to goods x Establishment covers certain goods-related economic activities
Harmonization x
Mutual recognition x Services: non-binding, encourages relevant professional bodies to develop recommendations (Art. 85)
Domestic regulation discipline(s) x Financial services (Art. 105), concerning certain procedures (Art.87), regulatory bodies & authorities (Art. 93&95)
Regulatory cooperation x Regulatory dialogues only





Labour mobility (labour market access) x
Labour protection x Commitment to basic ILO conventions; upholding levels of protection in domestic legislation (Art. 193)
Consumer protection x
Environment x Upholding levels of protection in domestic legislation (Art. 188)
Cultural cooperation x
Sustainable development x Specifically in Art. 3
OTHER ELEMENTS (related to services only) Yes No Explanation
Time frame for implementation x Some EU states apply transitional periods for Mode 4 commitments for CSSs and IPs (expired in 2011 and 2014)
Ratchet clause (autonomous liberalization included) x
Safeguards x
Subsidies x
Exceptions GATS Art: XII XVI XIVbis
x x x
Compatibility clause (relationship to Art. V GATS) x
Categories of Mode 4 covered Yes No
Cat. 1 Key personnel x Includes business visitors (responsible for setting up a commercial presence) and intra-corporate transfers




Cat. 2 Independent professionals x
Short term visitors for 
business purposes x Endeavour to facilitate short-term business visits for specific purposes (Art. 84)
Business services sellers x Temporary entry and stay for a period of up to 90 days in any 12-month period  (Art. 82)
SECTORS CPC MODE 1 MODE 2 MODE 3 MODE 4: Cat. 1 Mode 4: Cat. 2
SC NT SC NT SC NT SC NT SC NT
AVERAGE FOR MODE 0,40 0,43 0,70 0,76 0,78 0,72 0,51 0,82 0,22 0,33
1. BUSINESS SERVICES 0,72 0,71 0,94 0,93 0,95 0,92 0,44 0,54 0,51 0,31
A. Professional Services 0,51 0,44 1,00 0,95 0,97 0,85 1,00 0,66 0,73 0,31
a. Legal Services                                         861 1,00 0,48 1,00 0,48 1,00 0,81 1,00 0,44 0,00
b.
Accounting, auditing and 
bookeeping services           
862 0,33 0,22 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,70 1,00 0,74 0,00
c. Taxation Services                                      863 0,85 0,78 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 1,00 0,85 1,00 0,44
d. Architectural services 8671 0,56 0,56 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 1,00 0,81 1,00 0,48
e. Engineering services 8672 0,70 0,70 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,81 1,00 0,52
f. Integrated engineering services 8673 0,70 0,70 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,81 1,00 0,52
g.
Urban planning and 
landscape architectural 
services 
8674 0,56 0,56 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 1,00 0,81 1,00 0,48
h. Medical and dental services 9312 0,22 0,22 1,00 1,00 0,89 0,70 1,00 0,41 0,67 0,04
i. Veterinary services 932 0,15 0,15 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,89 1,00 0,52 0,78 0,00
j.




93191 0,04 0,04 1,00 1,00 0,85 0,70 1,00 0,41 0,81 0,00
k. Other
B. Computer and Related Services 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,44
C. Research and Development Services 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
D. Real Estate Services 0,52 0,52 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,72 0,00
a. Involving own or leased property 821 0,52 0,52 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,74 0,00
b. On a fee or contract basis 822 0,52 0,52 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,70 0,00
E. Rental/Leasing Services without Operators 0,59 0,58 0,75 0,75 0,83 0,82 0,20 0,00 0,00
a. Relating to ships 83103 0,78 0,78 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 0,00 0,00
b. Relating to aircraft 83104 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
c. Relating to other transport equipment
83101+ 
83102+
0,70 0,70 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
d.




0,70 0,70 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
e. Other 832 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,15 0,15 1,00 0,00 0,00
F. Other Business Services 0,72 0,72 0,88 0,88 0,87 0,86 0,42 0,79 0,36 0,49
a. Advertising services 871 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,52
b.
Market research and public 
opinion  polling services  
864 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,89 0,33
c. Management consulting service 865 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,52
d. Services related to man. consulting 866 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,00 1,00 0,52
e. Technical testing and analysis serv. 8676 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 1,00 0,52
f.
Services incidental to 
agriculture, hunting and 
forestry
881 0,81 0,81 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,00
g. Services incidental to fishing 882 0,85 0,85 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
h. Services incidental to mining 883+5115      1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
i.





1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
j.
Services incidental to energy 
distribution
887 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,04 0,04 0,00 0,00
k.
Placement and supply 
services of personnel
872       0,04 0,04 0,11 0,11 0,44 0,37 0,00 0,00
l. Investigation and security 873       0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,19 0,19 0,00 0,00
m.
Related scientific and 
technical consulting  
services
8675           0,33 0,33 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,96 1,00 0,81 0,93 0,44
n.
Maintenance and repair of 
equipment (not including 
maritime vessels, aircraft  or 
other transport equipment)        
633+ 8861-
8866      
1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,56
o. Building-cleaning services 874       0,07 0,07 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,78 0,00
p. Photographic services 875       0,81 0,81 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 0,00
q. Packaging services 876       1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
r. Printing, publishing 88442 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,89 1,00 0,96 0,00
s. Convention services 87909 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,00
t. Other 8790
2. COMMUNICATION SERVICES 0,75 1,00 0,75 1,00 0,75 1,00 0,00 0,00
A. Postal services 7511 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
B. Courier services 7512 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
C. Telecommunication services 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
D. Audiovisual services 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
3. CONSTRUCTION AND RELATED ENGINEERING SERVICES 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,93 0,00
4. DISTRIBUTION SERVICES    0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,94 0,88 0,25 0,96 0,00
A. Commission agents' services 621 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00




0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,85 0,59 1,00 0,96 0,00
D. Franchising 8929 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
E. Other
5. EDUCATIONAL SERVICES                                          0,56 0,56 0,61 0,61 0,55 0,01 0,60 0,86 0,00
A. Primary education services 921 0,67 0,67 0,78 0,78 0,67 0,00 1,00 0,89 0,00
B. Secondary education services 922 0,67 0,67 0,78 0,78 0,67 0,00 1,00 0,85 0,00
C. Higher education services 923 0,59 0,59 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,00 1,00 0,85 0,00
D. Adult education 924 0,78 0,78 0,78 0,78 0,67 0,00 0,00 0,00
E. Other education services 929 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,00 0,00
6. ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES                                   0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,52
7. FINANCIAL SERVICES 0,02 0,02 0,50 0,50 0,98 0,57 1,00 0,81 0,00
A.
All insurance and insurance-
related services
812 0,04 0,04 0,07 0,07 1,00 0,63 1,00 0,81 0,00
B. Banking and other financial services (excl. insurance) 0,00 0,00 0,93 0,93 0,96 0,52 1,00 0,81 0,00
8. HEALTH RELATED AND SOCIAL SERVICES 0,04 0,06 0,65 0,98 0,32 0,48 0,67 0,89 0,00
(other than those listed under 1.A.h-j.) 
A. Hospital services 9311 0,04 0,04 1,00 1,00 0,48 0,48 1,00 0,89 0,00
B.




0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
C. Social Services 933 0,07 0,07 0,96 0,96 0,48 0,48 1,00 0,89 0,00
D. Other
9. TOURISM AND TRAVEL RELATED SERVICES 0,56 0,56 1,00 1,00 0,99 0,95 1,00 0,83 0,59 0,28
A.
Hotels and restaurants (incl. 
catering)
641-643 0,11 0,11 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 1,00 0,96 0,00
B.
Travel agencies and tour ope
rators services
7471 0,93 0,93 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,93 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,52
C. Tourist guides services 7472 0,63 0,63 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,56 0,81 0,04
D. Other
10. RECREATIONAL, CULTURAL AND SPORTING SERVICES 0,44 0,44 0,58 0,58 0,56 0,54 0,25 0,96 0,24 0,00
(other than audiovisual services)
A.
Entertainment services (incl. 
theatre, live bands and 
circus services)
9619 0,07 0,07 0,56 0,56 0,59 0,59 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,00
B. News agency services 962 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,00 0,00
C.
Libraries, archives, 
museums and other cultural 
services
963 0,04 0,04 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00
D. 
Sporting and other 
recreational services
964 0,63 0,63 0,70 0,70 0,59 0,59 0,00 0,00
E. Other
11. TRANSPORT SERVICES 0,34 0,40 0,71 0,79 0,50 0,62 0,35 0,64 0,10 0,53
A. Maritime Transport Services  0,66 0,45 1,00 0,79 0,20 0,20 1,00 0,62 0,20 0,52
a. Passenger transportation 7211 1,00 0,37 1,00 0,37 0,04 0,04 1,00 0,93 0,00
b. Freight transportation 7212 1,00 0,37 1,00 0,37 0,04 0,04 1,00 0,93
c. Rental of vessels with crew 7213 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,04 0,04 1,00 0,89 0,00
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
vessels
8868 0,26 0,26 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,52
e. Pushing and towing services 7214 0,70 0,70 1,00 1,00 0,04 0,04 1,00 0,00 0,00
f.
Supporting services for 
maritime transport




0,43 0,41 0,69 0,67 0,20 0,20 0,33 0,00 0,00
a. Passenger transportation 7221 0,56 0,52 0,56 0,52 0,04 0,04 0,00 0,00
b. Freight transportation 7222 0,56 0,52 0,56 0,52 0,04 0,04 0,00 0,00
c. Rental of vessels with crew 7223 0,44 0,44 1,00 1,00 0,04 0,04 0,00 0,00
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
vessels
8868 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
e. Pushing and towing services 7224 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,04 0,04 1,00 0,00 0,00
f.
Supporting services for 
internal waterway transport
745 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,04 0,04 1,00 0,00 0,00
C. Air Transport Services   0,24 0,60 0,40 1,00 0,39 0,98 0,00 0,20 0,56
a. Passenger transportation 731 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
b. Freight transportation 732 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
c. Rental of aircraft with crew 734 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,00 0,00
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
aircraft
8868 0,19 0,19 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,56
e.
Supporting services for air 
transport
746 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
D. Space Transport 733 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
E. Rail Transport Services 0,21 0,21 0,80 0,80 0,96 0,94 0,20 0,96 0,20 0,56
a. Passenger transportation 7111 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,00 0,00
b. Freight transportation 7112 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,00 0,00
c. Pushing and towing services 7113 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,96 0,93 0,00 0,00
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
rail transport equipment
8868 0,07 0,07 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,93 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,56
e.
Supporting services for rail 
transport services
743 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,93 0,00 0,00
F. Road Transport Services 0,50 0,50 1,00 1,00 0,78 0,68 0,80 0,66 0,20 0,48
a. Passenger transportation 7121+7122 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,85 0,00
b. Freight transportation 7123 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,74 1,00 0,89 0,00
c.
Rental of commercial 
vehicles with operator
7124 0,48 0,48 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,85 1,00 0,89 0,00
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
road transport equipment
6112+8867 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,48
e.
Supporting services for road 
transport services
744 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,85 0,00 0,00
G. Pipeline Transport 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,07 0,54 0,52 0,50 0,96 0,00
a. Transportation of fuels 7131 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,00 0,00
b.
Transportation of other 
goods
7139 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,07 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,96 0,00
H.
Services auxiliary to all mod
es of transport
0,65 0,65 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,85 0,00 0,00
a. Cargo-handling services 741 0,07 0,07 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,85 0,00 0,00
b.
Storage and warehouse 
services
742 0,89 0,89 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,85 0,00 0,00
c.
Freight transport agency 
services
748 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,85 0,00 0,00
d. Other 749
EU-Central America EIA
NAME OF AGREEMENT Association Agreement
PARTIES Central America, on the on hand, and the European Union and its Member States, on the other
Type Bilateral Regional Number of EU Member State parties: 27
x
Development level of the non-EU party Developed Developing
x
Signature In Force Notification
STATUS OF THE AGREEMENT 29-Jun-12 Provisional 26-Feb-13 Provisional application since Aug-Dec-13 depending on the partner
ELEMENTS RELATED TO NON-DISCRIMINATION Yes No Explanation
MFN x A MFN clause only in relation to intellectual property
Standstill (prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures) x
WIDER PROCESS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION Yes No Explanation
Progressive liberalization x
Art. XXIV GATT agreement x
Art. V bis GATS agreement x
Mode 3 relating also to goods x Certain non-service sectors covered under Mode 3 (Establishment)
Harmonization x
Mutual recognition x Services: non-binding, encourages relevant professional bodies to develop recommendations







Labour mobility (labour market access) x
Labour protection x Commitment to basic ILO treaties; upholding levels of protection in domestic legislation (Art.291)
Consumer protection x
Environment x Reaffirming commitment to multilateral environmental agreements; upholding levels of protection
Cultural cooperation x
Sustainable development x Specifically in Art. 284
OTHER ELEMENTS (related to services only) Yes No Explanation
Time frame for implementation x No phase-out periods on the EU side in services
Ratchet clause (autonomous liberalization included) x
Safeguards x
Subsidies x Only the possibility to exchange information upon request (Art. 344)
Exceptions GATS Art: XII XVI XIVbis
x x
Compatibility clause (relationship to Art. V GATS) x
Categories of Mode 4 covered Yes No
Key personnel x Incl. business visitors responsible for setting up an establishment and intra-corporate transferees
Graduate trainees x
Business service sellers x No sector specific commit's, Art.175: entry/stay for a period up to 90 days in any 12-month period
Contractual service 
suppliers x Both parties reaffirm obligations resulting from their GATS commitments.
Independent professionals x The same as for contractual service suppliers
Short term visitors for 
business purposes
x
SECTORS CPC MODE 1 MODE 2 MODE 3 MODE 4
SC NT SC NT SC NT SC NT
AVERAGE FOR MODE 0,41 0,44 0,77 0,83 0,77 0,67 0,51 0,84
1. BUSINESS SERVICES 0,72 0,71 0,98 0,97 0,95 0,89 0,44 0,54
A. Professional Services 0,51 0,44 1,00 0,94 0,97 0,85 1,00 0,67
a. Legal Services                                         861 1,00 0,44 1,00 0,44 1,00 0,81 1,00 0,37
b.
Accounting, auditing and 
bookeeping services           
862 0,33 0,22 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,74 1,00 0,78
c. Taxation Services                                      863 0,85 0,78 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 1,00 0,85
d. Architectural services 8671 0,56 0,56 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 1,00 0,81
e. Engineering services 8672 0,70 0,70 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,81
f. Integrated engineering services 8673 0,70 0,70 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,81
g.
Urban planning and 
landscape architectural 
services 
8674 0,56 0,56 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 1,00 0,81
h. Medical and dental services 9312 0,22 0,22 1,00 1,00 0,89 0,70 1,00 0,41
i. Veterinary services 932 0,15 0,15 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,85 1,00 0,52
j.




93191 0,04 0,04 1,00 1,00 0,81 0,70 1,00 0,48
k. Other
B. Computer and Related Services 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
C. Research and Development Services 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
D. Real Estate Services 0,52 0,52 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,72
a. Involving own or leased property 821 0,52 0,52 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,74
b. On a fee or contract basis 822 0,52 0,52 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,70
E. Rental/Leasing Services without Operators 0,59 0,59 1,00 1,00 0,83 0,62 0,20 0,00
a. Relating to ships 83103 0,78 0,78 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 0,00
b. Relating to aircraft 83104 0,67 0,67 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
c. Relating to other transport equipment
83101+ 
83102+
0,70 0,70 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
d.




0,70 0,70 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
e. Other 832 0,07 0,07 1,00 1,00 0,15 0,15 1,00 0,00
F. Other Business Services 0,72 0,72 0,89 0,89 0,88 0,87 0,42 0,79
a. Advertising services 871 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
b.
Market research and public 
opinion  polling services  
864 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
c. Management consulting service 865 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
d. Services related to man. consulting 866 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,00
e. Technical testing and analysis serv. 8676 0,67 0,67 0,70 0,70 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93
f.
Services incidental to 
agriculture, hunting and 
forestry
881 0,81 0,81 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
g. Services incidental to fishing 882 0,85 0,85 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
h. Services incidental to mining 883+5115      1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96
i.





1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
j.
Services incidental to energy 
distribution
887 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,07 0,07 0,00
k.
Placement and supply 
services of personnel
872       0,04 0,04 0,11 0,11 0,41 0,37 0,00
l. Investigation and security 873       0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,19 0,19 0,00
m.
Related scientific and 
technical consulting  
services
8675           0,33 0,33 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,81
n.
Maintenance and repair of 
equipment (not including 
maritime vessels, aircraft  or 
other transport equipment)        
633+ 8861-
8866      
1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
o. Building-cleaning services 874       0,07 0,07 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,78
p. Photographic services 875       0,81 0,81 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93
q. Packaging services 876       1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
r. Printing, publishing 88442 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,89 1,00 0,96
s. Convention services 87909 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96
t. Other 8790
2. COMMUNICATION SERVICES 0,75 1,00 0,75 1,00 0,75 1,00 0,00
A. Postal services 7511 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
B. Courier services 7512 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
C. Telecommunication services 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
D. Audiovisual services 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
3. CONSTRUCTION AND RELATED ENGINEERING SERVICES 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96
4. DISTRIBUTION SERVICES    0,17 0,17 0,75 0,75 0,92 0,86 0,25 0,96
A. Commission agents' services 621 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,93 0,93 0,00




0,22 0,22 1,00 1,00 0,85 0,63 1,00 0,96
D. Franchising 8929 0,22 0,22 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
E. Other
5. EDUCATIONAL SERVICES                                          0,56 0,56 0,61 0,61 0,46 0,33 0,60 0,85
A. Primary education services 921 0,67 0,67 0,78 0,78 0,56 0,41 1,00 0,89
B. Secondary education services 922 0,67 0,67 0,78 0,78 0,56 0,41 1,00 0,85
C. Higher education services 923 0,59 0,59 0,67 0,67 0,56 0,41 1,00 0,81
D. Adult education 924 0,78 0,78 0,78 0,78 0,56 0,41 0,00
E. Other education services 929 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,00 0,00
6. ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES                                   0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
7. FINANCIAL SERVICES 0,00 0,00 0,54 0,54 0,98 0,28 1,00 0,81
A.
All insurance and insurance-
related services
812 0,00 0,00 0,11 0,11 1,00 0,56 1,00 0,81
B. Banking and other financial services (excl. insurance) 0,00 0,00 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,00 1,00 0,81
8. HEALTH RELATED AND SOCIAL SERVICES 0,04 0,06 0,65 0,98 0,32 0,00 0,67 0,89
(other than those listed under 1.A.h-j.) 
A. Hospital services 9311 0,04 0,04 1,00 1,00 0,48 0,00 1,00 0,89
B.




0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
C. Social Services 933 0,07 0,07 0,96 0,96 0,48 0,00 1,00 0,89
D. Other
9. TOURISM AND TRAVEL RELATED SERVICES 0,56 0,56 1,00 1,00 0,99 0,95 1,00 0,83
A.
Hotels and restaurants (incl. 
catering)
641-643 0,11 0,11 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 1,00 0,96
B.
Travel agencies and tour ope
rators services
7471 0,93 0,93 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,93 1,00 0,96
C. Tourist guides services 7472 0,63 0,63 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,56
D. Other
10. RECREATIONAL, CULTURAL AND SPORTING SERVICES 0,44 0,44 0,59 0,59 0,55 0,55 0,25 0,96
(other than audiovisual services)
A.
Entertainment services (incl. 
theatre, live bands and 
circus services)
9619 0,07 0,07 0,59 0,59 0,59 0,59 1,00 0,96
B. News agency services 962 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,00
C.
Libraries, archives, 
museums and other cultural 
services
963 0,04 0,04 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,00
D. 
Sporting and other 
recreational services
964 0,63 0,63 0,70 0,70 0,59 0,59 0,00
E. Other
11. TRANSPORT SERVICES 0,28 0,38 0,57 0,74 0,54 0,56 0,42 0,80
A. Maritime Transport Services  0,41 0,41 0,79 0,79 0,34 0,34 1,00 0,30
a. Passenger transportation 7211 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
b. Freight transportation 7212 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
c. Rental of vessels with crew 7213 0,48 0,48 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,96 1,00 0,85
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
vessels
8868 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96
e. Pushing and towing services 7214 0,26 0,26 1,00 1,00 0,04 0,04 1,00 0,00
f.
Supporting services for 
maritime transport




0,58 0,58 0,67 0,67 0,34 0,34 0,50 0,96
a. Passenger transportation 7221 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,04 0,04 0,00
b. Freight transportation 7222 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,04 0,04 0,00
c. Rental of vessels with crew 7223 0,44 0,44 1,00 1,00 0,89 0,89 0,00
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
vessels
8868 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96
e. Pushing and towing services 7224 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,04 0,04 1,00 0,00
f.
Supporting services for 
internal waterway transport
745 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,04 0,04 1,00 0,00
C. Air Transport Services   0,20 0,56 0,40 1,00 0,40 0,50 0,00
a. Passenger transportation 731 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
b. Freight transportation 732 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
c. Rental of aircraft with crew 734 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
aircraft
8868 0,19 0,12 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
e.
Supporting services for air 
transport
746 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
D. Space Transport 733 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
E. Rail Transport Services 0,21 0,21 1,00 1,00 0,95 0,95 0,20 0,96
a. Passenger transportation 7111 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,00
b. Freight transportation 7112 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,00
c. Pushing and towing services 7113 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,00
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
rail transport equipment
8868 0,07 0,07 1,00 1,00 0,93 0,93 1,00 0,96
e.
Supporting services for rail 
transport services
743 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 0,93 0,00
F. Road Transport Services 0,50 0,50 1,00 1,00 0,78 0,69 0,80 0,66
a. Passenger transportation 7121+7122 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,85
b. Freight transportation 7123 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,67 1,00 0,89
c.
Rental of commercial 
vehicles with operator
7124 0,48 0,48 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,89 1,00 0,89
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
road transport equipment
6112+8867 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,00
e.
Supporting services for road 
transport services
744 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,93 0,00
G. Pipeline Transport 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,07 0,54 0,52 0,50 0,96
a. Transportation of fuels 7131 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,00
b.
Transportation of other 
goods
7139 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,07 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,96
H.
Services auxiliary to all mod
es of transport
0,37 0,37 0,67 0,67 0,95 0,59 0,33 0,96
a. Cargo-handling services 741 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,96 0,00 0,00
b.
Storage and warehouse 
services
742 0,11 0,11 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,89 1,00 0,96
c.
Freight transport agency 
services
748 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 0,89 0,00
d. Other 749
ANALYSIS OF THE EU-GEORGIA EIA
NAME OF AGREEMENT Association Agreement
PARTIES The European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part 
Type Bilateral Regional Number of EU Member State parties:28
x
Development level of the non-EU partyDeveloped Developing
x
Signature In Force Notification
STATUS OF THE AGREEMENT 27-Jun-14 01-Jul-16 02-Jul-14
ELEMENTS RELATED TO NON-DISCRIMINATION Yes No Explanation
MFN x MFN limited to establishment (Art. 79(1) and 79(2), subject to reservations in Annex XIV-A and XIV-E)
Standstill (prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures) x Limited to establishment (Art. 79(3))
WIDER PROCESS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION Yes No Explanation
Progressive liberalization x Establishment (Art. 80) and Cross-border supply of services (Art. 87)
Art. XXIV GATT agreement x
Art. V bis GATS agreement x
Mode 3 relating also to goods x
Harmonization x Georgia under obligation to approximate a significant part of its trade-relevant legislation with the EU's
Mutual recognition x Services: non-binding, encourages relevant professional bodies to develop recommendations
Domestic regulation discipline(s) x Articles 93-95 set out disciplines on domestic regulation as affecting trade in services
Regulatory cooperation x
Transparency x Generally and also more specifically in the field of services
Intellectual property x
Public procurement x Gradual approximation of the public procurement legislation of Georgia with the EU's acquis 
Competition policy x
Investment protection x
Labour mobility (labour market access) x
Labour protection x Commitment to basic ILO conventions, upholding their level of protection
Consumer protection x Georgia undertakes to approximate its consumer protection laws to the EU legislation
Environment x Cooperation on trade-related environmental issues & commitment to implement existing multilateral agreements
Cultural cooperation x
Sustainable development x Reaffirming commitment to sustainable development
OTHER ELEMENTS (related to services only) Yes No Explanation
Time frame for implementation x Full implementation to be attained through gradual legislative approximation with EU laws
Ratchet clause (autonomous liberalization included) x
Safeguards x
Subsidies x A transparency and information obligation under Art. 206
Exceptions x GATS Art: XII XVI XIVbis
x x x
Compatibility clause (relationship to Art. V GATS) x
Categories of Mode 4 covered Yes No
Cat. 1 Key personnel x Includes business visitors for establishment purposes and intra-corporate transferees
Cat. 1 Graduate trainees x




Cat. 2 Independent professionals x
Short term visitors for 
business purposes
x
SECTORS CPC MODE 1 MODE 2 MODE 3 MODE 4 Cat. 1 Mode 4 Cat. 2
SC NT SC NT SC NT SC NT SC NT
AVERAGE FOR MODE 0,44 0,46 0,77 0,83 0,93 0,74 0,50 0,84 0,19 0,40
1. BUSINESS SERVICES 0,73 0,72 0,95 0,94 1,00 0,90 0,44 0,57 0,46 0,49
A. Professional Services 0,54 0,45 1,00 0,95 1,00 0,79 0,99 0,66 0,59 0,43
a. Legal Services                                         861 0,96 0,50 1,00 0,54 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,39 1,00 0,39
b.
Accounting, auditing and 
bookeeping services           
862 0,36 0,25 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,68 1,00 0,71 0,00
c. Taxation Services                                      863 0,86 0,79 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,86 0,93 0,46
d. Architectural services 8671 0,68 0,54 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,89 1,00 0,79 1,00 0,43
e. Engineering services 8672 0,75 0,71 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 1,00 0,75 1,00 0,43
f. Integrated engineering services 8673 0,75 0,71 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 1,00 0,75 1,00 0,43
g.
Urban planning and 
landscape architectural 
services 
8674 0,61 0,54 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,89 1,00 0,79 1,00 0,43
h. Medical and dental services 9312 0,21 0,21 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,86 1,00 0,46 0,00
i. Veterinary services 932 0,21 0,21 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,82 1,00 0,64 0,00
j.




93191 0,04 0,04 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 0,93 0,43 0,00
k. Other
B. Computer and Related Services 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,96 1,00
C. Research and Development Services 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,93 0,00
D. Real Estate Services 0,52 0,52 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,73 0,00
a. Involving own or leased property 821 0,50 0,50 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,75 0,00
b. On a fee or contract basis 822 0,54 0,54 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,71 0,00
E. Rental/Leasing Services without Operators 0,61 0,61 0,77 0,77 1,00 0,79 0,20 0,00 0,00
a. Relating to ships 83103 0,79 0,79 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 0,00 0,00
b. Relating to aircraft 83104 0,68 0,68 0,71 0,71 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
c. Relating to other transport equipment
83101+ 
83102+
0,71 0,71 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
d.




0,71 0,71 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
e. Other 832 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
F. Other Business Services 0,72 0,72 0,91 0,91 1,00 0,83 0,47 0,88 0,31 0,52
a. Advertising services 871 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,57
b.
Market research and public 
opinion  polling services  
864 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
c. Management consulting service 865 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,50
d. Services related to man. consulting 866 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,96 0,50
e. Technical testing and analysis services 8676 0,68 0,68 0,75 0,75 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,93 1,00 0,54
f.
Services incidental to 
agriculture, hunting and 
forestry
881 0,82 0,82 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,00
g. Services incidental to fishing 882 0,86 0,86 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
h. Services incidental to mining 883+5115      1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,00
i.




1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
j.
Services incidental to energy 
distribution
887 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,04 0,00 0,00
k.
Placement and supply 
services of personnel
872       0,04 0,04 0,50 0,50 1,00 0,07 0,00 0,00
l. Investigation and security 873       0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 1,00 0,07 0,00 0,00
m.
Related scientific and 
technical consulting  
services
8675           0,36 0,32 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,79 0,89 0,46
n.
Maintenance and repair of 
equipment (not including 
maritime vessels, aircraft  or 
other transport equipment)        
633+ 
8861-
8866      
1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,82 1,00 0,57
o. Building-cleaning services 874       0,07 0,07 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,75 0,00
p. Photographic services 875       0,79 0,79 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 1,00 0,86 0,00
q. Packaging services 876       1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
r. Printing, publishing 88442 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,86 1,00 0,89 0,00
s. Convention services 87909 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,00
t. Other 8790
2. COMMUNICATION SERVICES 0,75 1,00 0,75 1,00 0,75 1,00 0,00 0,00
A. Postal services 7511 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
B. Courier services 7512 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
C. Telecommunication services 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
D. Audiovisual services 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
3. CONSTRUCTION AND RELATED ENGINEERING SERVICES 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,00
4. DISTRIBUTION SERVICES    0,36 0,36 0,75 0,75 1,00 0,79 0,25 0,96 0,00
A. Commission agents' services 621 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,00 0,00




0,36 0,36 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,00
D. Franchising 8929 0,36 0,36 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
E. Other
5. EDUCATIONAL SERVICES                                          0,60 0,56 0,62 0,62 1,00 0,72 0,60 0,86 0,00
A. Primary education services 921 0,71 0,64 0,75 0,75 1,00 0,86 1,00 0,89 0,00
B. Secondary education services 922 0,71 0,64 0,79 0,79 1,00 0,86 1,00 0,86 0,00
C. Higher education services 923 0,68 0,61 0,68 0,68 1,00 0,89 1,00 0,82 0,00
D. Adult education 924 0,79 0,79 0,79 0,79 1,00 0,89 0,00 0,00
E. Other education services 929 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11 1,00 0,11 0,00 0,00
6. ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES                                   0,10 0,10 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,54
A. Sewage services 9401 0,11 0,11 1,00 1,00 0,00
B. Refuse disposal services 9402 0,07 0,07 1,00 1,00 0,00
C. Sanitation and similar services 9403 0,11 0,11 1,00 1,00 0,00
D. Other
7. FINANCIAL SERVICES 0,00 0,00 0,52 0,52 1,00 0,54 1,00 0,79 0,00
A.
All insurance and insurance-
related services
812 0,00 0,00 0,11 0,11 1,00 0,54 1,00 0,79 0,00
B. Banking and other financial services (excl. insurance) 0,00 0,00 0,93 0,93 1,00 0,54 1,00 0,79 0,00
8. HEALTH RELATED AND SOCIAL SERVICES 0,04 0,06 0,65 0,98 0,67 0,75 0,67 0,89 0,00
(other than those listed under 1.A.h-j.) 
A. Hospital services 9311 0,04 0,04 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,89 0,00
B.




0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
C. Social Services 933 0,07 0,07 0,96 0,96 1,00 0,54 1,00 0,89 0,00
D. Other
9. TOURISM AND TRAVEL RELATED SERVICES 0,56 0,56 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,90 1,00 0,80 0,26 0,43
A.
Hotels and restaurants (incl. 
catering)
641-643 0,11 0,11 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,93 0,00
B.
Travel agencies and tour ope
rators services
7471 0,93 0,93 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 0,79 0,43
C. Tourist guides services 7472 0,64 0,64 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,75 1,00 0,54 0,00
D. Other
10. RECREATIONAL, CULTURAL AND SPORTING SERVICES 0,43 0,43 0,62 0,62 1,00 0,70 0,25 0,96 0,22 0,00
(other than audiovisual services)
A.
Entertainment services (incl. 
theatre, live bands and 
circus services)
9619 0,07 0,07 0,68 0,68 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,89 0,00
B. News agency services 962 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,00 0,00
C.
Libraries, archives, 
museums and other cultural 
services
963 0,04 0,04 0,07 0,07 1,00 0,86 0,00 0,00
D. 
Sporting and other 
recreational services
964 0,61 0,61 0,71 0,71 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
E. Other
11. TRANSPORT SERVICES 0,27 0,29 0,60 0,70 0,80 0,86 0,31 0,79 0,12 0,54
A. Maritime Transport Services  0,46 0,46 0,82 0,82 1,00 0,67 1,00 0,62 0,19 0,54
a. Passenger transportation 7211 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
b. Freight transportation 7212 0,46 0,46 0,46 0,46 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00
c. Rental of vessels with crew 7213 0,50 0,50 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,89 0,00
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
vessels
8868 0,43 0,43 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,54
e. Pushing and towing services 7214 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,89 0,00
f.
Supporting services for 
maritime transport




0,43 0,42 0,71 0,70 1,00 0,96 0,17 0,96 0,16 0,54
a. Passenger transportation 7221 0,54 0,50 0,61 0,57 1,00 0,89 0,00 0,00
b. Freight transportation 7222 0,54 0,50 0,61 0,57 1,00 0,89 0,00 0,00
c. Rental of vessels with crew 7223 0,43 0,43 0,96 0,96 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
vessels
8868 0,14 0,14 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,54
e. Pushing and towing services 7224 0,00 0,00 0,11 0,11 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
f.
Supporting services for 
internal waterway transport
745 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
C. Air Transport Services   0,24 0,09 0,40 0,50 0,40 1,00 0,00 0,19 0,57
a. Passenger transportation 731 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
b. Freight transportation 732 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
c. Rental of aircraft with crew 734 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
aircraft
8868 0,18 0,18 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,96 0,57
e.
Supporting services for air 
transport
746 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
D. Space Transport 733 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
E. Rail Transport Services 0,21 0,21 0,80 0,80 1,00 0,98 0,00 0,19 0,57
a. Passenger transportation 7111 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,00 0,00
b. Freight transportation 7112 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,00 0,00
c. Pushing and towing services 7113 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,96 0,00 0,00
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
rail transport equipment
8868 0,07 0,07 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,96 0,57
e.
Supporting services for rail 
transport services
743 0,96 0,96 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00




0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,75 1,00 0,82 0,00
b. Freight transportation 7123 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,75 1,00 0,82 0,00
c.
Rental of commercial 
vehicles with operator
7124 0,46 0,46 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,89 0,00
d.




1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,96 0,50
e.
Supporting services for road 
transport services
744 0,96 0,96 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
G. Pipeline Transport 0,00 0,00 0,11 0,11 1,00 0,52 0,50 0,96 0,00
a. Transportation of fuels 7131 0,00 0,00 0,11 0,11 1,00 0,07 0,00 0,00
b.
Transportation of other 
goods
7139 0,00 0,00 0,11 0,11 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,96 0,00
H.
Services auxiliary to all mod
es of transport
0,36 0,36 0,99 0,99 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
a. Cargo-handling services 741 0,00 0,00 0,96 0,96 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
b.
Storage and warehouse 
services
742 0,11 0,11 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
c.
Freight transport agency 
services
748 0,96 0,96 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
d. Other 749
ANALYSIS OF THE EU-KOREA EIA
NAME OF AGREEMENT Free Trade Agreement
PARTIES The European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part
Type Bilateral Regional Number of EU Member State parties:27
x
Development level of non-EU party Developed Developing
x
Signature In Force Notification
STATUS OF THE AGREEMENT 06-Oct-10 01-Jul-11 07-Jul-11
ELEMENTS RELATED TO NON-DISCRIMINATION Yes No Explanation
MFN x Limited to Modes 1 and 2 (Art. 7.8) and Mode 3 (Art. 7.14), subject to exceptions
Standstill (prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures) x Only in relation to the scheduled commitments (Art. 7.7)
WIDER PROCESS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION Yes No Explanation
Progressive liberalization x
Art. XXIV GATT agreement x
Art. V bis GATS agreement x
Mode 3 relating also to goods x Regarding Modes 3 and 4, the EU has commitments also on certain non-service sectors
Harmonization x
Mutual recognition x Non-binding, encourages relevant bodies to develop recommendations + working group (Art.7.21)
Domestic regulation discipline(s) x Non-binding, procedural requirements & endeavour to ensure objective criteria in different measures
Regulatory cooperation x Bilateral regulatory cooperation through various committees and sectoral working groups
Transparency x Generally and also more specifically in the field of services
Intellectual property x
Public procurement x
Competition policy x Chapter 11: covers goods, services, establishment. Competitive safeguards in telecomm's services.
Investment protection x
Labour mobility (labour market access) x
Labour protection x Commitment to basic ILO conventions, upholding their level of protection
Consumer protection x
Environment x Reaffirming commitment to multilateral environmental agreements, upholding level of protection
Cultural cooperation x Non-binding protocol
Sustainable development x Non-binding: economic development, social development and environmental protection
OTHER ELEMENTS (related to services only) Yes No Explanation
Time frame for implementation x No phase-out periods on the EU side in services
Ratchet clause (autonomous liberalization included) x
Safeguards x
Subsidies x
Exceptions x GATS Art: XII XIV XIVbis
x x x
Compatibility clause (relationship to Art. V GATS) x Art. 1.1 of Chapter One ("Objectives")
Categories of Mode 4 covered Yes No
Key personnel x Includes business visitors responsible for setting up an establishment and intra-corporate transferees
Graduate trainees x
Business service sellers x Scheduled together with key personnel and graduate trainees
Contractual service 
suppliers x Reaffirm obligations resulting from GATS commitments. Further commit's depend on GATS results
Independent professionals x The same as for contractual service suppliers
Short term visitors for 
business purposes
x
SECTORS CPC MODE 1 MODE 2 MODE 3 MODE 4
SC NT SC NT SC NT SC NT
AVERAGE FOR MODE 0,44 0,46 0,73 0,79 0,80 0,79 0,48 0,84
1. BUSINESS SERVICES 0,72 0,71 0,94 0,93 0,93 0,90 0,42 0,55
A. Professional Services 0,51 0,45 1,00 0,95 0,93 0,81 1,00 0,73
a. Legal Services                                         861 1,00 0,48 1,00 0,48 1,00 0,81 1,00 0,37
b.
Accounting, auditing and 
bookeeping services           
862 0,33 0,22 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,67 1,00 0,96
c. Taxation Services                                      863 0,85 0,78 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 1,00 0,89
d. Architectural services 8671 0,56 0,56 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 1,00 0,81
e. Engineering services 8672 0,70 0,70 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,81
f. Integrated engineering services 8673 0,70 0,70 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,81
g.
Urban planning and 
landscape architectural 
services 
8674 0,56 0,56 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 1,00 0,81
h. Medical and dental services 9312 0,22 0,22 1,00 1,00 0,78 0,63 1,00 0,41
i. Veterinary services 932 0,19 0,19 1,00 1,00 0,81 0,70 1,00 0,67
j.




93191 0,04 0,04 1,00 1,00 0,74 0,63 1,00 0,74
k. Other
B. Computer and Related Services 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
C. Research and Development Services 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
D. Real Estate Services 0,52 0,52 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,72
a. Involving own or leased property 821 0,52 0,52 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,74
b. On a fee or contract basis 822 0,52 0,52 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,70
E. Rental/Leasing Services without Operators 0,59 0,59 0,76 0,76 0,79 0,77 0,20 0,00
a. Relating to ships 83103 0,78 0,78 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 0,00
b. Relating to aircraft 83104 0,67 0,67 0,70 0,70 0,00 0,00 0,00
c. Relating to other transport equipment
83101+ 
83102+
0,70 0,70 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
d.




0,70 0,70 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
e. Other 832 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,93 0,93 1,00 0,00
F. Other Business Services 0,72 0,72 0,88 0,88 0,85 0,84 0,32 0,77
a. Advertising services 871 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
b.
Market research and public 
opinion  polling services  
864 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
c. Management consulting service 865 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
d. Services related to man. consulting 866 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,00
e. Technical testing and analysis serv. 8676 0,67 0,67 0,70 0,70 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93
f.
Services incidental to 
agriculture, hunting and 
forestry
881 0,81 0,81 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
g. Services incidental to fishing 882 0,85 0,85 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
h. Services incidental to mining 883+5115      1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
i. Services incidental to manufacturing 884+885 (except for 88442)1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
j.
Services incidental to 
energy distribution
887 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,04 0,04 0,00
k.
Placement and supply 
services of Personnel
872       0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,00
l. Investigation and security 873       0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,15 0,11 0,00
m.
Related scientific and 
technical consulting  
services
8675           0,33 0,33 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,81
n.
Maintenance and repair of 
equipment (not including 
maritime vessels, aircraft  
or other transport 
equipment)        
633+ 8861-8866      1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
o. Building-cleaning services 874       0,07 0,07 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,78
p. Photographic services 875       0,81 0,81 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,93
q. Packaging services 876       1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
r. Printing, publishing 88442 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,85 1,00 0,96
s. Convention services 87909 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96
t. Other 8790
2. COMMUNICATION SERVICES 0,75 1,00 0,75 1,00 0,75 1,00 0,00
A. Postal services 7511 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
B. Courier services 7512 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
C. Telecommunication services 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
D. Audiovisual services 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
3. CONSTRUCTION AND RELATED ENGINEERING SERVICES 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96
4. DISTRIBUTION SERVICES    0,40 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,95 0,95 0,00
A. Commission agents' services 621 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11 1,00 1,00 0,00
B. Wholesale trade services 622 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11 1,00 1,00 0,00
C. Retailing services 631+632 6111+6113+61210,37 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,81 0,81 0,00
D. Franchising 8929 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
E. Other
5. EDUCATIONAL SERVICES                                          0,57 0,56 0,62 0,62 0,59 0,58 0,60 0,86
A. Primary education services 921 0,67 0,67 0,78 0,78 0,67 0,67 1,00 0,89
B. Secondary education services 922 0,67 0,67 0,78 0,78 0,67 0,67 1,00 0,85
C. Higher education services 923 0,67 0,59 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 1,00 0,85
D. Adult education 924 0,78 0,78 0,81 0,81 0,89 0,89 0,00
E. Other education services 929 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,00 0,00
6. ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES                                   0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
7. FINANCIAL SERVICES 0,04 0,04 0,52 0,52 1,00 0,30 1,00 0,81
A.
All insurance and insuranc
e-related services
812 0,07 0,07 0,11 0,11 1,00 0,59 1,00 0,81
B.
Banking and other financia
l services (excl. insurance)
0,00 0,00 0,93 0,93 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,81
8. HEALTH RELATED AND SOCIAL SERVICES 0,05 0,08 0,65 0,98 0,35 0,52 0,67 0,89
(other than those listed under 1.A.h-j.) 
A. Hospital services 9311 0,04 0,04 1,00 1,00 0,52 0,52 1,00 0,89
B.
Other Human Health 
Services
9319 (other than 93191)0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
C. Social Services 933 0,11 0,11 0,96 0,96 0,52 0,52 1,00 0,89
D. Other
9. TOURISM AND TRAVEL RELATED SERVICES 0,56 0,56 1,00 1,00 0,98 0,96 1,00 0,83
A.
Hotels and restaurants 
(incl. catering)
641-643 0,11 0,11 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,96
B.
Travel agencies and tour o
perators services
7471 0,93 0,93 1,00 1,00 0,93 0,93 1,00 0,96
C. Tourist guides services 7472 0,63 0,63 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,56
D. Other
10. RECREATIONAL, CULTURAL AND SPORTING SERVICES0,33 0,33 0,49 0,49 0,67 0,67 0,25 0,96
(other than audiovisual services)
A. Entertainment services 9619 0,07 0,07 0,56 0,56 0,59 0,59 1,00 0,96
B. News agency services 962 0,59 0,59 0,63 0,63 0,56 0,56 0,00
C.
Libraries, archives, 
museums and other 
cultural services
963 0,04 0,04 0,07 0,07 0,93 0,93 0,00
D. 
Sporting and other 
recreational services
964 0,63 0,63 0,70 0,70 0,59 0,59 0,00
E. Other




0,75 0,75 1,00 1,00 0,98 0,94 1,00 0,72
a. Passenger transportation 7211 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
b. Freight transportation 7212 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
c. Rental of vessels with crew 7213 0,48 0,48 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,89 1,00 0,78
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
vessels
8868 0,26 0,26 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96
e.
Pushing and towing 
services
7214 * * 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,89 1,00 0,78
f.
Supporting services for 
maritime transport




0,43 0,43 0,67 0,67 0,94 0,88 0,00
a. Passenger transportation 7221 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 1,00 0,96 0,00
b. Freight transportation 7222 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,96 0,89 0,00
c. Rental of vessels with crew 7223 0,44 0,44 1,00 1,00 0,89 0,81 0,00
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
vessels
8868 0,11 0,11 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
e.
Pushing and towing 
services
7224 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,89 0,81 0,00
f.
Supporting services for 
internal waterway transport
745 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,89 0,81 0,00
C. Air Transport Services   0,20 0,10 0,40 0,50 0,40 0,50 0,00
a. Passenger transportation 731 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
b. Freight transportation 732 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
c. Rental of aircraft with crew 734 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
aircraft
8868 0,19 0,19 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
e.
Supporting services for air 
transport
746 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
D. Space Transport 733 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
E. Rail Transport Services 0,21 0,21 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,94 0,20 0,96
a. Passenger transportation 7111 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,00
b. Freight transportation 7112 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,96 0,00
c.
Pushing and towing 
services
7113 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,93 0,00
d.
Maintenance and repair of 
rail transport equipment
8868 0,07 0,07 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,93 1,00 0,96
e.
Supporting services for rail 
transport services
743 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,93 0,00




0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,93 0,00 1,00 0,85
b. Freight transportation 7123 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,74 1,00 0,89
c.
Rental of commercial 
vehicles with operator
7124 0,48 0,46 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,85 1,00 1,00
d.




1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,00
e.
Supporting services for 
road transport services
744 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 0,85 0,00
G. Pipeline Transport 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,07 0,54 0,52 0,50 0,96
a. Transportation of fuels 7131 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,00
b.
Transportation of other 
goods
7139 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,07 1,00 0,96 1,00 0,96
H.
Services auxiliary to all mo
des of transport
1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,89 0,00
a. Cargo-handling services 741 * * 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,89 0,00
b.
Storage and warehouse 
services
742 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,89 0,00
c.
Freight transport agency 
services
748 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,89 0,00
d. Other 749
* Unbound due to lack of technical feasibility
